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### Viewing cable 10ANKARA87, WHAT LIES BENEATH ANKARA'S NEW FOREIGN POLICY

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
10ANKARA87 | 2010-01-20 05:05 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Ankara

`

    VZCZCXRO2532
    PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
    DE RUEHAK #0087/01 0200525
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 200525Z JAN 10
    FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1747
    INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
    RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0003
    RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0994
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    RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1082
    RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0170
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    RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0252
    RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 6792
    RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 0352
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
    RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
    RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
    RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-3/J-5//
    RHMFISS/EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GE
    RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 ANKARA 000087

    SIPDIS

    DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR EUR/SE

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2020
    TAGS: PREL TU
    SUBJECT: WHAT LIES BENEATH ANKARA'S NEW FOREIGN POLICY

    REF: A. 09 ANKARA 1717
         ¶B. 09 ISTANBUL 466
         ¶C. 09 ANKARA 1561 (EXDIS)

    Classified By: Ambassador James Jeffrey for reasons 1.4 (b,d)

    INTRODUCTION/COMMENT
    --------------------

    ¶1. (C) There is much talk in chanceries and in the
    international media these days about Turkey's new, highly
    activist foreign policy, which unquestionably represents a
    transition not only from prior governments, but also from the
    AKP regime before the Gaza/Davos events, and before the
    ascent of Ahmet Davutoglu as Foreign Minister in April.  Some
    commentaries are upbeat, but others, including many experts
    and editorial writers in the US, have expressed concern.  The
    ruling AKP foreign policy is driven by both a desire to be
    more independently activist, and by a more Islamic
    orientation.  Frankly, rational national interest,
    particularly trade opportunities and stability
    considerations, also drives Turkey's new slant.  Major
    challenges with us in the coming months include the direction
    of Turkish-Israeli relations, the fate of the Protocols with
    Armenia, and the Turkish posture vis--vis Iran.

    ¶2. (C) Does  all this mean that the country is becoming more
    focused on the Islamist world and its Muslim tradition in its
    foreign policy?  Absolutely.  Does it mean that it is
    "abandoning" or wants to abandon its traditional Western
    orientation and willingness to cooperate with us?  Absolutely
    not. At the end of the day we will have to live with a Turkey
    whose population is propelling much of what we see.  This
    calls for a more issue-by-issue approach, and recognition
    that Turkey will often go its own way.  In any case, sooner
    or later we will no longer have to deal with the current cast
    of political leaders, with their special yen for destructive
    drama and - rhetoric.  But we see no one better on the
    horizon, and Turkey will remain a complicated blend of world
    class "Western" institutions, competencies, and orientation,
    and Middle Eastern culture and religion.  END INTRODUCTION.

    COMPONENTS OF POLICY
    --------------------

    "The Traditional Western"

    ¶3. (C) Turkish policy today is a mix of "traditional Western"
    orientation, attitudes and interests, and two new elements,
    linked with new operational philosophies: "zero conflicts"
    and "neo-Ottomanism."  The traditional still represents the
    core of Turkish foreign policy, and is centered on
    cooperation and integration with the West. Its core is NATO,
    the customs union with the EU, and most significantly, the EU
    accession effort.  This all began with the Ottoman effort to
    emulate the European great powers, and was propelled
    powerfully forward by Ataturk.  Nevertheless the country was
    on the sidelines in World War II.  It was only the threat of
    the USSR, and the dominance (and outstretched hand) of the
    US, that led to the "Turkey we know":  tough combat partner
    in Korea, major NATO ally, US anchor in the Middle East.
    Much of this continues.

