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CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

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### Viewing cable 10MOSCOW392, IRAN DOMINATES NETANYAHU'S VISIT TO MOSCOW

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
10MOSCOW392 | 2010-02-22 11:11 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Moscow

`

    VZCZCXRO9554
    PP RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHKUK RUEHTRO
    DE RUEHMO #0392/01 0531132
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 221132Z FEB 10
    FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6552
    INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
    RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
    RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 2246
    RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 0342

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 000392

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2019
    TAGS: PGOV PREL RS IR
    SUBJECT: IRAN DOMINATES NETANYAHU'S VISIT TO MOSCOW

    Classified By: Acting Political Minister Counselor Eric Green for reaso
    ns 1.4 (b) and (d).

    ¶1.  (C) Summary:  In a two-day visit to Moscow, PM Netanyahu
    pressed his case on Iran while the GOR was more focused on
    trade than the MEPP.  The Israeli PM downplayed disagreements
    over Hamas and welcomed government initiatives to help
    crisis-depleted economic relations.  Netanyahu came away
    pleasantly surprised with Moscow's tougher attitude towards
    Tehran and the GOR's willingness to countenance sanctions,
    even though disagreement remains on their content.  Israeli
    contacts are confident Russia will not deliver the S-300s to
    Iran anytime soon.  End Summary.

    ----------------------
    A Special Relationship
    ----------------------

    ¶2.  (C) In his first official visit to Russia, PM Netanyahu
    met with President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin as well
    as leaders from Russia's Jewish community.  Both sides
    described this as a productive visit with "frank but positive
    discussions."

    ¶3.  (C) Israeli DCM Roi Rosenblit said Netanyahu's visit
    emphasized the "special relationship" between Israel and
    Russia.  He indicated that this the connection between the
    two countries has flourished in the past year.  Thanks to
    visa free travel, 400,000 Russian tourists travelled to
    Israel in 2009.

    --------------------------------------------- --
    Bilateral Economic and Cultural Ties Increasing
    --------------------------------------------- --

    ¶4.  (C) According to Dmitri Lebedov, Second Secretary in the
    MFA's Israel and Palestine Department, there was some
    discussion of economic issues, including cooperation in
    nanotechnology, agriculture, tourism and banking.  The
    Russian-Israeli Bilateral Economic and Trade Commission last
    met in November 2009.  The commission is planning another
    meeting in 2010 in Jersusalem although a date has not yet
    been selected.  Lebedev noted that Putin has agreed to visit
    Israel in 2010.

    ¶5.  (C) Rosenblit said both sides blamed the economic crisis
    for the decrease in bilateral trade in 2009 which affected
    Israeli imports of both raw diamonds and petrochemicals.
    Both sides are looking for ways to diversify trade to include
    more agricultural products.  Rosenblit noted that Russia was
    very interested in attracting Israeli investment, citing a
    bilateral agreement on industrial research and development
    which gives both governments the ability to finance joint
    start-ups.

    ¶6.  (C) Elaborating on economics issues, Rosenblit said that
    Netanyahu and Putin discussed energy issues.  Rosenblit said
    that Israel had discussed with Russia and Turkey the
    possibility of extending to Israel a gas pipeline but this
    proposal became unnecessary after Israel found offshore gas
    reserves in Haifa.  Although Gazprom is still interested in
    building facilities in Haifa and aiding in distribution,
    Rosenblit said this was now a question for the private
    sector.   Rosenblit also claimed that an agreement was
    reached to launch a bilateral agricultural business forum in
    Moscow, possibly in March 2010.  This would also be a private
    effort, but under governmental auspices.  He also said that
    there was some discussion about future outer space
    cooperation for peaceful purposes.

    ¶7.  (C) Rosenblit claimed that the 65th anniversary of World
    War II and Holocaust remembrance were high on the agenda.  He
    said that both the GOI and the GOR are unhappy with recent
    attempts to revise the history of these events.  He noted
    that a Holocaust Museum will be built in Russia and a
    commemorative site recognizing the Red Army's role in WWII
    will be constructed in Israel.  Rosenblit also said that PM
    Putin invited President Peres to the May 9 Victory Day
    ceremonies in Moscow later this year.  Medevedev also
    reportedly green lighted the idea of a cultural program
    including a "Year of Russia in Israel" and "Year of Israel in
    Russia" exchange.

    -------------------------------------------
    Middle East Peace Not High on Either Agenda
    -------------------------------------------

    ¶8.  (C) According to Rosenblit, MEPP was not thoroughly
    discussed and he "doubted that the Moscow Conference
    specifically was mentioned."  Rosenblit also downplayed the

    MOSCOW 00000392  002 OF 003

    recent visits of Abbas and Meshaal and the importance
    attached to them by the Russians.  He said that he believed
    Georgia was of greater importance to Russia than Syria,
    Lebanon or Palestine.

    ¶9. (C) Rosenblit said that Netanyahu emphasized his openness
    to talks between the GOR and the Palestinians because he
    welcomed any way to bring them back to negotiations.  "We
    wanted everyone to tell Abbas to return to negotiations
    because we can't give him a deal until he sits down."  He
    noted that Israel prefers direct contacts but supports any
    kind of negotiations.  Rosenblit said that Israel still
    insists on talks without preconditions and no interim
    agreements: "Nothing is agreed until everything is agreed."
    Rosenblit said that Israel supported Russia's efforts to
    achieve comprehensive negotiations including Syria and
    Lebanon.

