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CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

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### Viewing cable 09UNVIEVIENNA553, AUSTRIAN AMBASSADOR TO IRAN DESCRIBES ELECTIONS AS

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
09UNVIEVIENNA553 | 2009-12-09 13:01 | CONFIDENTIAL | UNVIE

`

    VZCZCXRO1474
    OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHTRO
    DE RUEHUNV #0553/01 3431343
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 091343Z DEC 09
    FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0393
    INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
    RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
    RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE 1500

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 UNVIE VIENNA 000553

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2023
    TAGS: PREL IR AU AORC KNNP
    SUBJECT: AUSTRIAN AMBASSADOR TO IRAN DESCRIBES ELECTIONS AS
    DRIVING TEHRAN ENVIRONMENT

    REF: UNVIE 544

    Classified By: DCM Geoff Pyatt for reasons 1.4 (c) and (e)

    ¶1.  (C)   Summary.  On December 3, former Austrian Ambassador
    to Tehran Michael Postl (please protect) debriefed MsnOff on
    his final calls on Iranian officials as he left post.  He
    noted that former Presidents Khatami and Rafsanjani both had
    extracted themselves from the normal political scene and were
    focused on tangential issues where their weight could still
    be felt.  Nevertheless, Rafsanjani suggested that it would be
    helpful if the West spoke out against the election fraud and
    human rights violations that followed.

    ¶2.  (C)   Postl said that President Ahmadinejad's chief of
    cabinet, Mashaie, made clear to him prior to the Geneva talks
    that Iran was planning to approach the talks with a spirit of
    compromise and that Postl would be "surprised" by Iran's
    attitude.  Postl explained the lack of follow-through in the
    wake of the talks as a probable decision by Supreme Leader
    Khamenei that the West was not trustworthy or that Iran could
    get more from the P5 plus 1 than the six offered in Geneva.
    Majles Speaker Larijani's outspoken disapproval of the Tehran
    Research Reactor deal advocated by Ahmadinejad could have
    been an exercise of Larijani's first opportunity to undermine
    Ahmadinejad after he was pressured to disavow himself of
    knowledge that Iranian prisoners were being raped in jail,
    which lost him credibility with the Iranian public.  Finally,
    Postl argued that the U.S. should focus its outreach to Iran
    on formats that Iranians perceive are less biased, such as
    BBC Persian's version of Hardtalk or Press TV.  End Summary.

    ¶3.  (C)   On December 3, former Austrian Ambassador to Tehran
    Michael Postl gave MsnOff a readout of the state of domestic
    political wranglings in Tehran prior to his departure from
    post in October.  Now posted in Vienna, Postl noted that he
    still advises the Austrian government on Iran issues and that
    he was recently asked to see if his contacts in Iran would
    meet with him even though he had departed post.  Many said
    that they would, so he may be asked by the Austrian Foreign
    Ministry to return to Iran periodically to make use of the
    excellent contacts he was afforded given his Farsi skills and
    native Iranian wife.

    ¶4.  (C)   Postl recounted his final calls on contacts in Iran
    before leaving post, noting that many who had refused
    meetings with him after the elections were now willing to
    meet him.  When he met with former President Khatami, Khatami
    noted that because of the post-election environment, it did
    not make sense to talk about politics.  Postl suggested that
    they discuss the possibility of Khatami pursuing a dialogue
    of civilizations or religions that might give him an opening
    to the West.  Khatami noted that he did want to focus more on
    that kind of dialogue and engagement and that he might come
    to Austria next year in pursuit of such discussions.

    -------------------------------------------
    Final Calls Reveal Disillusionment with the
    Possibilities for Change
    -------------------------------------------

    ¶5.  (C)   Postl noted that in his final calls, he sought out
    a meeting with the new health minister, Marzieh Vahid
    Dastjerdi since he was interested in meeting the Islamic
    Republic's first female minister.  Postl described her as
    "sort of a puppet" and very insecure despite her good
    credentials for the job.  She is a member of the Larijani
    family, giving this influential clan placement in the
    executive branch, in addition to the leverage they hold
    through the key posts of Ali Larijani as Majles Speaker and
    Javad Larijani as head of the Judiciary.  In their meeting,
    Dastjerdi and Postl discussed possible cooperation between
    Iran and Austria in hospitals, training, and person-to-person
    contacts in the medical field.

    ¶6.  (C)   Postl also called on the powerful new chief of
    President Ahmadinejad's cabinet, Mashaie.  Postl said that
    many believed that Mashaie's rejection for a vice
    presidential post showed that there were disagreements
    between Ahmadinejad and the Supreme Leader, but the fact that
    he was given the slot as head of the cabinet means that
    Khamenei must not be fundamentally opposed to him.  Postl was
    candid with Mashaie, noting that although the Iranian
    elections were an internal matter, the treatment of civilians
    in the aftermath of the elections was wrong by any
    calculation.  Postl assessed that using Farsi instead of
    English made a difference in the reaction he received to this
    candor, and Mashaie said that he would be pleased to meet
    with Postl again if he were in Iran.

