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### Viewing cable 09PARIS1097, IRAN: FRENCH COMMENTS ON DEALING WITH HOSTAGES

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
09PARIS1097 | 2009-08-12 14:02 | SECRET | Embassy Paris

`

    VZCZCXYZ0021
    OO RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHFR #1097/01 2241402
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 121402Z AUG 09 ZDS
    FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
    TO RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
    RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6952
    INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

` `

    S E C R E T PARIS 001097

    C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y (ADDED TAG)

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/12/2019
    TAGS: PGOV PREL CASC FR
    SUBJECT: IRAN: FRENCH COMMENTS ON DEALING WITH HOSTAGES

    REF: PARIS 1046

    Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Kathleen H. Allegrone, for
    reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

    ¶1.  (S) SUMMARY: President Sarkozy's Strategic Affairs
    Advisor Franois Richier and MFA Middle East Director (A/S
    equivalent) Patrice Paoli told Political Minister Counselor
    in separate meetings August 11 that the French approached
    their hostage situations in Iran by first seeking an
    immediate, behind-the-scenes resolution before the Iranians
    brought charges against their captives, and then, once that
    approach failed, by adopting a two-pronged strategy: (1)
    relentlessly publicizing the cases with repeated employment
    of key words chosen carefully to put the Iranians on the
    defensive, and (2) constant exertion of diplomatic and
    political pressure, with the help of allies, in the form of
    regular demarches in Tehran and convocations of Iranian
    Ambassadors in European and Middle Eastern capitals.  Paoli
    and Richier predicted that the Iranians will advise us, via
    the Swiss, to remain calm and quiet while waiting for Iranian
    legal procedures to move forward.  Ignore this warning, they
    insisted, because silence will not expedite the process.
    They argued that USG statements and actions can sway and even
    mobilize public opinion within Iran.  Whether or not we
    choose to speak out, they warned, the Iranians will
    energetically disseminate fabricated accusations.  As the USG
    seeks to engage the Iranians, Richier predicted it will be
    difficult to determine which Iranian institution currently
    has control of American hostages and, more importantly, which
    one has the authority to decide their fate.  The French still
    have not identified a key broker within the Iranian
    government with the power to resolve their own hostage cases.

    ¶2.  (S) SUMMARY (CONT'D): Paoli and Richier also warned of
    possible Iranian efforts to blackmail the USG.  They may try,
    for instance, to drag out the cases of the American and
    French hostages through the US/EU late September deadline for
    a response from the regime on the nuclear issue.  Richier
    said the French believe this familiar Iranian tactic --
    hostage-taking as political blackmail -- will only increase
    in the near future.  The Iranians may also seek specific
    exchanges, such as the release from French custody of Majid
    Kakavand, an Iranian national whom the French arrested March
    20 at Charles de Gaulle airport on the behalf of the U.S.
    Department of Justice on proliferation issues.  Overall, as
    the USG prepares to handle its hostage cases, the French
    recommended we prepare for uncertainty.  In the face of
    unpredictable Iranian behavior, Paoli and Richier said that
    constant pressure from foreign leaders and the media appears
    to be the only means to accelerate decision-making in Tehran.
     They also reported that the EU has no plans at the moment to
    recall its Ambassadors from Iran.  END SUMMARY.

    STEP 1: SEEK BEHIND-THE-SCENES RESOLUTION
    -----------------------------------------

    ¶3.  (S) Franois Richier and Patrice Paoli told the Political
    Minister Counselor that each time they learned of the arrest
    of their citizens in Iran, the GOF sought their immediate
    release through discrete but direct contact with Iranian
    officials.  (NOTE: Richier was accompanied by Mr. Lioutaud
    from the Office of French National Intelligence Coordinator,
    Bernard Bajolet (equivalent to our Director of National
    Intelligence).  END NOTE.)  They hoped to act quickly enough
    to prevent the regime from pressing formal charges.  Once the
    Iranians refused to release the prisoners, Paoli said, the
    prosecutors publicized the charges and began preparations for
    a public trial.  A trial seems to be a pre-condition for the
    release of foreign detainees in Iran, whom the French
    described as "hostages" held in order to achieve political
    goals.

    STEP 2: USE THE MEDIA TO PUT IRANIANS ON DEFENSIVE
    --------------------------------------------- -----

    ¶4.  (S) Once the quiet approach failed, the French launched a
    relentless public relations strategy.  They did not merely
    wait for questions from the press; instead, they made
    frequent pronouncements of their own about the hostages.
    They publicized the cases with repeated use of key words
    chosen carefully to put the regime on the defensive by
    influencing Iranian public opinion.  Paoli and Richier
    emphasized the susceptibility of the Iranian population to
    messages sent through the media.  USG public statements can
    sway and even mobilize public opinion within Iran, they
    claimed, especially in the post-election environment.
    ¶5.  (S) In their statements, the French repeatedly employed
    key words to focus attention on the rights of detainees, and
    on Iranian legal commitments to respect those rights, such as
    "basic human rights," "good treatment," "Vienna Convention."
    They also used words to refute the regime's false
    accusations, like "innocent," "baseless," and "immediate
    release."  Paoli said the French have deliberately avoided
    using the word "negotiation" when describing their contact
    with Iranian leaders: "We demand only their immediate
    liberation; we do not negotiate for the release of innocent
    civilians."  (NOTE: Paoli said he strongly regretted the
    mistaken use of the word "negotiate" recently by a GOF
    spokesman.  END NOTE.)

