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CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

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### Viewing cable 09STATE100153, EXISTENCE OF A COVERT URANIUM ENRICHMENT

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
09STATE100153 | 2009-09-25 18:06 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Secretary of State

`

    UNCLASSIFIED   STATE   00100153
    O 251814Z SEP 09
    FM SECSTATE WASHDC
    TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
    RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 9888

` `

    UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 100153

    SENSITIVE

    E.O. 12958: N/A
    TAGS: IR KNNP MNUC PARM
    SUBJECT: EXISTENCE OF A COVERT URANIUM ENRICHMENT
    FACILITY IN IRAN

    ¶1.  (U) This is an action request.  Please see paragraph
    3 for action.

    ¶2.  (SBU) BACKGROUND:  The United States is aware that
    Iran has been secretly building another enrichment
    facility, in addition to the one at Natanz.  Some other
    governments are also in possession of similar
    information.  The United States, France, and the United
    Kingdom briefed the IAEA on Thursday, 24 September on
    this facility.  The United States remains committed to a
    diplomatic resolution of international concerns with
    Iran's nuclear program.  These concerns are reinforced
    by the existence of this facility.  Immediate,
    unconditional cooperation by Iran with the IAEA is
    essential to address these concerns and to ensure that a
    diplomatic process has a chance to succeed.

    ¶3.  (U) ACTION REQUEST:  Posts are requested to inform
    senior host government officials of the existence of a
    covert uranium enrichment facility in Iran using the
    points contained in paragraph 4.  Posts are NOT
    authorized to provide a copy of the points.  Washington
    understands that, in a previous iteration of this
    message, a non-paper was authorized.  If points have
    already been conveyed in writing, posts are instructed
    to request discretion on the part of host government
    interlocutors.  If asked about coincidental claims by an
    Iranian exile group of previously unknown nuclear
    weaponization sites, posts should convey the following,
    IC-cleared point:

    -- We do not believe that these other sites that you
    refer to are the Qom enrichment site.  There are many
    suspect sites, including these others, that we monitor.

    ¶4.  (U) BEGIN TALKING POINTS:

    -- We have acquired substantial, specific information
    that Iran has been secretly building another enrichment
    facility ? in addition to Natanz.

    -- The facility is located near the city of Qom, Iran,
    and has been under construction for several years.  The
    facility is located in an underground tunnel complex on
    the grounds of an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
    Base.

    -- Earlier this year, we developed information that gave
    us increased confidence that the facility was a uranium
    enrichment site.

    -- The site is under the management of the Atomic Energy
    Organization of Iran, but unknown to all but the most
    senior AEOI officials.

    -- The site is intended to hold approximately 3000
    centrifuges but we do not know what type of centrifuge
    Iran intends to employ there.  We assess an enrichment
    plant containing 3000 centrifuges is not adequate to
    produce regular fuel reloads for civilian nuclear power
    plants, which require a much larger number of
    centrifuges.

    -- Based on our understanding of the status of the
    facility, we assess that Iran will not be able to begin
    enriching uranium there before at least 2010.  Iran is
    continuing construction of support buildings at the
    facility.  Intelligence indicates that earlier this
    year, Iran was installing the infrastructure required
    for centrifuges.

    -- Iran may claim that this facility is for civilian
    nuclear fuel production.  The Iranian government
    continues to claim that it is not pursuing a nuclear
    weapon.  Yet this facility is too small to be viable for
    production of fuel for a nuclear power reactor.  It may
    be well-suited, however, for a military purpose.

    -- We are aware that some other governments are in
    possession of similar information.

    -- We learned this week that Iran has sent the IAEA a
    letter indicating that it is constructing a pilot fuel
    enrichment facility and that the "required
    infrastructure has been established."

    -- The letter provides no details and states that

    STATE 00100153  002 OF 002

    "further complementary information will be provided in
    an appropriate and due time." We assume this new
    enrichment facility is the facility that we and other
    governments have been tracking.

    -- We, the UK and France have briefed the IAEA on the
    information that they have so that they can fully
    investigate the facility.  The President, with his UK
    and French counterparts, plans to make an announcement
    Friday morning in Pittsburgh.

    -- We firmly believe that the existence of a new
    centrifuge facility in Iran constitutes a serious
    violation of Iran's international obligations.

    -- Iran was required to suspend all uranium enrichment-
    related activities in UN Security Council resolution
    ¶1737.  This legally-binding requirement has been
    reaffirmed in three subsequent UNSC resolutions.

    -- When Iran decided to build this facility, it was
    obligated to declare this to the IAEA.  It failed to do
    so.

    -- What is clear is that Iran once again has engaged in
    a deceit of the international community.   The President
    made clear that we are serious about using diplomacy to
    find a negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear
    program, but in order to do so, Iran needs to be
    transparent and truthful.

    -- It is now time for Iran to prove to the international
    community that it is willing to play by the rules.   We
    urge your public support on this matter as we head into
    the October 1 meeting with Iran.

    -- It will particularly important that Iran understand
    that it must end the pattern of deception and once and
    for all commit itself to full transparency.   It is time
    for Iran to come clean on the questions about its
    weaponization studies and to implement the Additional
    Protocol.

    -- The Ministers of the P5+1 held a productive meeting
    on the margins of the UN General Assembly.  They stated
    their expectation that Iran will be prepared to take
    constructive steps when it meets with the P5+1 on
    October 1st.  In light of this new and troubling
    information, the burden is clearly on Iran to prove the
    exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear program.  It
    is essential that Iran accept that the process in Geneva
    must be real an address their nuclear program.  We are
    prepared to engage in a real process but will not be a
    party to a phony one.

    -- We hope that we can count on your public support for
    holding Iran to its international obligations.

    END TALKING POINTS

    ¶5.  (U) Posts are requested to report any substantive
    responses.  Richard Nephew (ISN/RA, 202-647-7680,
    NephewRM@state.sgov.gov) is the Department's POC for
    this cable.

    ¶6.  (U) MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
    CLINTON

`