    UNVIE VIEN 00000553  002 OF 004

    ¶7.  (C)   In what Postl believes was the first meeting former
    President Rafsanjani had granted to a Westerner -- and
    perhaps the first meeting with a foreigner -- since the
    elections, the two discussed economic cooperation, which
    Rafsanjani said was his primary focus.  They avoided the
    topics of the election and the nuclear issue, especially
    given the presence of 10 to 15 "watchers" from different
    veins of the Iranian government.  Rafsanjani was very
    interested in non-nuclear energy cooperation and asked very
    detailed questions about wind energy, which Postl said
    Austria would be able to help with.  Rafsanjani also
    discussed his sense of how the Iranian government could
    evolve, arguing that change must come from within Iran and
    that interference from foreigners was not welcome in most
    circumstances.  Nevertheless, Rafsanjani believed that the
    best help possible from foreigners would be to say that the
    elections were not fair and to note the human rights
    violations in the aftermath, though he was not specific about
    what he thought the influence of such statements would be.
    Postl noted that recent months clearly had been hard on
    Rafsanjani; he looked pale and had lost a lot of weight, but
    his eyes were still "active," according to Postl.

    ¶8.  (C)   Postl described the positions of presidential
    candidates Karrubi and Musavi as children of the revolution
    and argued that neither of them wants systemic change.
    Rather, they hoped to give Iran a "human face."  Since the
    "population of Iran," according to Postl, opposes the Islamic
    system, the people are not very strongly behind either of
    these candidates.  In closing out his comments on his final
    meetings in Tehran, Postl noted that after he departed post,
    his contacts were questioned thoroughly and aggressively,
    which Postl described as a reality of life in Iran and
    contact with a Westerner.

    --------------------------------
    Infighting and Confusion Driving
    the Nuclear Issue
    --------------------------------

    ¶9.  (C)   In his discussions at the end of September with
    Mashaie, Postl encouraged him to ensure that Iran did not
    "miss the opportunity" presented by the talks in Geneva.
    Mashaie responded that Iran would be "sure to take" advantage
    of this opportunity and told Postl that Postl would be
    surprised at Iran's approach, that Iran would come with
    seriousness and an attitude of compromise.  Postl's
    assessment is that Iran decided that this was the right time
    to show flexibility in order to get an agreement, especially
    since Ahmadinejad wants to claim responsibility for an
    agreement with the West.  Postl believes that Nuclear
    Negotiator Jalili came to Geneva with this spirit of
    compromise and was following direction, presumably from
    Ahmadinejad.  Iran's failure to follow through on these
    agreements may have been due to a decision by Khamenei either
    that the West was not trustworthy despite Iran's supposed
    good intentions or that Iran could get more from the West or
    P5 plus 1 than was offered in Geneva.  Despite the fact that
    people close to the President say he wants "more," the system
    gets in the way as do Ahmadinejad's bad advisers.  Postl's
    interlocutors say that if Ahmadinejad alone were to decide
    about engagement with the West, "things would move more
    quickly."  Postl noted that Khamenei is still respected in
    Iran and, in his personal opinion, there is no essential
    divergence between the Supreme Leader and Ahmadinejad.  On
    issues where the Supreme Leader's opinions were clear, Postl
    argued that other influential Iranians would not "touch on
    issues," even to undercut Ahmadinejad.  The only way to
    challenge these leaders was to focus on "unjust" or
    un-Islamic behavior.

    ¶10.  (C)   Postl said that Majles Speaker Larijani probably
    was not in favor of the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) deal,
    but when MsnOff questioned whether he really opposed the deal
    or was responding to the fact that Ahmadinejad came out in
    favor of the deal, Postl recounted another possibility tied
    to the post-election environment.  Postl noted that he had
    asked someone close to Larijani whether he was aware of the
    rapes of election-related prisoners.  The interlocutors said
    that not only was Larijani aware, but all officials were
    aware of what was going on inside the prison.  Nevertheless,
    when Larijani spoke publicly about the issue, he stated
    clearly that the rapes are not occurring and thus lost some
    credibility with the Iranian public.  To have not given a
    more ambiguous response, such as that he would look into the
    situation, Larijani must have been under strong pressure from
    above, in Postl's estimation.  Given the clarity that what
    Ahmadinejad had done after the election was wrong and
    Larijani's distaste for Ahmadinejad, the TRR proposal may
    have been Larijani's first opportunity to strike back at

    UNVIE VIEN 00000553  003 OF 004

    Ahmadinejad.