    ¶6.  (S) Moreover, the French predicted that the Iranians will
    advise us, via the Swiss, to remain calm and quiet.  They
    will imply that the cases will be resolved more quickly if we
    just wait for the Iranian legal procedures to move forward.
    Ignore this warning, Richier and Paoli insisted.  "Be vocal,"
    Richier advised, "even more so if the Iranians ask you not to
    be," because silence will not expedite the process.  "They
    are the masters of stalling tactics," Paoli said.  Whether or
    not we choose to remain silent about the cases, the Iranians
    will launch a media blitz.  They will energetically
    disseminate fabricated accusations about their captives,
    Richier predicted.  Paoli and Richier both acknowledged that
    an aggressive USG public posture involves risks as well, as
    it will "increase the value" of the hostages to Iranian
    leaders.  Nonetheless, they said they still believe that
    public pressure, on balance, will prove more effective than
    behind-the-scenes engagement.  Ideally, both public
    statements and private discussions can take place
    simultaneously.

    STEP 3: CALL ON ALLIES (AND OTHERS) TO PRESSURE IRAN
    --------------------------------------------- -------

    ¶7.  (S) Paoli and Richier advocated the constant exertion of
    diplomatic and political pressure on the Iranian regime.
    Recognizing the central role of the wiss protecting power,
    they suggested the USG enlist the help of other allies as
    well, in the form of regular demarches in Tehran and
    convocations of Iranian leaders in capitals around the world.
     Paoli explicitly stated that France would be willing to
    weigh in, if asked.  Richier explained that the French
    approached Syria almost immediately after they learned French
    citizien Clotilde Reiss had been arrested on July 1.  He then
    previewed the presidential communiqu about the release of
    the French Embassy employee, Nazak Afshar, in which the
    French explicitly thanked the Syrians for their help.  "Of
    course we don't know if the Syrians did anything," Richier
    admitted, "but we wanted to thank them anyway.  It should at
    least confuse the Iranians."  He said the French did not/not
    reach out to Russia and China for assistance, but he and
    Paoli both argued that the support of EU and other countries
    had a major impact on Iranian leaders.  The French have
    coordinated closely with the British, Richier said, though
    primarily on the ground in Tehran.  He suggested the USG
    consider approaching other countries, including relatively
    disinterested allies such as Brazil, and ask them to lean on
    the Iranians.  He also mentioned the potential impact of
    blogs written by Iranian ex-patriates in the U.S.

    GOOD LUCK FIGURING OUT WHO IS IN CHARGE IN TEHRAN
    --------------------------------------------- ----

    ¶8.  (S) Richier predicted it will be difficult to determine
    which Iranian institution currently has control of the U.S.
    hostages and, more importantly, which one has the authority
    to decide their fate.  The French still have not identified a
    key broker within the Iranian government with the power to
    resolve their own hostage cases.  They learned that the
    deliberative procedures of Iranian institutions remain
    unusually opaque.

    BE PREPARED FOR POLITICAL BLACKMAIL
    -----------------------------------

    ¶9.  (S) Richier said the Iranians have in the past tried to
    "blackmail" them, trading release of a French national for an
    Iranian national.  He warned of possible Iranian efforts to
    blackmail the USG.  The Iranians may try, for instance, to
    drag out the cases of the American and French hostages
    through the US/EU late September deadline for a response from
    the regime on the nuclear issue.  Richier said the French
    believe this familiar Iranian tactic -- hostage-taking as
    political blackmail -- will only increase in the near future.

    ¶10.  (S) The Iranians may also seek specific exchanges, such
    as the release from French custody of Majid Kakavand.
    Without going into details, Richier said Kakavand had been
    apprehended by the French and was under a U.S. extradition
    request.  He noted that GOF officials had briefed President
    Sarkozy on this case and that the French are prepared to
    continue holding him.  (Background from Embassy Justice
    Attache: Kakavand is an Iranian national whom the French
    arrested March 20 at Charles de Gaulle airport on behalf of
    the Department of Justice for extradition to the U.S. on
    export control (proliferation) charges.)  Then again, Richier
    noted, it is possible that the Iranian agency or agencies
    holding American citizens may not be aware of Kakavand, or
    may have no interest in his release; it is simply impossible
    to predict how their bureaucracies will behave.

    ¶11.  (S) Paoli said the French knew the Iranians intended to
    use the arrest of Clotilde Reiss and Nazak Afshar as a means
    to punish the French for their criticism of Iran's recent
    election results.  More importantly, the Iranians hoped to
    muzzle future French criticism: "They want to paralyze us,"
    Paoli said, explaining that the Iranians had failed in this
    attempt.  Of course, he added, the regime also wanted to use
    French and British hostages to validate their allegation that
    foreign agents organized the mass post-election protests.
    Paoli and Richier both reported that the Iranians continue to
    harass and intimidate the local employees of their Embassy in
    Tehran.  They described the burden on resources required to
    respond to each arrest: "The time we have had to devote to
    this is absolutely ridiculous," Richier said.

