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### Viewing cable 09BRUSSELS536, IRAN SANCTIONS: AA/S GLASER BRIEFS EU ON PRIORITY

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
09BRUSSELS536 | 2009-04-08 12:12 | SECRET//NOFORN | USEU Brussels

`

    VZCZCXRO2503
    OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHROV RUEHTRO
    DE RUEHBS #0536/01 0981223
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 081223Z APR 09
    FM USEU BRUSSELS
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY
    RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RUEAORC/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RUEADRO/HQ ICE DRO WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/DOD WASHDC PRIORITY

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 000536

    SIPDIS
    NOFORN

    STATE FOR P, S/SAGSWA, NEA/IR, ISN, EEB/ESC, S/CT, L, EUR,
    INL
    TREASURY FOR TFFC, TFI, OIA
    EU POSTS FOR IRAN WATCHERS AND TFCOS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2019
    TAGS: ETTC KNNP PARM KTFN PTER EFIN KCRM KJUS KHLS
    UNSC, IR, PINR, EUN, KPAL, KPAO
    SUBJECT: IRAN SANCTIONS: AA/S GLASER BRIEFS EU ON PRIORITY
    TARGETS

    REF: A. A. BRUSSELS 205
         ¶B. B. BRUSSELS 41
         ¶C. C. 2008 BRUSSELS 1468
         ¶D. D. BRUSSELS 101

    Classified By: USEU EconMinCouns Peter Chase for reasons 1.4 (b), (d),
    (e).

    ¶1.  (S//NF) SUMMARY AND COMMENT:  During a March 2-3 visit to
    Brussels, Daniel Glaser, Acting Assistant Secretary of the
    Treasury for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes,
    assured an uncertain European Union that the United States
    remains committed to the dual track approach to Iran and said
    we would welcome additional EU designations targeting Iran's
    proliferation and sanctions evasion activities.  Delivering
    an unprecedented classified briefing to over 70 Middle East
    and nonproliferation experts from all 27 EU states and
    institutions, Glaser encouraged the EU to move forward on
    specific designations to support the current international
    framework targeting Iran's illicit conduct through financial
    measures.

    ¶2.  (C) EU Member States and officials uniformly praised the
    U.S. information-sharing on sanctions and the U.S. policy
    review.  Capturing the predominant sentiment, the Czech
    Presidency expressed gratitude for AA/S Glaser's presentation
    and confirmation that further EU measures "would be
    consistent with the U.S. policy review" as a signal the EU
    "are all waiting for, as this plays an important role in EU
    considerations."  However, some EUMS were uncertain whether
    they should move forward on pending designations before the
    completion of the policy review.  During the briefing and on
    its margins, member states' concerns emerged over national
    economic interests, unintended consequences (e.g., hurting
    average Iranians, sanctions efficacy, Iran's regional role,
    lawsuits, and international unity).  Glaser's separate
    consultations with representatives from the Council
    Secretariat and Commission, and Ambassadors of the Czech
    Republic (Presidency), UK, France, Germany, Spain, and
    incoming EU-Presidency Sweden are reported septel.

    ¶3.  (C) The content, tone, and timing of AA/S Glaser's
    briefing impressed an appreciative EU audience as a sign of
    the new U.S. Administration's seriousness about engagement
    with Europe.  The EU is predisposed to respond positively to
    the new Administration's policy on Iran and wants its views
    taken into account during the policy review stage.
    Glaser's presentation kept the good feelings going, but also
    helped bring EU experts down to earth in terms of specific
    tasks on which the EU could usefully focus now.  We hope the
    briefing provides a basis for further USG lobbying in
    individual EU Member States in capitals on pending EU
    designations.  END SUMMARY AND COMMENT.

    -------------------------------
    U.S. Message:  EU Should Act --
    2009 The Critical Year
    -------------------------------

    ¶4.  (S) On March 3, the Czech EU Presidency convened a formal
    meeting of the EU-27 Iran and non-proliferation experts
    (COMOG/CONOP) to receive a classified briefing from a U.S.
    interagency delegation led by AA/S Glaser on measures in the
    financial and transport sectors to counter Iran's illicit
    conduct.  The session lasted a little over an hour (40 minute
    presentation followed by 30 minutes of Q/A).  Given intense
    EU interest and in order to set the political context for the
    detailed technical briefing on specific U.S. designations
    that followed, AA/S Glaser  noted that the U.S. policy review
    on Iran had not yet finalized, but it was already clear that

    BRUSSELS 00000536  002 OF 004

    the USG would remain committed to a dual track approach to
    resolving the nuclear issue.  Consequently, the United States
    would welcome EU actions now to reinforce existing UNSCRs.
    The EU should act quickly to designate additional high
    priority proliferation targets.

