add courtlistener - sfeed_tests - sfeed tests and RSS and Atom files
(HTM) git clone git://git.codemadness.org/sfeed_tests
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(DIR) commit 2cb50935324273fd8dc51043aa923b18a0976240
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(HTM) Author: Hiltjo Posthuma <hiltjo@codemadness.org>
Date: Wed, 2 Oct 2024 10:03:47 +0200
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+<feed xml:lang="en-us" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><title>CourtListener.com: All opinions for the Supreme Court of the United States</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/" rel="alternate"/><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/feed/court/scotus/" rel="self"/><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/</id><updated>2024-08-16T00:00:00-07:00</updated><author><name>Free Law Project</name><email>feeds@courtlistener.com</email></author><rights>Created for the public domain by Free Law Project</rights><entry><title>Department of Education v. Louisiana</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10042853/department-of-education-v-louisiana/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-08-16T00:00:00-07:00</published><author><name>Supreme Court of the United States</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10042853/department-of-education-v-louisiana/</id><summary type="html">
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+ <p>Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024) 1 Per Curiam SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ No. 24A78 _________________ DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, ET AL. v. LOUISIANA, ET AL. ON APPLICATION FOR STAY _________________ No. 24A79 _________________ MIGUEL CARDONA, SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, ET AL. v. TENNESSEE, ET AL. ON APPLICATION FOR STAY [August 16, 2024] PER CURIAM. The application for a partial stay presented to JUSTICE ALITO in No. 24A78 and by him referred to the Court is denied. The application for a partial stay presented to JUSTICE KAVANAUGH in No. 24A79 and by him referred to the Court is denied. The Department of Education recently issued a new rule implementing Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. The rule newly defined sex discrimination to “includ[e ] discrimination on the basis of sex stereotypes, sex characteristics, pregnancy or related conditions, sexual orientation, and gender identity.” 89 Fed. Reg. 33886 (2024). Several States and other parties sought preliminary injunctions against the new rule, arguing among other things that the rule exceeded the bounds of the statutory text enacted by Congress. District Courts in Louisiana and Kentucky agreed with the plaintiffs and preliminarily enjoined enforcement of the rule in the plaintiff States. The 2 DEPARMENT OF EDUCATION v. LOUISIANA Per Curiam Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Sixth Circuits then declined to stay the injunctions in the interim period while those courts consider the Government’s appeals of the preliminary injunctions. The Government has now filed emergency applications in this Court seeking partial stays of the preliminary injunctions pending resolution of the appeals in the Fifth and Sixth Circuits. The Court denies the Government’s applications. Importantly, all Members of the Court today accept that the plaintiffs were entitled to preliminary injunctive relief as to three provisions of the rule, including the central provision that newly defines sex discrimination to include discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity. But the Government argues (and the dissent agrees) that those provisions should be severed and that the other provisions of the new rule should still be permitted to take effect in the interim period while the Government’s appeals of the preliminary injunctions are pending in the Courts of Appeals. The lower courts concluded otherwise because the new definition of sex discrimination is intertwined with and affects many other provisions of the new rule. Those courts therefore concluded, at least at this preliminary stage, that the allegedly unlawful provisions are not readily severable from the remaining provisions. The lower courts also pointed out the difficulty that schools would face in determining how to apply the rule for a temporary period with some provisions in effect and some enjoined. In this emergency posture in this Court, the burden is on the Government as applicant to show, among other things, a likelihood of success on its severability argument and that the equities favor a stay. On this limited record and in its emergency applications, the Government has not provided this Court a sufficient basis …</p><br>
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+ <a href="/opinion/10042853/department-of-education-v-louisiana/">Original document</a>
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+</summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/08/16/department_of_education_v._louisiana.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Precedential"/></entry><entry><title>Department of Education v. Louisiana</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10123092/department-of-education-v-louisiana/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-08-16T00:00:00-07:00</published><author><name>Supreme Court of the United States</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10123092/department-of-education-v-louisiana/</id><summary type="html">
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+ <p>Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024) 1 Per Curiam SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ No. 24A78 _________________ DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, ET AL. v. LOUISIANA, ET AL. ON APPLICATION FOR STAY _________________ No. 24A79 _________________ MIGUEL CARDONA, SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, ET AL. v. TENNESSEE, ET AL. ON APPLICATION FOR STAY [August 16, 2024] PER CURIAM. The application for a partial stay presented to JUSTICE ALITO in No. 24A78 and by him referred to the Court is denied. The application for a partial stay presented to JUSTICE KAVANAUGH in No. 24A79 and by him referred to the Court is denied. The Department of Education recently issued a new rule implementing Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. The rule newly defined sex discrimination to “includ[e ] discrimination on the basis of sex stereotypes, sex characteristics, pregnancy or related conditions, sexual orientation, and gender identity.” 89 Fed. Reg. 33886 (2024). Several States and other parties sought preliminary injunctions against the new rule, arguing among other things that the rule exceeded the bounds of the statutory text enacted by Congress. District Courts in Louisiana and Kentucky agreed with the plaintiffs and preliminarily enjoined enforcement of the rule in the plaintiff States. The 2 DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION v. LOUISIANA Per Curiam Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Sixth Circuits then declined to stay the injunctions in the interim period while those courts consider the Government’s appeals of the preliminary injunctions. The Government has now filed emergency applications in this Court seeking partial stays of the preliminary injunctions pending resolution of the appeals in the Fifth and Sixth Circuits. The Court denies the Government’s applications. Importantly, all Members of the Court today accept that the plaintiffs were entitled to preliminary injunctive relief as to three provisions of the rule, including the central provision that newly defines sex discrimination to include discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity. But the Government argues (and the dissent agrees) that those provisions should be severed and that the other provisions of the new rule should still be permitted to take effect in the interim period while the Government’s appeals of the preliminary injunctions are pending in the Courts of Appeals. The lower courts concluded otherwise because the new definition of sex discrimination is intertwined with and affects many other provisions of the new rule. Those courts therefore concluded, at least at this preliminary stage, that the allegedly unlawful provisions are not readily severable from the remaining provisions. The lower courts also pointed out the difficulty that schools would face in determining how to apply the rule for a temporary period with some provisions in effect and some enjoined. In this emergency posture in this Court, the burden is on the Government as applicant to show, among other things, a likelihood of success on its severability argument and that the equities favor a stay. On this limited record and in its emergency applications, the Government has not provided this Court a sufficient basis …</p><br>
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+ <a href="/opinion/10123092/department-of-education-v-louisiana/">Original document</a>
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+</summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/08/16/department_of_education_v._louisiana_1.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Precedential"/></entry><entry><title>Harrel v. Raoul</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/9987645/harrel-v-raoul/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-07-02T00:00:00-07:00</published><author><name>Supreme Court of the United States</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/9987645/harrel-v-raoul/</id><summary type="html">