    ¶4. (C) Europe is by far Turkey's most important economic
    partner in terms of investment and trade. The EU accounts for
    42 percent of Turkey,s total trade, while the US accounts
    for a bit less than 5 percent.  While the US is much less
    important in terms of trade statistics, it remains important
    in various sectors (e.g.energy, aviation, military), and in
    various ways.  NATO is essential to and much respected by

    ANKARA 00000087  002 OF 006

    Turkey.  (Note:  The fact that "only" about one-third of the
    Turkish population in one poll see NATO as important to
    Turkey's security is actually a plus; on any poll Turks
    usually are overwhelmingly negative about any foreign
    engagement or relationship.  But we should not be too
    sanguine here since support for NATO has been halved over the
    past decade.  End Note)  The military is armed by the US, and
    Turkey recognizes that many fires in its back yard -- from
    Iraq to Afghanistan and Pakistan -- can only be solved by
    close cooperation with and acceptance of US and NATO
    leadership.  Finally, even AKP leaders know that much of
    their allure or "wasta" in the Middle East and elsewhere
    stems from their privileged position in key Western clubs.
    This traditional orientation may be shaken, or reduced, but
    as it has both significant buy-in by elites of all
    philosophies, and many concrete advantages, Turkey will not
    abandon it.

    "Zero Problems with Turkey's Neighbors"

    ¶5. (C) But this Turkey is trying to "post-modernize" itself.
    One major area of AKP effort has been to resolve problems
    with Turkey's immediate "near abroad."  This effort stands in
    contrast with the "traditional" Turkish policy of letting
    these frozen conflicts fester, and is much more compatible
    with US and European interests.  The list of Turkish
    initiatives under the AKP is impressive:  accepting the Annan
    Plan in 2004 to resolve Cyprus, continuing the 1999
    rapprochement with Greece, the opening to Armenia culminating
    in the signing of recognition protocols, warming and
    productive relations with both Baghdad and Erbil (the latter
    complemented by significant reforms in Turkey's relations
    with its own Kurdish population).  The signature
    accomplishment of this policy is the wooing of Syria.  While
    this road to Damascus in fact was paved by Syria's
    accommodation of prior Turkish governments' demands
    (relinquishing claims on Turkey's Hatay province, expelling
    Ocalan), it is touted by the Turks as a game-changer.  As
    noted below, they have leveraged it to tackle a number of
    regional problems, from Lebanon to Iran.

    ¶6. (C) While this new approach is to be applauded, there is a
    fly in its ointment.  Little of true practical and final
    accomplishment has been achieved.  Cyprus is still split
    (albeit the fault, at least in terms of the Annan plan, lies
    more with the Greek Cypriots and the EU); tensions with
    Greece in the Aegean continue; the Protocols with Armenia
    have not been ratified due to Turkish concerns about
    Nagorno-Karabakh; Iraq's instability and the KRG's
    unwillingness to do more against the PKK raise questions
    about the sustainability of Turkey's constructive Iraq
    policy; the rapprochement with Syria has not really produced
    any Syrian "flip" away from Iran.  Granted, Turkey is dealing
    with some of the world's most difficult actors, and facing
    stiff opposition at home to making more concessions, but the
    proof of this pudding is yet to be seen.

    "Neo Ottomanism"

    ¶7. (C) The idea of Turkey using its cultural and religious
    links to the Middle East to the advantage of both Turkish
    interests and regional stability is not new with the AKP, but
    has been given much more priority by it, in part because of
    the Islamic orientation of much of the party, including
    leaders Erdogan, Gul, and Davutoglu.  Moreover, the AKP's
    constant harping on its unique understanding of the region,
    and outreach to populations over the heads of conservative,
    pro-US governments, have led to accusations of
    "neo-Ottomanism."  Rather than deny, Davutoglu has embraced
    this accusation.  Himself the grandson of an Ottoman soldier

    ANKARA 00000087  003 OF 006

    who fought in Gaza, Davutoglu summed up the Davutoglu/AKP
    philosophy in an extraordinary speech in Sarajevo in late
    2009 (REF A).  His thesis: the Balkans, Caucasus, and Middle
    East were all better off when under Ottoman control or
    influence; peace and progress prevailed.  Alas the region has
    been ravaged by division and war ever since.  (He was too
    clever to explicitly blame all that on the imperialist
    western powers, but came close). However, now Turkey is back,
    ready to lead -- or even unite.  (Davutoglu: "We will
    re-establish this (Ottoman) Balkan").

