Currently released so far... 243 / 251,287

### Articles

Brazil

### Browse by release date

2010/11

### Browse by creation date

66 72 79 86 89 90 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02
1979/08
1986/05
1989/12
1990/01
2004/01 2004/12
2005/03 2005/05 2005/06 2005/12
2006/04 2006/08 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D H I J K L M P R S T U
Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bishkek Embassy Berlin Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad
Embassy Cairo Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Doha Embassy Damascus Consulate Dubai
Embassy Harare
Iran RPO Dubai Consulate Istanbul
Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kabul
Embassy London
Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Manama Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich
Embassy Prague Embassy Paris Embassy Panama
Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh
Secretary of State Embassy Sanaa Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa
USEU Brussels UNVIE

### Browse by tag

A B C E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U X Y Z
AE ASEC AM AF AR AU AORC AJ AG
BA BR BH BY BU
CVIS CH CASC CF COUNTERTERRORISM CD CV
ETRD ECON ELAB EFIN ENRG EG ETTC EPET EINV EFIS EXTERNAL EAID EUN EU ECUN EAIR EZ EAGR ELTN ECPS
FR
GM GG GR GOI GE GA
HO
IR IAEA IS IZ INRB IN IRAJ IQ IT
JO JA
KNNP KHLS KJUS KDEM KSPR KPKO KUNR KWBG KWMN KPAL KCRM KU KG KHIV KPRP KZ KN KTFN KGHG KSCA KMDR KPAO KCOR KACT KIRF KS KTIA KISL
LE LY LG
MNUC MPOS MARR MU MASS MOPS MCAP MOPPS MK MAR MTCRE MY ML MR
NATO NG
OPDC OEXC OIIP OVIP OPRC OTR OTRA
PGOV PREL PARM PTER PINR PHUM PINS PREF PM PEPR PROP PK PBIO PA PBTS PECON POLITICAL PARTIES
QA
RU RS RW
SA SYR SY SO SU SF SCUL SM SNAR SOCI SENV SP SG
TRGY TU TI TX TC TSPA
US UZ UE UK UNESCO UP UNSC UV
XF XA
YM
ZP ZR ZF ZI

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page

### Viewing cable 09BAGHDAD1103, IRAN IN IRAQ: STRATEGY FOR PRESSURING IRGC-QF

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09BAGHDAD1103.
Help us extend and defend this work

Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
09BAGHDAD1103 | 2009-04-24 16:04 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Baghdad

`

    VZCZCXRO8610
    PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDIR RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
    DE RUEHGB #1103/01 1141618
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    P 241618Z APR 09
    FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2829
    INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 001103

    NOFORN
    SIPDIS

    DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/I AND NEA/IR
    NSC STAFF FOR OLLIVANT AND MAGSAMEN

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/23/2029
    TAGS: PREL PTER PINR MOPS ECON ETRD IR IZ
    SUBJECT: IRAN IN IRAQ: STRATEGY FOR PRESSURING IRGC-QF

    REF: A. 07 BAGHDAD 150
         ¶B. 07 BAGHDAD 488
         ¶C. BAGHDAD 289

    Classified By: Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Patricia A. Butenis for
     reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

    ¶1. (S/NF) Summary:  Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps - Quds
    Force (IRGC-QF) officers are active in Iraq, conducting
    traditional espionage and supporting violent extremists as
    well as supporting both legitimate and malign Iranian
    economic and cultural outreach.  Iraqis and their government
    have demonstrated increasing willingness to push back against
    malign Iranian influence in the last year.  Working with the
    Iraqis, we have succeeded in stopping some IRGC-QF activity
    through military operations and diplomatic engagement, while
    we prevented some IRGC-QF officers from entering Iraq through
    explicit warnings that we would target them unilaterally.
    However, under the Security Agreement effective January 1,
    all operations in Iraq must be conducted in conjunction with
    Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), and our previous unilateral
    warnings carry less weight.  As Coalition Forces continue the
    period of responsible drawdown, we will rely increasingly on
    the GOI to keep the pressure on the IRGC-QF.  We intend to
    support the GOI in these efforts through continued diplomatic
    engagement, intelligence sharing, and our security
    partnership of Coalition Forces working by, with, and through
    the ISF. End summary.

