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CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

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### Viewing cable 09BERLIN1433, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR HEUSGEN ON AFGHANISTAN,

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
09BERLIN1433 | 2009-11-12 17:05 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Berlin

`

    VZCZCXRO6312
    OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
    DE RUEHRL #1433/01 3161743
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 121743Z NOV 09
    FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5750
    INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BERLIN 001433

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/11/2019
    TAGS: PREL MARR NATO MNUC PARM KNNP GM IR RU AF
    SUBJECT: NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR HEUSGEN ON AFGHANISTAN,
    MIDDLE EAST, IRAN, DETAINEES, RUSSIA, NUKES AND BALKANS

    Classified By: AMBASSADOR PHILIP D. MURPHY. REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D).

    ¶1. (C) SUMMARY.  Chancellery National Security Advisor
    Christoph Heusgen told EUR A/S Phil Gordon and Ambassador
    Murphy in a November 10 meeting in Berlin that Germany
    strongly preferred that the proposed international conference
    on Afghanistan be held outside the country to make it easier
    to press Karzai to commit to the necessary reforms.  On the
    Middle East, Heusgen thought Netanyahu had to do much more on
    settlements if there was to be any hope of re-starting
    negotiations.  On Iran, Heusgen hoped for some conclusion by
    early next month on whether the diplomatic track was going to
    bear fruit so that this issue could be discussed at the
    December 10 EU Summit.  Heusgen said Germany was ready to
    discuss taking Guantanamo detainees, but stressed the
    importance of dealing directly with the Ministry of Interior
    and keeping the negotiations confidential.  While arguing for
    being rhetorically supportive of the Medvedev European
    Security proposal, Heusgen shared U.S. skepticism about a new
    treaty and an OSCE Summit hosted by Kazakhstan.  Heusgen
    distanced the Chancellery from the proposal to remove all
    remaining tactical nuclear weapons from Germany, stressing
    the need to get reciprocal cuts from the Russians.  Also
    discussed was CFE, the Macedonian name issue and Bosnia.  END
    SUMMARY.

    AFGHANISTAN

    ¶2. (C) Heusgen confirmed that Germany would only announce
    additional resources for Afghanistan after the proposed
    international conference, which Chancellor Merkel and UK PM
    Brown are now proposing for January 28 in London.  He said
    the conference is key because this is where the Germans
    expect the Afghan government to make specific commitments to
    improve governance and to gradually begin assuming
    responsibility from the international community.  President
    Karzai had to be put under international pressure to perform
    according to prescribed benchmarks.  Toward that end, the
    Chancellery felt strongly that the conference should be held
    outside of Afghanistan and not on Karzai's "home turf."
    Heusgen complained that the German and U.S. embassies in
    Kabul are on "a different track" and pushing for a conference
    in Kabul.  It was important to "make up our minds" quickly on
    the way ahead.  If the conference slipped to February or
    later, and the UK were no longer able to host it in view of
    the upcoming parliamentary elections there, then Germany
    would be willing to.

    ¶3. (C) Heusgen at first expressed concern that the U.S. would
    undermine international leverage on Karzai by rolling out its
    new strategy and resource commitments before he made any
    reciprocal commitments to reform.  Gordon assured him that
    the formal U.S. roll-out would only come after the November
    19 inauguration, where Karzai is expected to "say the right
    things" in his inaugural address.  Gordon also highlighted
    the need to coordinate on the U.S. roll-out to avoid the
    perception that the U.S. was "Americanizing" the
    international effort in Afghanistan.  It should be announced
    as a common strategy and not as a U.S. strategy to which the
    Allies then respond.  Heusgen agreed in principle, but
    indicated that Germany would stick to its approach of holding
    back on any announcement of new commitments until after the
    international conference.

    MIDDLE EAST

    ¶4. (C)  Referring to the Secretary's recent public statements
    on settlements, Heusgen said that Germany "perceives this
    differently" and thought Netanyahu needed "to do more" in
    order bring the Palestinians to the negotiating table.  With
    Palestinians in East Jerusalem getting notices from Israeli
    authorities that their houses will be destroyed, it would be
    "suicide" for President Abbas to move under the current
    circumstances.  Heusgen said he could not fathom why
    Netanyahu did not understand this.  He suggested pressuring
    Netanyahu by linking favorable UNSC treatment of the
    Goldstone Report to Israel committing to a complete stop in
    settlement activity.  Gordon said that making a direct
    linkage between the two would almost certainly be
    counterproductive, but agreed that it was worth pointing out
    to the Israelis that their policy on settlements was making
    it difficult for their friends to hold the line in the UNSC.
    Heusgen said this certainly would be an issue when Netanyahu
    and "half of his cabinet" visit Berlin on November 30 for
    bilateral government consultations.

