Currently released so far... 243 / 251,287

### Articles

Brazil

### Browse by release date

2010/11

### Browse by creation date

66 72 79 86 89 90 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02
1979/08
1986/05
1989/12
1990/01
2004/01 2004/12
2005/03 2005/05 2005/06 2005/12
2006/04 2006/08 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D H I J K L M P R S T U
Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bishkek Embassy Berlin Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad
Embassy Cairo Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Doha Embassy Damascus Consulate Dubai
Embassy Harare
Iran RPO Dubai Consulate Istanbul
Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kabul
Embassy London
Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Manama Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich
Embassy Prague Embassy Paris Embassy Panama
Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh
Secretary of State Embassy Sanaa Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa
USEU Brussels UNVIE

### Browse by tag

A B C E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U X Y Z
AE ASEC AM AF AR AU AORC AJ AG
BA BR BH BY BU
CVIS CH CASC CF COUNTERTERRORISM CD CV
ETRD ECON ELAB EFIN ENRG EG ETTC EPET EINV EFIS EXTERNAL EAID EUN EU ECUN EAIR EZ EAGR ELTN ECPS
FR
GM GG GR GOI GE GA
HO
IR IAEA IS IZ INRB IN IRAJ IQ IT
JO JA
KNNP KHLS KJUS KDEM KSPR KPKO KUNR KWBG KWMN KPAL KCRM KU KG KHIV KPRP KZ KN KTFN KGHG KSCA KMDR KPAO KCOR KACT KIRF KS KTIA KISL
LE LY LG
MNUC MPOS MARR MU MASS MOPS MCAP MOPPS MK MAR MTCRE MY ML MR
NATO NG
OPDC OEXC OIIP OVIP OPRC OTR OTRA
PGOV PREL PARM PTER PINR PHUM PINS PREF PM PEPR PROP PK PBIO PA PBTS PECON POLITICAL PARTIES
QA
RU RS RW
SA SYR SY SO SU SF SCUL SM SNAR SOCI SENV SP SG
TRGY TU TI TX TC TSPA
US UZ UE UK UNESCO UP UNSC UV
XF XA
YM
ZP ZR ZF ZI

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page

### Viewing cable 09BEIJING2494, PRC/IRAN: CHINA IN WAIT-AND-SEE MODE BILATERALLY

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09BEIJING2494.
Help us extend and defend this work

Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
09BEIJING2494 | 2009-09-01 12:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Beijing

`

    VZCZCXRO6005
    OO RUEHBC RUEHCN RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHGH RUEHKUK RUEHTRO RUEHVC
    DE RUEHBJ #2494/01 2441218
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 011218Z SEP 09
    FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5857
    INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIJING 002494

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2034
    TAGS: PREL PARM ENRG PTER MNUC IR CH
    SUBJECT: PRC/IRAN: CHINA IN WAIT-AND-SEE MODE BILATERALLY
    BUT PUSHING FOR DIALOGUE

    Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson.
    Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

    ¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  China is biding its time until the political
    crisis in Iran reaches a clearer resolution and the
    Ahmadinejad government consolidates power, and will signal
    its renewed engagement by sending a high-level delegation to
    Tehran once the political situation has been resolved,
    according to an MFA official.  Our contact reaffirmed China's
    commitment to the P5-plus-1 process and assessed that Iran is
    attempting to keep the door to negotiation with the United
    States open despite the turmoil surrounding the June
    election, but cautioned that a complete halt to uranium
    enrichment is an unattainable goal.  China continues to urge
    Iran to respond positively to the P5-plus-1 offer for talks,
    and these entreaties have been passed directly to Supreme
    Leader Khamenei.  Iran reportedly requested to upgrade its
    relationship with Beijing to a "strategic partnership," but
    China refused.  A Communist Party official told us that the
    CCP is seeking to increase its relations with six major
    political parties and factions in Iran and deepen its
    understanding of U.S. policy in the Middle East.  He repeated
    China's standard position on the Iran nuclear issue and
    suggested that the U.S. offer economic incentives to persuade
    the Iranians to enter into talks on the nuclear issue.  He
    dismissed concerns that negative perceptions in the Middle
    East of China after the July violence in Xinjiang province
    would affect China's diplomacy with Iran.  END SUMMARY.

    ¶2. (C) PolOff discussed Iran-China relations with MFA West
    Asian Affairs Department Iran Division Deputy Director Ni
    Ruchi August 31.  In a separate meeting the same day, Chinese
    Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee International Liaison
    Department (CCID) Third Bureau (West Asia and North Africa)
    Director Wu Baocai gave PolOff the Party's perspective on
    Iran and the nuclear issue.

    Holding Back Bilaterally until Political Dust Settles
    --------------------------------------------- --------

    ¶3. (C) MFA Iran Division Deputy Director Ni said that the
    political turmoil in Iran had yet to settle and that China
    was still waiting for the situation to calm further before
    re-engaging fully in bilateral relations.  He argued that the
    internal divisions that had played out in the June
    presidential elections had existed well before the violent
    aftermath of the June election.  China had been aware of the
    potential for conflict among those divisions to spill into
    the street and had taken a cautious approach before the
    election.  He said that the Chinese government understood
    that the election was a strong indication of deep-seated
    divisions within the Iranian government, but stressed that
    the contested election had not fundamentally undermined the
    current government and that China would continue with its
    normal engagement with Tehran.