    ¶8. (C) While this speech was given in the Balkans, most of
    its impact is in the Middle East.  Davutoglu's theory is that
    most of the regimes there are both undemocratic and
    illegitimate.  Turkey, building on the alleged admiration
    among Middle Eastern populations for its economic success and
    power, and willing to stand up for the interests of the
    people, reaches over the regimes to the "Arab street."
    Turkey's excoriating the Israelis over Gaza, culminating in
    the insulting treatment of President Peres by Erdogan at
    Davos in 2009, illustrates this trend.  To capitalize on its
    rapport with the people, and supposed diplomatic expertise
    and Ottoman experience, Turkey has thrown itself into a
    half-dozen conflicts as a mediator.  This has worked well, as
    noted above, with Iraq, and was quite successful in the
    Syrian-Israeli talks before Gaza.  Turkey has also achieved
    some limited success on Lebanon and in bringing Saudi Arabia
    and Syria together.  As noted below, however, this policy
    brings with it great frictions, not just with us and the
    Europeans but with many supposed beneficiaries of a return to
    Ottoman suzerainty.  Furthermore, it has not achieved any
    single success of note.

    WHY THE CHANGE?
    ---------------

    ¶9. (C) Various factors explain the shifts we see in Turkish
    foreign policy beyond the personal views of the AKP
    leadership:

    -- Islamization:  As reported REF B, religiosity has been
    increasing in Turkey in past years, just as has been seen in
    many other Muslim societies.  The AKP is both a beneficiary
    of, and a stimulus for, this phenomenon.  However, bitter
    opposition within Turkey against domestic "pro-Islamic"
    reforms (e.g., head scarves) has frustrated the AKP, and a
    more "Islamic" or "Middle Eastern" foreign policy offers an
    alternative sop for the AKP's devout base.

    -- Success:  Despite its problems, Turkey over the past 50
    years has been a success story, rising to the 16th largest
    economy and membership in the G-20.  This, along with its
    extraordinary security situation compared to all other
    regional states, and democratic system, encourage a more
    active -- and more independent -- leadership role in regional
    and even global affairs.

    -- Economics:  one secret of Turkish success has been its
    trade and technology-led economic growth.  This growth is in
    good part thanks to its customs union with the EU, by far its
    biggest export market, and resulting investment from the EU,
    as well as decades of technology transfer and educational
    assistance from the U.S.  Nevertheless, with exports to the
    EU down due to the 2008-2009 crisis, Turkey is looking for
    new markets, particularly in the hydrocarbon rich Arab world,
    Iran, Russia, and Caucasus/Central Asia.  They have money,
    and strong import demand, and Turkey is dependent on them for
    its oil and gas.  These countries, however, (along with
    China-another Turkish export target) tend much more than the
    EU and North America to mix politics and trade.  To some

    ANKARA 00000087  004 OF 006

    degree the West thus is taken for granted and economic
    priority is directed towards relations with the Middle East
    and "Eurasia."

    -- Civilians ascendant: Erdogan's political success -
    together with a number of messy scandals resulting in public
    investigation - has meant that the Turkish General Staff now
    plays a much smaller role in defining Turkey's foreign
    policy.  Turkey's support to NATO is still strong, but it now
    lacks the suspicion of Russia which the cold-war instinct of
    General Staff brought to the mix.

    -- EU disillusionment:  Both popular and elite Turkish
    opinion has recently grown much more pessimistic about
    eventual EU membership -- or even its value.  The reasons for
    this are complex, but include the shifting mood in Europe
    towards Islam, the replacement of "pro-Turkey" leaders in
    France and Germany by Sarkozy and Merkel, both decidedly cool
    towards Turkey's EU membership, and a sense in Turkey of
    distance from and lack of sympathy for Europe.

    -- Relativization of the Western anchor.  An op-ed in the
    Financial Times by Gideon Rechman on January 4 noted
    correctly the tendency of the "young giants" -- South Africa,
    Brazil, India, and Turkey -- to pursue Third Worldish
    policies and rhetoric even while benefitting enormously from
    the globalized trade and international security created and
    maintained by the "West."  That certainly characterizes
    Turkey.  With the end of the cold war, relative success in
    the struggle with the PKK, and the "taming" of Syria, Iraq,
    and (at least from Turkey's point of view) Iran, Turkey's
    need for NATO and U.S. security is reduced.  Its dependence
    on Western trade, investment, technology transfer and
    educational exchange remains critical, but is regarded as a
    "free good" that Turkey deserves and does not have to expend
    effort for.  Relations with its various new friends in the
    North-East-South or on the other hand require effort which is
    facilitated by some downplaying of Turkey's Western anchor.