    IRAN

    ¶5. (C) Heusgen praised the U.S. for its patience with Iran,

    BERLIN 00001433  002 OF 003

    but noted that at some point, it would be necessary to move
    to the second track in order to maintain credibility.
    Heusgen said that he and his British counterpart agreed that
    ideally, there would be some conclusion on this by early next
    month so that the way ahead could be discussed by EU leaders
    at their summit on December 10.  Gordon agreed that there had
    to be a time limit, noting that President Obama had given the
    Iranians "by the end of the year" to respond favorably.  He
    also noted that the U.S. could support a Turkish role in the
    proposed exchange of low-enriched uranium for reactor fuel if
    that would make it easier for Iran to accept the deal.
    Gordon indicated, however, that Turkish PM Erdogan needed to
    be careful about losing credibility in Washington if he
    continued to make comments about Ahmadinejad being his
    "friend."

    GUANTANAMO DETAINEES

    ¶6. (C) Heusgen noted that now that the Bundestag election was
    past, Germany was ready to help on detainees, as it had
    promised earlier.  He advised the USG to work directly with
    new Interior Minister de Maiziere, rather than going first to
    MFA and the Chancellery, which had irritated de Maiziere's
    predecessor and made him less willing to cooperate.  In this
    regard, he thought that it would be helpful if DHS Secretary
    Napolitano made direct contact with de Maiziere.  Heusgen
    also suggested that the discussions be kept confidential
    until MOI had come to a decision on which detainees to accept
    and in which state they would be settled.  Premature public
    disclosure could doom the whole initiative.  Heusgen said
    that Uighurs would be "too difficult," but that Germany could
    probably accept "2-3 others."  (Comment: The reluctance about
    Uighurs is due to the expected negative reaction of the
    Chinese government.  End Comment.)

    EUROPEAN SECURITY PROPOSAL AND POSSIBLE OSCE SUMMIT

    ¶7. (C) Heusgen said that while the West should try to react
    positively to whatever the Russians propose in advancing the
    Medvedev European security proposal, nothing should be
    accepted that would undermine current European security
    institutions, including the OSCE.  He shared Gordon's
    misgivings about a proposed treaty.  He was also skeptical
    about the idea of an OSCE Summit in Astana, agreeing that
    Kazakhstan's human rghts record and the lack of substantive
    agenda items made it unattractive.  Heusgen suggested that an
    OSCE Summit be offered to the Russians on the condition they
    solve the frozen conflict in Transnistria, which he said
    Moscow could accomplish "in about a month."

    TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS

    ¶8. (C) In response to Gordon's question about how the
    government planned to take forward the commitment in the
    coalition agreement to seek the removal of all remaining
    nuclear weapons from Germany, Heusgen distanced the
    Chancellery from the proposal, claiming that this had been
    forced upon them by FM Westerwelle.  Heusgen said that from
    his perspective, it made no sense to unilaterally withdraw
    "the 20" tactical nuclear weapons still in Germany while
    Russia maintains "thousands" of them.  It would only be worth
    it if both sides drew down.  Gordon noted that it was
    important to think through all the potential consequences of
    the German proposal before going forward.  For example, a
    withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Germany and perhaps from
    Belgium and the Netherlands could make it very difficult
    politically for Turkey to maintain its own stockpile, even
    though it was still convinced of the need to do so.

    CFE

    ¶9. (C) Gordon asked for Heusgen's views on a German CFE paper
    that had been delivered to the State Department just a few
    days earlier.  Heusgen said he did not know anything about
    it, claiming that he did not follow this issue closely or
    "believe in it."  He noted that MFA "loved this disarmament
    business," which was okay, but it had to be balanced or the
    "Russians will sit there and laugh."

    MACEDONIAN NAME ISSUE

    ¶10. (C) Gordon briefed Heusgen on the current state of the
    negotiations, noting that the two key issues were the
    geographic modifier and international usage.  Heusgen noted
    that the Chancellor knew PM Macedonian Gruevski through their
    common membership in the European People's Party and would be
    willing to engage him on this issue if that would be helpful.

    BOSNIA

    BERLIN 00001433  003 OF 003

    ¶11. (C) Heusgen revealed that Serb President Tadic was coming
    to Berlin the week of November 16 for consultations.  He
    noted that while Tadic always claimed to be tough on
    Republika Srpska PM Dodic, he needed to be tougher.  While
    expressing pessimism about whether it would ever be possible
    to turn Bosnia into a "working state," Heusgen agreed it was
    important to keep trying.
    MURPHY

`