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CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

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### Viewing cable 09RPODUBAI316, IRAN: AHMADINEJAD'S STAR FADING IN THE ARAB WORLD?

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
09RPODUBAI316 | 2009-08-03 11:11 | SECRET//NOFORN | Iran RPO Dubai

`

    VZCZCXRO3166
    RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHTRO
    DE RUEHDIR #0316/01 2151125
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    R 031125Z AUG 09
    FM RPO DUBAI
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0474
    INFO RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
    RUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
    RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
    RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
    RUEHDIR/RPO DUBAI 0475

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RPO DUBAI 000316

    NOFORN
    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL:  8/3/2019
    TAGS: PREL PROP PGOV PINR IR
    SUBJECT: IRAN: AHMADINEJAD'S STAR FADING IN THE ARAB WORLD?

    DUBAI 00000316  001.2 OF 003

    CLASSIFIED BY: Timothy Richardson, Acting Director, Iran
    Regional Presence Office, Department of State.
    REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
    ¶1. (U) This is a joint cable by the Iran Regional Presence
    Office and the Dubai Regional Media Hub.

    ¶2. (S/NF) Summary: Since Iran's June 12 presidential elections,
    Arab media have intensely focused their coverage on the
    demonstrations in Iran and the international community's
    response to the government crackdown.  Whereas in recent years
    the Arab media have limited their commentary to Iran's external
    relations -- particularly its regional ambitions and the
    international implications of its nuclear program -- during the
    post-election crisis Arab commentators have, for the first time,
    poked a hole in the veneer of the Islamic Republic's internal
    political system and explored its underpinnings more closely,
    often challenging the system's very legitimacy in on-air
    commentary.  A number of these commentators have opined that
    Ahmadinejad has, at least in the near term, lost standing among
    some moderate Arabs, who have come to view Ahmadinejad's
    administration as oppressive, unpopular, and undemocratic, much
    as they criticize many Arab governments.  However, all of the
    Arab media figures we spoke to emphasized that Arab criticism of
    Ahmadinejad has not necessarily led to increased support for
    U.S. policy in the region.  On the contrary, closer analysis
    suggests that Ahmadinejad's eroding popularity in the Arab world
    has created a scenario in which any U.S. effort to engage the
    current Iranian government will be perceived by a wide spectrum
    of Arabs as accommodation with Ahmadinejad.

    ALL EYES ON IRAN

    ----------------

    ¶3. (S/NF) Iran's post-election crisis has dominated the Arab
    media's news coverage for the past seven weeks.  The
    demonstrations have garnered special coverage on Al-Arabiya and
    have consistently been among the top headlines on Al-Jazeera.
    The marketing director of the Middle East Broadcasting Company
    (MBC), parent company of Al-Arabiya, told IRPO/DRMH that
    Al-Arabiya's viewership has skyrocketed since the June 12
    election.  Al-Arabiya's news website has also experienced a
    dramatic increase in visits from users living in the region
    between Tripoli and Amman, which the marketing director, a
    native of Lebanon, attributed to the tremendous interest Sunni
    Arabs have in watching the drama in Iran unfold.  Coverage of
    Iran's election aftermath is not limited to straightforward news
    reporting; editorial pages, media commentaries, and the Arab
    blogosphere have also been abuzz with debate over the
    demonstrations, the international community's response, and the
    implications of these events for the Arab world.  While Iran's
    elections may no longer command daily headlines in the Western
    media, nearly all the Arab media commentators with whom we spoke
    recognized that the Arab street remains firmly focused on the
    recent unrest and continuing political drama playing out in Iran.

    THE BENEVOLENT DICTATOR'S FALL FROM GRACE?

    ------------------------------------------

    ¶4. (S/NF) A Syrian journalist and blogger, who owns a media
    consultancy firm in Dubai, believes that many in the Arab street
    initially viewed Ahmadinejad when he came to power in 2005 as a
    "benevolent dictator."  Citing the tradition of the Mahdi, the
    media consultant argued that both Shi'a and Sunni Arabs are
    taught from early childhood to await the arrival of a strong and
    unimpeachable figure who will lead the Muslim world.  The media
    consultant maintained that even secular Arabs view the world,
    albeit unintentionally, with this ingrained mindset.  Our
    contact argued that Ahmadinejad played in to this narrative, and
    when Ahmadinejad arrived on the international stage many Arabs
    saw him, in contrast to their own flawed leaders, as a humble
    and pious man who was brave enough to stand up for his people
    and the greater Muslim world by confronting Israel and the West
    head on.  However,  both the intensely competitive campaign
    period and the forceful reaction by the Iranian people to the
    official election results have led some moderate Arabs to
    rethink Ahmadinejad's  true disposition. The election, the media
    consultant said, led some Arabs to understand that despite his
    astutely crafted and well-marketed image in the Arab world,

    DUBAI 00000316  002.2 OF 003

    Ahmadinejad is resented by many Iranians for domestic
    mismanagement, incompetence, and corruption.  Because of this
    public fall from grace, so the media consultant told us,
    Ahmadinejad is no longer the "untouchable, holy figure" in the
    Arab world he once was -- his flaws have brought him down to the
    level of the Arab world's own imperfect leaders. An Al-Arabiya
    executive, speaking at a recent conference, said that the
    election aftermath had destroyed the image many Arabs had of the
    Islamic Revolution, and Ahmadinejad's legitimacy as a leader was
    now open to question. [NOTE: The media consultant attributed
    Iran's perceived "victories" over the U.S. and the West to
    Ahmadinejad, as opposed to Supreme Leader Khamenei.  While
    conventional wisdom in the West is that Khamenei has the final
    say over Iran's most vital interests, including the nuclear
    program, the consultant's comments suggest that the Arab street
    views Ahmadinejad as much more influential in the Islamic
    Republic's decision-making system.]