    DAVUTOGLU DISCONTENTS
    ---------------------

    ¶10. (C) The AKP's new approach to international affairs
    receives mixed reviews inside and outside Turkey.  It is not
    a major factor in the AKP's relative popularity, but several
    elements of it (unfortunately, those we are least happy with)
    do appeal to voters.  Criticism of Israel post-Gaza is
    overwhelmingly popular, and the relatively soft Turkish
    position on Iran -- a country about which many Turks are
    skeptical -- is presumably helpful with a narrow, but for
    Erdogan's electoral fate important, group of Islamic voters
    associated with former PM Erbakan.

    ¶11. (C) Nevertheless, many in Turkey's large westernized
    elite see the Islamic Outreach as a complement to the alleged
    AKP plan to Islamize Turkish society, and complain bitterly
    about their country's losing its western moorings.  The
    Nationalist segment in Turkey, mobilized most by the
    Nationalist Action Party (MHP), sees the AKP's compromises on
    Armenia, the KRG in northern Iraq, Cyprus, etc, as a betrayal
    of diaspora "Turks" (the Iraqi Turkomen, Azeris, Turkish
    Cypriots, etc) and charges that the AKP is trying to replace
    the Republic's organizing principle of "Turkism" with the
    broader Islamic "Umma."  The Republican People's Party (CHP),
    the lead opposition party, attacks AKP foreign policy
    relatively ineffectively with a mix of MHP-like nationalist
    rhetoric and "abandoning the west" criticism.

    ¶12. (C) But it is in the EU that the Erdogan foreign policy
    of late has run into the heaviest of sailing.  To some degree

    ANKARA 00000087  005 OF 006

    European angst at Turkey's "new direction" is viewed as an
    excuse to pummel Turkey to score domestic points among
    anti-foreigner elements.  But there is real concern in
    Europe, made manifest by the Rasmussen NATO SecGen issue last
    April.  Europeans were furious with Turkey's presentng itself
    as the "Islamic" voice or conscience in NATO, having
    consulted with Middle Eastern States before talking to its
    NATO allies.  Extrapolating that behavior into the even more
    diversity-intolerant EU is a nightmare.  Erdogan's foreign
    (and domestic) policy orientation conjures up not just a
    clash of Christianity and Islam, but the spectre of a "meld"
    of Europe and the Middle East, and of Europe's secularlism
    with oriental religiosity.  Davutoglu and others argue that
    Turkey's "success" as a coming Middle East power makes it
    more attractive to the EU -- giving Europe a new foreign
    policy "market" through Turkey.  While some in Europe appear
    interested in this idea, ironically including Turkey EU
    membership skeptic France, this does not seem to carry much
    weight in most European capitals, let alone populations.

    ¶13. (C) Finally, not all of the ex-Ottomans look with
    fondness on their past under the Pashas, or yearn for
    Turkey's return.  Reaction among many in the Balkans to
    Davutoglu's Sarejevo speech (REF A) was quite strong. In the
    Middle East itself, the Arab street might applaud Turkey's
    populistic and essentially cost-free support for more radical
    elements, but it's not particularly appreciated by rulers
    (although Turkey seems to have made some progress with Syria,
    brokered a rapprochement between President Bashir and Saudi
    King Abdullah, and has had some role in resolving the Lebanon
    cabinet stalemate).  Sooner or later, though, Turkey will
    have to produce results, take risks, commit real resources,
    and take hard decisions to augment a policy now consisting
    mainly of popular slogans, ceaseless trips, and innumerable
    signatures on MOUs of little importance.  The experience with
    Iran, which despite significant Turkish verbal support and
    wooing, appears uninterested in granting Turkey any
    concessions, or agreeing to a Turkish lead in mediation
    efforts, is telling.