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+ <p>Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024) 1 Statement of THOMAS, J. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES DANE HARREL, ET AL. 23–877 v. KWAME RAOUL, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ILLINOIS, ET AL. JAVIER HERRERA 23–878 v. KWAME RAOUL, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ILLINOIS, ET AL. CALEB BARNETT, ET AL. 23–879 v. KWAME RAOUL, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ILLINOIS, ET AL. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR GUN RIGHTS, ET AL. 23–880 v. CITY OF NAPERVILLE, ILLINOIS, ET AL. JEREMY W. LANGLEY, ET AL. 23–944 v. BRENDAN F. KELLY, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF THE ILLINOIS STATE POLICE, ET AL. GUN OWNERS OF AMERICA, INC., ET AL. 23–1010 v. KWAME RAOUL, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ILLINOIS, ET AL. ON PETITIONS FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT Nos. 23–877, 23–878, 23–879, 23–880, 23–944, 2 HARREL v. RAOUL Statement of THOMAS, J. and 23–1010. Decided July 2, 2024 The petitions for writs of certiorari are denied. JUSTICE ALITO would grant the petitions for writs of certiorari. Statement of JUSTICE THOMAS. The State of Illinois enacted a law that makes it a felony to possess what Illinois branded “assault weapons,” a term defined to include AR–15s. See Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 720, §5/24–1.9(a)(1)(J)(ii)(II) (West 2023). “The AR–15 is the most popular semi-automatic rifle” in America and is there- fore undeniably “in common use today.” Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F. 3d 1244, 1287 (CADC 2011) (KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting); see also Garland v. Cargill, 602 U. S. 406, 430–431 (2024) (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting) (describing “semiautomatic rifles” such as the AR–15 as “commonly available”). Petitioners sought a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the law, arguing that the law violates their Second Amendment right to “keep and bear Arms.” The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir- cuit rejected petitioners’ request for a preliminary injunc- tion, concluding “that the AR–15 . . . is not protected by the Second Amendment.” Bevis v. Naperville, 85 F. 4th 1175, 1197 (2023). According to the Seventh Circuit, the rifle se- lected by millions of Americans for self-defense and other lawful purposes does not even fall within the scope of the Arms referred to by the Second Amendment. Ibid. This Court is rightly wary of taking cases in an interlocutory pos- ture. But, I hope we will consider the important issues pre- sented by these petitions after the cases reach final judg- ment. We have never squarely addressed what types of weapons are “Arms” protected by the Second Amendment. To be sure, we explained in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570 (2008), that the Second Amendment’s protection “extends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at the Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024) 3 Statement of THOMAS, J. time of the founding.” Id., at 582. And, we noted that “the Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not typ- ically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful pur- poses,” id., at 625, …</p><br>
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+ <a href="/opinion/9987645/harrel-v-raoul/">Original document</a>
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+</summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/07/02/harrel_v._raoul.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Relating-to orders"/></entry><entry><title>Bassett v. Arizona</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/9987647/bassett-v-arizona/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-07-02T00:00:00-07:00</published><author><name>Supreme Court of the United States</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/9987647/bassett-v-arizona/</id><summary type="html">
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+ <p>Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024) 1 SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES LONNIE ALLEN BASSETT v. ARIZONA ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA No. 23–830. Decided July 2, 2024 The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE KAGAN and JUSTICE JACKSON join, dissenting from the denial of certio- rari. “[M]andatory life-without-parole sentences for juveniles violate the Eighth Amendment.” Miller v. Alabama, 567 U. S. 460, 470 (2012). Sentencing courts therefore must have “discretion to impose a lesser punishment” on children who commit crimes before they turn 18. Jones v. Missis- sippi, 593 U. S. 98, 100 (2021). An Arizona court sentenced Lonnie Allen Bassett to life without parole for a crime he committed as a juvenile. At the time Bassett was sen- tenced, however, Arizona courts had no discretion to impose parole-eligible sentences because the State had completely abolished parole for people convicted of felonies. The Arizona Supreme Court acknowledged that “Bassett was actually ineligible for parole.” State ex rel. Mitchell v. Cooper, 256 Ariz. 1, ___, 535 P. 3d 3, 8 (2023). Arizona also agrees that “parole-eligibility is constitutionally required,” and that “Arizona law did not provide a parole eligible op- tion at the time of Bassett’s sentencing.” Brief in Opposi- tion 1, 24. Nevertheless, the Arizona Supreme Court de- nied Bassett’s petition for postconviction relief. This Court’s precedents require a “discretionary sentenc- ing procedure—where the sentencer can consider the de- fendant’s youth and has discretion to impose a lesser sen- tence than life without parole.” Jones, 593 U. S., at 112. Because Arizona’s sentencing scheme instead mandated 2 BASSETT v. ARIZONA SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting life without parole for juveniles, I would grant the petition for certiorari and summarily reverse the judgment below. I In 2004, Lonnie Bassett shot and killed two people in Ar- izona when he was 16. He was riding in the back seat of a car driven by Frances Tapia when he used a shotgun to shoot Tapia and her boyfriend, who was sitting in the pas- senger seat. Bassett was convicted of two counts of first-degree mur- der. At the time he was sentenced, defendants convicted of first-degree murder in Arizona received one of two sen- tences: either (1) “natural life,” under which the defendant was “not eligible for commutation, parole, . . . or release from confinement on any basis;” or (2) “life,” which required a defendant to serve 25 years before “releas[e] on any ba- sis.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann., §13–703(A) (2003); see §§13– 703.01(A), 13–1105(C). Arizona abolished parole for people with felony convictions in 1994, however, and that re- mained the law until 2014. See §41–1604.09(I) (1994); §13– 716 (2014); §41–1604.09(I)(2) (1994). Therefore, for people with first-degree murder convictions, “the only ‘release’ available under Arizona law [wa]s executive clemency, not parole.” Cruz v. Arizona, 598 U. S. 17, 23 (2023). Although Arizona’s sentencing statute “continued to list two alterna- tives to death,” id., at …</p><br>
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+ <a href="/opinion/9987647/bassett-v-arizona/">Original document</a>
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+</summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/07/02/bassett_v._arizona.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Relating-to orders"/></entry><entry><title>Doe v. Snap</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/9987646/doe-v-snap/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-07-02T00:00:00-07:00</published><author><name>Supreme Court of the United States</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/9987646/doe-v-snap/</id><summary type="html">
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+ <p>Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024) 1 THOMAS, J., dissenting SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES JOHN DOE, THROUGH NEXT FRIEND JANE ROE v. SNAP, INC., DBA SNAPCHAT, L.L.C., DBA SNAP, L.L.C. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT No. 23–961. Decided July 2, 2024 The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. JUSTICE THOMAS, with whom JUSTICE GORSUCH joins, dissenting from the denial of certiorari. When petitioner John Doe was 15 years old, his science teacher groomed him for a sexual relationship. The abuse was exposed after Doe overdosed on prescription drugs pro- vided by the teacher. The teacher initially seduced Doe by sending him explicit content on Snapchat, a social-media platform built around the feature of ephemeral, self- deleting messages. Snapchat is popular among teenagers. And, because messages sent on the platform are self- deleting, it is popular among sexual predators as well. Doe sued Snapchat for, among other things, negligent design under Texas law. He alleged that the platform’s design en- courages minors to lie about their age to access the plat- form, and enables adults to prey upon them through the self-deleting message feature. See Pet. for Cert. 14–15. The courts below concluded that §230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 bars Doe’s claims. 47 U. S. C. §230. The Court of Appeals denied rehearing en banc over the dis- sent of Judge Elrod, joined by six other judges. 