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CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

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### Viewing cable 07BERLIN802, SCENESETTER FOR ANGELA MERKEL IN WASHINGTON: GOALS

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
07BERLIN802 | 2007-04-20 07:07 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Berlin

`

    VZCZCXRO1520
    RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
    DE RUEHRL #0802/01 1100748
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    R 200748Z APR 07
    FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7989
    INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
    RUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVE
    RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 000802

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2022
    TAGS: PREL PGOV ECUN EU GM
    SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR ANGELA MERKEL IN WASHINGTON: GOALS
    FOR EUROPE, GOALS AT HOME

    REF: BERLIN 747

    Classified By: DCM John Koenig.  Reason: 1.4(b) and (d)

    ¶1. (C) Summary.  Angela Merkel arrives in Washington in an
    enviable position of political strength, both at home and in
    the EU.  However, she is conscious that her strength derives
    largely from the weakness of her counterparts and other
    factors beyond her control.  Achieving her goals for the EU -
    in the trans-Atlantic context these are focused on climate
    change and the Transatlantic Economic Initiative - will
    reinforce her position at home and in the EU, and serve as a
    springboard to success on the larger G-8 stage.  A success
    for Merkel is also a success for the U.S.  Even after the
    German EU Presidency, we will want the Atlanticist Merkel to
    remain a dominant force within the EU.  In Berlin, a
    successful summit will strengthen her and other
    trans-Atlanticists against those who favor a policy of vocal,
    public antagonism.  End Summary.

    Leading in the EU; Muddling Through at Home
    -------------------------------------------

    ¶2. (C) Angela Merkel's role as Germany's and Europe's leader
    is undisputed.  No other leader of a large member state is
    politically fit enough to offer himself up as a leader.  Her
    leadership of the G-8 and Germany's intrinsic weight and
    economic recovery are further boosts.  At home, Merkel is not
    only riding high in opinion polls (70 percent popularity
    rating) and enjoying the benefits of leadership at a time of
    long-sought economic growth, but has also wrong-footed her
    coalition partner Social Democrats with reformist domestic
    social policies.  However, in both cases her apparent
    strength is not entirely of her own making, but derives in
    large part from her office, the weakness of her counterparts,
    or from other factors beyond her control.  She took the helm
    of the EU at a time when progress on the European project had
    largely come to a halt, when European institutions were
    unsure of how or in which direction to move, and (as noted)
    no alternative leaders were present. In Berlin, her coalition
    partner and rival, the Social Democrats (SPD), are dealing
    with weak leadership, a vacuum of ideas, and a challenge from
    the left.

    ¶3. (C) Merkel has responded to these similar circumstances
    with quite different tactics.  In the EU, she has asserted
    German and her personal leadership over the Council
    Secretariat, especially with respect to her goal of

    SIPDIS
    developing a road map for furthering the EU constitution.
    She has sidelined Brussels by putting her own representatives
    on the road to discuss the constitution in other capitals and
    has weighed in personally as needed to find compromises that
    keep the constitutional project moving forward.  Likewise,
    she has vigorously pursued the Transatlantic Economic
    Initiative within the EU to remove regulatory barriers, and
    has pushed for agreement on the new EU climate change and
    energy initiatives.  She has not succeeded in all her
    undertakings -- prospects for a new EU Partnership and
    Cooperation Agreement with Russia remain distant, for
    example.  Still, the view that we hear from Brussels is of
    vigorous and effective leadership.  In Berlin, Merkel is
    known for her reticence to engage in aggressive politics,
    preferring to stay in the background until the "correlation
    of forces" is clear and then engaging to nudge the debate in
    her preferred direction.  Though the SPD is weak, Merkel has
    been reluctant to push it hard.  Her strategy appears to be
    aimed at building and consolidating her own and her party's
    dominance with a view toward a clear victory in 2009
    elections, rather than attempting to score victories now that
    could alienate significant voter groups.

    Washington: What's In It for Merkel
    -----------------------------------

    ¶4. (C) We sum up Merkel's goal for the U.S.-EU Summit as
    being to achieve substantive progress in the U.S.-EU
    relationship for its own sake and to build a lasting
    foundation for her leadership in the EU and in Germany.  The
    substantive agenda is clear and we need not explore it in
    detail here.  It is focused on our political cooperation in
    key areas - climate change and energy security as well as the
    Transatlantic Economic Initiative.  We recognize that in
    these and other areas, European goals are not exactly aligned
    with our own.  Nonetheless, success in these areas, the
    former a key concern of European publics and the latter
    important to sustaining European growth, after a long period
    in which trans-Atlantic relations were dominated by negative
    headlines and exchanges focused on other regions, would prove
    Merkel's particular competence at succeeding in Europe's key
    external relationship.  After success in Washington, Merkel

    BERLIN 00000802  002 OF 002

    can count on maintaining her position in Europe against any
    incoming French President and UK Prime Minister-in-waiting
    Brown.  Success in Washington will also strengthen her hand
    in the follow-on summits with Russia, Canada, and Japan and
    sets the stage for success in G-8 summit deliberations on
    climate change.

    ¶5. (C) At home, a Summit success may enable Merkel to end the
    SPD's ability to use loud, public "principled" criticism of
    the U.S. as a winning tactic.  Gerhard Schroeder won the 2002
    election with his public attacks on U.S. Iraq policy, but if
    Merkel brings home meaningful agreements -- especially on
    issues with domestic resonance such as climate change and
    trans-Atlantic economic cooperation -- she will have shown
    the German public that her policy of constructive engagement
    with the U.S. brings real benefits on issues of concern to
    it.  Foreign policy, especially trans-Atlantic relations, is
    one of the few areas where the SPD still enjoys greater
    public support than does the CDU/CSU.  Success in Washington
    may undercut the SPD on that theme, as the CDU/CSU has
    already undercut it on many domestic social themes.

    A Note on Style
    ---------------

    ¶6. (C) Merkel is pushing for a Summit that is more than a
    predictable set-piece, quickly forgotten.  She looks for real
    decisions to be made during the Summit discussions.  This
    does more than just ensure that she has something important
    to do.  It emphasizes her personal commitment to restoring
    European-American relations and her belief in face-to-face
    engagement.  We recognize the difficulty of organizing
    discussions in this format, but believe we too stand to gain
    by such an approach.

    What's In This for Washington
    -----------------------------

    ¶7. (C) Post has previously reported on Merkel's risk-averse
    approach to foreign policy.  We do not expect her to change
    her leadership style because of success in Washington.  The
    real benefits for the U.S. lie in how success will affect the
    public understanding of how Germany can best build a
    relationship with Washington and its view of the U.S., the
    changing of which is a frequent theme in conversations with
    German leaders and thinkers.  A successful Summit will also
    reinforce our message that the U.S. and EU are natural
    partners, closely bound by common interests.  As a cautious
    conservative in a difficult coalition, Merkel will not run
    great risks for the U.S.  But, if she can show the public
    that cooperation with the U.S. works, the effect will be to
    cut the risk she runs by cooperating with the U.S.  It is a
    more complex path to a closer and more effective relationship
    than we would perhaps like, but our observation of Merkel and
    our conversations with her advisors lead us to see it as the
    best path available.
    TIMKEN JR

`