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CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

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### Viewing cable 10ANKARA294, TURKEY: LARGEST WAVE OF MILITARY DETENTIONS TO

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
10ANKARA294 | 2010-02-23 19:07 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Ankara

`

    VZCZCXRO1215
    PP RUEHSL
    DE RUEHAK #0294/01 0541901
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 231901Z FEB 10
    FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2228
    INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEHAK/USDAO ANKARA TU PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU//TCH// PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 000294

    SIPDIS

    DEPT FOR EUR/SE; OSD FOR WADE POPOVICH

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2020
    TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS TU
    SUBJECT: TURKEY: LARGEST WAVE OF MILITARY DETENTIONS TO
    DATE POSES QUESTIONS: WHAT NEXT IN AKP-MILITARY CLASH?

    REF: A. ANKARA 150
         ¶B. ANKARA 53 AND PREVIOUS
         ¶C. ANKARA 107

    Classified By: Ambassador James F. Jeffrey, Reasons 1.4 (b,d)

    ¶1. (C) Summary:  On February 22 police detained 47 retired
    and active-duty military officers, including 17 flag-grade
    officers for -- according to press reports -- their alleged
    involvement in coup plots dating back to 2003-2004.  Although
    coverage of the detentions blanketed the press, neither the
    Turkish General Staff (TGS) nor the government appear
    publicly outraged (in the case of TGS) or congratulatory (the
    governing Justice and Development Party) by the actions.
    There has been no official statement from the TGS, and PM
    Ergodan took a back seat by stating that the police were
    simply acting on order from the judiciary.  (His attack dog
    Deputy PM Arinc was more polemical.)  CHOD GEN Basbug
    announced that he has postponed imminent travel to Egypt, and
    late on February 23 called an emergency meeting with his
    four-star generals and admirals.  Prosecutors have now
    detained all of the force commanders from the 2003-2004
    period with the exception of former CHOD Hilmi Ozkok and
    former Turkish Land Forces Commander Aytac Yalman.  End
    summary.

    Unprecedented Arrests...
    -------------------------

    ¶2.  (SBU) On February 22 nearly 50 retired and current
    military officers (and one NCO) were detained, likely for
    their alleged connections to the "Sledgehammer" (Balyoz)
    investigations.  The homes and offices of many retired flag
    officers were also searched and police seized and removed
    documents for further inspection.  Among those detained were
    four active duty admirals and 17 retired generals, including:

    --Ergin Saygun:  Former Deputy CHOD (2006-2008) and 1st Army
    Commander (2008-2009).  Saygun is very well-known to the
    U.S.; he was our primary coordinator on anti-terrorism issues
    for many years, and had accompanied PM Erdogan during his
    November 2007 visit to Washington.

    --Ibrahim Firtina:  Former Air Force Chief from 2003-2005.
    Firtina was questioned in December 2009 by the Ergenekon
    prosecutors and has been implicated in the press for his role
    in the Sledgehammer Operation.

    --Cetin Dogan: Former 1st Army Commander (2002-2004).

    --Ozden Ornek:  Former Navy Chief (2003 - 2005).  Ornek's
    diary, which allegedly details discussions among senior
    military officers to start a coup between 2003-2005, is being
    used by prosecutors as their primary source of evidence.
    Ornek was also questioned by Ergenekon prosecutors in
    December 2009.

    --Engin Alan:  LtG (retired).

    --Suha Tanyeli:  BG (retired). Tanyeli was head of the TGS
    Strategic Research Center (SAREM).

    ¶3.  (C) The operation itself appears to have been well
    coordinated, as detentions and searches took place
    simultaneously in Ankara, Istanbul, Izmir, Bursa, Diyarbakir,
    Hatay, Kocaeli, and Bodrum.  There have been no official
    pronouncements regarding the reasons for the operation,
    although the press widely suspects that the arrests are in
    connection with the 2003 Sledgehammer plan (which allegedly
    included a plan to overthrow the AKP government (ref B) and a
    separate plot known as "Operation Cage" (ref A)).  Press
    reports state that many of the detained individuals'
    signatures were found on "Sledgehammer" documents.  The
    majority of individuals, according to the press, are being
    interrogated in Istanbul.

