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CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

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### Viewing cable 10BAKU134, AZERBAIJANI PRESIDENT TO U/S BURNS: "YOU CAN'T

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
10BAKU134 | 2010-02-25 08:08 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Baku

`

    VZCZCXRO2823
    OO RUEHDBU
    DE RUEHKB #0134/01 0560815
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 250815Z FEB 10
    FM AMEMBASSY BAKU
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2437
    INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
    RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 3808
    RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
    RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE IMMEDIATE 1573

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAKU 000134

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2020
    TAGS: PREL PHUM MARR ETRD AJ AM RS IR TU
    SUBJECT: AZERBAIJANI PRESIDENT TO U/S BURNS:  "YOU CAN'T
    BOIL TWO HEADS IN ONE POT"

    Classified By: Charge Donald Lu, for reasons 1.4 (b,d).

     ¶1.  (C) Summary:  President Aliyev used this coarse street
    slang to describe the relationship between Russian President
    Medvedev and PM Putin, but he might well have used the same
    idiom to describe his concerns about Turkey-Armenia
    reconciliation and the Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) Peace Process.
    He told U/S Burns that the "Sword of Damocles" of the April
    24 Armenian Remembrance Day is hanging over the NK Process,
    as well as the Turkey-Armenia normalization process.  He
    suggested that it would be easier if the Turkey-Armenia
    normalization could be considered after April in order to
    allow more time for progress on NK.  He also took the
    opportunity to press the USG to apply maximum pressure on
    Yerevan to make concessions on NK.  He stressed, "Now we are
    trying to be even more flexible."

    ¶2.  (C) Summary Continued:  On Iran, President Aliyev said he
    supported economic isolation and believed it could be
    effective if enforced by a broad coalition.  He complained
    about Iranian security provocations.  On a proposed
    battalion-sized Afghanistan contribution, Aliyev said that he
    would support sending a team to Georgia to observe the
    training being provided by EUCOM to Georgian troops headed
    for Afghanistan.  On energy cooperation, President Aliyev
    said that if the Turks demonstrate "constructive behavior"
    this year that a gas transit deal can happen.  Finally, on
    the jailed youth activists, though he made no firm
    commitments regarding their release, he said, "I think (a
    pardon or amnesty) can be done.  I had no intention to hurt
    anyone."  End Summary.

    Seeks Pressure on Yerevan to Resolve NK
    ---------------------------------------

    ¶3.  (C) Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Bill
    Burns began his hour-long meeting with President Ilham Aliyev
    by stressing that he was sent with the simple message that
    Washington wants to build our bilateral relations and create
    a stronger partnership.  He then offered his condolences for
    the three Azeri soldiers killed on the Line of Contact on
    February 18.  Aliyev responded that such events show that
    there is no peace, no peace treaty and no peacekeepers
    enforcing the cease-fire.  He worried more such incidents
    could happen.  Burns commented that such incidents
    underscored the urgency of finding a political solution on
    Nagorno-Karabakh.

    ¶4.  (C) The balance of Aliyev,s comments sought to convey
    that he was ready to move forward in the Minsk Group Process,
    but that international pressure would be needed if Armenia
    was to move forward.  He said that it is now time to find a
    final resolution, but Armenian President Sargsian wants to
    walk away from the process.  "I told the co-chairs that
    Armenia wants to delay as long as possible and escape at the
    end.""  He said that Azerbaijan was prepared to do its part
    to propel the talks forward.  "Now we will try to be even
    more flexible."

    ¶5.  (C) Aliyev outlined several steps to persuade Armenia to
    agree to the Minsk Group Basic Principles:

    -- the three co-chair countries should consolidate their
    efforts at a senior-level,

    -- (C) the three co-chair countries should send a strong
    message that the independence of NK is not under review, and

    -- (C) if these new proposals are not accepted, there should
    be consequences in terms of international isolation,
    especially in the form of Russia,s curtailing some of its
    economic support for Armenia.

    ¶6.  (C) Aliyev noted that at Sochi, President Sargsian had
    inserted a proposal for specifying a definite date for a
    referendum or plebiscite on NK final status.  This, Aliyev
    argued, undermined the entire framework of the agreement,
    which is premised on an eventual referendum ) with no
    definite timeframe ) in exchange for legalizing "the
    illegally established regime in NK.""  He also noted that
    Armenia is vulnerable to isolation because it is dependent
    upon remittances from its diaspora, as well as imports of gas
    and electricity.  "After 18 years of negotiation, we have
    tested all options.  If this phase (of Minsk Group talks)
    ends, what is next?" the President asked aloud.