88 F. 4th 1069 (2023). The Court declines to grant Doe’s petition for certiorari. In doing so, the Court chooses not to address whether social-media platforms—some of the largest and most pow- erful companies in the world—can be held responsible for their own misconduct. Section 230 of the Communications 2 DOE v. SNAP, INC. THOMAS, J., dissenting Decency Act states that “[n]o provider or user of an interac- tive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another infor- mation content provider.” §230(c)(1). In other words, a so- cial-media platform is not legally responsible as a publisher or speaker for its users’ content. Notwithstanding the statute’s narrow focus, lower courts have interpreted §230 to “confer sweeping immunity” for a platform’s own actions. Malwarebytes, Inc. v. Enigma Soft- ware Group USA, LLC, 592 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (statement of THOMAS, J., respecting denial of certiorari) (slip op., at 1). Courts have “extended §230 to protect companies from a broad array of traditional product-defect claims.” Id., at ___–___ (slip op., at 8–9) (collecting examples). Even when platforms have allegedly engaged in egregious, intentional acts—such as “deliberately structur[ing]” a website “to fa- cilitate illegal human trafficking”—platforms have success- fully wielded §230 as a shield against suit. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 8); see Doe v. Facebook, 595 U. S. ___, ___ (2022) (statement of THOMAS, J., respecting denial of certiorari) (slip op., at 2). The question whether §230 immunizes platforms for their own conduct warrants the Court’s review. …</p><br>
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+ <a href="/opinion/9987646/doe-v-snap/">Original document</a>
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+</summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/07/02/doe_v._snap.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Relating-to orders"/></entry><entry><title>McCrory v. Alabama</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/9987643/mccrory-v-alabama/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-07-02T00:00:00-07:00</published><author><name>Supreme Court of the United States</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/9987643/mccrory-v-alabama/</id><summary type="html">
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+ <p>Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024) 1 Statement of SOTOMAYOR, J. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES CHARLES C. MCCRORY v. ALABAMA ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF ALABAMA No. 23–6232. Decided July 2, 2024 The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. Statement of JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR respecting the denial of certiorari. What should a court do when faced with a 40-year-old conviction resting on science that has now been wholly dis- credited? A court has a variety of tools to test the reliability of forensic evidence introduced in criminal trials today. Yet when a court must look backward, to convictions resting on forensic evidence later repudiated by the scientific commu- nity, those tools may fail. This petition raises difficult questions about the ade- quacy of current postconviction remedies to correct a con- viction secured by what we now know was faulty science. One in four people exonerated since 1989 were wrongfully convicted based on false or misleading forensic evidence in- troduced at their trials. 1 Hundreds if not thousands of in- nocent people may currently be incarcerated despite a mod- ern consensus that the central piece of evidence at their trials lacked any scientific basis. Petitioner Charles M. McCrory was convicted of murder in 1985 based on forensic bitemark testimony that has now been roundly condemned by the scientific community and retracted by the expert who introduced it at his trial. —————— 1 Since 1989, 3,545 people have been exonerated, meaning they were wrongly convicted of a crime. See Nat’l Registry of Exonerations, https:// www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages / ExonerationsContrib FactorsByCrime.aspx. Of these wrongful convictions, over 1,000 rested in part on forensic evidence now known to have been false or misleading. See ibid. 2 MCCRORY v. ALABAMA Statement of SOTOMAYOR, J. McCrory argues to this Court that this now-discredited fo- rensic evidence rendered his trial fundamentally unfair in violation of the Due Process Clause. Even if that were true, McCrory faces many procedural hurdles that could delay or even preclude relief based on existing state and federal postconviction statutes. I vote to deny this petition because due process claims like McCrory’s have yet to percolate suf- ficiently through the federal courts. Legislatures concerned with wrongful convictions based on faulty science, however, need not wait for this Court to address a constitutional rem- edy. Several States have already tackled this troubling problem through targeted postconviction statutes. These statutes create an efficient avenue for innocent people con- victed based on forensic science that the scientific commu- nity has now largely repudiated. I A The wholesale reevaluation of forensic evidence began in 2005, when Congress instructed the National Academy of Sciences to investigate the state of forensic science. The Academy responded four years later with a groundbreaking 314-page report that strongly suggested many forms of fo- rensic evidence that previously had been accepted by courts were, in fact, scientifically unsound. See National Research Council, Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward (2009) (NAS …</p><br>
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+ <a href="/opinion/9987643/mccrory-v-alabama/">Original document</a>
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+</summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/07/02/mccrory_v._alabama.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Relating-to orders"/></entry><entry><title>Price v. Montgomery County</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/9987642/price-v-montgomery-county/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-07-02T00:00:00-07:00</published><author><name>Supreme Court of the United States</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/9987642/price-v-montgomery-county/</id><summary type="html">
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+ <p>Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024) 1 Statement of SOTOMAYOR, J. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES LISA PRICE, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF NICKIE MILLER v. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, KENTUCKY, ET AL. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT No. 23–649. Decided July 2, 2024 The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. Statement of JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR respecting the denial of certiorari. Nickie Miller was charged with murder based on the false confession of a witness. The witness later recanted her co- erced confession, including in jailhouse letters she sent to her husband. Upon learning about the letters, a court or- dered the witness to retrieve and turn them over to Miller’s defense team. The lead prosecutor on Miller’s case, Keith Craycraft, instead allegedly encouraged the witness to de- stroy the letters in response to the court order. The witness destroyed the letters instead of turning them over. Miller spent two years in prison before the State dropped the charges against him. Miller then sued Craycraft and others under Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983, for mali- cious prosecution, fabrication and destruction of evidence, due process violations, and conspiracy. The District Court dismissed the claims against Craycraft, concluding that he had absolute immunity as a prosecutor. The Sixth Circuit agreed, but noted that Craycraft’s “successful pressuring of [the witness] to destroy her jailhouse correspondence” was “difficult to justify and seemingly unbecoming of an official entrusted with enforcing the criminal law.” 72 F. 4th 711, 720 (2023). Miller now asks this Court to decide whether absolute immunity is available under §1983 when, as here, a prosecutor knowingly destroys exculpatory evidence and 2 PRICE v. MONTGOMERY COUNTY Statement of SOTOMAYOR, J. defies a court order. Pet. for Cert. i. The Court’s denial of certiorari should not signal toler- ance of the prosecutor’s conduct.1 The allegations, assumed true at this stage of the case, tell a disturbing story. Pros- ecutors are “representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.” Berger v. United States, 295 U. S. 78, 88 (1935). The prose- cutor’s conduct in this case “diminishes the dignity of our criminal justice system and undermines respect for the rule of law.” Calhoun v. United States, 568 U. S. 1206, 1208 (2013) (SOTOMAYOR, J., statement respecting denial of cer- tiorari). Prosecutorial immunity can promote “the vigorous and fearless performance of the prosecutor’s duty.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 427 (1976). This immunity has limits, however. For example, absolute immunity does not apply “when a prosecutor gives advice to police during a criminal investigation, when the prosecutor makes state- ments to the press, or when a prosecutor acts as a complain- ing witness in …</p><br>
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+ <a href="/opinion/9987642/price-v-montgomery-county/">Original document</a>
