Currently released so far... 243 / 251,287

### Articles

Brazil

### Browse by release date

2010/11

### Browse by creation date

66 72 79 86 89 90 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02
1979/08
1986/05
1989/12
1990/01
2004/01 2004/12
2005/03 2005/05 2005/06 2005/12
2006/04 2006/08 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D H I J K L M P R S T U
Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bishkek Embassy Berlin Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad
Embassy Cairo Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Doha Embassy Damascus Consulate Dubai
Embassy Harare
Iran RPO Dubai Consulate Istanbul
Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kabul
Embassy London
Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Manama Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich
Embassy Prague Embassy Paris Embassy Panama
Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh
Secretary of State Embassy Sanaa Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa
USEU Brussels UNVIE

### Browse by tag

A B C E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U X Y Z
AE ASEC AM AF AR AU AORC AJ AG
BA BR BH BY BU
CVIS CH CASC CF COUNTERTERRORISM CD CV
ETRD ECON ELAB EFIN ENRG EG ETTC EPET EINV EFIS EXTERNAL EAID EUN EU ECUN EAIR EZ EAGR ELTN ECPS
FR
GM GG GR GOI GE GA
HO
IR IAEA IS IZ INRB IN IRAJ IQ IT
JO JA
KNNP KHLS KJUS KDEM KSPR KPKO KUNR KWBG KWMN KPAL KCRM KU KG KHIV KPRP KZ KN KTFN KGHG KSCA KMDR KPAO KCOR KACT KIRF KS KTIA KISL
LE LY LG
MNUC MPOS MARR MU MASS MOPS MCAP MOPPS MK MAR MTCRE MY ML MR
NATO NG
OPDC OEXC OIIP OVIP OPRC OTR OTRA
PGOV PREL PARM PTER PINR PHUM PINS PREF PM PEPR PROP PK PBIO PA PBTS PECON POLITICAL PARTIES
QA
RU RS RW
SA SYR SY SO SU SF SCUL SM SNAR SOCI SENV SP SG
TRGY TU TI TX TC TSPA
US UZ UE UK UNESCO UP UNSC UV
XF XA
YM
ZP ZR ZF ZI

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page

### Viewing cable 07BAGHDAD3895, UK AMBASSADOR TO IRAN ON IRI NEGOTIATING STYLE,

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07BAGHDAD3895.
Help us extend and defend this work

Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
07BAGHDAD3895 | 2007-11-30 10:10 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Baghdad

`

    VZCZCXRO1775
    PP RUEHDIR
    DE RUEHGB #3895/01 3341039
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 301039Z NOV 07
    FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4580
    INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
    RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
    RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
    RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC//NSC//

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003895

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    LONDON PLEASE PASS TO GAYLE

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2027
    TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER IR IQ
    SUBJECT: UK AMBASSADOR TO IRAN ON IRI NEGOTIATING STYLE,
    TACTICS

    BAGHDAD 00003895  001.3 OF 003

    Classified By: by CDA Patricia Butenis for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

    1.(C) UK Ambassador to Tehran Geoffrey Adams, in a series of
    meetings with U.S. Embassy Baghdad and MNF-I officials,
    outlined his recommendations on how to negotiate with
    Iranians.  Ambassador Adams thought that Iran had several
    goals from talks with the U.S., both superficial and
    substantive.  In negotiations, he advised being steady and
    firm, tough but not aggressive, and at the same time, seeking
    to engage and draw attention to mutual interests.  He
    outlined Iran,s preconceptions and its obsession with and
    mistrust of  the West, which, he said, can blind it to its
    interests.  He warned that the Iranian participants would
    likely have very strict instructions what they could say and
    that it would be difficult to get them off script, though the
    element of surprise could work.  Adams added that the
    Iranians would be very nervous of negative repercussions if
    they made a misstep, and they would likely report on each
    other.  Answers to questions and proposals would more likely
    only come at follow-on meetings, and decision-making in Iran
    is slowed by the need for consensus, so patience is needed.
    That said, it was important to rid the Iranians of their
    standard notion that time was on their side.  End summary

