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### Viewing cable 10STATE15856, S) TURKISH FIRMS ENGAGED IN MILITARY

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
10STATE15856 | 2010-02-22 15:03 | SECRET | Secretary of State

`

    VZCZCXYZ0018
    OO RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHC #5856 0531551
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 221547Z FEB 10
    FM SECSTATE WASHDC
    TO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 0000
    INFO RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL IMMEDIATE 0000

` `

    S E C R E T STATE 015856

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2035
    TAGS: ETTC MARR MCAP MOPS PARM PINR PREL PTER MASS TU IR
    SUBJECT: (S) TURKISH FIRMS ENGAGED IN MILITARY
    MATERIEL-RELATED DEALS WITH IRAN

    Classified By: EUR/PRA Director Stephanie Miley

    ¶1. (U) This is an action request to Embassy Ankara.  Please
    see paragraph 7.

    ----------
    BACKGROUND
    ----------

    ¶2. (S) The U.S. has information about several transactions
    involving Turkish firms planning to export and import from
    Iran arms and related material controlled by the Wassenaar
    Arrangement.  Specifically, Iran is interested in procuring
    Full Metal Jacket (FMJ) .38 caliber and wadcutter bullets; 40
    mm automatic grenade launchers; 5.56 mm composite magazines
    (for M16 assault rifles), and 7.62 X 39 mm and 7.62 X 51 mm
    composite magazines from Turkey.  In addition, we understand
    that a Turkish firm may also be pursuing a deal to import
    plastic explosives and nitrocellulose from Iran.

    ¶3. (S) The U.S. wants to provide this information to Turkish
    officials, request that they investigate this activity and
    use all available means to prevent these firms from exporting
    and importing such arms to and from Iran.  In addition to any
    domestic Turkish authorities that may apply, these activities
    may also be in violation of both United Nations Security
    Resolution (UNSCR) 1747 and U.S. domestic authorities.

    ¶4. (S) UNSCR 1747: UNSCR 1747, paragraph 5, prohibits Iran
    from supplying, selling or transferring from its territory
    any "arms or related materiel."  It also requires all states
    to prohibit the procurement of such items from Iran by their
    nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft; whether
    or not such transfers originated in the territory of Iran.
    The procurement of plastic explosives from Iran would violate
    UNSCR 1747.

    ¶5. (S) The Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act
    (INKSNA): INKSNA authorizes sanctions against any foreign
    person that transfers to or from Iran, North Korea, or Syria
    goods, services, or technology controlled by multilateral
    control lists (e.g., Nuclear Suppliers Group, Missile
    Technology Control Regime, Australia Group, or Wassenaar
    Arrangement); of the same kind as those on multilateral
    control lists, but falling below the control list parameters,
    when it is determined that such goods, services, and
    technologies have the potential to make a material
    contribution to WMD, or cruise or ballistic missile systems;
    on U.S. national control lists for WMD/missile reasons that
    are not on multilateral lists; or with the potential of
    making a material contribution to WMD, or cruise or ballistic
    missile systems.  Accordingly, the U.S. is concerned that if
    the Turkish firms proceed with transferring the grenade
    launchers, bullets, and ammunition magazines, we would be
    required to report this to the U.S. Congress and the Turkish
    firms could be subject to U.S. sanctions.

    ¶6. (S) The U.S. is also concerned about the potential exports
    to Iran because one of the items may be of U.S. origin.
    According to Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)
    records, Turkey received 181 MK-19 40 mm grenade launchers
    from the United States in 1995.  However, we do not know
    definitively if any of these are among the 40 mm grenade
    launchers contemplated as part of the sale to Iran.  We note,
    however, that if any U.S.-origin defense equipment (including
    technical data) is re-transferred to Iran, that would violate
    Section 3 of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA).  As a
    consequence, Turkey could lose its country eligibility under
    the AECA to purchase or lease defense articles, including
    Patriot or Reaper unmanned aerial vehicles, or services, or
    to receive credits or guarantees relating to any purchase or
    lease.

