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### Viewing cable 08MUSCAT174, ADMIRAL WILLIAM J. FALLON'S MEETING WITH SULTAN

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
08MUSCAT174 | 2008-03-01 05:05 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Muscat

`

    VZCZCXRO2105
    PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
    DE RUEHMS #0174/01 0610549
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    P 010549Z MAR 08
    FM AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9318
    RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
    INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 MUSCAT 000174

    SIPDIS

    NOFORN
    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/2018
    TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER ENRG KWMN IR IZ MU
    SUBJECT: ADMIRAL WILLIAM J. FALLON'S MEETING WITH SULTAN
    QABOOS

    Classified By: Ambassador Gary A. Grappo for Reasons 1.4 (b, d)

    -------
    SUMMARY
    -------

    ¶1.  (C) Sultan Qaboos discussed both domestic and regional
    issues during his February 19 meeting with Admiral William J.
    Fallon, CENTCOM Commander.  On the domestic front, the Sultan
    described his desire to empower the government to be more
    responsive to citizen concerns.  Seeking to strengthen the
    role of Omani women, the Sultan plans to convene a conference
    in 2009 designed to increase the participation and leadership
    of women in all aspects of Omani society.  Sultan Qaboos also
    shared plans for continued infrastructure development in Oman
    and described efforts underway to obtain more natural gas.
    On Iraq, the Sultan advised against a premature withdrawal of
    U.S. forces and stated that more regional assistance would be
    forthcoming if Iraqis would "come together" to take charge
    of, and invest in, their own country.  Sultan Qaboos shared
    U.S. concerns about Iranian meddling in Iraq and elsewhere,
    but contended that Tehran knew confrontation with the U.S.
    was not in its interest.  Iran's "charm offensive" in the GCC
    had succeeded in lessening suspicions of some officials about
    the true intentions of Iranian policies.  End Summary.

    ¶2.  (C) CENTCOM Commander Admiral Fallon, accompanied by the
    Ambassador, met February 19 with Sultan Qaboos bin Sa'id for
    approximately 2 hours at one of the Sultan's castles -- Husn
    al Shumugh -- in the interior of Oman.  (Note:  The Sultan
    was outside of Muscat on his annual 4-6 week "meet the people
    tour" during which he visits selected sites outside the
    capital.  End Note.)  The Sultan appeared in good health and
    was cheerful, although he commented that his role as ruler of
    Oman was demanding and did not allow him time to do all the
    things he wanted to do, such as reading more books.  "My
    office is wherever I am," he stated, noting that he
    constantly had to attend to paperwork and urgent requests
    from his staff, among other tasks.  The Sultan added that
    despite his busy schedule, he always made time to "watch the
    news," though he did not elaborate on his preferred media
    outlet.

    -------------------
    CONCERNS ABOUT IRAQ
    -------------------

    ¶3.  (C) The Sultan expressed concern over a premature
    withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq.  Recognizing recent
    improvements in the security situation, he counseled that
    American troops should only leave "when the time is right."
    He stressed that Iraqis had to "take charge" of the fate of
    their country, but questioned whether the different factions
    would be able to "come together" to accomplish this.  He
    pointedly asked the Admiral, "Do you really think Prime
    Minister Maliki and his government are capable of pulling the
    country together?"  The Sultan did not directly respond to
    Admiral Fallon's comment on the need for assistance and
    investment for Iraq from elsewhere in the region.  Instead,
    he stated that if the Iraqi people helped themselves and
    invested in their own country, others would follow suit.

    ¶4.  (C) The Sultan appeared to follow events in Iraq closely.
     He commented, for example, that the Kurds had apparently
    "come out well" in recent central government talks on budget
    issues, and asked about the status of electricity production
    in Iraq.  The Sultan seemed to take a particular interest in
    Admiral Fallon's discussion of Iraqi Shia leader Abdul Aziz
    al-Hakim, including the status of Hakim's health and his
    possible successors.

    --------------------------
    INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT
    --------------------------

    ¶5.  (C) In addition to emphasizing the need for outside
    investment in Iraq, Admiral Fallon highlighted the importance
    of assistance from regional states for infrastructure
    development in Afghanistan and other Central Asian nations.
    Again the Sultan sidestepped the issue and shifted the
    conversation to the critical role of roads and highways in
    economic development.  He then mentioned infrastructure
    projects for Oman currently under consideration, including
    construction of a new dam and a freight rail line from the
    northern port of Sohar to the planned port in Duqm.  The
    Sultan hoped that the southern port of Salalah could be
    linked by rail to Muscat and, eventually, to other GCC
    states.

    MUSCAT 00000174  002 OF 003

    --------------
    IRANIAN ISSUES
    --------------

    ¶6.  (C) The Sultan commented that the Iranians are "not
    fools," and claimed that Tehran realized there are "certain
    lines it cannot cross" (i.e., direct confrontation with the
    U.S.).  Regarding GCC relations with the Iranian government,
    he stated, "Iran is a big country with muscles and we must
    deal with it."  He continued that Iran's "charm offensive" in
    the region had achieved a degree of success as some GCC
    authorities (he did not mention names) were now less
    suspicious of Iranian intentions.  The Sultan added,
    laughing, that "I must say that as long as (the U.S.) is on
    the horizon, we have nothing to fear."

