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CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

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### Viewing cable 09MOSCOW1488, ISRAELI FM LIEBERMAN IN MOSCOW

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
09MOSCOW1488 | 2009-06-05 13:01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Moscow

`

    VZCZCXRO1697
    PP RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHROV RUEHTRO
    DE RUEHMO #1488/01 1561306
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 051306Z JUN 09
    FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3659
    INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
    RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
    RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
    RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
    RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 001488

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2019
    TAGS: PGOV PREL IR IS SY GG RS
    SUBJECT: ISRAELI FM LIEBERMAN IN MOSCOW

    Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells for reasons 1.4 (b/d).

    ¶1. (C) Summary: Israeli FM Lieberman's June 2-3 visit to
    Russia appears not to have broken new ground diplomatically,
    but cemented Moscow's impression that the Russian-speaking
    Lieberman is one of their own.  The trip included meetings
    with Medvedev and Putin, as well as a lengthy discussion with
    FM Lavrov, during which Lieberman indicated that Israel was
    not considering a military strike on Iran.  Both sides agreed
    to hold off on scheduling the Moscow ME conference until
    after President Obama's visit to Moscow, and Lavrov quizzed
    Lieberman on a possible U.S. plan to bring together Israeli
    and Palestinian leaders.  Lieberman rebuffed Lavrov's calls
    for Israel to ease the pressure on Gaza and halt settlement
    expansion, while Lavrov agreed to consider Lieberman's
    request for Russian officials to visit the Israeli soldier
    held by Hamas.  Lavrov said that "nothing new" could happen
    on Iran until the U.S. opened its dialogue with Tehran, and
    repeated Russian concerns about the need to reach a
    negotiated settlement with this "important neighbor."  He
    reiterated that Russia had not transferred S-300s to Iran,
    but also had to consider its contract to provide the missiles
    to Tehran.  Lavrov thanked Israel for limiting military sales
    to Georgia, but thought other countries were supplying
    offensive weapons to Tiblisi, which could be emboldened to
    start "another adventure."  The FMs discussed expanding
    bilateral economic ties, and Lavrov raised Russian concern
    that Israel was partaking in "historical revisionism" that
    sought to blame Russia for the Ukrainian famine of the 1930s.
     End summary.

    Behaved Like an Old Friend
    --------------------------

    ¶2. (C) Israeli DCM Yuval Fuchs told us that FM Lieberman's
    June 2-3 visit to Russia ran the gamut of international and
    bilateral issues, from the peace process to the payment of
    Soviet-era pensions to Russian speakers living in Israel.
    His visit centered upon a two-hour June 2 meeting with FM
    Lavrov that Fuchs characterized as a standard presentation of
    views, during which "nothing breathtaking" was said.
    Lieberman had a hectic day that began with a meeting at
    Medvedev's home on the outskirts of Moscow, then the Lavrov
    meeting at the MFA, a flight to St. Petersburg on a chartered
    plane to see Putin, and dinner with Lavrov upon returning to
    Moscow.  On June 3, Lieberman had breakfast with former FM
    Igor Ivanov (a personal friend), meetings with the heads of
    the Duma and Federation Council international affairs
    committees, discussions with Russian Jewish leaders, and a
    press conference.  He then departed Moscow for Minsk.

    ¶3. (C) Fuchs explained that Lieberman conducted his meetings
    in Russian, shared stories about Moscow, and smoked, creating
    a comfortable atmosphere with his Russian interlocutors.  The
    Israeli FM "behaved like an old friend" commented Fuchs, who
    thought that the Russians acted as if they already knew him,
    although it was too early to say whether this personal
    diplomacy would have a measurable effect on already strong
    Russia-Israel relations.

    Lavrov-Lieberman
    ----------------

    ¶4. (C) Fuchs said that during the meeting with Lavrov, the
    GOR's planned Moscow ME conference was not a central topic
    for either side.  Lieberman stressed the importance of
    coordinating such efforts with the U.S., and said it would
    not be appropriate to set the timing of a conference until
    after President Obama's visit to Moscow.  Lavrov agreed, and
    said that Moscow did not want to hold a conference that would
    not produce results.  Lavrov asked Lieberman if Israel was
    aware of an idea supposedly floated by S/E Mitchell to bring
    together Israeli and Palestinian leaders; Lieberman said no.

