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### Viewing cable 09RPODUBAI389, IRAN: CLERICAL CONFAB STIFFS RAFSANJANI FOR SUPREME LEADER

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
09RPODUBAI389 | 2009-09-24 14:02 | CONFIDENTIAL | Iran RPO Dubai

`

    VZCZCXRO3466
    PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHTRO
    DE RUEHDIR #0389/01 2671420
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 241420Z SEP 09
    FM RPO DUBAI
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0543
    INFO RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
    RHMFISS/USCENTCOM TELECOM CENTER MACDILL AFB FL
    RUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
    RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
    RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY 0426
    RUEHDIR/RPO DUBAI 0544

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RPO DUBAI 000389

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL:  9/24/2019
    TAGS: PREL PGOV IR
    SUBJECT: IRAN: CLERICAL CONFAB STIFFS RAFSANJANI FOR SUPREME LEADER

    REF: RPO DUBAI 384

    DUBAI 00000389  001.2 OF 002

    CLASSIFIED BY: Alan Eyer, Director, Iran Regional Presence
    Office, DOS.
    REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
    ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Oppositionist hopes that Iran's clerical class
    would mobilize to oppose Supreme Leader Khamenei's post-election
    policies appear sharply diminished in the wake of the first
    Assembly of Experts meeting since the June 12 Presidential
    election. Not only did the Assembly, which has the power to
    appoint, supervise and dismiss the Supreme Leader, give a
    ringing endorsement of Khamenei's rule and his handling of the
    post-election crisis, it did so in the conspicuous absence of
    its Chair, Ayatollah Rafsanjani.  Moreover, leaks of the
    closed-door proceedings to the conservative press indicate that
    at least two prominent members of this clerical deliberative
    body excoriated Rafsanjani for his failure to support Khamenei
    during the unrest.  Despite his absence at the closure of the
    Assembly of Experts meeting, Rafsanjani was compelled to
    publicly endorse the closing statement while seated at the knee
    of the Supreme Leader during a September 24 press conference.
    END SUMMARY.

    Assembly of Experts: A 'Deliberative' Body

    2 (C) The Majles-e Khobregan, or Assembly of Experts (AOE), is a
    Constitutionally-mandated deliberative body composed of 86
    directly-elected senior clerics from across the country.  By
    law, the Assembly must meet for a minimum of two days twice a
    year.  Though theoretically vested with the power to appoint,
    supervise and dismiss the Supreme Leader, in practical terms the
    Assembly's only real responsibility is to appoint the Supreme
    Leader's successor should he die or become incapacitated.  As
    such, the AOE's last noteworthy act was appointing current
    Supreme Leader Khamenei after Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's 1989
    death.  Every subsequent meeting has ended with the issuance of
    a perfunctory statement lauding the Assembly's decision to
    appoint Khamenei and praising his leadership. Nevertheless,
    according to Article 111 of the Constitution, the Assembly can
    find Khamenei unfit for office; accordingly, control of the AOE
    remains a (potential) check on the Supreme Leader's otherwise
    unbridled power.

    ¶3. (C) The Assembly is currently chaired by Ayatollah Ali Akbar
    Hashemi Rafsanjani, who was re-elected to the two-year term of
    Speaker in March 2009.  At the time of his re-election, he
    garnered 51 votes, an improvement over the 46 votes he received
    in 2007, despite efforts by hardline conservative clerics, led
    by Ayatollahs Mesbah-Yazdi and Ibrahim Yazdi, to unseat him.

    First Meeting since the Election

    ¶4. (C) On September 22-23 the AOE convened for the first time
    since Iran's disputed June 12 election.  Rafsanjani opened the
    sixth official meeting of this Fourth Assembly of Experts by
    again cautioning that a "suspicious faction" is trying to create
    rifts among Iran's leaders and by condemning the "atmosphere of
    insults and dispute" that has prevailed since the June
    presidential election.  He also promised that "system insiders
    of good will" are developing a plan to resolve Iran's domestic
    political problems. His opening statement was followed by
    reports to the body by Judiciary deputy Mohsen Ejei
    (Intelligence Minister during the presidential election and its
    aftermath) and Revolutionary Guards Commander Jaafari.
    According to press reports, at least sixteen Assembly members
    spoke.

    ¶5. (C) Though summaries of the closed-door proceedings released
    by Rafsanjani's office did not reflect any discord among the
    members and indeed indicated the body's support of him,
    conservative Iranian press charged Rafsanjani's office with
    'censoring' coverage of the proceeding, reporting that at least
    two prominent members sharply criticized Rafsanjani for failing
    to support the Supreme Leader after the disputed election.  One
    quotation prominently featured in conservative news outlets was
    Mashhad Friday Prayer Leader Ayatollah al-Hoda rhetorically
    asking Rafsanjani, "why after twenty years, have you remained
    silent in the face of these unprecedented insults (to the
    Supreme Leader)?"

    DUBAI 00000389  002.2 OF 002

    ¶6. (C) More tellingly, Rafsanjani did not attend the second and
    final day of the meeting, with recently retired former Judiciary
    Head Ayatollah Shahrudi chairing in his absence. Hardline
    conservative Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami (the same cleric who
    replaced Rafsanjani as Qods Day prayer leader - reftel) read the
    Assembly's final statement, which was an unqualified if not
    fawning endorsement of the Supreme Leader himself and his "wise
    policies" for quickly extinguishing the post-election "flames of
    sedition."  Khatami noted that Rafsanjani, despite his absence,
    agreed with "every point" of the final statement, which also
    credited Khamenei for dismissing the fraud allegations as part
    of a plot to undermine the Islamic Republic.  The final
    statement was also noteworthy in its perfunctory congratulations
    to President Ahmadinejad for his election victory, and its more
    sincere admonishment of Ahmadinejad to scrupulously follow
    Supreme Leader Khamenei's guidance.

    ¶7. (C) COMMENT: Following the disputed June 12 presidential
    election, many speculated that the axis of a Rafsanjani
    counter-attack would focus on rallying clerical support to his
    cause. However, the rumored AOE "emergency session" never
    convened, and absent such a meeting it remained unclear how much
    support Rafsanjani had among this body that reflects the
    political leanings of Iran's traditional senior clergy.  Now
    that the AOE has met, it is clear that the clerical cavalry
    isn't coming over the horizon anytime soon.  Furthermore, the
    AOE final statement, seen in conjunction with the removal of
    Rafsanjani as Qods Day Speaker (reftel), indicates in the
    clearest terms yet that in the most severe crisis of his career,
    Rafsanjani is unable to mobilize his once vast and influential
    patronage network to achieve his political ends.  And given that
    Rafsanjani's presumed power is serving as at least a partial
    deterrent to further regime moves against Mousavi, Karrubi and
    Khatami, the results of this two-day AOE session bode ill for
    the leadership of the oppositionist "Green Path of Hope."  END
    COMMENT.
    EYRE

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