    ¶5.  (S) To be sure, "engagement" would be an important aspect
    of a comprehensive strategy to dissuade Iran from acquiring
    nuclear weapons.  However, "engagement" alone is unlikely to
    succeed. Diplomacy's best chance of success requires all
    elements combining pressure and incentives to work
    simultaneously, not sequentially.  Our shared challenge is to
    work together in finding the right mix of measures.  Time was
    not on our side.  The international community must urgently
    choose between several bad options facing us in 2009; none of
    these options were without cost.  Glaser pointed out that the
    dynamic nature of the international financial system required
    that targeted financial sanctions against Iran must be
    continually adjusted to maintain, let alone increase,
    pressure on Iran.  Over time, targeted Iranian entities were
    finding ways to evade sanctions via front companies and
    facilitators.  Without continuous active management on the
    part of the international community, the measures taken thus
    far would be rendered merely symbolic gestures.

    ¶6.   (S) Glaser stated that the EU had an important, but
    time-sensitive, opportunity to help diplomacy succeed by
    targeting illicit Iranian conduct that contravened UN
    Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs). The international
    framework for moving forward was already in place, under the
    auspices of the UNSCRs and the Financial Action Task Force
    (FATF). ; we should continue to support and operate within
    this framework.  Glaser urged the EU not to Underestimate its
    influence on the actions of other key countries and regions.

    Priority Designation Targets
    -----------------------------

    ¶7.  (S) AA/S Glaser's formal presentation provided U.S. views
    and specific intelligence on financial and transport entities
    under active EU consideration for designation, including Bank
    Mellat, the Export Development Bank of Iran (EDBI), Bank
    Saderat, the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Line (IRISL),
    and Iran Air (the only entity not yet U.S.-designated, which
    AA/S Glaser explained remains a potential target).
    Separately, several EU contacts found our case against Bank
    Mellat, EDBI and shipping companies to be particularly well
    formulated.

    ----------------------
    EU Audience, Reactions
    ----------------------

    ¶8.  (C) All 27 EU Member States (EUMS) attended the Czech
    Presidency-hosted classified briefing on March 3 in Brussels.
     Indicative of the EU's high level of interest, all but
    Slovakia sent their capitals-based nonproliferation working
    group ("CONOP") technical expert in addition to their Middle
    East regional expert (mixture of capitals- and
    Brussels-based).  This was the first time the USG was
    welcomed to address this combined EU expert working group,
    which meets ad hoc to decide on revising EU nonproliferation
    measures against Iran.  Permanent institutional staff
    covering Iran, sanctions, and nonproliferation attended from
    the EU's Commission and Council Secretariat.  The EU's
    Situation Center (SitCen), the community's intelligence
    coordination unit, also sent several representatives.

    ¶9.  (C) Capturing the main sentiment in the room, the Czech
    Presidency expressed gratitude for AA/S Glaser's presentation

    BRUSSELS 00000536  003 OF 004

    and confirmation that further EU measures "would be
    consistent with the U.S. policy review" as a signal the EU
    "are all waiting for, as this plays an important role in EU
    considerations."  The Czechs and several others noted that
    U.S. information-sharing was conducive to closer
    transatlantic cooperation on Iran policy, predicting this
    would directly influence internal EU debate on pending
    designations of entities and individuals supporting Iran's
    proliferation.

    ¶10.  (C) Betraying some smaller EU states' resentment of the
    EU-3 countries' (UK, France, Germany) prerogatives within the
    Council on Iran policy, Cyprus pointedly thanked the U.S.
    delegation for sharing information with the entire EU "so all
    can take an informed decision," rather than being asked to
    take action through a "leap of faith" when some EUMS have
    information but the rest do not.  "We also welcome that you
    are stressing the dual-track approach," Cyprus added.
    (Comment:  The Cypriot intervention notwithstanding, the
    Czechs took considerable risk just in hosting the U.S.
    presentation.  The EU remains prickly over direct U.S.
    participation in their internal discussions and processes,
    particularly after the bitter divides over Iraq.  The Czechs
    suffered some pushback prior to the event.  End Comment.)
    ¶11.  (C) At the conclusion of the briefing, a handful of
    smaller EUMS raised concerns routinely featured in the EU's
    ongoing internal debate over next steps.  (Note: The EU-3 and
    Italy refrained from speaking during the briefing in apparent
    deference to the rest of the membership who do not enjoy
    routine access to U.S. senior Iran policymakers.  End Note.)