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+</summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/07/02/price_v._montgomery_county.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Relating-to orders"/></entry><entry><title>King v. Emmons</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/9987644/king-v-emmons/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-07-02T00:00:00-07:00</published><author><name>Supreme Court of the United States</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/9987644/king-v-emmons/</id><summary type="html">
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+ <p>Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024) 1 JACKSON, J., dissenting SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES WARREN KING v. SHAWN EMMONS, WARDEN ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT No. 23–668. Decided July 2, 2024 The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. JUSTICE JACKSON, with whom JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR joins, dissenting from the denial of certiorari. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), federal habeas courts must give substan- tial deference to factual determinations made by state courts. See 28 U. S. C. §§2254(d)(2), (e)(1). But deference is not a rubber stamp; it “does not imply abandonment or abdication of judicial review.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U. S. 322, 340 (2003). “A federal court can disagree with a state court’s [factual findings] and, when guided by AEDPA, conclude the decision was unreasonable or that the factual premise was incorrect by clear and convincing evi- dence.” Ibid. In this capital case, a Georgia prosecutor struck every Black woman and all but two Black men from a jury pool during voir dire. Responding to a challenge from the de- fendant based on Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (1986), the prosecutor protested, arguing that it was “improper” for the court to inquire into his reasons for making the strikes. 4 App. in No. 20–12804 (CA11), p. 7. He then proceeded to explain that one of his “main reason[s]” for a specific strike was that “this lady is a black female.” Id., at 9. The trial court determined that this racially discrimina- tory strike violated Batson. In response, the prosecutor erupted into a rant against Batson. He repeatedly asserted that it was “improper for this [c]ourt to tell me . . . that’s not a justifiable strike.” Id., at 43. And he concluded: “I take 2 KING v. EMMONS JACKSON, J., dissenting issue with this entire whole process . . . . It’s improper and it’s wrong.” Id., at 44. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia found that none of the prosecutor’s other peremptory strikes were racially discriminatory—but nowhere did that court acknowledge the fact that one of the prosecutor’s strikes was explicitly discriminatory, nor did the court even mention the prosec- tor’s drawn-out rants against Batson. The Eleventh Circuit then proceeded on federal habeas review to conclude that the state court did not make “an unreasonable determina- tion of the facts” under §2254(d)(2), despite its having com- pletely ignored those highly salient facts. That was error. The deference that AEDPA requires is not boundless, and when a state court fails to engage with critical evidence in rendering its factual findings, a federal habeas court should not hesitate to deem those findings un- reasonable. Because I would summarily reverse the Elev- enth Circuit’s contrary decision, I respectfully dissent. I Petitioner Warren King was charged with malice murder and other crimes for his involvement in the killing of a con- venience store employee in the course …</p><br>
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+ <a href="/opinion/9987644/king-v-emmons/">Original document</a>
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+</summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/07/02/king_v._emmons.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Relating-to orders"/></entry><entry><title>Allstates Refractory Contractors v. Su</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/9987648/allstates-refractory-contractors-v-su/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-07-02T00:00:00-07:00</published><author><name>Supreme Court of the United States</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/9987648/allstates-refractory-contractors-v-su/</id><summary type="html">
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+ <p>Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024) 1 THOMAS, J., dissenting SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES ALLSTATES REFRACTORY CONTRACTORS, LLC v. JULIE A. SU, ACTING SECRETARY OF LABOR, ET AL. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT No. 23–819. Decided July 2, 2024 The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. JUSTICE GORSUCH would grant the petition for a writ of certiorari. JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting from the denial of certiorari. Congress gave the Occupational Safety and Health Ad- ministration the power to enact and enforce any workplace- safety standard that it deems “reasonably necessary or ap- propriate.” 29 U. S. C. §§652(8), 655(b). This petition asks us to consider whether that grant of authority is an uncon- stitutional delegation of legislative power. Because the standard this Court currently applies to determine whether Congress has impermissibly delegated legislative power “largely abdicates our duty to enforce that prohibition,” I would grant the petition. Department of Transportation v. Association of American Railroads, 575 U. S. 43, 77 (2015) (THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment). The Constitution vests “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted . . . in a Congress of the United States.” Art. I, §1. And, “[w]e have held that the Constitution categorically for- bids Congress to delegate its legislative power to any other body,” including to an administrative agency. Association of American Railroads, 575 U. S., at 77 (opinion of THOMAS, J.); see also Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U. S. 457, 472 (2001). But, under our precedents, a del- egation of authority is constitutional so long as the relevant statute sets out an “ ‘intelligible principle’ ” to guide the agency’s exercise of authority. Id., at 472. The Court of 2 ALLSTATES REFRACTORY CONTRACTORS, LLC v. SU THOMAS, J., dissenting Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld the delegation of au- thority to the Occupational Safety and Health Administra- tion under this “intelligible principle” test, over Judge Nal- bandian’s dissent. 79 F. 4th 755, 760 (2023). I continue to adhere to my view that the intelligible prin- ciple test “does not adequately reinforce the Constitution’s allocation of legislative power.” Association of American Railroads, 575 U. S., at 77 (opinion of THOMAS, J.); see also Gundy v. United States, 588 U. S. 128, 164 (2019) (GORSUCH, J., dissenting) (explaining that our current in- telligible principle test “has no basis in the original mean- ing of the Constitution, in history, or even in [our prece- dents]”). This case exemplifies the problem. Congress purported to empower an administrative agency to impose whatever workplace-safety standards it deems “appropri- ate.” That power extends to virtually every business in the United States. See §654(a)(2); §652(5) (defining the regu- lated “employer[s]” as any “person engaged in a business affecting commerce who has employees”). The agency claims authority to regulate everything from a power lawnmower’s design, 29 CFR §1910.243(e) (2023), to the level of “contact between trainers and whales at SeaWorld,” SeaWorld of Florida, LLC v. Perez, …</p><br>
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+ <a href="/opinion/9987648/allstates-refractory-contractors-v-su/">Original document</a>
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+</summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/07/02/allstates_refractory_contractors_v._su.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Relating-to orders"/></entry><entry><title>Moody v. NetChoice, LLC</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/9987187/moody-v-netchoice-llc/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-07-01T00:00:00-07:00</published><author><name>Supreme Court of the United States</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/9987187/moody-v-netchoice-llc/</id><summary type="html">
