Subj : BINKP over TLS
To   : Rob Swindell
From : Alexey Fayans
Date : Fri Dec 20 2019 04:12 pm

Hello Rob!

On Thu, 19 Dec 2019 at 15:43 -0800, you wrote to me:

 >> The whole sentence is wrong. CA is required to make sure that the
 >> certificate provided by server was not replaced by an attacker
 >> during MitM attack. With self-signed certificate you can never tell
 >> that you are connecting to the real system, unless you know a CA
 >> pubkey used to sign that self-signed certificate. That's kinda
 >> basic stuff.
 RS> True, if you're concerned about active MitM attacks (not just
 RS> passive-snooping).

Isn't it your main argument against STARTTLS?

 RS> But if you're concerned about active MitM attacks,
 RS> then you don't want to use STARTTLS either.

Why not? It is perfectly mitigated and I explained that a few times already. 
You gotta stop looking back at old SMTP implementation that wasn't designed 
against active MitM attacks in the first place.


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