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CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

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### Viewing cable 09ABUDHABI754, S) MbZ HOSTS GULF SECURITY DINNER WITH ISA ASD VERSHBOW AND

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
09ABUDHABI754 | 2009-07-23 09:09 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Abu Dhabi

`

    VZCZCXRO4493
    OO RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDIR
    DE RUEHAD #0754/01 2040940
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 230940Z JUL 09
    FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2770
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
    INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
    RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0493
    RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1754
    RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0930
    RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0684
    RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0436
    RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0112
    RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 0646
    RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 0927
    RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0662
    RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0486
    RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
    RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ABU DHABI 000754

    NOFORN
    SIPDIS

    FOR S AND S/SRAP HOLBROOKE
    DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARP AND SCA

    E.O. 12958: 07/22/2019
    TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL PARM EAID MOPS IR IS AF PK SY LE SA
    QA, AE

    SUBJECT: (S) MbZ HOSTS GULF SECURITY DINNER WITH ISA ASD VERSHBOW AND
    PM A/S SHAPIRO

    CLASSIFIED BY CHARGE D'AFFAIRES DOUGLAS C.GREENE FOR REASONS 1.4 B
    AND D.

    REF A SECRETARY'S LETTER TO MBZ ON PUMA HELICOPTERS
    REF B SECSTATE 76108

    ¶1. (S) Summary: Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ, also
    Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces and de facto defense
    chief) hosted a July 19 executive session of the Gulf Security
    Dialogue in Abu Dhabi (July 20 plenary with UAE uniformed officers
    reported septel).  The U.S. delegation was led by Assistant Secretary
    of Defense for International Security Affairs Alexander Vershbow and
    Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs Andrew
    Shapiro.  MbZ called for advanced U.S.-UAE joint military
    coordination and faster delivery of FMS items to respond to a
    worst-case scenario in Iran.  As with other senior U.S. officials
    (but with increasing alarm and a shortening time frame), MbZ focused
    on the Iranian threat and his belief that an Israeli pre-emptive
    strike on Iran is likely in a matter of months.  ASD Vershbow assured
    MbZ of the U.S. commitment to UAE security; A/S Shapiro relayed that
    this visit was his first since taking his new position - reflecting
    the importance we place on the relationship.  Discussions also
    centered on UAE military and humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan
    and Pakistan and the peace process.   End summary.

    ¶2. (SBU) Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ) hosted a
    working dinner with U.S. Gulf Security Dialogue delegation the
    evening of July 19.  The U.S. Delegation was led by Assistant
    Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs Andrew Shapiro and
    Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
    Alexander Vershbow and included RADM William Payne, Ambassador, and
    DCM.  The UAE was represented by Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces
    Hamad Thani al-Rumaithi, Ambassador to the U.S. Yousef al-Otaiba,
    Under Secretary of the Crown Prince's Court Mohamed al-Mazrouei,
    Deputy Chief of Staff Ali Hamad al-Kaabi and Air Force Chief Mohammed
    Swaidan al-Qamzi.

    Joint Planning for Worst-Case Scenario in Iran
    --------------------------------------------- -

    ¶3. (S) In a three-hour working dinner, MbZ focused primarily on his
    overarching concern -- the threat from Iran, stressing as he has with
    other senior U.S. officials that U.S. engagement with Iran will
    ultimately fail and that he fears a surprise (Israeli pre-emptive
    strike on Iran) in a shorter timeframe than USG estimates (he fears
    it could happen this year).  ASD Vershbow assured MbZ of the U.S.
    commitment to UAE security; A/S Shapiro relayed that his trip to the
    UAE was his first since taking on his new position, reflecting the
    importance we place on the relationship.

    ¶4. (S/NF) MbZ reiterated his belief that an Israeli pre-emptive
    strike against Iran was increasingly likely, saying he was convinced
    the Netanyahu government was prepared to act against Iran, and that
    he agreed with Israeli intelligence assessments regarding how close
    Tehran is to achieving its nuclear ambitions.  The Iranian response
    to a pre-emptive strike, predicted MbZ, would be attacks on U.S.
    allies in the region, foremost among them the UAE; Iran may also
    unleash terrorist cells against western interests around the world.
    ASD Vershbow explained that the USG assessment differed in timeframe
    -- we do not anticipate military confrontation with Iran before the
    end of 2009 -- stressing, however, that denying Iran's nuclear
    ambitions and stemming its efforts to achieve regional hegemony were
    foremost among U.S. international security concerns.

