Currently released so far... 243 / 251,287

### Articles

Brazil

### Browse by release date

2010/11

### Browse by creation date

66 72 79 86 89 90 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02
1979/08
1986/05
1989/12
1990/01
2004/01 2004/12
2005/03 2005/05 2005/06 2005/12
2006/04 2006/08 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D H I J K L M P R S T U
Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bishkek Embassy Berlin Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad
Embassy Cairo Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Doha Embassy Damascus Consulate Dubai
Embassy Harare
Iran RPO Dubai Consulate Istanbul
Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kabul
Embassy London
Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Manama Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich
Embassy Prague Embassy Paris Embassy Panama
Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh
Secretary of State Embassy Sanaa Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa
USEU Brussels UNVIE

### Browse by tag

A B C E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U X Y Z
AE ASEC AM AF AR AU AORC AJ AG
BA BR BH BY BU
CVIS CH CASC CF COUNTERTERRORISM CD CV
ETRD ECON ELAB EFIN ENRG EG ETTC EPET EINV EFIS EXTERNAL EAID EUN EU ECUN EAIR EZ EAGR ELTN ECPS
FR
GM GG GR GOI GE GA
HO
IR IAEA IS IZ INRB IN IRAJ IQ IT
JO JA
KNNP KHLS KJUS KDEM KSPR KPKO KUNR KWBG KWMN KPAL KCRM KU KG KHIV KPRP KZ KN KTFN KGHG KSCA KMDR KPAO KCOR KACT KIRF KS KTIA KISL
LE LY LG
MNUC MPOS MARR MU MASS MOPS MCAP MOPPS MK MAR MTCRE MY ML MR
NATO NG
OPDC OEXC OIIP OVIP OPRC OTR OTRA
PGOV PREL PARM PTER PINR PHUM PINS PREF PM PEPR PROP PK PBIO PA PBTS PECON POLITICAL PARTIES
QA
RU RS RW
SA SYR SY SO SU SF SCUL SM SNAR SOCI SENV SP SG
TRGY TU TI TX TC TSPA
US UZ UE UK UNESCO UP UNSC UV
XF XA
YM
ZP ZR ZF ZI

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page

### Viewing cable 09TELAVIV1060, REP. WEXLER DISCUSSES IRAN WITH IDF INTELLIGENCE

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09TELAVIV1060.
Help us extend and defend this work

Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
09TELAVIV1060 | 2009-05-13 12:12 | SECRET | Embassy Tel Aviv

`

    VZCZCXRO3194
    OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHTRO
    DE RUEHTV #1060 1331220
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 131220Z MAY 09
    FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1790
    INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

` `

    S E C R E T TEL AVIV 001060

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/13/2019
    TAGS: PREL MPOS KNNP IR IS
    SUBJECT: REP. WEXLER DISCUSSES IRAN WITH IDF INTELLIGENCE
    CHIEF YADLIN

    Classified By: DCM Luis G, Moreno, Reason 1.4 (b) (d)

    ¶1.  (S)  Representative Robert Wexler (D, Florida),
    accompanied by Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Rogin and DCM
    Moreno, met with Israel Defense Forces Intelligence Chief, MG
    Amos Yadlin, on Sunday 10 May 2009.  MG Yadlin focused his
    discussion on the preparations for the upcoming visit of
    Prime Minister Netanyahu to the United States and the Iranian
    nuclear program.  MG Yadlin informed Rep. Wexler that the PM
    was preparing intensely for his upcoming visit to Washington.
     In addition to hours of policy review, the PM had been
    provided significant amounts of intelligence from the IDI and
    Mossad on Iran's nuclear program.  The intelligence presented
    included assessments of the current status of the Iranian
    program; timelines, effects of sanctions; views of the
    international community; and outcomes of engagement.  The
    differences that exist between the intelligence community in
    interpretations of the Iranian nuclear program as well as the
    relationship between Iran and the Palestinians were also
    presented.  MG Yadlin indicated that the IDF had presented
    its information last week, leaving the cabinet on Friday 08
    May 2009 to consider policy options and how information will
    be presented during the upcoming visit to Washington.
    Although no direct feedback was provided, MG Yadlin opined
    that the PM appears determined on Iran.

    ¶2.  (S)  Rep. Wexler asked MG Yadlin to expand on the
    differences in the interpretations of the intelligence.  MG
    Yadlin explained that until 2003, Iran had violated the
    Nuclear Proliferation Treaty by having a weaponization group
    and although Iran could show civilian uses for a missile
    program and a fissile program, there was no justification for
    a weaponization group.  He went on to say that Iran halted
    its program in 2003 after the invasion of Iraq, but
    reinvigorated the program in 2005.  He expressed that some in
    the US agree with this and others do not.  He went on to
    explain that Israel is not in a position to underestimate
    Iran and be surprised like the US was on 11 September 2001.

    ¶3.  (S)  MG Yadlin explained that Israel tries to be more
    precise than the US in estimating Iran's intentions and
    timeline for obtaining a nuclear bomb.  Iran is in the
    position of wanting to pay only a minimum cost for its
    current program. It does not want to be North Korea or what
    Iraq was before 2003.  Iran intends to keep resolutions and
    sanctions at a certain manageable level and continue to
    produce low enriched uranium until there is enough for
    several bombs.  MG Yadlin stated that Iran could decide to
    produce a bomb by 2010, but Iran is waiting for the right
    time in the future and that there are some who will always
    doubt it despite the evidence.

    ¶4.  (S)  Rep. Wexler then asked about the prospect of
    engagement.  MG Yadlin said he does not oppose engagement,
    and in fact gave a speech approximately six months ago
    expressing that Israel needed to find a way to find positives
    in engagement.   He feels there needs to be an agreed upon
    deadline; a measure for success or failure; and a plan B if
    engagement does not work in order for engagement to have any
    chance.  He also expressed strongly that engagement should
    have already started.  MG Yadlin outlined four possible
    outcomes of engagement.  Two good outcomes would be the
    Iranian nuclear program stopped or a failure of engagement
    that allows Russia and China to see the US made all efforts
    to prevent the program diplomatically and allows for greater
    cooperation in the future.  Two bad outcomes would be Iran
    playing for time with no claim of failure on the part of
    engagement or a bad bargain that still allows Iran to obtain
    a nuclear bomb even if in a longer timeline.  Rep. Wexler
    went on to discuss that there is a third good option in that
    the President may have better leverage with the American
    public to support action if engagement efforts are attempted
    and failed.  Rep Wexler recommended that the Israeli people
    need to consider the US perspective and public opinion.  MG
    Yadlin responded that he is not recommending the US enter a
    third front, but it has to be understood that Israel sees
    things differently and that Israel has to be ready and can
    not remove the military option from the table.  Rep Wexler
    stated that he expected Israel would be pleasantly surprised
    by the President's acceptance of all possible options in
    regards to Iran.

    ********************************************* ********************
    Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website:
    http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv
    ********************************************* ********************
    CUNNINGHAM

`