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CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

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### Viewing cable 07PARIS743, CODEL TANNER: MEETING WITH FRENCH POLITICAL

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
07PARIS743 | 2007-02-27 13:01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Paris

`

    VZCZCXRO8959
    OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
    DE RUEHFR #0743/01 0581314
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 271314Z FEB 07
    FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5193
    INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 000743

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2017
    TAGS: PREL FR
    SUBJECT: CODEL TANNER:  MEETING WITH FRENCH POLITICAL
    DIRECTOR ARAUD

    Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt for reaso
    ns 1.4 (b) and (d).

    Summary
     -------

    ¶1. (C)  During a meeting with Codel Tanner on February 22,
    French MFA Political Director Gerard Araud reviewed the
    current state of the bilateral relationship, commented on
    NATO's continuing purpose, and compared France's and
    Britain's historically distinct orientations towards the U.S.
     He also discussed Afghanistan and Iran, two outstanding
    cases of U.S.-French cooperation.  On Afghanistan, Araud
    highlighted France's continued participation in NATO
    operations, but called for a more explicitly defined
    "political strategy" for reaching a desired end-state.  On
    Iran, he emphasized the need for continuing pressure on Iran,
    through P-5 unity, which is impacting on Ahmadinejad's
    weakened position, and which offers the only hope for a
    negotiated outcome.  End Summary.

    NATO's Purpose
    ---------------

    ¶2.  (C) MFA Political Director Gerard Araud hosted Codel
    Tanner, in Paris for the annual discussions of the NATO
    Parliamentary Assembly (NPA) Economic Committee with the
    OECD, to a meeting and luncheon on February 22.  Ambassadors
    Stapleton and Morella also attended.  Both sides saluted the
    historical links and continuing cultural and economic ties
    between the U.S. and France, along with our wide-ranging
    diplomatic cooperation.  Araud took the opportunity of the
    visit of the U.S. members of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly
    to offer, in his typically plain-spoken fashion, a thumb-nail
    history of U.S.-French relations since World War II,
    including our different approaches to NATO.  Recalling an
    Cold War bromide, Araud said that NATO's original purpose had
    been "to keep the Germans down, the Russians out, and the
    Americans in."  Its current purpose is -- for the newer
    central European and Baltic members, given their fear of
    Russia, "rational or not" -- to keep the Americans in.    For
    other members, NATO provides a way to meet their defense --
    without having to pay for it.  Araud decried the abysmally
    low defense spending by the European allies.  Among the
    Europeans, only the French and the British come close to
    carrying their weight, an exception which can be explained by
    their history as global powers, and their residual desire to
    exert influence.

    Trans-Atlantic Ties:  The Cases of Britain, France and Germany
    --------------------------------------------- -----------------

    ¶3.  (C) Taking up this theme, Araud offered the Codel a
    historical disquisition on the differences between France's
    and Britain's post-war relationship with the U.S.  Britain,
    for its part, tries to "ride the tiger," influencing U.S.
    policy behind the scenes.  This is what they have tried to do
    on Iraq:  "With what success, we might ask?"  France, on the
    other hand, tries to defend its interests, "tries to exist
    (as an independent player)."  The U.S. often views this
    simply as opposition, or anti-Americanism, which it isn't:
    "We're trying to exist, and to exercise our right to have our
    own opinion, including on how to address international
    crises.  That means that we may agree in some cases -- as on
    Iran where we work extremely closely, coordinating daily.  In
    others, as in Iraq, we disagreed, and still do.  This is not
    anti-Americanism, it's France developing its own analyses and
    exercising its own policy."  Stepping back, Araud recalled
    that the 1956 Suez Crisis had marked the end of both France
    and the UK's great power aspirations. Each, however, drew a
    different lesson from their joint failure.  U.S. opposition
    to the Suez operation, (which together with the Soviet
    Union's threat to use nuclear weapons had scuttled the
    Anglo-French operation), had led the British to conclude that
    "nothing was possible without the Americans," and that their
    influence would have to be applied through the U.S., by being
    at its side, and having its voice heard as America's most
    trusted ally.  The French took a distinctly different course,
    that of autonomy and independence (as symbolized in its
    decision, a few months after Suez, to create its own nuclear
    force).  Germany was a case apart, for historical reasons.
    With a military that was totally integrated into NATO, it was
    America's model ally.  Now things are changing: for the first
    time since WW II, during the Iraq crisis, Germany opposed the
    U.S.  While the British and French conception of their own
    roles -- "the special relationship" and
    independence/autonomy, respectively -- still apply, Germany's
    is now a question mark.