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+ <p>(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2023 1 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber &amp; Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus MOODY, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF FLORIDA, ET AL. v. NETCHOICE, LLC, DBA NETCHOICE, ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT No. 22–277. Argued February 26, 2024—Decided July 1, 2024* In 2021, Florida and Texas enacted statutes regulating large social-me- dia companies and other internet platforms. The States’ laws differ in the entities they cover and the activities they limit. But both curtail the platforms’ capacity to engage in content moderation—to filter, pri- oritize, and label the varied third-party messages, videos, and other content their users wish to post. Both laws also include individualized- explanation provisions, requiring a platform to give reasons to a user if it removes or alters her posts. NetChoice LLC and the Computer &amp; Communications Industry As- sociation (collectively, NetChoice)—trade associations whose members include Facebook and YouTube—brought facial First Amendment challenges against the two laws. District courts in both States entered preliminary injunctions. The Eleventh Circuit upheld the injunction of Florida’s law, as to all provisions relevant here. The court held that the State’s restrictions on content moderation trigger First Amendment scrutiny under this Court’s cases protecting “editorial discretion.” 34 F. 4th 1196, 1209, 1216. The court then concluded that the content-moderation provi- sions are unlikely to survive heightened scrutiny. Id., at 1227–1228. Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit thought the statute’s individualized- explanation requirements likely to fall. Relying on Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U. S. 626, the —————— *Together with No. 22–555, NetChoice, LLC, dba NetChoice, et al. v. Paxton, Attorney General of Texas, on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 2 MOODY v. NETCHOICE, LLC Syllabus court held that the obligation to explain “millions of [decisions] per day” is “unduly burdensome and likely to chill platforms’ protected speech.” 34 F. 4th, at 1230. The Fifth Circuit disagreed across the board, and so reversed the preliminary injunction of the Texas law. In that court’s view, the plat- forms’ content-moderation activities are “not speech” at all, and so do not implicate the First Amendment. 49 F. 4th 439, 466, 494. But even if those activities were expressive, the court determined the State could regulate them to advance its interest in “protecting a diversity of ideas.” Id., at 482. The court further held that the statute’s indi- vidualized-explanation provisions would likely survive, even assuming the platforms were engaged in speech. It found no undue burden un- der Zauderer because the platforms needed only to “scale up” a “com- plaint-and-appeal …</p><br>
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+ <a href="/opinion/9987187/moody-v-netchoice-llc/">Original document</a>
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+</summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/07/01/moody_v._netchoice_llc.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Precedential"/></entry><entry><title>Moody v. NetChoice, LLC Revisions: 7/11/24</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/9999993/moody-v-netchoice-llc-revisions-71124/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-07-01T00:00:00-07:00</published><author><name>Supreme Court of the United States</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/9999993/moody-v-netchoice-llc-revisions-71124/</id><summary type="html">
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+ <p>(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2023 1 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber &amp; Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus MOODY, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF FLORIDA, ET AL. v. NETCHOICE, LLC, DBA NETCHOICE, ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT No. 22–277. Argued February 26, 2024—Decided July 1, 2024* In 2021, Florida and Texas enacted statutes regulating large social-me- dia companies and other internet platforms. The States’ laws differ in the entities they cover and the activities they limit. But both curtail the platforms’ capacity to engage in content moderation—to filter, pri- oritize, and label the varied third-party messages, videos, and other content their users wish to post. Both laws also include individualized- explanation provisions, requiring a platform to give reasons to a user if it removes or alters her posts. NetChoice LLC and the Computer &amp; Communications Industry As- sociation (collectively, NetChoice)—trade associations whose members include Facebook and YouTube—brought facial First Amendment challenges against the two laws. District courts in both States entered preliminary injunctions. The Eleventh Circuit upheld the injunction of Florida’s law, as to all provisions relevant here. The court held that the State’s restrictions on content moderation trigger First Amendment scrutiny under this Court’s cases protecting “editorial discretion.” 34 F. 4th 1196, 1209, 1216. The court then concluded that the content-moderation provi- sions are unlikely to survive heightened scrutiny. Id., at 1227–1228. Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit thought the statute’s individualized- explanation requirements likely to fall. Relying on Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U. S. 626, the —————— *Together with No. 22–555, NetChoice, LLC, dba NetChoice, et al. v. Paxton, Attorney General of Texas, on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 2 MOODY v. NETCHOICE, LLC Syllabus court held that the obligation to explain “millions of [decisions] per day” is “unduly burdensome and likely to chill platforms’ protected speech.” 34 F. 4th, at 1230. The Fifth Circuit disagreed across the board, and so reversed the preliminary injunction of the Texas law. In that court’s view, the plat- forms’ content-moderation activities are “not speech” at all, and so do not implicate the First Amendment. 49 F. 4th 439, 466, 494. But even if those activities were expressive, the court determined the State could regulate them to advance its interest in “protecting a diversity of ideas.” Id., at 482. The court further held that the statute’s indi- vidualized-explanation provisions would likely survive, even assuming the platforms were engaged in speech. It found no undue burden un- der Zauderer because the platforms needed only to “scale up” a “com- plaint-and-appeal …</p><br>
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+ <a href="/opinion/9999993/moody-v-netchoice-llc-revisions-71124/">Original document</a>
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+</summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/07/01/moody_v._netchoice_llc_revisions_71124.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Precedential"/></entry><entry><title>Corner Post, Inc. v. Board of Governors</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/9987188/corner-post-inc-v-board-of-governors/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-07-01T00:00:00-07:00</published><author><name>Supreme Court of the United States</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/9987188/corner-post-inc-v-board-of-governors/</id><summary type="html">
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+ <p>(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2023 1 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber &amp; Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus CORNER POST, INC. v. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT No. 22–1008. Argued February 20, 2024—Decided July 1, 2024 Since it opened for business in 2018, petitioner Corner Post, like most merchants, has accepted debit cards as a form of payment. Debit card transactions require merchants to pay an “interchange fee” to the bank that issued the card. The fee amount is set by the payment networks (such as Visa and MasterCard) that process the transaction. In 2010 Congress tasked the Federal Reserve Board with making sure that in- terchange fees were “reasonable and proportional to the cost incurred by the issuer with respect to the transaction.” 15 U. S. C. §1693o– 2(a)(3)(A). Discharging this duty, in 2011 the Board published Regu- lation II, which sets a maximum interchange fee of $0.21 per transac- tion plus .05% of the transaction’s value. In 2021, Corner Post joined a suit brought against the Board under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The complaint challenged Regulation II on the ground that it allows higher interchange fees than the statute permits. The District Court dismissed the suit as time- barred under 28 U. S. C. §2401(a), the default six-year statute of limi- tations applicable to suits against the United States. The Eighth Cir- cuit affirmed. Held: An APA claim does not accrue for purposes of §2401(a)’s 6-year statute of limitations until the plaintiff is injured by final agency ac- tion. Pp. 4–23. (a) The APA grants Corner Post a cause of action subject to certain conditions, see 5 U. S. C. §702 and §704, and 28 U. S. C. §2401(a) de- lineates the time period in which Corner Post may assert its claim. Section 702 authorizes persons injured by agency action to obtain ju- dicial review by suing the United States or one of its agencies, officers, 2 CORNER POST, INC. v. BOARD OF GOVERNORS, FRS Syllabus or employees. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 140– 141. The Court has explained that §702 “requir[es] a litigant to show, at the outset of the case, that he is injured in fact by agency action.” Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs v. Newport News Shipbuilding &amp; Dry Dock Co., 514 U. S. 122, 127. A litigant therefore cannot bring an APA claim unless and until she suffers an injury. While §702 equips injured parties with a cause of action, §704 provides that judicial review is available in most cases …</p><br>
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+ <a href="/opinion/9987188/corner-post-inc-v-board-of-governors/">Original document</a>
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+</summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/07/01/corner_post_inc._v._board_of_governors.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Precedential"/></entry><entry><title>Trump v. United States</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/9987186/trump-v-united-states/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-07-01T00:00:00-07:00</published><author><name>Supreme Court of the United States</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/9987186/trump-v-united-states/</id><summary type="html">