    -----------
    Background:
    -----------

    ¶2. (S/NF) IRGC-QF leadership took advantage of the vacuum
    which surrounded the fall of Saddam Hussein and the entry of
    Coalition Forces into Iraq in 2003, using the opportunity to
    send operatives to Iraq when little attention was focused on
    Iran.  In January 2007, Coalition Forces raided an unofficial
    Iranian consulate in Erbil, detaining five Iranians who
    claimed to be diplomats but in reality held no diplomatic
    status.  They were suspected of operations aimed at killing
    Coalition and Iraqi security forces (refs A and B).  The
    original targets of the raid, IRGC-QF officers Abbas Hoseyni
    (of the Erbil office) and Hormat Faruqi (of the Sulaimaniyah
    office), escaped and fled to Iran.  The Iranian government
    immediately pulled back most IRGC-QF officers from Iraq and
    shuttered its "consulates" in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah until
    mid-2007; consulates in Basrah and Karbala remained open.
    Since 2007, Iran has submitted diplomatic visa applications
    for Hoseini and Faruqi to return to Iraq.  In 2008 the
    Embassy and MNF-I convinced the GOI not to approve these
    applications, making it clear if they returned to Iraq, they
    would be targeted by Coalition Forces.

    ¶3. (S/NF) Since 2008, the MFA has passed names of Iranians
    applying for diplomatic visas to the US Embassy for vetting.
    Background checks have revealed that about 20 percent have
    possible ties to the IRGC or Iran's Ministry of Intelligence
    and Security (MOIS) (ref C).  The MFA has informed us that it
    denies visas to all new suspected intelligence officers, but
    we have not been able to verify such claims.  In January
    2009, the MFA passed a list of 35 names to the USG of Iranian
    diplomats already in country before the vetting process
    began.  Of those, eight had ties to IRGC or MOIS.

    --------
    Strategy
    --------

    ¶4. (S/NF) As U.S. forces continue a period of responsible
    draw down, we will seek to ensure that the GOI understands
    that IRGC-QF activity harms Iraq -- which should be
    self-evident if the IRGC-QF continues to conduct malign
    activity that targets Iraqi citizens and infrastructure.
    Qactivity that targets Iraqi citizens and infrastructure.
    Engagements with political and security leadership at the
    national and provincial level, intelligence sharing, and
    security cooperation will be key to explaining the dangers of
    IRGC-QF activity and providing Iraqis the information they
    need to defend their own interests.  The following are
    diplomatic, political, military, intelligence, and public
    information options which either the GOI can pursue
    unilaterally, or in concert with the USG, to target IRGC-QF
    activity in Iraq.

    ---------
    Diplomacy
    ---------

    BAGHDAD 00001103  002 OF 003

    ¶5. (S/NF) We intend to continue working closely with the MFA
    to deny visas to Iranian intelligence officers.  We may also
    consider suggesting that the MFA use another diplomatic tool,
    albeit one with more consequences --  the "persona non grata"
    designation.  The MFA may be reluctant to take this step
    because Iraqi diplomats in Iran would face retaliation and
    the dispute would inevitably become public.  Since the fall
    of Saddam, the GOI has avoided most public disagreements with
    Iran.

    --------------------
    Security Partnership
    --------------------

    ¶6. (S/NF) The role of the ISF in countering IRGC-QF in Iraq
    is critical, yet complex.  We can encourage the Iraqi Army to
    take the lead on kinetic action against IRGC-QF agents, with
    Iraqi police monitoring and reacting to suspicious activity
    at the local level.  We intend to continue to strengthen our
    partnership with the ISF to counter pro-Iranian elements who
    have infiltrated the security forces such as Kata'ib
    Hizbollah and Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq.  While the US combat mission
    will end by August 31, 2009, we will continue to assist the
    Ministry of Defense (MOD) with training, equipment, mentoring
    and other bilateral military-to-military programs and
    engagements.  Military sales, such as the recent Iraqi
    interest in purchasing F-16s and plans to transition from
    AK-47 to M-4 rifles, will increase US influence through
    training and support in Iraq for years to come, although the
    MOD will continue to consider weapons purchases from other
    sources as well.

    ---------------
    Border Controls
    ---------------

    ¶7. (S) The Department of Border Enforcement (DBE) can help
    limit IRGC-QF activity by combating smuggling and
    scrutinizing people and cargo crossing legitimate routes from
    Iran into Iraq.  While the DBE currently has a strong
    commander, Major General Mohsen Abdul Hasan Lazim, corruption
    at the ports of entry (POEs), unwillingness of inspectors to
    do their jobs, and poor leadership and professionalism at the
    supervisory level keep the DBE from being fully effective.
    The USG can assist, however. Personal Identification Secure
    Comparison and Evaluation System (PISCES), which checks
    travelers' biographic data, is already in use at many land
    and air POEs around Iraq.  Additional training at sea ports,
    airports, and land borders could help Iraqi officials detect
    smugglers of cash, weapons, weapons components and other
    contraband.  An Iranian IRGC-QF officer was briefly detained
    at Baghdad International Airport in November 2008 when his
    name was flagged in PISCES.  In January 2009, KRG's Minister
    of the Interior Karim Sinjari praised PISCES and asked for
    the system at two more land border entry points the KRG
    shares with Iran, Khalil Ibrahim and Hadjer Meran.

