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### Viewing cable 10STATE13750, READOUT OF JANUARY 20 U.S.-FRANCE STRATEGIC DIALOGUE

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
10STATE13750 | 2010-02-17 03:03 | SECRET//NOFORN | Secretary of State

`

    VZCZCXRO5206
    PP RUEHSL
    DE RUEHC #3750/01 0480313
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    P 170309Z FEB 10
    FM SECSTATE WASHDC
    TO RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 8385
    INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 1309
    RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 6409
    RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 6148
    RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0360
    RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 7288
    RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 STATE 013750

    SIPDIS
    NOFORN

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/26/20
    TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS NATO RS FR IR TU
    SUBJECT: READOUT OF JANUARY 20 U.S.-FRANCE STRATEGIC DIALOGUE
    IN WASHINGTON

    Classified By: Under Secretary Bill Burns for reasons 1.4(b,
    d).

    ¶1.  (S/NF) Summary.  On January 20, 2010, Under Secretary Bill
    Burns and Defense Under Secretary for Policy Michele Flournoy
    hosted the third U.S.-France Strategic Dialogue with
    counterparts Jacques Audibert and Michel Miraillet.
    Discussions focused on Afghanistan, Pakistan, NATO Reform,
    Missile Defense, Turkey, Russia, Iran, and the Middle East
    Peace Process.  The French indicated an announcement of
    further civilian contributions to Afghanistan would be made at
    the London Conference, but hedged on a decision regarding
    additional combat troops.  On NATO's new Strategic Concept,
    the French highlighted the potential for a split in the
    Alliance between old and new members, and agreed that a
    document that linked to NATO reform measures was needed.  The
    French requested more information on the U.S. proposal to make
    Missile Defense a mission for NATO.  Both U/S Burns and USD(P)
    Flournoy underscored that the potential sale of a French
    Mistral-class Helicopter carrier to Russia would be unhelpful
    in terms of regional stability.  Next steps on Iran were
    discussed with the French agreeing that the European Union
    (EU) was more unified than ever on the need for increased
    pressure and welcoming U.S. efforts to engage the EU as a
    whole on this issue.  End Summary.

    ------------------------
    AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN
    ------------------------

    ¶2.  (S/NF)  U/S Burns praised the French contributions and
    previewed U.S. goals for the London Conference on Afghanistan,
    which included agreement on growing the Afghan National
    Security Forces (ANSF), reintegration, and choosing a new UN
    Senior Representative for Afghanistan.  USD(P) reviewed the
    POTUS decision and highlighted that July 11, 2011 was an
    inflection point -- the beginning of a process.  She noted
    that POTUS was careful to not create an artificial timeline
    for transition to Afghan responsibility and that the U.S.
    message to the region is that "we are not leaving."  Deputy
    SRAP Jones described the new U.S. regional stability strategy
    and our efforts to align Karzai with the international
    community's civilian priorities.

    ¶3.  (S/NF)  Audibert remarked on France's "special" commitment
    to Afghanistan based on France leading the invocation of
    NATO's Article 5 after 9/11.  Nine years later, the French
    cite Allied unity as the mission's principal success.  France
    believes the President's announcement of 30,000 more troops
    substantively changed the operation.  While the London
    conference is a chance to impress upon Afghan President Hamid
    Karzai that he must implement the commitments in his
    inauguration speech, the French are concerned it might be too
    early to put too much political pressure on Karzai.  Audibert
    suggested a second international conference on Afghanistan in
    the spring would be helpful and was pleased to hear about
    plans for an April conference in Kabul.  Audibert also stated
    that France will make an announcement about its "civilian
    surge" at the London conference, but that commitments on
    further troop deployments were not ready.  Miraillet lamented
    French public opposition to the war in Afghanistan, but
    believed that the government was making progress in convincing
    the French people of the necessity for the operation.  He also
    explained that the military staff had developed several plans
    for additional contributions, which were now with President
    Sarkozy for action.

    ----------------------
    NATO STRATEGIC CONCEPT
    ----------------------

    ¶4.  (C/NF) Audibert noted that the Strategic Concept (SC) was
    "not a redrafting of the Washington Treaty," and should not
    open troublesome issues such as new missions and redefining
    Article 5.  He further emphasized that France wanted to stay
    as close to the 1999 Strategic Concept as possible on language

    STATE 00013750  002 OF 004

    relating to NATO nuclear issues.  Audibert highlighted the
    risk of a split between old and newer members of the Alliance
    on these questions and advocated for a short, simple document.
    The French want to use the Strategic Concept to drive reform
    at NATO.  He noted that France had submitted several proposals
    on reform and that France was keen for U.S. support.
    Miraillet added that with the dire state of NATO financing, it
    was important to stress financial reform even before the
    drafting of the Strategic Concept.  Miraillet also warned that
    SecGen Rasmussen might put a tight grip on drafting the
    concept and cautioned that Turkey would play a stronger role
    in drafting than in 1999.