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+ <p>(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2023 1 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber &amp; Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus TRUMP v. UNITED STATES CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT No. 23–939. Argued April 25, 2024—Decided July 1, 2024 A federal grand jury indicted former President Donald J. Trump on four counts for conduct that occurred during his Presidency following the November 2020 election. The indictment alleged that after losing that election, Trump conspired to overturn it by spreading knowingly false claims of election fraud to obstruct the collecting, counting, and certi- fying of the election results. Trump moved to dismiss the indictment based on Presidential immunity, arguing that a President has absolute immunity from criminal prosecution for actions performed within the outer perimeter of his official responsibilities, and that the indict- ment’s allegations fell within the core of his official duties. The District Court denied Trump’s motion to dismiss, holding that former Presi- dents do not possess federal criminal immunity for any acts. The D. C. Circuit affirmed. Both the District Court and the D. C. Circuit de- clined to decide whether the indicted conduct involved official acts. Held: Under our constitutional structure of separated powers, the nature of Presidential power entitles a former President to absolute immunity from criminal prosecution for actions within his conclusive and preclu- sive constitutional authority. And he is entitled to at least presump- tive immunity from prosecution for all his official acts. There is no immunity for unofficial acts. Pp. 5–43. (a) This case is the first criminal prosecution in our Nation’s history of a former President for actions taken during his Presidency. Deter- mining whether and under what circumstances such a prosecution may proceed requires careful assessment of the scope of Presidential power under the Constitution. The nature of that power requires that a former President have some immunity from criminal prosecution for official acts during his tenure in office. At least with respect to the 2 TRUMP v. UNITED STATES Syllabus President’s exercise of his core constitutional powers, this immunity must be absolute. As for his remaining official actions, he is entitled to at least presumptive immunity. Pp. 5–15. (1) Article II of the Constitution vests “executive Power” in “a President of the United States of America.” §1, cl. 1. The President has duties of “unrivaled gravity and breadth.” Trump v. Vance, 591 U. S. 786, 800. His authority to act necessarily “stem[s] either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself.” Youngstown Sheet &amp; Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 585. In the latter case, the Presi- …</p><br>
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+ <a href="/opinion/9987186/trump-v-united-states/">Original document</a>
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+</summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/07/01/trump_v._united_states.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Precedential"/></entry><entry><title>Corner Post, Inc. v. Board of Governors Revisions: 7/09/24</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/9998478/corner-post-inc-v-board-of-governors-revisions-70924/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-07-01T00:00:00-07:00</published><author><name>Supreme Court of the United States</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/9998478/corner-post-inc-v-board-of-governors-revisions-70924/</id><summary type="html">
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+ <p>(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2023 1 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber &amp; Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus CORNER POST, INC. v. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT No. 22–1008. Argued February 20, 2024—Decided July 1, 2024 Since it opened for business in 2018, petitioner Corner Post, like most merchants, has accepted debit cards as a form of payment. Debit card transactions require merchants to pay an “interchange fee” to the bank that issued the card. The fee amount is set by the payment networks (such as Visa and MasterCard) that process the transaction. In 2010 Congress tasked the Federal Reserve Board with making sure that in- terchange fees were “reasonable and proportional to the cost incurred by the issuer with respect to the transaction.” 15 U. S. C. §1693o– 2(a)(3)(A). Discharging this duty, in 2011 the Board published Regu- lation II, which sets a maximum interchange fee of $0.21 per transac- tion plus .05% of the transaction’s value. In 2021, Corner Post joined a suit brought against the Board under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The complaint challenged Regulation II on the ground that it allows higher interchange fees than the statute permits. The District Court dismissed the suit as time- barred under 28 U. S. C. §2401(a), the default six-year statute of limi- tations applicable to suits against the United States. The Eighth Cir- cuit affirmed. Held: An APA claim does not accrue for purposes of §2401(a)’s 6-year statute of limitations until the plaintiff is injured by final agency ac- tion. Pp. 4–23. (a) The APA grants Corner Post a cause of action subject to certain conditions, see 5 U. S. C. §702 and §704, and 28 U. S. C. §2401(a) de- lineates the time period in which Corner Post may assert its claim. Section 702 authorizes persons injured by agency action to obtain ju- dicial review by suing the United States or one of its agencies, officers, 2 CORNER POST, INC. v. BOARD OF GOVERNORS, FRS Syllabus or employees. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 140– 141. The Court has explained that §702 “requir[es] a litigant to show, at the outset of the case, that he is injured in fact by agency action.” Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs v. Newport News Shipbuilding &amp; Dry Dock Co., 514 U. S. 122, 127. A litigant therefore cannot bring an APA claim unless and until she suffers an injury. While §702 equips injured parties with a cause of action, §704 provides that judicial review is available in most cases …</p><br>
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+ <a href="/opinion/9998478/corner-post-inc-v-board-of-governors-revisions-70924/">Original document</a>
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+</summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/07/01/corner_post_inc._v._board_of_governors_revisions_70924.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Precedential"/></entry><entry><title>Fischer v. United States</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/9986255/fischer-v-united-states/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-06-28T00:00:00-07:00</published><author><name>Supreme Court of the United States</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/9986255/fischer-v-united-states/</id><summary type="html">
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+ <p>(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2023 1 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber &amp; Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus FISCHER v. UNITED STATES CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT No. 23–5572. Argued April 16, 2024—Decided June 28, 2024 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 imposes criminal liability on anyone who corruptly “alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, docu- ment, or other object, or attempts to do so, with the intent to impair the object’s integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding.” 18 U. S. C. §1512(c)(1). The next subsection extends that prohibition to anyone who “otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding, or attempts to do so.” §1512(c)(2). Petitioner Joseph Fischer was charged with violating §1512(c)(2) for his conduct on Jan- uary 6, 2021. On that day, Congress convened in a joint session to certify the votes in the 2020 Presidential election. While they did so, a crowd of supporters of then-President Donald Trump gathered out- side the Capitol, and some eventually forced their way into the build- ing, breaking windows and assaulting police. App. 189. This breach of the Capitol delayed the certification of the vote. The criminal com- plaint alleges that Fischer was among those who invaded the building. Fischer was charged with various crimes for his actions on January 6, including obstructing an official proceeding in violation of §1512(c)(2). He moved to dismiss that charge, arguing that the provision criminal- izes only attempts to impair the availability or integrity of evidence. The District Court granted his motion in relevant part. A divided panel of the D. C. Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceed- ings. Held: To prove a violation of §1512(c)(2), the Government must establish that the defendant impaired the availability or integrity for use in an official proceeding of records, documents, objects, or other things used in an official proceeding, or attempted to do so. (a) To determine the scope of the residual “otherwise” clause in §1512(c)(2), the Court must decide how it is linked to its “surrounding 2 FISCHER v. UNITED STATES Syllabus words,” Yates v. United States, 574 U. S. 528, 536 (plurality opinion), and “ ‘give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of [the] statute.’ ” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362, 404 (quoting United States v. Menasche, 348 U. S. 528, 538-539). The Court considers both “the spe- cific context” in which (c)(2) appears “and the broader context of the statute as a whole.” Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U. S. 337, 341. (1) Section 1512(c)(1) describes particular types of criminal con- duct in …</p><br>
