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CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

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### Viewing cable 07PARIS4685, YOUR DECEMBER 16-18 VISIT TO FRANCE

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
07PARIS4685 | 2007-12-11 15:03 | SECRET | Embassy Paris

`

    VZCZCXRO8936
    OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHFL RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV
    DE RUEHFR #4685/01 3451512
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 111512Z DEC 07
    FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1429
    INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEHMRE/AMCONSUL MARSEILLE PRIORITY 1933
    RUEHSR/AMCONSUL STRASBOURG PRIORITY 0514

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 004685

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR CRAIG STAPLETON

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2017
    TAGS: OVIP PREL PGOV PINR KPAL EU FR LG SY IS IR
    SUBJECT: YOUR DECEMBER 16-18 VISIT TO FRANCE

    PARIS 00004685  001.2 OF 004

    Classified By: Ambassador Craig R. Stapleton, for reasons 1.5 (b) and (
    d)

    SUMMARY
    -------

    ¶1.  (C) That the first international follow-on to Annapolis
    is taking place in Paris reflects the new confidence and
    greater cooperation that characterize our relationship with
    France seven months into the Presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy.
    France's support for our efforts to achieve peace in the
    Middle East contrasts sharply with its previous preferred
    role as a side-line critic.  It is just one example of the
    broader re-positioning of France vis-a-vis the U.S. which we
    have been quick to recognize and take advantage of.
    Sarkozy's desire to maximize France's influence by working
    with the U.S. to address common challenges is the
    international component of a larger ambition for his
    five-year Presidency: to renew France though deep reform at
    home and resumption of its leadership in Europe.  With an
    exceptionally long political honeymoon behind him, Sarkozy is
    now pressing ahead with his domestic reform agenda.  He has
    met with predictable opposition (most dramatically in the
    form of transport strikes), and some questioning among
    political allies of his strategy of undertaking sequential,
    calibrated reform rather than a Thatcherite big bang at the
    outset of his term.  Despite the difficulty of the challenge,
    including an unsettled international economic context, and
    little budgetary room for maneuver, Sarkozy remains
    determined to see his program through.  Given his dominant
    political position, that remains a realistic prospect.  An
    activist on the international scene, with an opportunistic
    eye for grabbing attention and credit, Sarkozy will remain a
    challenging partner despite his desire to improve the
    bilateral relationship.  He has concentrated responsibility
    for foreign affairs in the Presidency to an unprecedented
    degree, while Foreign Minister Kouchner has focused on
    selected policy issues.  This message also addresses the
    specifics of France's Middle East policies.  While under
    Sarkozy the French are more supportive, our collaboration
    (and intra-GOF coordination) on Lebanon has of late not been
    as close as it should be, as Sarkozy's team in the Elysee has
    focused single-mindedly on electing a President while
    squeezing the democratically-elected majority and weakening
    its ability to deal with post-election challenges.  End
    Summary

    THE RELATIONSHIP
    ----------------

    ¶2.  (C) Madame Secretary, The seven months since Nicolas
    Sarkozy became President of France -- and the six months
    since your last visit -- has been a remarkable period in
    three respects.  First, our relationship with France has
    undergone a significant qualitative change.  Sarkozy has set
    in place a new paradigm for French foreign policy, one more
    favorable to our interests.  Scrapping Chirac's worldview,
    which equated French leadership with containing U.S.
    hegemony, Sarkozy has articulated the need for France to work
    closely with the U.S. -- in order to address common
    challenges, but also as the surest way to increase France's
    global influence.  France's increased involvement in and
    commitment to Afghanistan, the beginning of a French interest
    in Iraq, and France's consideration of a full return to NATO,
    are the most symbolically powerful examples of France's
    policy reorientation.  Second, we have ratcheted up our
    cooperation with France across our foreign policy agenda,
    particularly on Middle East issues, but also on Kosovo,
    Burma, Sudan/Darfur and elsewhere.  In Lebanon, Sarkozy's
    more activist foreign policy has already put the new
    cooperative relationship to the test.  Third, over the past
    seven months, Sarkozy has begun to implement the ambitious
    platform of domestic reform he had promised as a candidate.

