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CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

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### Viewing cable 09TELAVIV1177, CODELS CASEY AND ACKERMAN MEET WITH DEFENSE

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
09TELAVIV1177 | 2009-06-02 06:06 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tel Aviv

`

    VZCZCXRO8024
    OO RUEHROV
    DE RUEHTV #1177/01 1530619
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 020619Z JUN 09
    FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2000
    INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY

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    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 001177

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2019
    TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV MOPS IR KWBG IS
    SUBJECT: CODELS CASEY AND ACKERMAN MEET WITH DEFENSE
    MINISTER BARAK

    Classified By: DCM Luis G. Moreno, reasons 1.4 (b,d)

    ¶1. (C) Summary:  Post hosted two CODELS during the week of
    May 25: one from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee led
    by Senator Casey, the other from the House Committee on
    Foreign Affairs led by Congressman Ackerman.  Both
    delegations met with Defense Minister Ehud Barak, who
    conveyed similar points on the Peace Process and Israel's
    concerns about Iran.  End summary.

    Peace Process
    -------------

    ¶2. (C) Barak began his meeting with the Casey delegation by
    apologizing for being late due to what he described as an
    "internal debate" at the Prime Minister's office regarding
    the development of a response to President Obama's upcoming
    speech in Cairo.  He noted there are "perceived gaps" between
    the USG and the GOI regarding the Peace Process, and
    explained the GOI's internal debate is focused primarily on
    how to ensure that the U.S. and Israel "trust each other."
    Barak expressed confidence that PM Netanyahu is sincere in
    wanting to "seize this opportunity and move forward" with the
    Palestinians, but alluded to members of the coalition who do
    not agree with this course of action.

    ¶3. (C) From his perspective, Barak told the Casey delegation
    that the GOI was in no position to dictate policy to the
    Palestinians or the USG regarding the Peace Process -- "it
    takes two to tango, and three to negotiate," he said.  Barak
    noted that it is the GOI's responsibility to ensure that "no
    stone is left unturned" regarding the Peace Process; if
    efforts to achieve peace ultimately fail, then the GOI must
    be able to state that every effort was pursued.  He said he
    personally had no objection to "two states for two nations,"
    and panned Arab arguments for a bi-national state in Israel.
    Barak said Israel envisions "two peoples living side by side
    in peace and good neighborliness" as the final goal.

    ¶4. (C) With the Ackerman delegation, Barak focused on the
    need for a regional approach to the peace process.  He
    supports a regional initiative for peace and cooperation for
    the entire Middle East region to be launched by Israel.  He
    stressed as well the need to build trust and convince the
    U.S. administration that the new Israeli government is
    "serious in its efforts toward peace."

    ¶5. (C) Barak commented on political developments in the West
    Bank and Gaza in both meetings.  He said the GOI continues to
    review its policy, and then added that the Palestinian
    Authority has much to accomplish in terms of law enforcement,
    a functioning judiciary, and regaining control of Gaza before
    a "balanced" Palestinian state can be created.  He has been
    extremely impressed with the work of U.S. Security
    Coordinator Gen. Dayton training PA security forces, and
    commended Salam Fayyad's concrete, practical approach.

    ¶6. (C) Barak made clear in these meetings that he feels the
    Palestinian Authority is weak and lacks self-confidence, and
    that Gen. Dayton's training helps bolster confidence.  He
    explained that the GOI had consulted with Egypt and Fatah
    prior to Operation Cast Lead, asking if they were willing to
    assume control of Gaza once Israel defeated Hamas.  Not
    surprisingly, Barak said, the GOI received negative answers
    from both.  He stressed the importance of continued
    consultations with both Egypt and Fatah -- as well as the NGO
    community -- regarding Gaza reconstruction, and to avoid
    publicly linking any resolution in Gaza to the release of
    kidnapped IDF soldier Gilad Shalit.

    Iran/North Korea
    ----------------

    ¶7. (C) In his meeting with CODEL Casey, Barak said the GOI
    believes its "keystone" relations with the USG remain strong.
     He described the integral role the USG plays in preserving
    Israel's Qualitative Military Edge (QME), especially when
    faced with threats posed by Iran, Hizballah, and Hamas.  He
    noted that the GOI's positions on Iran are well known, and
    described North Korea's recent nuclear test as a "second
    wake-up call" (the first being the AQ Khan network).  Barak
    asked rhetorically how a lack of firm response to North Korea
    would be interpreted by Iran's leadership, speculating the
    USG would be viewed as a "paper tiger."

    ¶8. (C) In both meetings, Barak said "no option should be
    removed from the table" when confronting Iran and North
    Korea; engagement will only work in conjunction with a
    credible military option, he said.  Barak said he was

    TEL AVIV 00001177  002 OF 002

    personally skeptical that engagement would lead to an
    acceptable resolution, and argued in favor of a paradigm
    shift to confront the triple threat posed by nuclear
    proliferation, Islamic extremist terrorism, and rogue/failing
    states.  He said a strategic partnership with China, Russia,
    India, and the EU is essential in facing these threats.
    Barak argued that failure to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran
    would result in a nuclear arms race in the region as Turkey,
    Egypt, and Saudi Arabia look to acquire nuclear weapons.

    ¶9. (C) When asked if the USG and GOI have fundamental
    differences of opinion when assessing Iran's nuclear program,
    Barak said we share the same intelligence, but acknowledged
    differences in analysis.  He suggested that the USG view is
    similar to presenting evidence in a criminal court case in
    which a defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty.
    As such, USG standards are tougher -- especially following
    the failure to find WMD in Iraq -- while end-products such as
    the 2007 NIE unintentionally take on a softer tone as a
    result.  Barak said the fate of the region and the world
    rests on our ability to prevent Iran from gaining nuclear
    weapons -- as such, the standards for determining guilt
    should be lower as the costs are higher.

    ¶10. (C) In both meetings, Barak described Iranians as "chess,
    not backgammon players."  As such, Iran will attempt to avoid
    any hook to hang accusations on, and look to Pakistan and
    North Korea as models to emulate in terms of acquiring
    nuclear weapons while defying the international community.
    He doubted Tehran would opt for an open, relatively
    low-threshold test like the recent one in North Korea.
    Rather, Iran will seek ways to bypass the NPT while ensuring
    its program is redundant and well-protected to prevent an
    irreparable military strike.  Barak estimated a window
    between 6 and 18 months from now in which stopping Iran from
    acquiring nuclear weapons might still be viable.  After that,
    he said, any military solution would result in unacceptable
    collateral damage.  He also expressed concern that should
    Iran develop nuclear capabilities, other rogue states and/or
    terrorist groups would not be far behind.

    Pakistan
    --------

    ¶11. (C) Barak reinforced his message regarding Pakistan in
    both meetings.  He described Pakistan as his "private
    nightmare," suggesting the world might wake up one morning
    "with everything changed" following a potential Islamic
    extremist takeover.  When asked if the use of force on Iran
    might backfire with moderate Muslims in Pakistan, thereby
    exacerbating the situation, Barak acknowledged Iran and
    Pakistan are interconnected, but disagreed with a causal
    chain. To the contrary, he argued that if the United States
    had directly confronted North Korea in recent years, others
    would be less inclined to pursue nuclear weapons programs.
    By avoiding confrontation with Iran, Barak argued, the U.S.
    faces a perception of weakness in the region.

    ¶12. (U) CODELS Casey and Ackerman did not have the
    opportunity to clear this message.

    ********************************************* ********************
    Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website:
    http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv
    ********************************************* ********************
    CUNNINGHAM

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