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### Viewing cable 05ANKARA7215, NO SPLITS IN TURKEY'S GOVERNING AKP PARLIAMENTARY

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
05ANKARA7215 | 2005-12-08 15:03 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Ankara

`

    This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 007215

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2015
    TAGS: ECON PGOV PINR TU POLITICAL PARTIES
    SUBJECT: NO SPLITS IN TURKEY'S GOVERNING AKP PARLIAMENTARY
    GROUP -- FOR NOW

    REF: A. ANKARA 6543
         ¶B. ANKARA 6251
         ¶C. ANKARA 6337

    Classified By: PolCouns Janice G. Weiner, E.O. 12958, reasons
    1.4 (b) and (d).

    ¶1.  (C) Summary:  Despite media reports and opposition rumors
    of splits among PM Erdogan's Justice and Development Party's
    (AKP) 357 parliamentarians, the group remains intact )- for
    now.  Among AKP MPs, there are distinctive pious, pragmatic
    and nationalist currents, with crosscutting personal
    loyalties.  Recent events in Turkey's heavily-Kurdish
    southeast have heightened tensions between AKP,s
    Kurdish-origin MPs and the rest of the parliamentary group.
    While AKP MPs, numbers may slowly erode over the next year
    (ref A), a major split is unlikely as long as AKP -- and in
    particular PM Erdogan -- retain power and popularity.  End
    Summary.

    Despite Wishful Thinking, AKP Not Crumbling Yet
    --------------------------------------------- --

    ¶2.  (C) Over the past year, the Turkish press has repeatedly
    predicted open splits in the 357-member AKP parliamentary
    group.  While AKP has ideological and personality-based fault
    lines, there appears to be little chance of a major split
    while AKP remains Turkey,s number one party and Erdogan the
    country,s most popular politician.  Even Ankara AKP MP
    Ersonmez Yarbay, a maverick frequently openly critical of his
    own party, downplayed to us the rumors of party splits,
    saying they have been fueled by the opposition to force early
    elections.

    AKP,s Ideological Currents
    --------------------------

    ¶3.  (C) AKP,s parliamentary group is composed of politicians
    with widely differing viewpoints.  There are three main
    ideological currents:  pious, nationalist and pragmatic.
    Most AKP MPs do not fall neatly into any one category, and
    personal loyalties crosscut ideology, mostly among pious MPs.

    Pious
    -----

    ¶4.  (C) Almost all AKP MPs are religiously observant to some
    degree; for example, the vast majority fast during Ramadan.
    However, there is a large and distinctively more pious group
    of MPs, comprising former members of the banned Islamist
    Virtue (Fazilet) Party, former members of the National View
    Islamist youth group, and members of a wide range of
    (officially banned) Muslim brotherhoods.  Most of AKP,s top
    leaders fall into this group:  PM Erdogan, DPM/FM Abdullah
    Gul, parliament Speaker Arinc, Vice Speaker Alptekin (former
    PM and Islamic Saadet Party head Erbakan's right-hand man)
    and all five of AKP,s parliamentary whips.  Pious MPs
    generally represent the central Anatolian heartland, speak no
    English, and have traveled little.

    ¶5. (C) While most Turkish Islamists oppose the EU, AKP,s
    Islamist MPs toe the AKP line and support it, albeit less
    enthusiastically since October 3.  Typical of Turkish
    Islamists, they dislike Turkey,s military and have no ties
    to it other than their required military service.  Attitudes
    about the U.S. vary widely, from friendly to suspicious, but
    most favor better ties with the Muslim world.  Although the
    GOT, under Erdogan,s leadership, has taken a politically
    courageous public stand favoring privatization and foreign
    investment, many pious MPs oppose both.

    ¶6.  (C) AKP,s pious MPs are widely rumored to be deeply
    unhappy about PM Erdogan,s inability to ease restrictions on
    the wearing of headscarves and on religious schools.
    However, since AKP came to power in November 2002, no AKP MP
    has resigned and gone over to the Happiness (Saadet) Party,
    on AKP's Islamist flank.

    Nationalists
    ------------

    ¶7.  (C) It is hard to find a Turk who is not nationalistic.
    Yet a significant number of AKP MPs (as many as 50, according
    to one former MP), many of them former members of the
    ultra-nationalist National Action Party (MHP) or center-right
    True Path Party (DYP), are strong nationalists, even by
    Turkish standards.  This group includes Justice Minister and
    party spokesman Cemil Cicek, Deputy PM Abdullatif Sener,
    State Minister Kursad Tuzmen, and parliament Vice Speaker
    Sadik Yakut.

    ¶8.  (C) Among AKP MPs, nationalists take the hardest line
    against &concessions8 to the EU and on Cyprus.  MFA
    officials have told us on several occasions that the GOT is
    delaying bringing the Ankara Agreement extension protocol to
    parliament for ratification out of concern for the reaction
    of nationalist AKP MPs (ref B).  Nationalist AKP MPs are
    deeply suspicious about the motives of Turkey,s ethnic Kurds
    and were vocal critics of PM Erdogan,s August declaration in
    Diyarbakir that Turkey has a &Kurdish problem.8  Like their
    pious colleagues, nationalists, attitudes about the U.S.
    vary widely, from friendly to suspicious.  However, even
    pro-U.S. nationalists become extremely prickly at any
    perceived U.S. slight to Turkish national honor.