    2.(C) British Ambassador to Iran Geoffrey Adams offered
    advice in negotiating strategies with Iran in a series of
    meetings with U.S. officials and military officers in Baghdad
    November 24-25.   The following is an amalgamation of three
    meetings, held in advance of the fourth round of
    Iran-Iraq-U.S. trilateral discussions on Iraq.  Adams, who
    has served in Tehran for almost two years, said his
    observations were borne of much experience, to include a
    &master class8 when Iran captured at gunpoint 15 British
    Navy personnel in March 2007.  British Ambassador to Kuwait
    Stuart Laing also joined the discussions, as well as British
    First Secretary in Tehran Alex Pinfield.  Among those present
    on the U.S. side at various briefings were Ambassador
    Crocker, MNF-I Commanding General Petraeus, Pol-Mil Minister
    Counselor Ambassador Marcie Ries, MG Kevin Bergner, Special
    Advisor David Pearce, and IRPO Director Jillian Burns.  The
    British ambassador,s views of Iran,s strategic interests
    and the internal political situation to be reported septel.

    3.(C) Iranians, goal, in Adams, view, is to
    institutionalize talks with the U.S. and keep open the
    possibility of broadening the agenda.  While he heard that
    the Iranians were disappointed in the &lack of substance8
    in previous bilateral talks with the U.S, they felt they
    derived good publicity from participating.  Adams predicted
    the Iranians will seek to keep them going both to engender
    their prestige and to keep tabs on what the USG is thinking.
    He also thought the talks had triggered a useful internal
    debate in how to make the best use of the talks and their
    strategic interests.  Adams added that he believed there is a
    significant lobby in Iran against holding talks with the U.S.

    Assumptions
    ---------------

    4.(C) In talks with Iranians, Ambassador Adams recommended
    being steady and firm, tough but not aggressive, and at the
    same time, seeking to engage.   He stressed that Iranians are
    obsessed with the West and this obsession at times blinds
    them to their interests.  In this light, the US side should
    be aware of the following preconceptions on the Iranian side:

    -- the USG seeks to remove the current regime and replace it
    with a pro-Western one.

    -- USG policymakers spend an inordinate amount of time and
    energy thinking about (and plotting against) Iran.  As such,
    Iranians assume that everything we do or say has meaning and
    has been carefully thought out and coordinated, both
    internally and with the UK; there are no accidents.

    -- The current U.S. administration is politically very weak,
    facing major internal opposition, and as such, the threat of
    US military action against Iran is not realistic.

    -- Iran sees the U.S. as a tough, determined adversary that
    can be manipulated and wounded.

    Mistrust
    ----------

    BAGHDAD 00003895  002.4 OF 003

    5.(C) The legacy of the Iran-Iraq war, when the international
    community was either silent or sided with Saddam (even when
    he used WMD against Iranians) must be kept in mind.  Iranians
    mistrust the outside world, to include the very same Western
    powers and Sunni Arab states that are now seeking to ensure
    that pro-Iranian Shias do not dominate  power in Iraq.

    Short Leash
    --------------

    6.(C) Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) government negotiators
    arrive with precise and detailed instructions from which they
    do not deviate, out of fear of professional repercussions.
    They will go through all their talking points.  The USG
    should not expect substantive responses to questions or
    initiatives in real time.  This problem can be obviated to an
    extent by scheduling &lots of breaks,8 allowing IRIG
    officials time to confer amongst themselves and to seek
    guidance via telephone from Tehran.  However, given the fear
    of a misstep on the IRI side, the USG should not expect real
    engagement from the IRI outside of their instructions.
    Answers to questions and responses to suggestions are likely
    to come at follow-on meetings, although some questions never
    get answered.

