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CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

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### Viewing cable 09BEIJING2438, PRC/IRAN: SCHOLAR SUGGESTS U.S. NEGOTIATE SE

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
09BEIJING2438 | 2009-08-25 09:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Beijing

`

    VZCZCXRO0374
    OO RUEHBC RUEHCN RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHGH RUEHKUK RUEHTRO RUEHVC
    DE RUEHBJ #2438/01 2370941
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 250941Z AUG 09
    FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5775
    INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
    RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIJING 002438

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2029
    TAGS: PREL PARM ENRG PTER MNUC IR CH
    SUBJECT: PRC/IRAN: SCHOLAR SUGGESTS U.S. NEGOTIATE SE
    CRETLY WITH IRAN

    REF: BEIJING 1803

    Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson.  Reasons 1.
    4 (b/d).

    ¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  The unstable post-election political climate
    in Iran likely precludes the initiation of formal
    negotiations with Iran on ceasing its uranium enrichment
    program, according to a PRC scholar.  Though Iran is sincere
    in wishing to reach out to the United States on broader
    bilateral issues, it remains wary of "falling into a trap" in
    bilateral negotiations.  Under these circumstances, the
    scholar suggests, the United States should undertake "se
    cret" talks with Iran that would entail a U.S. concession
    allowing Iran some nuclear enrichment activities in return
    for Iran's adherence to a strict IAEA safeguard agreement,
    its cessation of support for Hamas and Hizbollah, and
    cooperation in Iraq and Afghanistan.  China has encouraged
    Iran to enter into negotiations with the United States,
    according to our contact, while the United States is involved
    in regional conflicts where Iran could play a positive role.
    However, the scholar stressed, pressing for additional
    sanctions through the P5-plus-1 mechanism would be
    counterproductive and put China in a "difficult position" of
    having to side with either the United States or Iran.  END
    SUMMARY.

    ¶2. (C) Director of the Center for Middle East Studies at the
    MFA-affiliated China Institute for International Studies
    (CIIS) and frequent media commentator on Middle East issues
    Li Guofu told PolOff August 24 that though the unexpected
    turmoil surrounding the June 12 Iranian election had
    politically weakened both President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and
    supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, both they and
    opposition candidate Mir Hussein Moussavi were "one side of a
    coin" in that none of them supported the suspension of Iran's
    uranium enrichment activities.

    Post-Election Atmosphere Not Right for Negotiations
    --------------------------------------------- ------

    ¶3. (C) Li argued that Ahmadinejad's congratulatory letter
    sent to President Obama following the 2008 U.S. elections had
    been a sincere indication of the Iranian leadership's
    willingness to talk.  Li said he had learned that former
    Iranian foreign minister Ali Akbar Velayati had discreetly
    contacted USG officials prior to the June 12 presidential
    election in Iran, agreeing to resume bilateral contacts after
    the election concluded, but that the turmoil and the
    lingering instability in Iran had prevented movement on that
    initiative.  Li reported that his contacts in Iran had
    recently said that the Iranian political climate
    post-election was still not stable enough for the leadership
    to engage in public negotiations on the nuclear issue.

    "Obama Factor"
    --------------

    ¶4. (C) Li said an additional factor adding to the Iranian
    leadership's reticence to reach out to the United States was
    President Obama's positive image among the Iranian public.
    ("Obama is with us," was an example of public sentiment
    reported to him by his Iranian contacts.)  Despite the fact
    that the leadership was satisfied with President Obama's
    statements after the June election, Iranian leaders were wary
    of "falling into a trap" in negotiations with United States.
    Li suggested that Khamenei remained suspicious of the United
    Kingdom, France and Germany based on the Iranian leadership's
    perception that these countries had played a role in stirring
    post-election turmoil.

    Grand Bargain in the Works?
    ---------------------------

    ¶5. (C) Li stated that Iran agreeing to suspend uranium
    enrichment unilaterally or completely was a "non-starter."
    Li cited unnamed contacts in the United States "with close
    access to policy-makers on Iran" to support his belief that
    the United States would be willing to accept some
    internationally-supervised uranium enrichment by Iran.  This
    would be a concession, Li said, that "the Europeans would
    have great difficulty accepting."  To make such a concession
    diplomatically palatable, Li continued, the United States in
    return would expect Iran's cessation of support for Hamas and
    Hizbollah, among other terrorist groups in the region, and
    its cooperation in Iraq and Afghanistan.  In addition, Li
    suggested, the United States would expect Iran to agree to a
    stricter IAEA safeguard agreement that would control Iran's
    nuclear activities and include terms that would be integrated
    into the NPT as a basis for further safeguards governing all

    BEIJING 00002438  002 OF 002

    NPT signatory countries (reftel).  He stated that before
    agreeing to a low level of Iranian enrichment activity, the
    United States would insist Iran implement a
    six-to-twelve-month freeze on nuclear enrichment activities.

    ¶6. (C) Li stressed that any Iranian nuclear program
    negotiations, which he believed would be lengthy, should be
    "se cret" and seek to produce a "win/win" scenario for both
    countries.  Li stated that Iran had doubts about the USG's
    ability to enter such a bargain, given U.S. political
    pressures, and that to the Iranians, a signal of U.S.
    sincerity to move forward might come through an unofficial
    visit along the lines of Henry Kissinger's late June trip to
    China to discuss North Korea sanctions or former President
    Clinton's early August visit to Pyongyang to effect the
    release of the two American journalists, which in his view
    had allowed the atmosphere for negotiations with the DPRK to
    improve.  Li suggested that former President Clinton could
    perhaps secure the release of the American hikers detained by
    Iranian authorities.  Li stated that the key element of a
    Kissinger visit would be the former Secretary of State's
    ability to have discreet, private and informal discussions.

    China Urges Iran to Reach Out to the United States
    --------------------------------------------- -----

    ¶7. (C) Despite U.S.-Iranian tensions, the PRC had encouraged
    Iran to take advantage of current circumstances to mend ties
    with the United States, according to Li, arguing that the
    United States would be more open to making concessions now
    because it was in a relatively weaker position tending to a
    number of trouble spots around the world, including the
    Middle East and South Asia, and needed Iran's help in Iraq
    and Afghanistan.  However, as the United States regained its
    position of strength, according to Li, its willingness to
    make concessions would disappear.  Li reported that MFA West
    Asian and North African Affairs Department Director General
    Song Aiguo had affirmed to him recently that China "would do
    whatever it could" to assist communication between the United
    States and Iran.  Asked whether Iran viewed China as a fair
    broker, Li said, "Iran trusts nobody."  While Iran understood
    China's interests in Iran, the Iranian leadership believed
    that when pushed to make a choice, China would side with the
    United States over Iran.

    P5 plus 1: A Show for Public Consumption
    ----------------------------------------

    ¶8. (C) Li stated that the P5-plus-1 process "was for public
    consumption" and that expectations of its success should be
    minimal.  Acknowledging the increasing pressure for
    additional sanctions given Iran's current unresponsiveness to
    offers of engagement, Li stated that pushing for additional
    sanctions would play to the hard-liners' advantage in Iran
    and not bring any change in Iranian behavior.  In addition,
    the prospect of imposing additional sanctions would put China
    in a "difficult position" of choosing between its interests
    vis-a-vis the United States and Iran, a choice it hoped to
    avoid.
    HUNTSMAN

`