    Pragmatists
    -----------

    ¶9.  (C) AKP,s pragmatic MPs generally speak English, are
    foreign-educated, and tend to be better-traveled than their
    colleagues.  They often come from large cosmopolitan areas,
    particularly Ankara or Istanbul; some were previously members
    of the center-right Motherland Party (ANAP).  Three of AKP,s
    five vice chairs, who frequently deal with foreigners, are
    from the pragmatic wing:  Bulent Gedikli, Reha Denemec and
    Saban Disli.  All are U.S-educated and represent either
    Istanbul or Ankara.  The same is true for pragmatic Erdogan
    translator and foreign policy advisor Egemen Bagis, who
    accompanies the PM on his trips to Europe and the U.S.

    ¶10.  (C) Although the pragmatic MPs are often AKP,s most
    visible face to foreigners, they have less influence inside
    AKP than their pious and nationalist colleagues.  In early
    2005, there were signs of frustration among AKP,s moderates,
    when a spate of AKP MP resignations went mostly to ANAP.
    Culture Minister Mumcu, AKP,s highest-profile resignation
    who went on become ANAP,s Chairman, said publicly he had
    only felt like a &guest8 in AKP (ref C).

    ¶11.  (C) Erdogan can ill afford to lose the pragmatists.  In
    addition to giving AKP a reasonable, big-tent image that
    plays well in the U.S. and Europe, AKP,s pragmatists are
    links to Istanbul and Ankara elites.  These MPs are AKP,s
    friendliest face toward the U.S. (Bagis heads parliament,s
    Turkey/U.S Friendship Committee), and most receptive to
    liberal political and open market economic reforms needed for
    EU accession.

    Crosscutting Personal Loyalties
    -------------------------------

    ¶12.  (C) AKP MPS are as divided by personality as by
    politics, but personality-based fault lines crosscut
    ideological ones.  PM Erdogan is the glue that holds AKP
    together; a chunk of AKP MPs were part of Erdogan,s team
    when he was Istanbul mayor and have followed him onto the
    national stage.  They include Finance Minister Unakitan,
    Transportation Minister Yildirim, State Minister Cubukcu, AKP
    whip Irfan Gunduz, and Erdogan speechwriter Huseyin Besli.
    All are personally pious or, in Cubukcu,s case, at least
    have consistently supported positions of the party,s pious
    wing.  Cubukcu, a female, was one of the few MPs who publicly
    supported Erdogan,s 2004 proposal to re-criminalize adultery.

    ¶13.  (C) Erdogan has consistently protected all three
    "Istanbul" Ministers despite repeated calls for their
    resignation.  Many other AKP MPs profess staunch loyalty to
    &Tayyip Bey8 and seek to stay close to him.  One contact
    suggests that Erdogan's strategy is to keep subordinates
    competing with each other for his attention so they are too
    busy to be a threat to him.

    ¶14.  (C) DPM/FM Gul remains Erdogan,s chief political rival
    within AKP.  Their differences are not ideological ) Gul and
    Erdogan are both pious ) but spring from Gul,s ambitions
    for greater power.  Gul, who represents the parliamentary
    faction of the banned Virtue Party, has a small, quiet
    following among AK MPs that includes whip Salih Kapusuz (from
    Gul,s home town of Kayseri), former AKP public relations
    vice chair Murat Mercan (sacked for incompetence by Erdogan
    earlier this year) and Taner Yildiz (also from Kayseri).

    ¶15.  (C) Parliament Speaker Arinc is AKP,s third leading
    personality and potential future rival to Erdogan.  However,
    Arinc is well behind Gul in influence and, according to our
    contacts, currently without a significant group of MP
    loyalists.

    AKP's Kurdish MPs
    -----------------

    ¶16.  (C) About 60 AKP MPs, mostly from Turkey,s southeast,
    are of Kurdish origin; Political and Legal Affairs Vice Chair
    Dengir Mir Firat is AKP's most visible Kurdish MP.  The Kurds
    who joined AKP and were elected to parliament tend to be
    pious, stressing the common bonds among all Muslims over
    Kurdish nationalism.  (The strongest Kurdish nationalists ran
    from the pro-Kurdish Democratic People,s Party (DEHAP) in
    2002 elections and failed to enter parliament because DEHAP
    did not cross the ten percent electoral threshold.)  One
    former Kurdish-origin MP, himself pious, has consistently
    told us even he considers AKP,s Kurdish MPs extraordinarily
    passive on Kurdish issues.

    ¶17.  (C) Yet recent events in the southeast, including AKP
    nationalists' reaction against PM Erdogan,s August &Kurdish
    problem8 speech in Diyarbakir and alleged Jandarma
    involvement in a November bombing in the southeastern town of
    Semdinli, have created tension between AKP,s Kurdish-origin
    MPs and the rest of the parliamentary group.  An Ankara
    provincial AKP official told us recently that tension with
    AKP,s Kurdish-origin MPs has infected AKP's pious wing,
    weakening it relative to other AKP factions.

    ¶18.  (C) Comment:  AKP's parliamentary strength, so far,
    springs from Erdogan's ability to keep such a diverse group
    of MPs united, and the lack of any viable opposition.  The
    question is whether Erdogan can continue to keep the
    parliamentary group together without turning AKP into an
    internally-undemocratic, personality-based party in the
    classic Turkish tradition.  AKP,s opposition will eventually
    come from inside AKP itself.  However, for now, Erodgan
    appears well in control and there is no viable political
    alternative for dissatisfied AKP MPs.  End Comment.
    WILSON

`