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+ <a href="/opinion/9986255/fischer-v-united-states/">Original document</a>
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+</summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/06/28/fischer_v._united_states.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Precedential"/></entry><entry><title>Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/9986254/loper-bright-enterprises-v-raimondo/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-06-28T00:00:00-07:00</published><author><name>Supreme Court of the United States</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/9986254/loper-bright-enterprises-v-raimondo/</id><summary type="html">
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+ <p>(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2023 1 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber &amp; Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus LOPER BRIGHT ENTERPRISES ET AL. v. RAIMONDO, SECRETARY OF COMMERCE, ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT No. 22–451. Argued January 17, 2024—Decided June 28, 2024* The Court granted certiorari in these cases limited to the question whether Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, should be overruled or clarified. Under the Chev- ron doctrine, courts have sometimes been required to defer to “permis- sible” agency interpretations of the statutes those agencies adminis- ter—even when a reviewing court reads the statute differently. Id., at 843. In each case below, the reviewing courts applied Chevron’s frame- work to resolve in favor of the Government challenges by petitioners to a rule promulgated by the National Marine Fisheries Service pur- suant to the Magnuson-Stevens Act, 16 U. S. C. §1801 et seq., which incorporates the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U. S. C. §551 et seq. Held: The Administrative Procedure Act requires courts to exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority, and courts may not defer to an agency inter- pretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous; Chevron is overruled. Pp. 7–35. (a) Article III of the Constitution assigns to the Federal Judiciary the responsibility and power to adjudicate “Cases” and “Controver- sies”—concrete disputes with consequences for the parties involved. The Framers appreciated that the laws judges would necessarily apply in resolving those disputes would not always be clear, but envisioned —————— *Together with No. 22–1219, Relentless, Inc., et al. v. Department of Commerce, et al., on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. 2 LOPER BRIGHT ENTERPRISES v. RAIMONDO Syllabus that the final “interpretation of the laws” would be “the proper and peculiar province of the courts.” The Federalist No. 78, p. 525 (A. Ham- ilton). As Chief Justice Marshall declared in the foundational decision of Marbury v. Madison, “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” 1 Cranch 137, 177. In the decades following Marbury, when the meaning of a statute was at issue, the judicial role was to “interpret the act of Congress, in order to ascertain the rights of the parties.” Decatur v. Paulding, 14 Pet. 497, 515. The Court recognized from the outset, though, that exercising inde- pendent judgment often included according due respect to Executive Branch interpretations of federal statutes. Such respect was thought …</p><br>
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+ <a href="/opinion/9986254/loper-bright-enterprises-v-raimondo/">Original document</a>
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+</summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/06/28/loper_bright_enterprises_v._raimondo.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Precedential"/></entry><entry><title>City of Grants Pass v. Johnson</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/9986256/city-of-grants-pass-v-johnson/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-06-28T00:00:00-07:00</published><author><name>Supreme Court of the United States</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/9986256/city-of-grants-pass-v-johnson/</id><summary type="html">
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+ <p>(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2023 1 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber &amp; Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus CITY OF GRANTS PASS, OREGON v. JOHNSON ET AL., ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT No. 23–175. Argued April 22, 2024—Decided June 28, 2024 Grants Pass, Oregon, is home to roughly 38,000 people, about 600 of whom are estimated to experience homelessness on a given day. Like many local governments across the Nation, Grants Pass has public- camping laws that restrict encampments on public property. The Grants Pass Municipal Code prohibits activities such as camping on public property or parking overnight in the city’s parks. See §§5.61.030, 6.46.090(A)–(B). Initial violations can trigger a fine, while multiple violations can result in imprisonment. In a prior decision, Martin v. Boise, the Ninth Circuit held that the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause bars cities from enforcing public-camping ordinances like these against homeless individuals whenever the number of homeless individuals in a jurisdiction exceeds the number of “practically available” shelter beds. 920 F. 3d 584, 617. After Martin, suits against Western cities like Grants Pass prolifer- ated. Plaintiffs (respondents here) filed a putative class action on behalf of homeless people living in Grants Pass, claiming that the city’s ordi- nances against public camping violated the Eighth Amendment. The district court certified the class and entered a Martin injunction pro- hibiting Grants Pass from enforcing its laws against homeless individ- uals in the city. App. to Pet. for Cert. 182a–183a. Applying Martin’s reasoning, the district court found everyone without shelter in Grants Pass was “involuntarily homeless” because the city’s total homeless population outnumbered its “practically available” shelter beds. App. 2 CITY OF GRANTS PASS v. JOHNSON Syllabus to Pet. for Cert. 179a, 216a. The beds at Grants Pass’s charity-run shelter did not qualify as “available” in part because that shelter has rules requiring residents to abstain from smoking and to attend reli- gious services. App. to Pet. for Cert. 179a–180a. A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s Martin injunction in rel- evant part. 72 F. 4th 868, 874–896. Grants Pass filed a petition for certiorari. Many States, cities, and counties from across the Ninth Cir- cuit urged the Court to grant review to assess Martin. Held: The enforcement of generally applicable laws regulating camping on public property does not constitute “cruel and unusual punishment” prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Pp. 15–35. (a) The Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause “has always been considered, and properly so, to be directed at the method …</p><br>
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+ <a href="/opinion/9986256/city-of-grants-pass-v-johnson/">Original document</a>
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+</summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/06/28/city_of_grants_pass_v._johnson.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Precedential"/></entry><entry><title>SEC v. Jarkesy Revisions: 6/27/24</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/9954582/sec-v-jarkesy-revisions-62724/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-06-27T00:00:00-07:00</published><author><name>Supreme Court of the United States</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/9954582/sec-v-jarkesy-revisions-62724/</id><summary type="html">