    THE PROBLEM FOR THE US
    ----------------------

    ¶14. (C) Turkey's new foreign policy is a mixed bag for us.
    Having regional heavyweights take on burdens, thereby
    relieving us, has long been a desired goal of US policy, but
    it comes with a certain loss of control.  Nevertheless, on a
    whole host of key issues of supreme importance to us --
    Afghanistan and Pakistan, cooperation in and on Iraq, NATO
    efforts (although a leading Turkish role in Missile Defense
    will not be easy) -- Turkey is a crucial ally, and our use of
    Incirlik, Habur gate, and Turkish airspace for our Iraq and
    Afghanistan operations is indispensible.  Its "zero
    conflicts" initiatives, which have moved Turkey forward on
    more of the key bilateral spats -- Cyprus, Greece, Kurds,
    Northern Iraq, Armenia -- than we have seen with any other
    Turkish government, also support U.S. interests.

    ¶15. (C) Nevertheless, these latter issues illustrate two
    problems.  At least in Turkish eyes, on this complex of
    issues the US , especially the media, interest groups, and
    Congress, default to a "blame Turkey" posture regardless of
    whatever it does.  Second, Turkey has repeatedly run into
    trouble actually consummating these various openings -- the
    Armenian protocols being the best example, but continued
    overflights of Greek islands and domestic opposition to the
    Kurdish opening are also relevant.  What we fear is that this
    inability to bring to conclusion foreign policy initiatives
    will affect not just the above, but most Turkish policy,
    given the over-extension of Davutoglu and his team, and a

    ANKARA 00000087  006 OF 006

    tendency to substitute rhetoric for long term investment of
    diplomatic, military, and assistance capital.  (Fortunately,
    Afghanistan/Pakistan and Iraq are the two major exceptions to
    this tendency.)

    ¶16. (C) The greatest potential strategic problem for the US,
    however, and the one that has some of the commentators
    howling, is the Turks neo-Ottoman posturing around the Middle
    East and Balkans.  This "back to the past" attitude so clear
    in Davutoglu's Sarajevo speech, combined with the Turks'
    tendency to execute it through alliances with more Islamic or
    more worrisome local actors, constantly creates new problems.
     Part of this is structural.  Despite their success and
    relative power, the Turks really can't compete on equal terms
    with either the US or regional "leaders" (EU in the Balkans,
    Russia in the Caucasus/Black Sea, Saudis, Egyptians and even
    Iranians in the ME).  With Rolls Royce ambitions but Rover
    resources, to cut themselves in on the action the Turks have
    to "cheat" by finding an underdog (this also plays to
    Erdogan's own worldview), a Siladjcic, Mish'al, or
    Ahmadinejad, who will be happy to have the Turks take up his
    cause.  The Turks then attempt to ram through revisions to at
    least the reigning "Western" position to the favor of their
    guy.  Given, again, the questioning of Western policy and
    motives by much of the Turkish public and the AKP, such an
    approach provides a relatively low cost and popular tool to
    demonstrate influence, power, and the "we're back" slogan.

    ¶17. (C) This has been, so far, manageable, if at times high
    maintenance, in the Balkans and Mideast, although the damage
    to Israeli-Turkish relations remains serious.  If the Turks
    are genuine in their desire to draw Syria away from Iran, and
    if they begin achieving real success rather than telephone
    books worth of questionable protocols, then that will be of
    benefit to us all.  But with Iran itself it is a different
    story.  REF C  describes the background to the Turkish
    relationship with Iran, one more complicated than with their
    ex-Ottoman Arab and other subjects.  Trade/hydrocarbon
    interests, Turkish aversion to sanctions stemming from the
    first Gulf War, Erdogan's vocal "third worldism" and certain
    domestic political considerations all push Turkey in the
    wrong direction.   Unlike with many of the other issues,
    however, Turkey will have to stand and be counted on Iran, in
    the Security Council, with MD, and in implementation of UN or
    US sanctions.  This will have a profound effect on relations
    second only to the fate of the Armenian protocols over the
    next year.
    Jeffrey

               "Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.s
    gov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turkey"

`