    ¶5.  (C/NF)  USD(P) asserted that the U.S. has played a leading
    role in the Senior Officials Group (SOG) because of our strong
    commitment to NATO reform.  On the SC, she said it was
    important that the key Allies make their input to the SecGen
    before pen was put to paper.  Further, USD(P) clarified that
    the U.S. did not believe Alliance transformation could happen
    without financial reform and that it was a priority for the
    U.S. State Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian
    Affairs Phil Gordon agreed; any misperception that the U.S.
    did not want to link the Strategic Concept to reform must be
    corrected.  OSD Assistant Secretary for International Security
    Affairs Alexander Vershbow added that the new concept must put
    a public face on the Alliance and address issues for the
    future, such as Article 4 and crisis management capacity.  He
    agreed that reform of financing was critical as the current
    budget crisis evidenced.  ASD Vershbow stressed that we must
    work with the UK to solve the financial crisis at NATO and
    suggested that the idea of "zero real growth" be put aside.
    Audibert was pleased to hear that the U.S. was on the same
    page as France regarding reform and that this was a priority
    goal for the French side during the Strategic Dialogue.

    ---------------
    Missile Defense
    ---------------

    ¶6.  (S/NF)  USD(P) briefed the French on the current state of
    play regarding worldwide U.S. missile defense plans.  She
    noted that the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) would
    soon be submitted to Congress and noted the Phased Adaptive
    Approach (PAA) would be a U.S. contribution to a NATO Missile
    Defense project.  This plan would protect both U.S. forces and
    interests in Europe and our NATO Allies.  USD(P) requested
    French support for securing NATO approval for the Active
    Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) program to
    become the Command and Control (C2) backbone of a wider
    European Missile Defense program.  USD(P) stressed that NATO
    approval for the C2 relationship between ALTBMD and the PAA
    was important as Turkey was unlikely to approve participation
    unless it was part of a larger NATO enterprise.

    ¶7.  (S/NF)  Miraillet conveyed that France was pleased with
    the Obama administration's swift action on Missile Defense and
    welcomed the U.S. development of the PAA.  France shared the
    U.S. perception of the threat and had ideas on ways it could
    participate in the U.S.-proposed system. However, Miraillet
    emphasized that France needed more information before the
    government could endorse a NATO-PAA linkage through ALTBMD,
    and argued that the Lisbon Summit may be too early for a NATO
    decision.  He said that France wanted information on phases
    three and four of the PAA and whether the SM-3 Block 2B could
    be perceived as a threat by the Russians.  Audibert added that
    France needed much more detail on the potential costs to NATO
    Allies before endorsing ALTBMD as the C2 for the European
    Missile Defense system.  He also asked how the C2
    relationships in the system would work in a NATO context.
    Audibert concluded by underscoring that French hesitation on
    accepting a NATO role for European-wide Missile Defense is not
    reluctance, but a reflection of the need for greater clarity
    on what was being proposed.

    ¶8.  (S/NF)  In response, USD(P) Flournoy said we would soon
    share additional details on C2 arrangements, noting that
    authorities would need to be delegated given the short
    decision time for a response.  She and ASD Vershbow pressed
    the importance of a political decision at Lisbon to adopt
    territorial Missile Defense as a NATO mission, both to secure
    Turkish agreement to host the forward-based radar and to
    demonstrate that NATO was addressing real Article 5 threats.

    STATE 00013750  003 OF 004

    ------
    Turkey
    ------

    ¶9.  (S/NF)  Miraillet and Audibert were remarkably downbeat on
    Turkey and lamented poor French bilateral relations with
    Turkish leadership, though they believed ties were slowly
    improving.  Miraillet believed the military leaders were no
    longer what they once were as the recent Ergenekon scandal had
    weakened the influence of the Generals in Turkish politics.
    Miraillet asserted that FM Ahmet Davutoglu had kept with his
    theory of "strategic depth," which he had described in his
    previously published books, through Turkey's continued
    engagement with neighbors like Syria and Iran and in Turkey's
    proactive approach to the Caucasus and recognition of the
    Iraqi Kurds.  Miraillet, in noting that the Turkish military
    had of late established a better relationship with the
    Pakistani military, stated that Turkey was a nuclear threshold
    country and that France did not know if there were similar
    civilian nuclear cooperation linkages with Pakistan.  In
    highlighting Turkey's unwillingness to engage in combat in
    Afghanistan, its improved relationships with Syria and Hamas,
    its willingness to negotiate with Iran outside the P5-plus-1
    process, and its position on selecting a new NATO Secretary
    General at the April 2009 Strasbourg Summit, Miraillet summed
    up that Turkey was becoming more of a global actor, but not
    always a positive actor in the international system.

    ¶10.  (S/NF)  USD(P) asked whether the EU was closer to
    identifying a way that it could signal to Turkey that the door
    was open to a closer relationship, such as observer status in
    the European Defense Agency.  Audibert noted that President
    Sarkozy had been particularly upset with the Turkish position
    on Rasmussen at Strasbourg and that Sarkozy's objection to
    Turkish membership in the EU was one of five pillars on his
    political campaign that the public still remembered.  Further,
    when France tried to move forward with closer NATO-EU ties
    during its 2008 EU presidency, Turkey rejected every plan that
    was put on the table.  For these reasons, it would be
    difficult for France to see any opening on EU membership for
    Turkey in the near future.  All French interlocutors agreed
    that a "more arrogant" Turkey could present a problem during
    NATO Strategic Concept discussions this year.  In response,
    Flournoy, Vershbow and Gordon reiterated that by closing the
    door on the Turks, the EU was creating a vicious circle that
    fueled Turkish obstructionism at NATO.