    ¶11.  (C)   Postl also noted that Iran probably has whiplash
    from the international community's response to the Fordow
    Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP), which will complicate our
    efforts to press Iran into compliance with its obligations.
    Although IAEA Director General ElBaradei said after the first
    inspection of the FFEP that it was nothing more than "a hole
    in a mountain," the IAEA Board of Governors passed a
    resolution against Iran, citing the FFEP as one of its main
    points (ref A). Postl argued that this probably leads Iran to
    believe that the international community is not serious about
    the issue, and that, rather, this is "a game."

    ¶12.  (C)   One of Postl's contacts close to the Supreme
    Leader pointed him to a Kayhan article from December 1,
    written by editor Shariatmadari, which espouses the views of
    Khamenei on the nuclear issue.  The article argues that Iran
    has gotten nothing from cooperation and should withdraw from
    the NPT immediately.  Since Khamenei has said that he is not
    opposed to an opening with the U.S., it becomes about
    Washington presenting the right arguments at the right time.
    However, Postl said that bringing up the issue of the
    detained Americans at Geneva probably fell flat with the
    Iranians.  Iranian officials told Postl that they were
    surprised that American officials raised this issue at those
    talks.  This was the wrong time to bring up this issue, Postl
    argued, since these issues are not connected in the minds of
    the Iranians.  (We will explain to the Austrians why this
    issue is so important and resonates so much to the U.S.)
    Postl suggested that the UK model was better:  when their
    sailors were captured, UK officials said that this issue had
    nothing to do with the political problems between the two
    countries.  The dissociation of the issues worked in favor of
    getting the sailors released.  Pressed on when might be such
    a right time to address the U.S. detainees, Postl suggested
    that one such way might have been to capitalize on the
    October 1 Geneva talks by following up quickly with a call
    from Under Secretary Burns to Jalili "in the spirit of
    Geneva."  During that phone call, Burns could engage Jalili
    on the detainee issue as an aside.  Postl also noted that
    some of his Iranian government contacts had noted with
    pleasure the appointment of Ambassador Limbert to deal with
    the Iranian file given his understanding of Iran.

    ----------------------------
    Postl's Tehran Retrospective
    ----------------------------

    ¶13.  (C)   Looking back on his tenure as Ambassador to Iran,
    Postl noted that the biggest "game changer" had been this
    past summer's presidential elections.  The events were
    causing backlash from much of the population.  Parents and
    grandparents were saying, according to Postl, that they do
    not want their children to be forced to experience the same
    Iran that they, themselves, have been living under for the
    last 30 years.  For the first time, one can see "kill
    Khamenei" and "death to Khamenei" scrawled on walls in
    Tehran.  These direct challenges to Khamenei's authority are
    new and significant.  Additionally, Postl expects that the
    population was disillusioned by the overwhelming fraud in the
    elections and many will not vote in the future.

    ¶14.  (C)   On engagement, Postl suggested that some ways
    forward for the U.S. and Iran might be to look into using a
    route from Chah Bahar, on Iran's southern coast, to get U.S.
    supplies into Afghanistan and using the assumption of office
    by new IAEA Director General Amano to press for "a new start"
    on the Additional Protocol and additional transparency
    measures discussions.

    ¶15.  (C)   Postl reiterated his message that Iranian citizens
    see the Voice of America (VOA) as biased and asked that we
    not underestimate their frustration.  If they see a pervasive
    media outlet as biased, this presents the U.S. in a negative
    light and works against U.S. messaging. He said that Iranians
    currently are faced with two biased choices: VOA and Iranian
    Broadcasting (IRIB).  In response to a MsnOff question about
    how BBC Persian is perceived, he noted that it is seen as
    more neutral, but has the stigma of being associated with the
    UK.  Postl floated the idea of U.S. support to Euro News to
    start broadcasting in Farsi.  He also suggested that doing
    Hardtalk in Persian might be one of the best outlets for U.S.
    arguments since the format of pitting opposing viewpoints
    against one another would counteract the perception of bias,
    but suggested that if our arguments to the Iranian people are
    not convincing, this quickly would become clear.  Finally,
    Postl noted that the U.S. should not shy away from interviews
    with Iranian media outlets, suggesting Press TV because it is
    in English and it is watched in Tehran.  A program built

    UNVIE VIEN 00000553  004 OF 004

    around broadcasting the differing opinions of the U.S., India
    (because its opinion is well-respected given its influence as
    a leader in the Nonaligned Movement), and Iran might be a
    useful way to get our messages across while counteracting
    perceptions of bias.
    DAVIES

`