    ¶8. (S) As of April 2009, there were 200 PISCES units in
    operation at 15 different POEs in Iraq.  Current guidance
    states that every traveler entering or exiting Iraq is
    processed through PISCES.  On occasion however, travelers
    will pay a small "fee" to enter or exit without going through
    PISCES.   If a potential match is found to someone on the
    "stop list," the screen freezes, and only INIS can unlock the
    screen and conduct a secondary inspection.  INIS notifies the
    GOI or USG when the identity of a wanted person is confirmed.
     PISCES is operated by Immigration officers assigned to the
    Department of Travel and Nationality, and the GOI will
    continue to use PISCES after the military drawdown.
    Collection and storage of biometric data is another tool the
    QCollection and storage of biometric data is another tool the
    GOI is already using at POEs, although Biometric Automated
    Toolset (BAT) system is run by U.S. forces and will not stay
    in Iraq after their departure.

    ¶9. (S/NF) A timely example of cooperation with DBE in
    countering Iranian lethal aid smuggling occurred April 14.  A
    DBE brigade in Maysan Province, partnered with Multi-National
    Division-South (MND-S) forces, captured an unmanned boat
    carrying explosive devices floating in the Huwayza Marsh.
    The patrol found three explosively formed projectiles (EFPs)
    and other military equipment.  MND-S said it was the first
    time the DBE had reported success against this type of
    smuggling.

    --------------------
    Intelligence Sharing
    --------------------

    BAGHDAD 00001103  003 OF 003

    ¶10. (S/NF) Coordinating with GOI intelligence agencies to
    stop IRGC-QF activity is complicated by the fact that the
    Iraqi intelligence establishment is extremely fragmented.
    Intelligence offices affiliated with the Ministry of the
    Interior (MOI), DBE, and the Ministry of State for National
    Security Affairs (MSNSA) do not trust each other and often
    work in opposition.  The USG could further assist Iraqi
    intelligence by negotiating and approving a bilateral
    US-Iraqi intelligence sharing agreements and further
    providing the GOI with intelligence that demonstrates the
    involvement of IRGC-QF officers in lethal assistance to
    extremists. US Forces in Iraq have established positive
    relationships with their ISF counterparts and are developing
    appropriate intelligence-sharing mechanisms. The USG can also
    assist the GOI to further develop its intelligence
    infrastructure to monitor malign Iranian influence and
    counter the IRGC-QF.  INIS currently interacts closely with
    the Office of Regional Affairs (ORA).  The establishment of a
    Defense Attach's Office at the Embassy will also help
    facilitate intelligence sharing and is under consideration by
    Chief of Mission.

    -------------------
    Public Information
    -------------------

    ¶11. (S/NF) Highlighting nefarious Iranian activity to GOI
    leadership and the Iraqi public has had a significant impact
    on increasing GOI willingness to confront Iran, as well as
    public rejection of Iranian attempts to dominate Iraq's
    political and economic sectors.  Provincial elections
    demonstrated that perceived fealty to Iran is a political
    liability for Iraqi politicians, and they are increasingly
    sensitive to it.  Continued USG assistance in uncovering and
    publicizing Iranian attempts to influence events in Iraq will
    make the country a much more inhospitable environment for
    IRGC-QF operatives.

    -------
    Comment
    -------

    ¶12. (S/NF) The Iranian government may sense that the drawdown
    of U.S. military forces in Iraq presents an opportunity to
    expand IRGC-QF activity, although the broader regional
    dynamic will undoubtedly also influence Iranian decision
    making.  Without the ability to conduct unilateral military
    action against IRGC-QF operatives in Iraq, we will leverage
    our evolving diplomatic, intelligence, security, and military
    partnerships with Iraq to maintain pressure.  Many USG
    agencies will be involved in assisting the Iraqis in this
    critical area, and must actively engage in order to counter
    IRGC-QF officers and their lethal aid.
    BUTENIS

`