    POST-ELECTION CRISIS NOT A SILVER BULLET FOR ARAB REGIMES

    --------------------------------------------- ------------

    ¶5. (S/NF) Ahmadinejad's fall from grace notwithstanding, most of
    the Arab media commentators with whom we spoke agreed that Arab
    governments have a limited ability to capitalize on
    Ahmadinejad's missteps because of the skeletons in their own
    closets.   Al-Arabiya's former Tehran bureau chief observed that
    Arab regional powers like Saudi Arabia and Egypt, who no doubt
    would like to exploit Ahmadinejad's current vulnerabilities,
    have remained noticeably silent.  In his view, they realize that
    any statement condemning Tehran's crackdown on peaceful
    dissidents would appear untenably hypocritical in the eyes of
    their own citizens.  He considers this public silence yet
    another "missed opportunity" for Arab leaders to take a stand to
    counter Ahmadinejad's rhetoric and further detract from his
    popularity with the Arab street.

    NEW SPACE TO DISAGREE WITH AHMADINEJAD AND THE U.S.

    --------------------------------------------- ------

    ¶6. (S/NF)  All of the Arab commentators and news media figures
    we spoke to agreed that the U.S. "played it right" throughout
    the post-election crisis by staying away from detailed public
    comments that could be perceived as interventionist.  However,
    the Arab commentators were quick to distinguish between
    criticism of Ahmadinejad in the Arab street and support for U.S.
    policies.  The Syrian media consultant said that the heated
    debates before the election, in which the three challengers --
    Mousavi, Karroubi, and Reza'i -- publicly criticized Ahmadinejad
    for corruption and economic mismanagement, made it clear to
    Arabs that this election was about Iran, not the U.S.  This
    distinction, coupled with the U.S.' restraint in commenting on
    the election, provided an unprecedented window for Arab
    commentators to criticize Ahmadinejad without appearing to side
    with the U.S.

    ¶7. (S/NF) Examples of this played out during two separate
    appearances by the Dubai Regional Media Hub Acting Director on
    live panel discussions on Abu Dhabi TV and Lebanese New TV
    regarding regional issues, including events in Iran.  Whereas
    fellow Arab panelist resolutely disagreed with her comments in
    support of U.S. policy in the region, in particular the peace
    process, they felt free to openly criticize Ahmadinejad's
    government, which they refrained from doing in the past, for its
    internal crackdown and regional ambitions.  One Saudi
    commentator contrasted Turkish regional mediation, which he
    described as a positive force in the region, with Iranian
    regional intervention, which he called pernicious and
    destabilizing.  A Lebanese commentator noted the irony of Iran
    accusing outsiders of interfering in its internal affairs when
    there is not "one corner of the Arab world" where Iran does not
    intervene behind the scenes.

    AHMADINEJAD DOWN BUT NOT OUT

    DUBAI 00000316  003.2 OF 003

    ----------------------------

    ¶8. (S/NF) As Al-Arabiya's Tehran bureau chief noted, while
    Ahmadinejad's image may have taken a hit in the Arab street as a
    result of the government's handling of domestic dissent, the
    damage is not necessarily permanent.  In his view, the Arab
    street is notoriously emotional and "could easily be turned to
    support Ahmadinejad once again" with some trumped up slogans and
    public bravado.  The bureau chief believed that, in the
    perceived leadership void left by Arab leaders on regional
    issues, Ahmadinejad could rally public opinion by capitalizing
    on any number of sensitive issues for the Arab street, most
    prominent among them Israel, at upcoming international fora.
    The Syrian media consultant, too, cautioned the U.S. not to
    overestimate any erosion in Ahmadinejad's popularity with Arabs.
     In his opinion, Ahmadinejad has only lost standing with a
    segment of moderates in the Arab street; he believes that most
    Arabs are so polarized, either for or against Ahmadinejad, that
    the allegations of voter fraud and the violent post-election
    crackdown on protesters will not permanently sway their
    positions one way or the other.

    ENGAGEMENT WITH IRAN: NO PLEASING THE ARAB STREET

    --------------------------------------------- ----

    ¶9. (S/NF) Comment:  Once the dust settles on Iran's
    post-election crisis, Arabs will look to see if the U.S. deals
    with Ahmadinejad as it pursues its nuclear nonproliferation
    agenda despite the lingering questions over the legitimacy of
    his election.  If the U.S. enters negotiations with
    Ahmadinejad's government, moderate Arab observers may argue that
    the U.S., for the sake of its own national interest, has cut a
    deal at the expense of pro-democracy advocates -- just as many
    in the Arab street believe the U.S. has done with a number of
    Arab regimes.  Those Arabs who continue to support Ahmadinejad,
    on the other hand, may perceive negotiations as a personal
    victory for a humble leader who brought the U.S. to its knees
    through steadfast resistance.  Thus, Ahmadinejad's "fall from
    grace" in the Arab world may have created yet another obstacle
    to improved Arab perceptions of the U.S. -- in which engagement
    with an Ahmadinejad-led government is now a potentially
    lose-lose scenario in which Arabs at both ends of the pro- and
    anti-Ahmadinejad spectrum will consider negotiations with
    Teheran an accommodation with the Iranian president.
    RICHARDSON

`