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CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

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### Viewing cable 08ANKARA691, IMPLICATIONS OF AKP CLOSURE CASE AND OUR PUBLIC

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
08ANKARA691 | 2008-04-11 12:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Ankara

`

    VZCZCXRO9919
    OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHFL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
    DE RUEHAK #0691/01 1021244
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 111244Z APR 08
    FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5884
    INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
    RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
    RHMFISS/39ABG INCIRLIK AB TU
    RHMFISS/425ABG IZMIR TU//CC//
    RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU
    RUEPGAB/MNF-I C2X BAGHDAD IZ
    RHMFISS/USCENTCOM SPECIAL HANDLING MACDILL AFB FL
    RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 000691

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    EUCOM PLEASE PASS TO POLAD

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2018
    TAGS: PGOV PREL TU
    SUBJECT: IMPLICATIONS OF AKP CLOSURE CASE AND OUR PUBLIC
    POSTURE

    Classified By: AMBASSADOR ROSS WILSON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

    ¶1. (c) Summary:  The closure case against Turkey's ruling
    Justice and Development Party (AKP) is a blow to this
    country's future.  It reflects unresolved conflicts about the
    nature of Turkey, the state, the extent of popular democracy
    and the role of religion in society.  It also results from
    failed leadership by PM Erdogan over the nine months since
    his re-election victory last July.  The outcome is uncertain,
    but the crisis here must be viewed through the peculiar
    entity that is Turkish democracy -- imperfect, crabbed, but
    functional in its way.  US priorities are sustaining our
    ability to work with this country on mutual interests and
    supporting its democratic process in a broad sense, but we
    should avoid opining on the specifics of Turkish politics.
    This approach will respect the raucous and historic debate
    and politicking among Turks taking place now about the future
    of their country -- a vital process for democracy here to
    continue to mature.  End Summary.

    Implications of the Closure Case
    --------------------------------

    ¶2. (c) Here is one way of looking at the AKP closure case.
    It is an attempted judicial coup, a Clausewitz-like extension
    of politics by legal means.  The indictment reads like a
    political tract.  It relies on newspaper clippings to justify
    excluding the party and 70-odd leaders from politics.  Among
    more bizarre bits of proof that the AKP intends to undo
    secularism are press reports of Secretary Powell praising the
    country,s "moderate Muslim" government and on its support
    for BMENA.  The propriety of banning parties is questionable
    in any democracy.  A ban based on a legally weak indictment
    of a party which nine months ago received 47 percent of the
    vote nationally and pluralities in 76 out of Turkey's 85
    constituencies looks like a travesty for democratic values
    and the rule of law.

    ¶3. (c) Another way of looking at the case focuses on its
    consistency with democracy Turkish style.  The constitution
    and laws have long provided for banning politicians and
    dissolving parties, 26 of which have fallen victim.  The AKP
    had many years in office to change this and other
    questionable policies (like Article 301 on insulting
    Turkishness), but did not.  What looks to Western democracies
    like an unusual power in the judiciary to compromise the
    results of last July's election is one of Turkey's check and
    balancing mechanisms to protect the rights of the minority --
    in this case secularists who feel threatened by the AKP.

    ¶4. (c) Some truth exists in both of these points of view.
    One clear thing is that PM Erdogan has stumbled badly.  One
    blunder was failing to make political bans more difficult
    when relevant legislation was amended several years ago.  As
    if dizzy with his own success, Erdogan failed to reassure the
    53 percent who voted against his government last July that it
    would respect their interests too.  He failed to use his
    re-election mandate to continue EU-related reforms that were
    the most formidable tools for calming fears of Islamization
    and untrammeled majority rule.  He allowed himself to be
    goaded by the National Action Party (MHP) into putting the
    headscarf ban at the head of the reform queue.  For this
    short-term populist win, he sacrificed a larger
    constitutional reform package that would have significantly
    strengthened Turkey's democracy.  Effective, progressive
    governance that was the hallmark of early AKP years in office
    dried up in the 2007 election year, and no momentum returned
    after that.  These and other missteps exacerbated fears among
    many that Erdogan was going too far, too fast; that there
    were no effective constraints on the AKP (especially after
    the military's botched intervention last spring); and that
    fundamentalists might soon dominate the bureaucracy,
    judiciary, universities, etc., to change Turkey in dangerous
    and permanent ways.

    ¶5. (c) The closure case on its face is a set-back for
    democracy and stability in Turkey.  For many, especially the
    large swath of previously neglected voters who make up
    Turkey's emerging middle class and whom Erdogan's populism
    galvanized, the message is that Turkish democracy is too
    poorly developed to protect their interests against the
    traditional elite.  This message is even more threatening to

    ANKARA 00000691  002 OF 003

    those here who are still marginalized, especially Kurds.
    More broadly, the case looks like, and to some extent is, the
    revenge of an unelected and unaccountable bureaucracy against
    Erdogan and popular democracy.  Turks fear the Deep State and
    many, including strong critics of the AKP, are deeply
    uncomfortable with the judiciary's attempt to manipulate the
    power balance.  Associated turmoil also renders Turkey's
    vulnerable economy more uncertain at a time when global
    trends are already very negative; a big downturn would
    reinforce the sense of crisis here.

