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### Viewing cable 09ANKARA1654, TURKEY: A/S GORDON PRESSES FM DAVUTOGLU ON IRAN

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
09ANKARA1654 | 2009-11-17 17:05 | SECRET | Embassy Ankara

`

    VZCZCXRO0653
    OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHTRO
    DE RUEHAK #1654/01 3211708
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 171708Z NOV 09
    FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1256
    INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001654

    SIPDIS

    DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR EUR/SE

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2019
    TAGS: KNNP PREL TU IR
    SUBJECT: TURKEY: A/S GORDON PRESSES FM DAVUTOGLU ON IRAN

    REF: ANKARA 1626

    Classified By: Ambassador James Jeffrey, for reasons 1.4(b,d)

    ¶1. (S) Iran dominated A/S Gordon's 40-minute meeting November
    12 with Foreign Minister Davutoglu.  The FM had just gotten
    off the phone with El-Baradei and had discussed in detail the
    IAEA proposal to send Iran's low enriched uranium to Turkey.
    El-Baradei had said he would "call Washington" that same
    morning.  This had followed two long "harsh" sessions with
    the Iranians in Istanbul on Sunday evening.  The Iranians
    have said they are willing to meet with Solana, but have told
    the Turks that they have serious problems with Cooper and the
    British.  They have "more trust" in the U.S.  The Iranians
    would also prefer to get fuel from the U.S. rather than the
    Russians.

    ¶2. (S) Davutoglu said the Iranians:  a) are ready to send a
    delegation to Vienna to work out the specifics on this
    proposal; b) have given their "full trust" to Turkey; c)
    continue to face serious domestic problems inside Iran.  He
    said the Turks actually see Ahmadinejad as "more flexible"
    than others who are inside the Iranian Government.
    Ahmadinejad is facing "huge pressure" after statements from
    some P5 members to the effect that a nuclear deal would
    succeed in weakening Iran,s nuclear capability -- which is
    interpreted by some circles in Iran as a virtual defeat.

    ¶3. (S) Given this context, the Turks had asked Ahmadinejad if
    the core of the issue is psychological rather than substance.
     Ahmadinejad had said "yes," that the Iranians agree to the
    proposal but need to manage the public perception.
    Accordingly, the Iranians are proposing that the first 400
    kilos be transferred to Kish Island -- thereby keeping it on
    Iranian soil -- and would receive right away an equivalent
    amount (30-50 kilos) of enriched fuel.  The second stage
    would focus on the management of Iranian public opinion,
    after which Tehran would proceed with the Turkey option for
    the remaining 800 kilos, probably in two tranches.  Davutoglu
    said Baradei agreed to consider this.

    ¶4. (S) Davutoglu noted that he had spoken to NSA General
    Jones Wednesday, who had said that we should perhaps suggest
    to the Iranians that they transfer 600 kilos to Kish Island
    and 600 kilos to Turkey simultaneously.  A/S Gordon said he
    could not give an official response to the proposal as this
    is the first time we heard it, but that he anticipates much
    skepticism about providing fuel to Iran before all the LEU
    has been taken out.  It would be better to get all 1200 kilos
    out right away.

    ¶5. (C) Davutoglu noted that these are two different
    proposals.  The first is Iran's request for fuel for its
    nuclear reactor.  Even if this takes place, he said, we still
    need to work on limiting Iran's nuclear enrichment
    capability.  If we succeed with this proposal, he said, it
    will create "confidence" and a "new momentum" and would allow
    room for negotiation.

    ¶6. (C) Noting that Davutoglu had only addressed the negative
    consequences of sanctions or the use of military force,
    Gordon pressed Davutoglu on Ankara's assessment of the
    consequences if Iran gets a nuclear weapon.  Davutoglu gave a
    spirited reply, that "of course" Turkey was aware of this
    risk.  This is precisely why Turkey is working so hard with
    the Iranians.  President Gul himself had spent two hours
    Sunday with Ahmadinejad in Istanbul.

    ¶7. (C) Gordon noted that while we acknowledge that Turkey can
    be helpful as a mediator, some of the Prime Minister's recent
    public comments raise questions about how Turkey sees this
    issue.  Davutoglu said he is aware of these concerns, but
    contended that the Guardian newspaper had not accurately
    presented its recent interview with the Prime Minister.   The
    PM's comments had been taken out of context.  Erdogan had
    been asked if he views Iran as a friend.  If he had said
    "no," it would not have been possible to convince Tehran to
    cooperate on this latest proposal.  Only Turkey can speak
    bluntly and critically to the Iranians, Davutoglu contended,
    but only because Ankara is showing public messages of
    friendship.

    ¶8. (C) Gordon pushed back that Ankara should give a stern
    public message about the consequences if UN resolutions are
    ignored.  Davutoglu countered that Erdogan had given just
    such a statement in Tehran when he visited.  He emphasized
    that Turkey's foreign policy is giving a "sense of justice"
    and a "sense of vision" to the region.  Turkey has provided a
    "third option" in addition to Iran and the Saudis (who he
    contended are viewed as "puppets" of the US).  The result, he
    said, is that we "limit Iranian influence in the region."  We

    ANKARA 00001654  002 OF 002

    need a "pro-Western approach AND a sense of justice."

    ¶9. (C) A/S Gordon has cleared this cable.

    JEFFREY

               "Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.s
    gov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turkey"

`