    ------
    Russia
    ------

    ¶11.  (S/NF)  Audibert began by stating that France was taking
    pragmatic approach to Russia, but that President Sarkozy had a
    "problem of confidence" and did not fully trust Russia.
    Audibert said Russia's two treaty proposals on new European
    Security Architecture were unacceptable and mere provocations,
    but that the French position was to use the proposals to
    engage the Russians on new approaches to crisis management,
    the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty, and on the
    adoption of the Open Skies/verification measures. However, he
    noted, these issues will continually be bogged down over the
    situation in Georgia, which Audibert saw as intractable as
    Russia will never "derecognize" the sovereignty of Abkhazia
    and South Ossetia while also never recognizing Georgian
    sovereignty over its territory, including the two enclaves.

    ¶12.  (S/NF) Audibert, noting he was raising his "if-raised"
    point, brought up the issue of France's potential sale of a
    helicopter carrier Mistral-class ship to Russia.  He asserted
    that the French had merely agreed to negotiate with Russia on
    the potential sale, but then argued that sale would be only
    for the ship without armament systems.  Audibert also said
    that while France understood U.S. concerns over the potential
    for Russia to use the ship for projection of power, it was
    important to note that any decision on the issue would, in the
    end, be political in nature.  Miraillet stated that this sale
    would be a gesture of good will to Russia as France assessed
    the Russian Navy was in dire condition.  In any case,
    concluded Miraillet, if France did not make the sale, the
    Netherlands and Spain would likely sell similar technology.

    ¶13.  (S/NF)  On Mistral, USD(P) observed the optics and policy
    behind the sale were perplexing as it would "fly in the face"

    STATE 00013750  004 OF 004

    of President Sarkozy's personal engagement on resolving the
    Georgia crisis in 2008.  She asserted that this sale would
    send a confusing political signal to Russia as well as to
    other Europeans.  U/S Burns concurred with USD(P), noting the
    sale would feed Georgia's fears and could lead to an arms
    race, increasing the chance of miscalculation by one or both
    sides.  USD(P) concluded that while we understood that France
    wanted to actively engage Russia, the U.S. would prefer that
    France find a different confidence-building measure than a
    Mistral sale.

    ----
    Iran
    ----

    ¶14.  (S/NF)  U/S Burns stated that the international community
    had reached a point where it had to begin looking for further
    consequences for Iran as the credibility of our efforts was at
    stake.  U/S Burns noted that other actors were watching
    Western actions on Iran.  He cautioned that moving China
    toward greater sanctions would not be easy, but that we need
    to continue engaging them.

    ¶15.  (S/NF)  Audibert noted that France was using every means
    possible to bring the EU together on Iran.  He noted a
    recently EU Council decision to task Foreign Ministers with
    developing new ideas on the way forward with Iran.  Briens
    stated that since the Iranian regime cracked down following
    the June 2009 elections,  the EU was more solid as a block on
    sanctions.  In particular,  Spain and Sweden, who were
    reluctant to support sanctions in the past, were more
    supportive because of recent gross human rights violations.

    -------------------------
    Middle East Peace Process
    -------------------------

    ¶16.  (S/NF)  Audibert hailed U.S. efforts to reestablish peace
    talks between Israel and the Palestinians.  He asked pointedly
    where the U.S. saw the process in the next six months, and how
    to further involve Europe, especially regarding a possible
    settlement.  Notably, the French did not advocate for a Middle
    East summit in Paris.

    ¶17.  (U)  Participants:

    United States:

    Department of State
    William Burns, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
    Phil Gordon, Assistant Secretary of State for European and
    Eurasian Affairs
    Paul Jones, Deputy Special Representative for Afghanistan and
    Pakistan
    Maureen Cormack, Director for Western Europe
    Tamir Waser, Special Assistant to U/S Burns
    Andrew Lorenz, Senior France Desk Officer

    Department of Defense
    Michele Flournoy, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
    Alexander Vershbow, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
    International Security Affairs
    Jim Townsend, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
    European and NATO Policy
    Andrew Winternitz, Deputy Director for European Policy

    France:

    Ministry of Foreign Affairs
    Jacques Audibert, Under Secretary for Political and Strategic
    Affairs
    Martin Briens, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear
    Nonproliferation
    Nicolas Roche, Political Counselor, Embassy of France

    Ministry of Defense
    Michel Miraillet, Director for Strategic Affairs
    Gen Gratien Maire, French Defense Attache to the U.S.
    Gen Emmanuel de Romemont, Deputy Director for Disarmament and
    Proliferation
    Col Cyrille Claver, Deputy Director for European and NATO
    Affairs
    Col Frederic Pesme, Director for North America

    18.This cable was cleared by U/S Burns and USD(P) Flournoy.
    CLINTON

`