    Unintended Consequences?
    ------------------------

    ¶12.  (C) Poland, Cyprus, and Portugal asked about the impact
    of current sanctions against Iran on the elite, the broader
    population, and the deteriorating economy.  Is the U.S.
    concerned that further moves could trigger an anti-Western
    backlash?  Could we target political elites without
    victimizing or burdening the general population?  While
    expressing support for targeted measures, Portugal and Cyprus
    worried that strengthening sanctions before Iran's June
    presidential elections could prove counterproductive by
    radicalizing the electorate and leading to Ahmadinejad's
    re-election.  Cyprus flagged comments by Iranian human rights
    activist Shirin Ebadi against sanctions and stressed that it
    want to encourage Iranian moderates.  Portugal asked whether
    the United States has considered Iran's role in the region,
    e.g., Afghanistan, Iraq, and the broader Middle East.

    ¶13.  (C) AA/S Glaser concurred that these are all important
    questions, but pointed out that the international community
    must choose among a set of bad options in a very compressed
    timeframe.  The international community must convey an urgent
    sense of seriousness -- both to Iran and to other interested
    regional stakeholders in order to change strategic
    calculations and maximize the chance of a diplomatic success.
     By law, U.S sanctions target those engaged in illicit
    conduct, including proliferation and terrorist financing.
    Targeting the Iran's access to the international financial
    system offers the best chance of reducing harm to the average
    population.

    ¶14.  (C) As to the impact of sanctions, Glaser noted that
    disaggregating the effect of international sanctions and
    Iran's own disastrous economic policies would be nearly
    impossible.  Moreover, sanctions must be examined in the
    context of an overall policy approach and not in isolation.
    A more useful indicator is the perception of Iran's

    BRUSSELS 00000536  004 OF 004

    decision-makers, who view sanctions as problematic, raising
    business costs, and necessitating evasive behavior:  the
    elite are reacting as if sanctions are having an impact.

    Russia and China?
    -----------------

    ¶15.  (C) The Netherlands asked for U.S. views on the roles of
    Russia and China.  Cyprus referenced the importance of P5 1
    unity to ensure Iran did not circumvent sanctions and promote
    efficacy, adding "UN backing is the best way."  AA/S Glaser
    agreed, but argued that we were already required to implement
    existing UNSCRs.  This situation demanded a nimble response
    to changing conditions, including deceptive practices by
    designated entities.  The U.S. closely consults Russia and
    China, who must play their parts.

    What Should the EU Do?  Will U.S. Answer the Mail?
    --------------------------------------------- -----

    ¶16.  (C) The Netherlands asked what the U.S. explicitly
    wanted from Europe in the diplomatic ("political") track, and
    whether we plan to respond to the Iranian President's earlier
    letters (to former President Bush).  AA/S Glaser referred the
    Dutch to State on matters of diplomacy.  On the sanctions
    front, he noted that the U.S. policy review should not be a
    reason for the EU to stop reviewing its existing sanctions
    for appropriate next steps.  Given the tight timeframe, it
    would be helpful for the EU to make similar designations to
    those already included under existing U.S. sanctions
    authorities.

    The Saderat Problem
    -------------------

    ¶17.  (S//NF) In his presentation, AA/S Glaser noted UNSCR
    1803 and EU Common Position identification of Saderat for
    proliferation concerns, but explained that our domestic
    designation falls under U.S. counter-terrorism authorities.
    Although not raised by Member States in the formal briefing,
    several EU contacts (UK, France, Germany, Council Secretariat
    and Czech Presidency) had raised concerns that the EU would
    not be able to act upon the U.S. basis for designation of
    Bank Saderat (support for terrorist activity).  The EU Common
    Position imposing measures against Iran is strictly limited
    to proliferation as a legal basis for inclusion on the list.
    Support for terrorist financing is not grounds for inclusion.
     (Comment: As the additional U.S. information presented was
    exclusively limited to terrorist financing concerns, some
    EUMS are questioning whether a sufficient proliferation basis
    exists for Saderat's inclusion under EU Iran sanctions.  The
    EU does not/not yet have consensus to include Saderat in the
    next round.  End Comment.)

    ¶18.  (U) AA/S Glaser has cleared this message.

    MINIMIZE CONSIDERED

    MURRAY
    .

`