    ¶6. (c) Today, however, Turkey remains a secure, relatively
    stable emerging democracy.  There is no serious violence on
    the streets, and the economy has not crashed.  The closure
    case is not a catastrophe or the undoing of Turkey's peculiar
    and imperfect democracy, at least not now.  It is better seen
    as one among many moves in a very long chess game that all
    sides here, including Erdogan and the AKP, are adept at
    playing.  The mere fact of the indictment has already
    moderated the AKP's rhetoric and pushed it to emphasize
    effective governance and more consensual policies, especially
    EU accession-related reform.  It is only a slight
    exaggeration to say that this is the way Turkey's crabbed,
    military-drafted constitution intended the system to work.
    Figures ranging from former President Demirel to former
    parliamentary Speaker Cetin have remarked to us recently that
    Turkey has seen worse and will come through these
    difficulties all right.  At this point, at least, their
    reassurances seem more justified than not.

    ¶7. (c) How matters will play out in the short-medium term is
    uncertain.

    -- A "victorious" AKP will still face intransigent opposition
    from one-third of the public, not to mention the courts,
    bureaucrats and generals.

    -- A post-closure AKP will reorganize under a new name and
    almost certainly still have the votes among its un-banned MPs
    to form the next government alone.  People already talk about
    plausible, post-closure scenarios that involve bringing
    Erdogan and other potentially banned figures back into the
    picture.

    -- Banishing the AKP will not change the reality that the
    main opposition parties are weak, divided and ill-equipped
    for 21st century politics.  Space may be created for a new
    centrist party, but credible leaders are not evident now, and
    the outlook for new elections that would propel them to
    prominence is uncertain.  The Islamist fringe in and outside
    the AKP could coalesce and become more radical; tarikats like
    the Gulenists may become more significant power centers than
    they are now.

    Without broad constitutional reform to replace the current
    top-down state and better protect individual liberties, and
    without more consensus on the extent and limits of secularism
    in modern Turkey, this struggle is likely to continue.

    ¶8. (c) This episode will last at least six months and
    possibly a year or more.  In the meantime, Turkey's
    leadership will be distracted and cautious.  Unfortunately,
    this comes during a period of immense challenges to and
    opportunities for Turkish interests domestically and in the
    region that include the Kurdish issue, relations with Iraq
    and the KRG, energy security, Cyprus, Armenia, EU accession,
    terrorism, etc.  Policy creativity, never Turkey's strong
    suit, will diminish.  We also note that before the
    Constitutional Court decides the AKP's fate, it will likely
    rule on the headscarf amendments; reinstituting the ban at
    universities may actually calm matters and defuse the
    anti-AKP case.  The Court may also rule on the closure of the
    Kurdish nationalist Democratic Society Party (DTP); this
    could prove more explosive than the AKP case, given that DTP
    leaders and constituents accept much less of the
    constitutional/legal order here than the AKP mainstream.

    Our Public Posture
    ------------------

    ¶9. (c) None of this changes the reality that Turkey is an
    extremely important ally in a dangerous region and that it

    ANKARA 00000691  003 OF 003

    is, despite many faults, more democratic and free than any
    other country in the Muslim world.  We should not stifle,
    through our intervention, what should fundamentally be a
    debate by Turks about the future of their country that is
    essential if its democratic institutions are to mature.
    Doing so would make this a US issue in ways harmful to our
    interests, our influence and to democratic values here.  We
    should stick to general principles, and let Turks sort out
    the details.  At some point, as matters develop, our
    intervention to head off a political meltdown here may be
    necessary, but that moment isn't now and may well never come.

    ¶10. (c) With this in mind, our public comments should take a
    positive and high road.  We should:

    -- Make clear our strong support for Turkey, its democratic
    institutions and its commitment to democratic values and
    secular principles that define our alliance and partnership.

    -- Urge Turkey's leaders and institutions to work for
    pragmatic solutions that reinforce stability and build
    consensus at a critical time for the country and in the
    region.

    -- Emphasize support for Turkey's goal of accession to the EU
    and its need to legislate and implement comprehensive
    political and economic reforms that will sustain that goal
    and secure liberty and prosperity in the future.

    -- Look forward to continuing to work with Turkey on behalf
    of common interests in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Caucasus, the
    Balkans, on terrorism, on energy security, on the Cyprus
    problem and elsewhere in the region and the world.

    Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
    http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey

    WILSON

`