    ¶7.  (C) Responding to Admiral Fallon's frustration with
    Iranian interference in Iraq, the Sultan remarked that
    Iranian meddling abroad was "almost a game" to the regime in
    Tehran, and said that Iran's leaders would have to stop this
    practice if Iran wanted to "join the world as a noble
    country."  The Sultan hoped that Iraqi leaders would clearly
    tell and convince Iranian President Ahmadinejad during his
    upcoming visit to Iraq to cease Iran's unhelpful interference
    in their internal affairs.  On the possibility that Iran is
    waiting out the President's final term before re-assessing
    its strategy, the Sultan said that Tehran should realize that
    it has to deal with the U.S. as a country, and not just the
    current administration.

    ------------------
    THE SEARCH FOR GAS
    ------------------

    ¶8.  (C) After noting Iranian dependence on imports of refined
    fuel, the Sultan described Oman's efforts to obtain more
    natural gas to fuel growing domestic power needs and
    large-scale industrial projects.  Oman had committed too much
    of its limited gas production to long-term liquefied natural
    gas (LNG) export contracts.  As a result, the government was
    trying to boost production by taking smaller and less
    productive gas fields away from Petroleum Development Oman
    (PDO) -- 60% owned by the government and 34% owned by Royal
    Dutch Shell -- and awarding them to outside companies such as
    British Gas and BP.  The Sultan claimed these firms were in a
    better position to increase productivity in these fields, and
    pointed to the progress of U.S.-based Occidental Petroleum
    Company in raising oil production in former PDO concession
    areas, such as Mukhaizna.

    ¶9.  (C) Looking offshore, the Sultan said he hoped that new
    gas fields would be found in the Gulf of Oman to help ease
    the country's natural gas shortage.  India's Reliance
    Industries was currently exploring a deepwater oil and gas
    block in this body of water, but had made no significant
    discoveries yet.  Qatar would begin supplying gas to Oman by
    2013, the Sultan noted, but not in quantities sufficient to
    meet outstanding needs.  He added that Oman was still
    supplying limited gas from Musandam to Ras al-Khaimah in the
    UAE due to an agreement he made with its emir -- and which
    the Sultan felt he could not break -- well before Oman was
    squeezed for this resource.

    ---------------------------
    THE IMPORTANCE OF EDUCATION
    ---------------------------

    ¶10.  (C) Sultan Qaboos shared that he placed a great deal of
    importance on education, and noted that a study of history
    provided the context needed to better understand present
    trends and events.  Regarding claims that some rulers in the
    region wanted to keep their people uneducated in order to
    more easily control them, the Sultan explained that this
    strategy could easily backfire as it also left the populace
    more susceptible to influence by extremists, such as the
    Muslim Brotherhood.  Former Egyptian president and
    pan-Arabist leader Gamal Abdal Nasser, the Sultan said, had
    "set the region back" by being "anti-everything" and engaging
    in vitriolic rhetoric designed to keep the masses ignorant.

    -----------------------------------
    EMPOWERING THE GOVERNMENT AND WOMEN
    -----------------------------------

    ¶11.  (C) On domestic politics, the Sultan announced that he
    would hold the first-ever combined meeting of his Cabinet of
    Ministers and the Majlis al-Shura (the directly elected lower

    MUSCAT 00000174  003 OF 003

    house of Oman's bicameral advisory body) on February 26.  By
    meeting together, the Sultan hoped that the Cabinet and the
    Majlis would learn how to cooperate better and jointly focus
    on important issues.  He commented that both bodies also
    needed to "demonstrate more leadership" and avoid past
    foot-dragging on promises made to the populace.  "People need
    to see the results of decisions," the Sultan stated.

    ¶12.  (C) Letting Admiral Fallon and the Ambassador in on a
    "secret," the Sultan confided that he planned to call for a
    conference of all "notable women" in Oman in 2009 in a bid to
    encourage Omani women to expand their participation and
    leadership in different aspects of Omani society.  Minister
    of Social Development, Dr. Sharifa bint Khalfan al-Yahyaiya
    (one of Oman's three female cabinet ministers) will chair the
    meeting on the Sultan's behalf.  Lamenting that no women won
    seats in the October 2007 election for the Majlis al-Shura,
    Sultan Qaboos observed that Omani women were stuck in
    tradition and needed to be empowered to "take more charge"
    and to be "less shy."  "Some customs (regarding women)," he
    added, "shouldn't be kept."  Nevertheless, gradual change is
    occurring in Oman, the Sultan asserted.  His philosophy was
    to "let it happen," rather than hold it up to public debate,
    as the latter course of action often led to factional
    fighting, internal strife, and other ills.

    ---------------------------------------------
    A RECURRENT THEME: MORE RESPONSIVE GOVERNMENT
    ---------------------------------------------

    ¶13.  (C) In concluding the meeting, Sultan Qaboos returned to
    his goal of improving the responsiveness of the Omani
    government to citizen concerns.  He stated that he would be
    pressing "harder" on his ministers to engage in more and
    better public relations efforts before the Omani police and
    to effectively enforce their decisions so that the people
    could see the benefits of announced actions.  Giving one
    particular example, the Sultan said that rather than simply
    announce a new development project, the government should
    explain the downstream employment opportunities the project
    would generate for Omani citizens.  Effective cooperation
    between ministries and the Majlis Oman was also needed to
    strengthen the civil institutional framework in Oman, the
    Sultan added.

    -------
    COMMENT
    -------

    ¶14.  (S/NF) In discussing his desire for operational change
    in the senior government ranks, the Sultan twice implied (but
    did not directly state) that such change was needed to
    prepare the country for his eventual departure from power.
    The Sultan's comments indicated that he may feel the
    government is too dependent on his authority and should be
    empowered to run more effectively without constant direction
    from the palace.  End Comment.

    ¶15.  (U) This message has been reviewed by Admiral Fallon.
    GRAPPO

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