    Afghanistan
    -----------

    PARIS 00000743  002 OF 003

    ¶4. (C) In the back and forth that followed Araud's
    presentation, Ambassador Stapleton noted that we describe the
    current state of the relationship as "normal," a
    characterization which Araud's historical synopsis supported.
     It's a relationship we value, said the Ambassador; and we
    certainly do not take the French for granted.  Rep John
    Tanner (D-TN) agreed on the value of a diversity of opinion.
    Reaffirming strong U.S. support for NATO, he pointed to
    Afghanistan as the Alliance's defining issue.  The U.S.
    appreciates France's support in this crucial battle.
    Congressman Paul Gillmor (R-OH), Vice-President of the NPA,
    noted the importance of the NATO to the U.S, France's
    commitment of resources to defense, and the commonality of
    interests in our joint effort in Afghanistan.  (NOTE:
    Congressmen Tanner and Gillmor earlier met with French
    television  and print media to push for strengthened Allied
    support in Afghanistan. END NOTE.)  Araud agreed, citing the
    recent dispatch of the French aircraft carrier Charles de
    Gaulle to the region, which will allow France to increase its
    participation in airstrikes in Afghanistan.  However,
    France's concern is lack of a "political strategy" concerning
    Afghanistan, a point Chirac tried to make at the Riga Summit.
     Perhaps France's proposed Contact Group wasn't the right
    solution, said Araud, as it raises the question of
    neighboring countries' roles, and Afghanistan's as well.  But
    at the end of the day, success in Afghanistan will be
    political, "and we are simply not convinced we have a
    political strategy, an end-game in view, a roadmap to
    success.  If what we are doing simply amounts to killing
    Taliban every Spring, some of us, five years from now, will
    have tired of this.  That's our concern; we're not
    criticizing NATO, which is doing it's job.  It's the
    political strategy that's missing.  For example, Iran is a
    natural ally in the fight against the Taliban.  And there is
    the drug problem, which affects you, us and Russia.  We're
    concerned about where we're going."

    Iran
    ----
    ¶5. (C) Responding to Congressman Dennis Moore's (D-KS)
    question about the French view of Iran, Araud underlined how
    closely the U.S. and France have been working together over
    the past four years.  He distinguished Iran from North Korea,
    "a criminal regime which doesn't care about the suffering of
    its people."  Iran, on the other hand, is a "sort of
    democracy," a proud country, where public opinion counts for
    something, and which doesn't want to be seen as a pariah
    state.  This complex reality calls for a dual policy:  a
    readiness to negotiate, but in a context of international
    pressure.  During the negotiation of UNSCR 1737 a difference
    opened up between the U.S. and the EU-3, said Araud, with the
    U.S. seeking a stronger text, while the Europeans insisted on
    one that could be supported by the P-5.  Araud contended that
    now the U.S. agrees, retrospectively, that the Europeans were
    right on insisting on a unanimous outcome, one that could not
    be interpreted as the West ganging up on Iran.  UNSC
    unanimity (and especially China's vote) sent a powerful
    message of Iran's isolation, impacting strongly on Iranian
    public opinion.  Araud admitted that "mercantile" factors
    were driving some, especially the Russians.  While the French
    Treasury "is furious" about U.S. warnings to European banks
    about their operations with Iran, said Araud, those efforts
    work -- they're very effective.  Araud commented that the
    U.S. military option is taken very seriously in Iran.  As
    recounted to him by well-known French journalist Bernard
    Guetta, who recently returned from Tehran, "the Iranians are
    terrified; they take the U.S. military threat seriously --
    people don't want it."  Another important factor is
    Ahmadinejad's growing weakness.  "He was elected because he
    wasn't corrupt, he promised housing and good administration,
    but he hasn't delivered.  And there was his recent defeat in
    the municipal elections.  That said, although the music has
    changed, the words haven't":  The Iranians continue to refuse
    to suspend enrichment.  Therefore we must keep up the
    pressure.  And the pressure is working.  So now we must work
    on a second sanctions resolution, and keep the door open to a
    "double suspension" deal with Iran.  We haven't failed,
    emphasized Araud.  According to Guetta, he said, many people
    close to Supreme Leader Khamenei had "incredibly violent
    things to say about Ahmadinejad whom they regard as an
    upstart.  They want him out.  The subdued celebration of
    Revolution Day, including Ahmadinejad's speech, in which he
    did not mention the Holocaust, was significant.  Araud also
    pointed to a recent press interview with Velayati in which he
    affirmed that the Holocaust was a historical reality.  We
    have two to three years, concluded Araud, to work on this
    before Iran gets the bomb.  We will and must continue to work
    on this together -- including with the Russians and Chinese.

    (6). (U)  Codel Tanner did not have the opportunity to clear
    this cable before departing Paris.
    Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:

    PARIS 00000743  003 OF 003

    http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm

    STAPLETON

`