    ¶5. (C) Lavrov pressed Israel to open checkpoints into Gaza,
    and suggested posting international monitors to allay Israeli
    concerns regarding smuggling.  When Lavrov argued that Hamas
    had stuck by the Gaza cease-fire, Lieberman retorted that
    Hamas would break the cease-fire when it believed doing so
    suited its needs.  Lavrov also pressed Israel to freeze the
    settlements, leading Lieberman to respond that "life goes on"
    and settlement expansion was necessary to accommodate growing
    communities.

    ¶6. (C) Fuchs said that Lavrov criticized the U.S. on several
    fronts, telling Lieberman that the U.S. invasion of Iraq was
    a "present" to Iran, and the U.S. decision to isolate Syria
    was a "setback" for a comprehensive ME settlement.
    Furthermore, the U.S. failure to "listen" to Russia, which

    MOSCOW 00001488  002 OF 002

    advised against Palestinian elections, had allowed Hamas to
    come to power and eventually take over Gaza, thereby
    strengthening Iran's position in the region.

    Syria
    -----

    ¶7. (C) Lavrov thought that the Turkish-led negotiations
    between Israel and Syria had been positive, and said that
    during his recent visit to Damascus, the Syrians indicated
    that they were ready to renew talks either through Turkey or
    Russia so long as they would include the future of the Golan
    Heights.  Lavrov said that he raised with Hamas leaders the
    need to allow visits to captured IDF soldier Gilad Shalit.
    Lieberman asked if Russian officials could visit Shalit, and
    Lavrov directed DFM Saltanov to explore this possibility.

    Iran
    ----

    ¶8. (C) Lavrov predicted that "nothing new" would happen with
    Iran until after the U.S. began its dialogue with Tehran,
    although he thought there was a better chance to get a "clear
    answer" from Iran on P5 1 proposals under the current U.S.
    Administration.  He reiterated that Russia did not believe
    there existed hard evidence that Iran's nuclear program had a
    military dimension, and thought it transparent enough to
    detect whether resources were directed to military uses.

    ¶9. (C) Lavrov expressed Russian interest in reaching a
    negotiated solution to the crisis surrounding Iran's nuclear
    program, and the need for the West to normalize relations
    with Tehran, a close Russian neighbor with which it shared
    the Caspian and its resources.  He raised Russian concern
    that an Israeli attack on Iran would cause instability in the
    region and an influx of refugees into the Caucasus.  Fuchs
    said that Lieberman responded that Israel "was not talking
    about such a response" and understood that an attack would
    cause a "chain reaction" within the region.  Lieberman made
    similar statements suggesting that Israel was not considering
    attacking Iran during his press conference.

    ¶10. (C) Lavrov reiterated that Russia and Iran had signed a
    deal to provide S-300s, but that Russia had not transferred
    any weapons.  The GOR did not intend to provide regionally
    destabilizing weapons, but also had to take into account how
    it would be perceived by others if Moscow failed to fulfill
    its contract with Tehran.

    Georgia
    -------

    ¶11. (C) Lavrov expressed Russian appreciation for Israeli
    steps to limit arms sales to Georgia to defensive weapons,
    but raised concern that other countries were supplying
    offensive weapons.  He was also concerned that the recent
    military exercises Georgia conducted with NATO might push
    Tiblisi to undertake "another adventure".

    Bilateral Issues
    ----------------

    ¶12. (C) Fuchs said that much of the discussion between Lavrov
    and Lieberman focused on expanding bilateral ties, especially
    in the economic sphere.  They also touched upon parochial
    issues of concern to Lieberman and his constituents, such as
    the payment of pensions owed by the Soviet Union and Russia
    to Russian-speaking Israelis.

    ¶13. (C) Lavrov raised Russian concern with "historical
    revisionism" regarding the Soviet Era and Second World War,
    which, he said, was particularly acute in Eastern Europe but
    was also present in Israel.  He cited Israel's official
    recognition of the Holodomor, the 1930s famine that occurred
    in Ukraine.  Lieberman explained that by recognizing this
    tragedy, Israel had not said Russia was guilty of causing it,
    nor that it was an act of genocide.
    BEYRLE

`