    ¶5. (S) In response to MbZ's position that ultimately engagement
    efforts with Iran would fail, both ASD and A/S  made clear than while
    the USG continues to press for a diplomatic solution, the offer of
    engagement is not opened-ended and will not come at the expense of
    Gulf security.

    ABU DHABI 00000754  002 OF 004

    ¶6. (S) Referring to the Iran Region Presence Office (IRPO) in Dubai,
    MbZ asked "how's that office doing?"  He did not demonstrate any
    particular concern or sensitivity regarding IRPO activities in UAE.
    MbZ said that the Iranian regime was in trouble internally and would
    move swiftly to oppress post-election opposition.  As for Rafsanjani,
    MbZ said he was a "survivor" who would not succeed in a leadership
    bid because he will not act unless he is one-hundred percent sure he
    will win.  Again turning to his primary security concern, MbZ
    suggested that Tehran would likely accelerate its nuclear program to
    draw attention away from its internal weakness and to foment
    nationalism among its citizenry.  "Time is not on our side", he said,
    hinting that a move should be made against Iran and "the sooner the
    better."

    Russia
    ------

    ¶7. (C)ASD Vershbow briefed MbZ on the positive outcome of POTUS's
    recent talks in Moscow.  MbZ said that he had met with Putin in June
    and he did not believe Russia saw a nuclearized Iran as a challenge
    to its interests, nor did Putin appreciate the threat of regional
    proliferation in response to an Iranian bomb.  He encouraged the U.S.
    to continue to press the Russians saying he believed if the Russians
    came over to our side, (with regard to tougher sanctions), the
    Chinese would follow.  MbZ said his he would travel in late July to
    Beijing, where he will surely press the Chinese on Iran.  ASD
    Vershbow suggested he urge the Chinese to send Iran a message by
    diversifying its oil imports away from Iran.

    Afghanistan - Neighbors Not Doing Enough
    ----------------------------------------

    ¶8. (S/NF) MbZ complained that Arab regimes are not doing enough to
    help in Afghanistan.  He said that as of one month ago, he surveyed
    the region and found that only Oman had funded its Tokyo conference
    pledge of $2 million.  He singled out Saudi Arabia and Qatar in
    particular for not doing their part, saying that the Saudis clearly
    did not see how important it was to their own interests.

    ¶9. (S/NF) MbZ criticized other regional leaders for playing both
    sides and for "dating" Iran.  MbZ compared the current situation to
    pre-WWII Europe saying, "Ahmedinejad is Hitler," and neighboring
    capitals believe erroneously that they can prevent Iranian
    retaliation by playing nice or signing agreements with Tehran.  "They
    think the are backing the winning horse," MbZ explained, emphasizing
    that if they think that by appeasing Iran they will avoid Iranian
    retaliation "then they are seriously mistaken, Sir."

    National Defense Strategy
    -------------------------

    ¶10. (S) Throughout the discussions, MbZ repeatedly called for
    coordinated military planning for the worst-case scenario of an
    unpredictable Iranian response to an Israeli strike, stressing that
    U.S.-UAE preparations must begin now well before commencement of
    hostilities.  Both sides agreed that improved coordination was a good
    idea, with ASD Vershbow utilizing the opportunity to push for a UAE
    national defense strategy.  (Note: GSD July 20 plenary meeting
    reported septel.  End Note.)

    Pakistan - 14 Additional PUMAs
    ------------------------------

    ¶11. (C) Passing a letter from Secretary Clinton thanking the UAE for
    its transfer of 14 U.S.-origin PUMA helicopters to Pakistan, A/S
    Shapiro thanked MbZ for the UAEG's partnership and regional
    leadership in providing assistance to Pakistan as well as its
    long-term participation in the coalition in Afghanistan.  MbZ updated
    the delegation on delivery status, saying that 10 of the promised 14

    ABU DHABI 00000754  003 OF 004

    had been delivered and the remaining 4 would shortly follow.  He
    added that efforts were underway to find and purchase additional
    helicopters, announcing (for the first time that we have heard this)
    the UAE's intentions to provide Pakistan with an additional 14 PUMAs.