    SARKOZY
    -------

    ¶3.  (C)  Before addressing the Middle East issues that will
    be the focus of your visit here, a word on the domestic
    context.  Sarkozy enjoyed an exceptionally long political
    honeymoon, one which extended well into the Fall.  His
    election -- representing the victory of a new-generation
    leader, one with unmatched communication skills and a
    detailed and ambitious program for renewing France -- led to
    a season of national elan and optimism.  The return to normal

    PARIS 00004685  002.2 OF 004

    in the political life of the country over the past two months
    was predictable, as Sarkozy's efforts to implement difficult
    domestic changes have run into opposition from those -- such
    as rail workers -- who stand to lose, and many others who
    fear change of any kind.  Sarkozy has disappointed some in
    his own camp for not immediately embarking on radical,
    deep-rooted, pervasive reform, taking advantage of his
    electoral mandate.  Instead, Sarkozy has decided to carefully
    pick his battles, gaining momentum from each piecemeal
    victory.  All in all, Sarkozy remains in a politically
    powerful position, operating as the hands-on leader of a
    largely unchecked executive branch, unencumbered for now by a
    political opposition worthy of the name.  He is determined to
    make his mark during his five year term (which he insists may
    be his single term of office), but has demonstrated greater
    caution than might have been expected, mindful of the
    international economic and financial environment, and severe
    budgetary constraints at home.

    KOUCHNER
    --------

    ¶4.  (C)  Sarkozy's foreign minister, Bernard Kouchner, was
    the prize catch in Sarkozy's opportunistic effort to appoint
    figures of the center and center-left to his government,
    thereby increasing its legitimacy and political heft (and
    depleting that of the opposition) as he waged the domestic
    reform battle.  While rumors circulate of a cabinet
    re-shuffle early in the new year or following municipal
    elections in March, Kouchner's position appears secure for
    now.  (Defense Minister Morin and Interior Minister
    Alliot-Marie are among those thought most imperiled.)  He
    enjoys a personal chemistry with the President based on
    Sarkozy's long-time admiration of Kouchner's personal and
    political courage and humanitarian accomplishments.  Kouchner
    remains very popular -- consistently scoring at or near the
    top of the polls measuring the popularity of France's
    political leaders.  But even his star quality (that he alone
    in the government can claim) has not kept him from being
    eclipsed by his hyper-active and media-savvy president.
    Surely more of a concern to Kouchner, Sarkozy has
    concentrated foreign policy decision-making and
    implementation to an unprecedented degree in the Elysee, with
    Secretary-General Claude Gueant and Diplomatic Advisor

    SIPDIS
    Jean-David Levitte accruing as much if not more influence
    than Kouchner.  Kouchner has largely focused on the issues
    with which he has the greatest experience and level of
    comfort -- Lebanon, Kosovo, and Darfur among them.  While he
    has of late curbed his penchant for off-the-cuff,
    undiplomatic public comments, the thin-skinned Kouchner has
    shown irritation over the involvement of Elysee officials in
    the delicate negotiations over Lebanon's presidential
    elections, and he may be uncomfortable with Sarkozy's
    increasing willingness to downgrade human rights
    considerations in his dealings foreign leaders, as
    demonstrated by the way he has kept his distance from the
    ongoing five-day visit to Paris of Mu'ammar Qadhafi.

    Middle East
    -----------

    ¶5.  (S)  Under Sarkozy, France's Middle East policies have
    become more supportive of and congruent with U.S. interests,
    but we are concerned that in the past few weeks our
    collaboration (and intra-GOF coordination) on Lebanon has not
    been what it should be, as Sarkozy's Presidency team has
    focused single-mindedly on electing a President in such a way
    that squeezes the democratically-elected majority and weakens
    its ability to deal with post-election challenges.

    --Arab/Israeli peace:  The French remain major supporters of
    our efforts focused on supporting the Israeli/Palestinian
    negotiations.  Their eagerness to make Annapolis a success
    and to host the Paris conference on assistance to the
    Palestinians underscored this.  Sarkozy and Kouchner both
    want France to be a key player in what they hope will be a
    strong and successful push in 2008 to the creation of a
    Palestinian state.  In many ways, France aspires to be a
    favored additional partner to the Quartet.  Syrian
    participation at Annapolis has also sparked hopeful
    commentary in the French media that a larger dynamic -- in
    which France can participate -- is underway that inter alia
    would foster an unraveling of the Syrian/Iranian relationship
    and halt Iranian inroads through support of Hizballah in
    Lebanon.  Sarkozy and Kouchner will listen attentively to any

    PARIS 00004685  003.2 OF 004

    vision you may outline of how you expect the negotiations to
    unfold and whether there is a reasonable expectation of them
    broadening to include Syria.