    The Russian Role in NK and Russian Succession

    BAKU 00000134  002 OF 004

    ---------------------------------------------

    ¶7.  (C) In response to U/S Burns' question about the Russian
    role in the NK talks, Aliyev responded that he was convinced
    that Medvedev's efforts have been sincere.  He said that
    Medvedev has personally met with the Azerbaijani and Armenian
    presidents five times.  Thus any failure to make progress on
    this issue will damage Medvedev's credibility.  He said that
    at Sochi, Medvedev tried to persuade Sargsian to achieve a
    breakthrough.  He added, however, that it was strange that
    with so much pressure from Moscow and Lavrov's visit to
    Yeveran, the Armenians not only resisted progress, but
    actually backtracked on previously-agreed items.  In response
    to a question, Aliyev said that he believes that PM Putin has
    his own separate opinion about the desirability of an NK
    resolution.  "I have no evidence, but I can feel this,"
    Aliyev remarked.

    ¶8.  (C) Aliyev said that he considers Medvedev "a modern,
    new-generation intellectual," surrounded by people whom he
    does not control.  He said that he has personally witnessed
    Medvedev taking decisions that then required further approval
    before they were implemented, referring specifically to a
    border demarcation agreement that he had agreed with Medvedev
    only to have it stymied by ""others,"" presumably in the
    prime ministerial office.  He added, "Many high-ranking
    officials don't recognize (Medvedev) as a leader."  He said
    that there are signs of a strong confrontation between the
    teams of the two men, although not yet between Putin and
    Medvedev personally.  "We have a saying in Azeri, 'Two heads
    cannot be boiled in one pot'" (crude street slang suggesting
    that two leaders are spoiling for a fight).

    Strong Pushback on the Turkey-Armenia Normalization
    --------------------------------------------- -------

    ¶9.  (C) U/S Burns stressed that the U.S. believes that
    progress on the Turkey-Armenia protocols could create
    political space for Sargsian to be more flexible on NK.  He
    continued that the reverse was also true, that a failure of
    the Turkey-Armenia process would almost certainly result in
    serious negative consequences for the NK process.  Aliyev
    said that NK progress would require a minimum of five or six
    months.  He suggested that the entire Turkey-Armenia protocol
    ratification process be delayed until after April 24.  He
    said that the "Sword of Damocles" of Armenian Remembrance Day
    is hanging unhelpfully not only over the Turkey-Armenia
    process, but also now the NK progress.  "If there were no
    deadline, maybe we could see how to combine our efforts (to
    resolve NK)."

    ¶10.  (C) Aliyev pushed back with his usual warnings about the
    negative effects of Turkey-Armenia protocol ratification
    without being proceeded by NK progress.  He darkly predicted
    postponement of any NK settlement; no comprehensive regional
    security improvement; damage to Turkey-Azerbaijani relations;
    no real partnership between Turkey and Armenia; further
    isolation of Central Asia; the undermining of energy
    projects; and damage to Georgia, both in lost transit income,
    but also in its role as the sole land corridor between Russia
    and Armenia.

    Relations with Iran Described as Tense and Unstable
    --------------------------------------------- ------

    ¶11.  (C) U/S Burns explained in detail the steps the U.S. had
    taken to initiate dialogue with Tehran and support the Tehran
    Research Reactor initiative.  He ended by noting that, given
    the rejection of these overtures, the U.S. would move forward
    with another UNSC resolution that included new sanctions
    targeting the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.  Aliyev
    responded that although the visible side of Azerbaijan's
    relations with Iran appears normal, the substance was very
    different.  "I do not exclude that relations will be become
    more difficult," the President added.

    ¶12.  (C) "(German Chancellor) Merkel was very firm with me on
    Iran, trying to persuade me.  I told her, 'No need,'" the
    President recalled.  He said that he was supportive of Iran's
    economic isolation and believed it could work if the
    international community worked together.  He said that
    earlier sanctions observance had been spotty with many
    European energy companies working in Iran.  "Statoil supports
    Iran more than it supports us!" he complained.  He noted that
    Russian President Medvedev once told him that Russia did not
    want the Americans to squeeze Iran, but also did not want a
    nuclear Iran.

    BAKU 00000134  003 OF 004

    ¶13.  (C) Aliyev said that Iranian provocations in Azerbaijan
    were on the rise.  He specifically cited not only the
    financing of radical Islamic groups and Hezbollah terrorists,
    but also:

    -- the Iranian financing of violent Ashura ceremonies in
    Nakhchivan,

    -- the organization of demonstrations in front of the Azeri
    consulates in Tabriz and Istanbul,

    -- a violent religious procession recently in Baku,

    -- the use of the President's photo alongside the Star of
    David on the Azeri-language Seher TV broadcast into
    Azerbaijan, and

    -- conflict in the Caspian.