    Humanitarian Aid for CT
    -----------------------
    ¶12. (C) In the context of defeating AQ in Afghanistan and Pakistan,
    MbZ called for Arab and Muslim regimes to do more to stem terrorist
    financing, whether it means closing down charities, business
    interests, "whatever is necessary."  He also pointed to the
    zealousness of Arab fighters vice Afghani nationals.  Nine-five
    percent of Arab fighters go to Afghanistan knowing they are going to
    die for ideological reasons.  Afghan nationals, on the other hand,
    are more practical.  "This makes one of them [Arabs] more valuable to
    AQ than ten or more Afghan fighters."  Afghanis, MbZ pointed out,
    have tribes, families, homes -- therefore the best way to counter
    local extremism in Afghanistan, and to a lesser extent Pakistan, is
    to improve the quality of life.

    ¶13. (SBU) MbZ described UAE humanitarian commitments of $300 million
    to build "model villages" in Afghanistan, complete with housing,
    hospitals and schools.  He invited the USG to join the UAE, Germany
    and France in this effort.  A/S Shapiro stressed the urgency of the
    displaced persons crisis in the Swat region of Pakistan, suggesting
    the UAE consider housing aid in this region.  MbZ replied "Why not?
    We will try to help wherever needed."

    MbZ on Pakistani Leadership
    ---------------------------

    ¶14. (S/NF) MbZ shared his assessment of the current Pakistani
    leadership saying President "Zardarni is dirty but not dangerous,"
    while Prime Minister Sharif is "dangerous but not dirty -- this is
    Pakistan.  Sharif cannot be trusted to honor his promises.  MbZ
    continued that a new personality may emerge but for the time being
    the UAE position was to play a helpful role by supporting the PM.

    Lebanon - Support for LAF and PM Hariri
    ---------------------------------------

    ¶15. (C) ASD Vershbow reiterated our request that the UAEG assist the
    Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) by funding the purchase and transfer of
    some of 56 U.S.-origin tanks from Jordan to Lebanon, noting our
    appreciation of the UAE's earlier funding of the first 10 tanks.
    This would help capitalize on the positive outcome of the elections
    and help reduce Hezbollah's (and Iran's) influence in Lebanon.
    Promising to look into what the UAE could do to help with this
    matter, MbZ asked if we had made the same request to Doha.  ASD
    replied that we had and that he would do so again when he arrived in
    Qatar July 20.

    ¶16. (C) Reiterating his favored theme of the generation gap in
    regional leadership (UAE having already passed the baton to the
    younger generation), MbZ praised Lebanese PM Saad Hariri, saying he
    was a good man.  "He feels very threatened at the moment (presumably
    by the Syrian regime), and it is important we do not lose him."  A/S
    Shapiro agreed, pointing to U.S. security assistance as proof of our
    concern and suggested that the UAE support U.S. efforts to strengthen
    Lebanese government institutions as the best opportunity to build GOL
    stability and security.

    July 18 Nasrallah Speech
    ------------------------

    ¶17. (S) MbZ pointed to Hezbollah SYG Hassan Nasrallah's July 18
    speech, saying he believed it reflected a change in Hezbollah's tone
    due to calculations that its Iranian backers were currently in a
    weakened state post-Presidential elections.  MbZ said that Nasrallah
    is likely suffering from decreased financial support, at least for

    ABU DHABI 00000754  004 OF 004

    the next six months.

    Behavior Change in Syria - I Think Not
    --------------------------------------

    ¶18. (S/NF) Vershbow pointed to recent progress with Syria on border
    control issues to stem the flow of foreign fighters to Iraq as a
    small step forward in effort at eliciting behavioral change from
    Damascus.  MbZ showed no confidence that Syria could be separated
    from the Iranian camp.  "If you want my opinion," replied MbZ, "I
    think not."  He advised that Syria had a lot of options and that,
    judging from past behavior, the regime would continue hedging on key
    regional issues (Iran, support for Hezbollah, peace process) for the
    foreseeable future.

    Praise for Bahraini Crown Prince
    --------------------------------

    ¶19. (C) MbZ said that a two-state solution was the only option for
    solving the Israeli-Palestinian issue.  MbZ praised the Bahraini
    Crown Prince Sheikh Salman bin Hamad al Khalifa for his "courageous"
    (July 17) editorial in the Washington Post (ref B), commenting that
    not enough Arab countries we on the right side of this issue.

    ¶20. (U) ASD Vershbow and A/S Shapiro cleared this message.

`