    ...But So What?
    ----------------

    ¶4. (C) Despite the press fury, reaction from TGS and the
    government has been minimal.  TGS has yet to make a official
    statement.  However, TGS CHOD General Ilker Basbug postponed
    his official travel to Egypt -- an extraordinary and

    ANKARA 00000294  002 OF 003

    unprecedented step -- and late on February 23 called an
    emergency meeting with his four-star generals and admirals.
    When asked about the arrests PM Erdogan, in Spain for a state
    visit, told reporters that the police were acting on the
    order of the judiciary.  Although a few "usual suspects"
    inflammatory statements from the opposition -- such as
    Republican Peoples' Party (CHP) Chairman Deniz Baykal's
    statement that the arrests made it feel was "as if Turkey was
    under occupation" -- made it into the press initially,
    overall press reactions were overshadowed the following day
    by other news stories.  Markets opened up this morning, and
    business continues as usual.

    Bad for TGS?  Good for AKP?
    ----------------------------

    ¶5. (C) This is the largest "round-up" of military officers to
    date; the lack of an immediate reaction from TGS may suggest
    that the (current) military leadership is either fully
    willing to allow this investigation and the democratic
    process to continue unimpeded, or is waiting for AKP to hang
    itself on unfounded allegations.  The military remains deeply
    unhappy about AKP's governance and is enraged at the steady
    campaign to erode the military's standing in Turkish society.
     To date, prosecutors have now detained all of the senior
    military commanders from the 2003-2004 period with the
    exception of former CHOD Hilmi Ozkok and former Land Forces
    Commander Aytac Yalman.  And although the TGS seemed to be
    caught off balance and therefore was unwilling to speak up
    yesterday in strong opposition to these ongoing
    investigations, it seems unlikely that it will remain silent.

    ¶6. (C) AKP appears to have concluded that it gains
    politically from the arrest of military officers.  Having
    perhaps nevertheless learned from past experiences, PM
    Erdogan was shielded from what could have been outraged
    criticism by secularists by conveniently being outside of the
    country.  His absence also did not allow for any publicized
    "urgent" meeting with CHOD Basbug, as has happened in the
    past.  Deputy PM Bulent Arinc's statements appeared designed
    to spin these developments as yet another example of how
    "times have changed" in Turkey and how the country is merely
    going through a "normalization" period.

    ¶7. (C) The next few days will prove interesting and possibly
    pivotal.  The judiciary has four days to either turn the
    detentions into formal arrests or release the individuals.
    If formal charges are brought, TGS will be forced to respond.
     Likewise, a lack of substantive evidence will rebound on the
    Government, and will give credence to accusations that the
    long-running Ergenekon investigation has a deeper and more
    insidious design:  to undermine AKP's secular opposition.

    ¶8. (C) Some knowledgeable embassy officers see this latest
    step as a more serious provocation that could trigger some
    type of unpredictable military reaction.  We will see.

    COMMENT
    --------

    ¶9.  (C) To repeat the facts on this whole "Ergenekon" set of
    events:

    a.  There is some "fire" behind the smoke.  The military
    obviously has plans to intervene if necessary in political
    affairs and can cite the 1982 constitution, endorsed by the
    population per referendum, which gives the military a key
    role in "overseeing" democratic governments' adherence to
    Ataturkist principles -- largely defined as by the military
    and its friends in the bureaucracy and judiciary.

    b.  PM Erdogan (supported by the EU and even many
    anti-Erdogan Turkes who want to see the military out of
    politics) legitimately wants to rein in this "droit de
    regard" status.

    c.  But PM Erdogan realizes that elections are coming up, and
    that he did relatively poorly in last year's elections (38%)
    but brilliantly in 2007 (47% AKP win) when he played off the
    military's counter-productive threats.

    d.  Thus much of this is electoral poiltics, albeit of a

    ANKARA 00000294  003 OF 003

    "below the belt" contact sport variety.

    e.  All this is exacerbated by the thuggish authoritarian
    behavior of the police and judiciary (reflecting prevailing
    tendencies in this society, including in the military).  In
    the U.S. a prosecutor or detective would simply have visited
    the generals in question to post questions.  "Invites" to the
    precinct, reading of rights, indictments, arrests, and
    detentions follow only after the amassing of evidence and
    clear indications of a case winnable in court.  Not here.
    Anyone even suspected of "having information" is hauled
    before the police (armed with automatic weapons), and
    humiliated before the press.  It's always been that way; now
    it's happening also to the top brass and their friends.

    f.  Up to now, however, most of those so publicly humiliated
    are eventually released due to patent innocence,a lack of
    evidence (as in the recent "Special Forces officers planning
    Arinc's assassination" caper -- ref A) or because the
    judiciary throws the whole process out (i.e. the law making
    military officers subject to civilian courts -- ref C).

    g.  But every day is a new one here, and no one can be
    certain where this whole choreography will fall out of whack.
     Then, look out.
    Jeffrey

               "Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.s
    gov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turkey"

`