    --Lebanon:  Even as the French have become a positive force
    behind our efforts on behalf of Arab-Israeli peace, the close
    collaboration with the GOF under former President Chirac,
    with his single-minded focus on supporting Saad Hariri and
    isolating Syria, has suffered.  This is partly due to the
    extremely fluid situation in Lebanon.  But it also results
    from the tug of war between Kouchner and the Elysee over who
    is in charge of the issue, one that developed after it became
    clear the deadline for electing a new president would pass
    without a new candidate chosen.  There is abundant evidence
    that the Syrians, possibly with help from the Amir of Qatar
    (a friend of Sarkozy and President Bashar al-Asad), lured the
    Elysee into leading a process with far different objectives
    than the one Kouchner began last summer.  Whereas Kouchner
    was focused on helping the Lebanese get out of their
    political deadlock, Levitte and the Elysee have sought a
    resolution of the presidential crisis that would satisfy
    larger geopolitical aims involving Syria.  It is also clear
    to us that the Elysee, given Sarkozy,s obsession with
    achieving results, is focused on electing a president so that
    it can be considered another French diplomatic triumph.  The
    unfortunate net result continues to be the impression that
    French pressure for a deal falls exclusively on the March 14
    majority and not where it belongs -- on the March 8
    opposition that is acting in close coordination with Syria
    intent on wringing key concessions from the democratically
    elected majority.  Even if the presidential crisis is
    resolved by December 17, we would recommend that you discuss
    with Kouchner and Sarkozy how we can more effectively work
    together as we address the multitude of difficult challenges
    facing Lebanon, of which the Presidential election is only
    the first.

    --Iran:  The public release of the recent NIE on Iranian
    nuclear capabilities was a shock to all but the highest
    levels of the GOF, which was briefed on its conclusions.
    Although the French have publicly backed our view that Iran
    continues to pose a serious threat and further international
    sanctions are warranted (a line echoed in most of the French
    press), the GOF anticipates a major "communication problem"
    with its EU partners, the Iranians, China, and Russia.  There
    is further the delicate diplomacy France is undertaking with
    different elements in the Iranian regime in order to maintain
    a viable channel that bypasses President Ahmadinejad (who
    appeared to complain about this in a recent letter to
    Sarkozy).  In geostrategic terms, the French see Iran as the
    primary threat to the Middle East and worry about inroads it
    has made in Lebanon and Iraq.  As noted above, there is also
    some thinking, at least among analysts outside the GOF, that
    Annapolis and the NIE betoken a significant shift of U.S.
    strategy in the Bush Administration's last year that involves
    new U.S. thinking about Iran.  Sarkozy and Kouchner would
    welcome anything you could share with respect to how we
    regard Iran in a post-Annapolis Middle East.

    --Iraq:  French follow-up to Kouchner's visit to Baghdad last
    August and Iraqi President Talabani's subsequent visit to
    Paris has been slow.  Concern about the security situation,
    despite what the French acknowledge to be marginal
    improvements in some areas of Iraq, lack of coordination at
    the working level among French ministries, and the failure so
    far to achieve a breakthrough on national reconciliation have
    slowed or prevented follow-on French engagement.  Kouchner,
    however, did ask SecDef Gates for a list of specific areas in
    which we thought France could be helpful.  We should use that
    opening to engage the French in a more active dialogue
    between representatives of our respective interagencies.  We
    recommend that you use the opportunity to inquire about
    Kouchner's current thinking about French assistance to Iraq
    and let him know we would like to send an interagency team to
    Paris early in the New Year to begin these discussions.  We
    would further recommend that you ask Kouchner about his
    efforts to rally EU support for and to promote meaningful
    engagement with the Iraqi government.  You might also praise
    his personal commitment to Iraq's success, as demonstrated in
    part by his participation in the recent Istanbul summit.  We
    understand Kouchner may next visit Iraq in February when
    France is expected to open an embassy office in Irbil.

    PARIS 00004685  004.2 OF 004

    Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
    http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm

    STAPLETON

`