    ADAPT YOUR APPROACH FOR EACH HOSTAGE
    ------------------------------------

    ¶12.  (S) Before offering accounts of the French experience
    with hostages in Iran, Richier and Paoli were both at pains
    to avoid offering any absolute advice.  They noted
    significant differences in the cases of Stephane Lherbier,
    Reiss, Afshar, the Americans captured near the border with
    Kurdistan, and other U.S.-Iranian dual nationals currently in
    custody.  Paoli said the French made a concerted, and
    successful, effort to keep the case of Stephane Lherbier
    "apolitical."  (NOTE: Lherbier, a French fisherman arrested
    by the Iranians in 2006, spent almost a year in prison prior
    to his release in 2007.  END NOTE.)  Since the Iranians have
    already accused the French and British hostages of espionage,
    Paoli and Richier suggested the USG make strenuous efforts to
    distance those cases from the situation of the U.S. hikers
    currently in captivity.  Moreover, in 2007, Iranian leaders
    did not perceive the French as negatively as they do now,
    which they said has further complicated the recent hostage
    cases.  Richier and Paoli both warned that the USG must make
    every effort to dissuade the Iranians from politicizing the
    case of the American hikers; thus far, they noted, Iranian
    officials have not formally linked them to the case against
    opposition members and the British and French hostages.
    Richier reported that the French found the Iranian "system"
    to be "perverse and complex but stable" in 2006, when seeking
    the release of Lherbier.  "Now it is still perverse and
    complex," Richier said, "but unstable, and this makes
    everything more difficult."

    BRACE FOR UNCERTAINTY
    ---------------------

    ¶13.  (S) Paoli stressed in particular the uncertain and
    unpredictable nature of French dealings with Iran in hostage
    situations.  There are no procedural certainties, and the
    timing of various steps appears arbitrary.  Progress toward a
    trial could take months, depending on variables such as the
    political environment and the whims of key actors inside
    Iranian institutions.  "Anything is possible and we know next
    to nothing," Paoli said, citing the recent arrest and quick
    release of a French citizen who told Iranian provincial
    police he was a researcher following the paths of the
    dinosaurs.  In the face of this uncertainty, Paoli and
    Richier said that constant pressure from foreign leaders and
    the media appears to be the only means to accelerate
    decision-making in Iran.

    ¶14.  (S) Paoli and Richier described their continuing
    uncertainty about the case of Clotilde Reiss.  They both
    stopped short of confirming that she would soon be
    transferred from Evin prison to the French Embassy in Tehran,
    although they expressed strong optimism.  Richier added that
    this step will require the GOF to pay the Iranians a large
    sum, to ensure that Reiss stays in the country pending
    further legal action against her (reftel).  Richier would not
    say whether the French will permit the Iranians to take Reiss
    back to court, or to prison: "We're focused on our short-term
    objective right now -- getting her out of jail."  He said
    that the French worry the Iranians could decide to arrest in
    the near future another one of the approximately 1,800 French
    citizens living in Iran.

    EU HAS NO PLANS TO RECALL AMBASSADORS
    -------------------------------------

    ¶15.  (S) Paoli noted that the EU relations with Iran are
    extremely tense at the moment.  He said the Iranians
    currently refuse to receive the Swedish Ambassador, even in
    his capacity as representative of the EU Presidency.
    Nonetheless, barring extreme actions by the Iranians, such as
    expulsion of one of the EU Ambassadors, Paoli predicted that
    the EU will not/not decide to withdraw its Ambassadors from
    Tehran.  (NOTE: Deputy MFA Middle East Director (PDAS
    equivalent) Jean-Franois Paucelle provided background on
    this issue in an earlier meeting.  He served as French Charge
    d'Affairs in Tehran in 1997, after the EU withdrew its
    Ambassadors to protest the assassination in Berlin, by
    Iranian government agents, of four members of the Iranian
    opposition-in-exile.  European Embassies, after their
    Ambassadors had departed, soon learned that Iranian officials
    refused to receive European Charges d'Affaires, and so all
    communication between EU members and Iran slowed down or
    halted altogether.  The Europeans also realized that the
    politics of returning Ambassadors to Iran can become complex.
     Following the withdrawal of their Ambassadors at present,
    Paucelle said, the Europeans would need to determine ahead of
    time when and under what conditions they would return.
    Possible criteria range widely, from returning the
    Ambassadors after the regime changes, as a long-term
    deadline, to after the release of Clotilde Reiss, as the
    shortest possible window.  In addition, after the EU decided
    to return its Ambassadors in 1997, the Iranians refused to
    allow some of them to return, in an attempt to sow division
    among EU members.  This chastening experience, Paucelle said,
    continues to inform EU discussions about whether or not to
    recall their Ambassadors from Iran.  END NOTE.)

    ¶16.  (SBU) Post will continue to liaise with the GOF on
    hostage issues and update Washington offices as events unfold.
    PEKALA

`