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+ <p>(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2023 1 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber &amp; Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION v. JARKESY ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT No. 22–859. Argued November 29, 2023—Decided June 27, 2024 In the aftermath of the Wall Street Crash of 1929, Congress passed a suite of laws designed to combat securities fraud and increase market transparency. Three such statutes are relevant: The Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the Investment Advis- ers Act of 1940. These Acts respectively govern the registration of se- curities, the trading of securities, and the activities of investment ad- visers. Although each regulates different aspects of the securities markets, their pertinent provisions—collectively referred to by regula- tors as “the antifraud provisions,” App. to Pet. for Cert. 73a, 202a— target the same basic behavior: misrepresenting or concealing mate- rial facts. To enforce these Acts, Congress created the Securities and Exchange Commission. The SEC may bring an enforcement action in one of two forums. It can file suit in federal court, or it can adjudicate the matter itself. The forum the SEC selects dictates certain aspects of the litiga- tion. In federal court, a jury finds the facts, an Article III judge pre- sides, and the Federal Rules of Evidence and the ordinary rules of dis- covery govern the litigation. But when the SEC adjudicates the matter in-house, there are no juries. The Commission presides while its Divi- sion of Enforcement prosecutes the case. The Commission or its dele- gee—typically an Administrative Law Judge—also finds facts and de- cides discovery disputes, and the SEC’s Rules of Practice govern. One remedy for securities violations is civil penalties. Originally, the SEC could only obtain civil penalties from unregistered investment advisers in federal court. Then, in 2010, Congress passed the Dodd- Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The Act au- thorized the SEC to impose such penalties through its own in-house 2 SEC v. JARKESY Syllabus proceedings. Shortly after passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC initiated an enforcement action for civil penalties against investment adviser George Jarkesy, Jr., and his firm, Patriot28, LLC for alleged violations of the “antifraud provisions” contained in the federal securities laws. The SEC opted to adjudicate the matter in-house. As relevant, the final order determined that Jarkesy and Patriot28 had committed se- curities violations and levied a civil penalty of $300,000. Jarkesy and Patriot28 petitioned for judicial review. The Fifth Circuit vacated the order on the ground that adjudicating the matter in-house violated the defendants’ Seventh Amendment right …</p><br>
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+ <a href="/opinion/9954582/sec-v-jarkesy-revisions-62724/">Original document</a>
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+</summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/06/27/sec_v._jarkesy_revisions_62724.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Precedential"/></entry><entry><title>Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P. Revisions: 6/27/24</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/9958670/harrington-v-purdue-pharma-lp-revisions-62724/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-06-27T00:00:00-07:00</published><author><name>Supreme Court of the United States</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/9958670/harrington-v-purdue-pharma-lp-revisions-62724/</id><summary type="html">
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+ <p>(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2023 1 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber &amp; Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus HARRINGTON, UNITED STATES TRUSTEE, REGION 2 v. PURDUE PHARMA L. P. ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT No. 23–124. Argued December 4, 2023—Decided June 27, 2024 Between 1999 and 2019, approximately 247,000 people in the United States died from prescription-opioid overdoses. Respondent Purdue Pharma sits at the center of that crisis. Owned and controlled by the Sackler family, Purdue began marketing OxyContin, an opioid pre- scription pain reliever, in the mid-1990s. After Purdue earned billions of dollars in sales on the drug, in 2007 one of its affiliates pleaded guilty to a federal felony for misbranding OxyContin as a less-addic- tive, less-abusable alternative to other pain medications. Thousands of lawsuits followed. Fearful that the litigation would eventually im- pact them directly, the Sacklers initiated a “milking program,” with- drawing from Purdue approximately $11 billion—roughly 75% of the firm’s total assets—over the next decade. Those withdrawals left Purdue in a significantly weakened financial state. And in 2019, Purdue filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. During that process, the Sacklers proposed to return approximately $4.3 bil- lion to Purdue’s bankruptcy estate. In exchange, the Sacklers sought a judicial order releasing the family from all opioid-related claims and enjoining victims from bringing such claims against them in the fu- ture. The bankruptcy court approved Purdue’s proposed reorganiza- tion plan, including its provisions concerning the Sackler discharge. But the district court vacated that decision, holding that nothing in the law authorizes bankruptcy courts to extinguish claims against third parties like the Sacklers, without the claimants’ consent. A di- vided panel of the Second Circuit reversed the district court and re- vived the bankruptcy court’s order approving a modified reorganiza- tion plan. Held: The bankruptcy code does not authorize a release and injunction 2 HARRINGTON v. PURDUE PHARMA L. P. Syllabus that, as part of a plan of reorganization under Chapter 11, effectively seek to discharge claims against a nondebtor without the consent of affected claimants. Pp. 7–19. (a) When a debtor files for bankruptcy, it “creates an estate” that includes virtually all the debtor’s assets. 11 U. S. C. §541(a). Under Chapter 11, the debtor must develop a reorganization plan governing the distribution of the estate’s assets and present it to the bankruptcy court for approval. §§1121, 1123, 1129, 1141. A bankruptcy court’s order confirming a reorganization plan “discharges the debtor” of cer- tain pre-petition debts. §1141(d)(1)(A). In this case, the Sacklers have not filed for bankruptcy or placed all their assets on the table for …</p><br>
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+ <a href="/opinion/9958670/harrington-v-purdue-pharma-lp-revisions-62724/">Original document</a>
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+</summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/06/27/harrington_v._purdue_pharma_l.p._revisions_62724.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Precedential"/></entry><entry><title>SEC v. Jarkesy Revisions: 6/27/24</title><link href="https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/9971894/sec-v-jarkesy-revisions-62724/" rel="alternate"/><published>2024-06-27T00:00:00-07:00</published><author><name>Supreme Court of the United States</name></author><id>https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/9971894/sec-v-jarkesy-revisions-62724/</id><summary type="html">
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+ <p>(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2023 1 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber &amp; Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION v. JARKESY ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT No. 22–859. Argued November 29, 2023—Decided June 27, 2024 In the aftermath of the Wall Street Crash of 1929, Congress passed a suite of laws designed to combat securities fraud and increase market transparency. Three such statutes are relevant: The Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the Investment Advis- ers Act of 1940. These Acts respectively govern the registration of se- curities, the trading of securities, and the activities of investment ad- visers. Although each regulates different aspects of the securities markets, their pertinent provisions—collectively referred to by regula- tors as “the antifraud provisions,” App. to Pet. for Cert. 73a, 202a— target the same basic behavior: misrepresenting or concealing mate- rial facts. To enforce these Acts, Congress created the Securities and Exchange Commission. The SEC may bring an enforcement action in one of two forums. It can file suit in federal court, or it can adjudicate the matter itself. The forum the SEC selects dictates certain aspects of the litiga- tion. In federal court, a jury finds the facts, an Article III judge pre- sides, and the Federal Rules of Evidence and the ordinary rules of dis- covery govern the litigation. But when the SEC adjudicates the matter in-house, there are no juries. The Commission presides while its Divi- sion of Enforcement prosecutes the case. The Commission or its dele- gee—typically an Administrative Law Judge—also finds facts and de- cides discovery disputes, and the SEC’s Rules of Practice govern. One remedy for securities violations is civil penalties. Originally, the SEC could only obtain civil penalties from unregistered investment advisers in federal court. Then, in 2010, Congress passed the Dodd- Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The Act au- thorized the SEC to impose such penalties through its own in-house 2 SEC v. JARKESY Syllabus proceedings. Shortly after passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC initiated an enforcement action for civil penalties against investment adviser George Jarkesy, Jr., and his firm, Patriot28, LLC for alleged violations of the “antifraud provisions” contained in the federal securities laws. The SEC opted to adjudicate the matter in-house. As relevant, the final order determined that Jarkesy and Patriot28 had committed se- curities violations and levied a civil penalty of $300,000. Jarkesy and Patriot28 petitioned for judicial review. The Fifth Circuit vacated the order on the ground that adjudicating the matter in-house violated the defendants’ Seventh Amendment right …</p><br>
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+ <a href="/opinion/9971894/sec-v-jarkesy-revisions-62724/">Original document</a>
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+</summary><link href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/06/27/sec_v._jarkesy_revisions_62724_1.pdf" length="0" rel="enclosure" type="application/pdf"/><category term="Precedential"/></entry></feed>
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