    Preparation
    --------------

    7.(C) IRIG officials will likely prepare in detail for the
    talks.  They may consult with Iranians with extensive
    experience with Americans, such as academics who have
    participated in Track Two talks or worked in the U.S.  He
    also mentioned that the head of Iran,s Chamber of Commerce
    Mohammad Nahavandian is also perceived as a U.S. expert and
    is likely consulted.  Adams doubted that Iran would seek
    advice in negotiating with Americans from other countries.
    Adams repeatedly said, &Iranians are not stupid,8 meaning
    they follow all the issues closely, even if they at times
    misread the signals.

    Slow Process
    ----------------

    8.(C) In light of the short leash negotiators have, plus the
    collaborative and multi-polar nature of IRI decision-making
    and the extreme sensitivity of the topic of direct USG-IRIG
    talks, the USG should not expect immediate &big steps.8
    Any progress will be slow and come only after much
    deliberation and discussion in Iran, with push-back from
    those circles opposing talks.  If the IRIG concludes that a
    policy shift is in their interests, it can do it and find a
    way to justify it, but will first have to achieve internal
    consensus.

    Stay Calm
    ------------

    9.(C) It is important with the Iranians not to lose one,s
    temper or show that one is upset.  Trading accusations allows
    the IRIG to rely on a familiar script; far better is to ask
    unexpected questions that will take them &off-script.8
    When asked how to best broach continued IRIG support of JAM
    splinter groups despite IRIG assurances to the Government of
    Iraq to stop the flow of weapons, Adams recommended keeping
    the tone  matter-of-fact and raising issues in question form,
    i.e. &given your assurances that you are seeking to help
    Iraqi forces re-establish peace and security, how can we
    explain the ongoing training of JAM-related illegal
    combatants in Iran?8

    Agenda
    ---------

    10.(C) Don,t offer an agenda beforehand, otherwise the
    agenda itself will become subject to ongoing negotiations.

    Establish Mutual Interests
    -------------------------------

    11.(C) Seek to show a commonality or intersection of national
    interests that will justify Iran taking actions suggested by
    the USG.  Prove to them that &if we fail in Iraq, they fail
    too.8  Draw them out on their contradictory tactics in order
    to spark debate within the IRIG.  Assess what the Iranians
    want out of the talks, beyond their publicly stated position
    of wanting a timetable for a withdrawal of foreign troops.

    BAGHDAD 00003895  003 OF 003

    Clock Ticking
    -----------------

    12.(C) IRIG interlocutors assume that time is on their side
    and hence default towards inaction.  Convince them that now
    is the time to act, and that not doing so will hurt their
    interests and that the situation could get worse.  In a
    related vein, the IRI must be convinced that the USG is
    prepared to stop dialogue (although not necessarily close the
    channel) if there is no progress.  At the same time, realize
    internally that the negotiators cannot take a bold move
    without consultation, a reasonable degree of patience is
    required, and progress may take time.

    Put the Ball in Their Court
    --------------------------------

    13.(C) Ask a lot of questions, always put the ball back in
    their court.  Doing so will encourage internal discussion and
    debate in Tehran, as well as put pressure on them to deviate
    from their prepared script.  Wrong foot them by saying
    something unexpected to try to take them off script.  Focus
    on accountability, asking for clarifications of actions that
    contradict their stated commitments.  Keep your message
    clear, including redlines, and do not be too subtle.

    Weaknesses
    --------------

    14.(C) Despite their rhetoric, Iranians understand their
    weaknesses include a lack of allies and foreign investment.

    Publicity
    ----------

    15.(C) Iran is very sensitive to press coverage that makes
    them look weak.  At the same time, the IRIG has a &high
    threshold for embarrassment8 when they are accused of
    illicit activities.  After the talks, the IRIG will seek to
    present the exchange as &businesslike,8 with the US and
    Iran on equal footing, where the IRIG &gave nothing away.8
    BUTENIS

`