    -------------------------
    ACTION REQUEST/OBJECTIVES
    -------------------------

    ¶7. (S) Post is requested to approach GOT officials to pursue
    the following objectives and to deliver the talking
    points/non-paper in paragraph 8 below as appropriate:

    -- Thank Turkish officials for Turkey's continued cooperation
    and support in preventing the transfer of arms or related
    material to and from Iran;

    -- Inform the GOT that we are very concerned that Turkish
    firms may be exporting to and importing from Iran arms and
    related material;

    -- Note that the export of Wassenaar Arrangement controlled
    items to Iran could require a report to the U.S. Congress
    under the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act
    (INKSNA) and may result in sanctions being imposed on the
    entities and individuals involved;

    -- Point out that the import of arms or related material from
    Iran would violate UNSCR 1747, which prohibits Iran from
    supplying, selling or transferring from its territory any
    "arms or related materiel" and requires all states to
    prohibit the procurement of such items from Iran by their
    nationals;

    -- Emphasize this is not the time for business as usual with
    Iran;

    -- Remind the GOT that both the DIO and Parchin were
    designated for an asset freeze under UNSCRs 1737 and 1747,
    respectively, and were sanctioned by the U.S. under Executive
    Order (E.O.) 13382;

    -- Strongly urge the GOT to use available legal authorities,
    including appropriate domestic laws and authorities related
    to implementing UNSCRs 1737 and 1747, to immediately
    terminate these deals and freeze any assets of DIO;

    -- Note that Iran has a long history of providing arms and
    other military equipment to terrorist groups and that these
    items could easily end up in the hands of al-Qaida, Hamas,
    Hizballah, and the Taliban;

    --------------
    TALKING POINTS
    --------------

    ¶8. (S//REL TURKEY) Begin talking  points:

    -- We appreciate the Government of Turkey's continued
    cooperation and support in preventing the transfer of
    military equipment and related materiel to and from Iran.

    -- In the spirit of this cooperation, we want to share with
    you some additional information about Turkish firms involved
    in dealings concerning arms and related materiel with Iran.

    ---------------
    EXPORTS TO IRAN
    ---------------

    -- We have information that the Turkish firms Mercan Tanitim
    Dis Ticaret ve Muhendislik Ltd. and Makina ve Kimya
    Endustrisi Kurumu (MKEK) may sign a contract to export
    military material to Iran.

    -- The items covered by the contract include: FMJ (Full Metal
    Jacket) .38 caliber and wadcutter bullets; 40 mm automatic
    grenade launchers; 5.56 mm composite magazines (for M16
    assault rifles), and 7.62 X 39 mm and 7.62 X 51 mm composite
    magazines, all of which are specified on the Wassenaar
    Arrangement Munitions List.

    -- In addition, according to the Defense Security Cooperation
    Agency (DSCA) records, Turkey received 181 MK-19 40 mm
    grenade launchers from the United States in 1995.  We do not
    know, definitively, if any of these were among the 40 mm
    grenade launchers contemplated as part of the sale to Iran.

    -- We should note, however, that if any U.S.-origin defense
    equipment (including technical data) is re-transferred to
    Iran, that transfer would violate Section 3 of the U.S. Arms
    Export Control Act (AECA).  As a consequence, Turkey could
    lose its country eligibility under the AECA to purchase or
    lease defense articles.  This could potentially include
    Patriot or Reaper unmanned aerial vehicles, or services, or
    the ability to receive credits or guarantees relating to any
    purchase or lease.

    -----------------
    IMPORTS FROM IRAN
    -----------------

    -- In addition to our information related to the export of
    arms material to Iran, we also understand some of the same
    Turkish firms involved in the exports are interested in
    procuring arms material from Iran.

    -- Specifically, we understand that in September 2009, Mercan
    Tanitim was pursuing a deal with MKEK to import 2,000 kg of
    Composition A-4 military plastic explosives produced by
    Parchin Chemical Industries, an Iranian government military
    company and an element of the Defense Industries Organization

    (DIO).

    -- We further understand that in September 2009, the Turkish
    companies Kolorkim Kimya San and Mercan Tanitim were
    considering a deal to import nitrocellulose (NC) from Iran.
    NC is a dual-use material that serves as a major component in
    smokeless gunpowder.

