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### Viewing cable 09ABUDHABI192, URGENT UAE REQUEST FOR AIR DEFENSE -- FIVE PATRIOT BATTERIES

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
09ABUDHABI192 | 2009-02-24 07:07 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Abu Dhabi

`

    P 240739Z FEB 09
    FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
    TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2167
    SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    INFO CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
    GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
    IRAN COLLECTIVE
    CJCS WASHINGTON DC
    DIA WASHINGTON DC
    JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J-5//
    HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
    NSC WASHDC

` `

    S E C R E T ABU DHABI 000192

    NOFORN

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2019
    TAGS: PREL PARM MOPS MASS IR AE
    SUBJECT: URGENT UAE REQUEST FOR AIR DEFENSE -- FIVE PATRIOT BATTERIES
    THIS YEAR

    Classified by Ambassador Richard Olson, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

    ¶1.  (S/NF) Summary:  UAE Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces convoked
    the Ambassador to request the urgent deployment of five U.S. patriot
    batteries in the UAE as an interim measure until the UAE's own
    batteries are operational (anticipated in 2012).  The UAE belief that
    an increasingly likely pre-emptive Israeli attack on Iran would
    prompt quick retaliation on U.S. allies (foremost among them the very
    proximate UAE) prompted the request.  End summary.

    ¶2.  (C) On 22 February 2009, Ambassador Richard Olson, Defense
    Attache (DATT) Colonel Bret Rider and Chief, US Liaison Office (USLO)
    Colonel David Sprague were summoned to the office of the Chief of
    Staff of the UAE Armed Forces (COS), where they were met by the COS,
    LTG Hamid Thani al Rumaithy, Director Military Intelligence and
    Security (MISS) MGen Eissa al Mazrouei, Commander of the UAE Air
    Force and Air Defence (AF&AD) AVM Mohammed Swaidan al Qamzi and the
    COSs office director BGen Faris Mohammed al Mazroui.

    ¶3.  (S) Following very brief pleasantries the COS bluntly commented:
    "I need to be open and frank with you, there are changes in the
    region that concern us."  On behalf of his government, the COS then
    made an official request of the US government to deploy between four
    and five Patriot batteries to the UAE during calendar year 2009.  He
    requested these batteries remain in place until such time as they can
    be replaced by the UAE's own nine batteries, currently on order.

    ¶4.  (S/NF) The UAE would place three of the US batteries in and
    around Abu Dhabi, one battery at the port of Jebel Ali, and a final
    battery somewhere else in the northern emirates (presumably Dubai).
    The COS noted previous studies on the placement of the batteries are
    on file and will help guide final placement.  The COS stated the
    batteries would be used to protect critical military and civilian
    targets.

    ¶5.  (S/NF) The COS noted that Iran will continue doing its best to
    keep the entire region unstable.  Iran is recognized as Israel's
    biggest threat in the region and Israel will attack Iran with little
    or no notice.  Following an Israeli attack, the UAE is convinced Iran
    will lash out against those who "help Israel," or the allies of
    Israel's friends, most significantly the UAE.  The COS noted the UAE
    has the Patriot system on order and expects to take delivery in 2012.
     He went on to mention the pending deployment of a single Patriot
    battery to protect Al Dhafra Air Base -- which should be operational
    within the next 30 to 60 days.  The COS noted the UAE operational
    capacity will come too late and the single US battery will be too
    little to stop Iranian missiles if they attack sooner rather than
    later.

    ¶6.  (S/NF) Hamid Thani senses indications and warnings the Israeli
    government now being formed will likely attack Iran.  He thinks the
    new (Netanyahu) government will be very determined to eliminate the
    threat of Iranian missiles, especially nuclear tipped ones, which
    they fear may come raining down on Israeli cities.  He also stated
    Israel would be justified to take such action as it must protect its
    citizens just as any nation has the duty to do.  He feels that a
    breakthrough in international efforts in regard to Iran's armament
    programs may slow Israel's actions.  However, the COS knows that
    Israel must maintain all its options.  He also knows the Iranians
    have toyed with the international community for over ten years as
    they built their capability.  He stated the Israelis are also very
    aware of Iranian tactics.

    ¶7.  (S/NF) When pressed on what type of event may precipitate an
    Israeli attack, the COS thought the delivery of the Russian S-300
    system could be the catalyst.  The COS stated very flatly that "I
    don't trust the Russians, I've never trusted the Russians or the
    Iranians."

    ¶8.  (S/NF) The COS went on to request continued and expanded
    intelligence sharing between the US and the UAE.  He asked the DATT
    what advance warning the US could expect of an Iranian attack.  He
    quickly added that he asks the same question of his MISS chief at
    least twice a week and gets no answer -- as he knows there is no good
    answer.  (Note: The COS served as the MISS chief prior to becoming
    COS and knows very well the capabilities related to predicting
    Iranian actions.  End note.)

    ¶9.  (C) The meeting ended nearly as quickly as it began with both
    sides wishing each other good will and great success during the
    International Defense Exhibition (IDEX) opening later in the day
    (immediately following this meeting all of the attendees departed
    directly for IDEX).  The COS met with and most certainly briefed the
    President, Prime Minister and Abu Dhabi Crown Prince (the de facto
    Minister of Defense) as IDEX began.

    OLSON

`