    ¶10.  (C) Referring to the recent visit to Moscow of Khaled
    Meshaal, Netanyahu told his interlocutors that Hamas should
    not be legitimized by other countries.  Although Meshaal had
    only a 15 minute meeting with Lavrov, it received significant
    coverage in the media.  Rosenblit said Medvedev asked what
    Russia could do to help with Hamas.  Netanyahu repeated that
    Israel does not see Hamas as a legitimate partner but would
    use the Russia-Hamas channel to discuss humanitarian issues
    such as the proposed prisoner swap for IDF soldier Gilad
    Shalit.

    ------------------------
    Closer than Ever on Iran
    ------------------------

    ¶11. (C) Lebedov sought to downplay discussions of Iran saying
    that, while it was discussed, other bilateral issues took up
    most of the discussions.

    ¶12. (C) Rosenblit, however, claimed that Iran was clearly at
    the top of Israel's agenda for this visit.  He said Netanyahu
    was "keen to form a group of like-minded parties" who
    recognized the danger of Iran's program and would cooperate
    to stop its "militant nuclearlization."  Netanyahu emphasized
    that Israel believes that once Iran has nuclear capabilities,
    other regional powers will immediately seek their own nuclear
    weapons.  Because of this danger, and the threat from Tehran
    itself, Netanyahu urged Russia to cooperate on tougher
    sanctions against Iran.

    ¶13. (C) The Israeli side, according to Rosenblit, was
    pleasantly surprised at Russia's harsh tone on Iran which had
    changed dramatically even since FM Lieberman's visit in
    November.  "We heard words from them that we've never heard
    before," Rosenblit claimed, "and we aren't hearing the same
    old arguments."  Rosenblit credited this change to the
    Iranians themselves, saying that their rejection of the TRR
    proposal and their decision to enrich to 20 percent had
    toughened Russia's stance on Iran.  He remarked that just a
    few months ago, there was concern in Israel that Iran would
    divide the international community, but Iran's actions have
    only served as a unifying factor. "Russia's understanding of
    the Iranian nuclear issue is closer to ours than it was a few
    months ago."

    --------------------------
    Ready to Discuss Sanctions
    --------------------------

    ¶14.  (C) On the issue of sanctions, Netanyahu reportedly
    handed the GOR a list of areas where Israel felt sanctions
    could affect change in Iran's behavior.  The list included
    restrictions on Iranian exports of energy products; Iranian
    imports of refined petroleum products; the financial and
    banking sectors; and, shipping and aerospace companies.  He
    noted that, while Russia was ready to discuss sanctions, the
    two did not necessarily see eye to eye on the specifics.
    Both sides did agree, however, that the UNSC had to agree on
    sanctions.  Rosenblit said that Russian officials do not
    believe that unilateral sanctions will have the desired
    effect.  They believe that the international community has to
    maintain united and either agree to impose or not impose
    sanctions.

    ¶15.  (C) Netanyahu encouraged Russia to be an example for
    China regarding sanctions.  Rosenblit said both Israel and
    Russia had been working bilaterally with China to convince
    them that it was time for a serious discussion on sanctions.
    --------------------------------------------- --
    S-300s: No Quid Pro Quo, but We Trust Medevedev
    --------------------------------------------- --

    MOSCOW 00000392  003 OF 003

    ¶16.  (C) When asked about media reports citing Netanyahu
    himself which suggested that Israel had agreed not to restart
    arms deals with Georgia in exchange for Russia's continued
    inaction on the S-300s contract with Iran, Lebedov noted
    that, in spite of this statement, there had been no change in
    the GOR's policy.  He claimed that fulfillment of the S-300s
    contract remained a political decision.  He remarked that the
    S-300 system was itself defensive in nature and could not be
    used against another party, such as Israel.

    ¶17.  (C) Rosenblit also would not acknowledge that a deal had
    been made.  Instead, he said that Netanyahu had reiterated
    his trust in Medvedev regarding the S-300s.  According to
    Rosenblit, Netanyahu believes that Russia has taken "all
    aspects of regional stability" into account when taking
    decisions on the S-300s.  Rosenblit did note that the S-300s
    issue offered a window onto the different vectors in Russian
    foreign policy, with the contradictory statements that their
    delivery was imminent, and the delay being caused by
    technical and political issues, coming just days before
    Netanyahu's visit.

    ¶18.  (C) Rosenblit said that neither Russia nor Israel was
    linking the S-300 issue with arms sales to Georgia.  Israel,
    he claimed, as a Russian partner, was "listening attentively"
    to Russia's concerns about weapons supplies to Georgia and
    the effects this could have in the region.  Israel has
    friendly relations with Georgia but the Russian relationship
    was also very important, he said.  He indicated that both
    sides were trying to come to an "understanding."

    ¶19.  (C) Comment: The Russian media built up the Prime
    Minster's visit as the final stage of Russia's
    Abbas-Meshaal-Netanyahu trifecta of Middle East callers.
    While both sides paid lip-service to MEPP issues, Iran was
    the main agenda item.  This reflects Netanyahu's priorities
    and the GOR's belief that it is Washington's job, not
    Moscow's, to pressure the Israelis on MEPP issues.  Israel
    came away pleased with Russia's changed posture on Iran, but
    disappointed that its list of sanctions was too ambitious for
    the GOR.  Separately, the widely reported "quid-pro-quo" on a
    mutual freeze of the Russian S-300 delivery for Iran and
    Israeli military sales to Georgia could be a convenient
    Israeli invention.  While Israeli contacts say there is no
    formal deal, Netanyahu's statements to the media created
    enough speculation to put Russia in a corner.  Should Moscow
    eventually deliver the system to Iran, Israel has a pretext
    to step up arms sales to Georgia.
    Beyrle

`