    ¶14.  (C) The President added that Azerbaijan will not
    reciprocate on the liberalization of the visa regime with
    Iran.  He also noted that Azerbaijan is planning to create a
    TV channel in Persian that will broadcast into Iran.  He said
    that he did not understand why the Supreme Religious Leader
    chose Ahmadinejad over former President Moussavi.  He joked
    that perhaps it was too dangerous to have two ethnic Azeris
    at the head of the Iranian state.  He said that the election
    fraud was outrageous, with Ahmadinejad winning in
    Azeri-dominated Tabriz and Moussavi winning in Tehran, where
    it was harder to falsify the vote.  He viewed the situation
    as very tense within Iran and believed it could erupt at any
    time.

    Supports Afghanistan Troop Contribution, with Conditions
    --------------------------------------------- -----------

    ¶15.  (C) U/S Burns asked for the President's support to
    continue our discussions about a battalion-sized contribution
    of troops to Afghanistan that would include a U.S. train and
    equip program.  The President said that he is aware of this
    initiative and his foreign and defense ministries are working
    on it.  He said that the fundamental problem is one of
    ""optics,""  claiming it was difficult for him politically if
    it looks like the Americans are only training Azeri troops to
    send them off to Afghanistan.  He said that it would be
    easier if half of those trained would be sent to Afghanistan,
    while the second half would remain in Azerbaijan or be used
    for other purposes.  U/S Burns noted that the President's
    suggestion would create problems involving the U.S. funding
    of the training.  The Charge proposed that as an initial
    step, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defense Ministry staff
    observe the training of Georgian troops headed to Afghanistan
    by U.S. Marines.  The President thought this was a good idea
    and instructed his aide to look at this suggestion.

    Pardon or Amnesty of the Youth Activists "Can be Done"
    --------------------------------------------- ---------

    ¶16.  (C) U/S Burns said that one of the ways Azerbaijan could
    show leadership as a tolerant and secular country was in
    advancing democracy and human rights.  He specifically asked
    that, following the appeal process of the two youth
    activists, the President find a way on humanitarian grounds
    to release the two men.  Aliyev made no firm commitment, but
    responded, "I think this can be done.  I had no intention to
    hurt anyone."  When U/S Burns expressed the hope that the
    government could quietly take this step, the President said,
    "Okay."

    Russians are a Factor in Turkish Gas Transit
    --------------------------------------------

    ¶17.  (C) On energy cooperation, President Aliyev said that if
    the Turks demonstrate "constructive behavior" this year that
    a gas transit deal can happen.  He was clear, however, that
    nothing would be signed before April 24.  He also professed
    to be worried that active Turkish-Russian cooperation could
    be one of the impediments to progress.  He confided that
    Turkish Energy Minister Yildiz recently told the head the
    Azerbaijani State Oil Company, "Why do you want to ruin our
    relations with Russia?  Do you really need Nabucco?"

    ¶18.  (C) The President continued that it is imperative for
    Azerbaijan that formalities for the commencement of Shah
    Deniz Phase II gas development begin this year.  This project
    will bring $20 billion in much-needed investment to
    Azerbaijan and potentially develop Azerbaijan into a major
    source of new gas, as much as 50 billion cubic meters.

    BAKU 00000134  004 OF 004

    ¶19.  (C) Unprompted by U/S Burns, Aliyev spelled out the
    reasons Azerbaijan decided to sell gas to Russia last year,
    noting that ""Moscow had asked" and offered a good price for
    gas that was surplus anyway.  But the real reason, Aliyev
    confided, was that the sale illustrated to "our Turkish
    friends" that they will not be allowed to create a gas
    distribution hub.  "Aliyev made clear his distaste for the
    Erdogan government in Turkey, underscoring the "naivete" of
    their foreign policy and the failure of their initiatives,
    including the loss of support for Turkey among traditional
    international friends because of Ankara,s hostility to
    Israel.  He noted that in his view, there had never been any
    merit to the notion of a "moderate Islamist" government in
    Turkey, and that Erdogan,s insistence on promoting Hamas and
    Gaza ) when other Arab countries were notably silent on
    these issues ) had brought Turkey no benefits.

    ¶20.  (U) Lastly, U/S Burns asked for the President's
    assistance in resolving the long-standing difficulties in
    finalizing the lease for the new Embassy compound.  The
    President responded positively that he thought this could be
    done.

    ¶21.  (U) U/S Burns was accompanied by EUR Deputy Assistant
    Secretary Amb. Tina Kaidanow, NSC Director Bridget Brink, and
    Charge.  President Aliyev was joined by his Foreign Policy
    Advisor Novruz Mammadov.

    ¶22.  (U) This message has been cleared by U/S Burns.
    LU

`