    -- As a subordinate of DIO, Parchin acts on behalf of DIO,
    importing and exporting chemical goods throughout the world.
    In April 2007, Parchin Chemical Industries was identified as
    the final recipient of sodium perchlorate monohydrate, a
    chemical precursor for solid propellant oxidizer, possibly to
    be used for ballistic missiles.

    -- As you know, DIO is one of seven Iranian nuclear-related
    entities designated for an asset freeze in the Annex to UNSCR
    ¶1737.  In addition to being listed in the Annex for UNSCR
    1737, DIO was sanctioned previously by the United States for
    WMD- or missile-related activities under the Iran and Syria
    Nonproliferation Act (ISNA), the Arms Export Control Act
    (AECA), Executive Order (E.O.) 13382, and the Export
    Administration Act.

    -- We would further note that Parchin Chemical Industries has
    been designated for an asset freeze under UNSCR 1747 and U.S.
    E.O. 13382 in July 2008 as a consequence of its work on
    behalf of Iran's ballistic missile program.  We, therefore,
    urge you, per UNSCR 1747, to freeze any assets of Parchin
    Chemical Industries that may come under Turkish jurisdiction.

    -- We would like to inform you that Turkish firms engaged in
    business with entities designated under E.O. 13382 are
    eligible for sanctions if such activities are not halted.

    -- Given the UN Security Council's grave concern over Iran's
    nuclear and ballistic missile program activities, we urge you
    to encourage all Turkish firms to avoid any affiliation with
    this company.

    -- Iran, a U.S.-designated State Sponsor of Terrorism, has a
    long history of providing arms and other military equipment
    to terrorist groups and other non-state actors, including in
    Iraq, Afghanistan, and Lebanon.  We are concerned that the
    materials being negotiated for transfer by the Turkish
    companies in question could be diverted by Iran to such
    groups.

    -- Iran has long supplied non-state actors, including
    terrorist groups such as Hizballah, with arms and other
    military equipment.  The terrorist applications of small arms
    and light weapons (SA/LW) are obvious, but Iran has also
    supplied terrorists with larger weapons systems that threaten
    regional security and stability.

    -- Failure to prevent these sales could result in the
    re-transfer of military material and explosives by Iran to
    groups like al-Qaida, Hamas, Hizballah, and the Taliban.
    This would harm the Turkish government's reputation as a NATO
    ally and demonstrated opponent of terrorism, and would
    reflect badly on the Turkish business community.

    -- These transactions could also be damaging to our bilateral
    relationship as these items can be used to kill and severely
    injure Coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan and elsewhere
    in the region.

    -- Turkey is also required to prevent the transfers from Iran
    as noted in UNSCR 1747, paragraph 5, which prohibits Iran
    from supplying, selling or transferring from its territory
    any "arms or related materiel."  All states are required to
    prohibit the procurement of such items from Iran by their
    nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft; whether
    or not such transfers originated in the territory of Iran.

    -- We believe the arms and explosives acquisitions being
    pursued by Mercan Tanitim and MKEK with Iranian entities
    would clearly violate this provision of UNSCR 1747, and that
    the Kolorkim and Mercan Tanitim deal involving the transfer
    of nitrocellulose may as well.

    -- Action to prevent such transfers would clearly demonstrate
    Turkey's commitment to the full and effective implementation
    of UNSCR 1747. Such action would also remove the possibility
    that these firms could be subject to U.S. sanctions under the
    Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA).

    -- We strongly urge you to investigate this information and
    prevent any transfers being contemplated by the entities
    involved by using authorities available under Turkish
    domestic law.

    -- Please share with us the results of your investigation at
    your earliest convenience.

    END POINTS

    ---------------------
    REPORTING REQUIREMENT
    ---------------------

    ¶9. (U) Post is requested to please report results of its
    efforts as soon as possible.

    -----------------
    POINTS OF CONTACT
    -----------------

    ¶10. (U) Washington points of contact for follow-up are
    Margaret T. Mitchell and Michael Rolleri of ISN/CATR, and
    Matthew Hardiman, EUR/PRA.
    CLINTON

`