    ¶4. (C) China would signal its re-engagement, Ni reported,
    with a high-level delegation to Tehran, but there was no
    timetable for such a visit yet because the leadership in
    Tehran was still fully focused on consolidating power.  He
    noted that during his mid-August visit to Iran, protestors
    had continued to take to the streets to express
    dissatisfaction with the election.  Ni reaffirmed China's
    commitment to the P5-plus-1 process, stressing that the U.S.
    and China not only had common interests in Iran, but the
    scope of this common interest was increasing.

    Iran Keeping the Door Open?
    ---------------------------

    ¶5. (C) Ni said that China had taken note of efforts by the
    Iranian government to keep a path open to direct negotiations
    despite the ongoing political turmoil.  He claimed that
    Tehran had refrained from overplaying its accusations of the
    U.S. role in the election turmoil, preferring to point the
    finger at European countries, indicating that the Iranian
    leadership was interested in maintaining the possibility of
    direct talks.  Ni said that the election had caused the
    Iranian leadership to reexamine seriously its foreign policy,
    particularly on the nuclear issue, adding that Iran's nuclear
    development had suffered technical setbacks recently, which
    had also forced the leadership to consider how to move
    forward.

    China Lobbying but Total Halt to Enrichment Unattainable
    --------------------------------------------- -----------

    ¶6. (C) Ni reported that China continued to urge Iran at every
    level of their engagement to respond positively to the
    P53-plus-1 offer of direct talks and cease uranium enrichment

    BEIJING 00002494  002 OF 002

    activities.  He said that Chinese leaders had pointed out to
    their Iranian counterparts on many occasions that the United
    States had shown "restraint" in its public comments during
    the June election aftermath, and that Iran was missing an
    important opportunity by refusing to respond to the P5-plus-1
    offer.  Ni said that China's message encouraging greater
    engagement had been passed directly to Supreme Leader
    Khamenei.  He cautioned that Tehran would not be able to
    respond positively to P5-plus-1 overtures until it had
    reinforced its position at home, and that a "100-percent"
    halt to uranium enrichment had become an unattainable goal.
    Ni said that China continued to believe that fresh sanctions
    would be ineffective in persuading Iran to cease enrichment
    activities and would be counter-productive by increasing the
    unity of the various factions in Iran behind the nuclear
    program and the current government.  Ni argued that the
    regime in Iran would emerge from the crisis in a weakened
    position and thus more likely to negotiate with the P5-plus-1
    on the nuclear issue.

    Iran Seeks "Strategic Partnership" with an Unwilling PRC
    --------------------------------------------- -----------

    ¶7. (C) Ni said that Iran had requested that Beijing upgrade
    its relationship with Tehran, presumably to counter Western
    pressure, by lobbying Beijing to label its relationship with
    Iran a "strategic partnership" as it does for Russia and
    other countries.  Ni said that China had so far refused to do
    so and Iran was frustrated with China's continuing insistence
    that the two countries shared merely "normal" relations.

    Party Seeks to Increase its Interaction with Iran
    --------------------------------------------- ----

    ¶8. (C) CCP Central Committee International Liaison Department
    (CCID) Third Bureau (West Asia and North Africa) Director Wu
    Baocai told PolOff August 31 that the CCP was seeking to
    increase its relations with six major political parties and
    factions in Iran.  He noted that links between the CCP and
    Iranian political parties had lagged behind the growth in
    relations between executive branches and far behind the
    increase in economic links.  He said that deepening
    understanding among the CCP leadership of the U.S. position
    on Iran was another emerging priority for his office and that
    he was open to continued exchanges with the U.S. on the
    nuclear issue.

    CCP Perspective on Iran Nuclear Program
    ---------------------------------------

    ¶9. (C) Wu said that CCP officials were increasingly concerned
    through 2008 at the possibility of the United States taking
    military action against Iran's nuclear program but assessed
    that such a possibility was much lower in 2009.  He noted
    that sanctions had not only failed to change Iranian behavior
    and create meaningful effects in Iran but were negatively
    affecting the countries joining in the international effort
    to persuade Iran to stop its nuclear activities, citing as an
    example constraints placed on Chinese banks from doing
    business with Iran.  He said that he believed the
    international community was unlikely to be able to persuade
    Iran to fully abandon its enrichment activities and suggested
    the U.S. offer modest economic benefits as an incentive to
    persuade Iran to enter into dialogue.  Wu reiterated China's
    strong opposition to Iran using its nuclear technology to
    develop nuclear weapons but stressed the right of all
    countries to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

    Iran Relations Unaffected by Xinjiang Violence
    --------------------------------------------- -

    ¶10. (C) Wu dismissed concerns that dismay in Iran and other
    parts of the Middle East over China's treatment of ethnic
    Uighurs in Xinjiang province would complicate China's
    diplomacy with Iran.  While acknowledging that some
    high-level religious leaders in Iran had been highly critical
    of China in the wake of the July violence in Xinjiang, he
    said that Beijing was seeking to counter the danger of China
    becoming a target for anger in the Muslim world by
    significantly increasing its media outreach in the Middle
    East, citing the recent establishment of an Arabic-language
    version of government-run CCTV.
    HUNTSMAN

`