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### Viewing cable 09RPODUBAI379, IRAN: KHAMENEI SAYS SYSTEM WILL "ACT DECISIVELY" AGAINST

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
09RPODUBAI379 | 2009-09-14 13:01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Iran RPO Dubai

`

    VZCZCXRO4969
    RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHTRO
    DE RUEHDIR #0379/01 2571344
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    R 141344Z SEP 09
    FM RPO DUBAI
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0531
    INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
    RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
    RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
    RUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC
    RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
    RUEHDIR/RPO DUBAI 0532

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RPO DUBAI 000379

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL:  9/14/2019
    TAGS: PREL PGOV IR
    SUBJECT: IRAN: KHAMENEI SAYS SYSTEM WILL "ACT DECISIVELY" AGAINST
    OPPONENTS

    REF: DUBAI RPO 378

    DUBAI 00000379  001.2 OF 003

    CLASSIFIED BY: Alan Eyre, Director, Iran Regional Presence
    Office, Department of State.
    REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
    ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On September 11 Supreme Leader Khamenei gave the
    main Tehran Friday Prayer sermon.  In his comments Khamenei
    sought to characterize his treatment of opposition in line with
    the practices of both the first Shia Imam Ali and also with that
    of his predecessor Ayatollah Khomeini.   He said while criticism
    within the framework of the existing political system was
    acceptable, those fundamentally opposing the system and seeking
    to harm the nation's security will be dealt with decisively.  In
    keeping with previous warnings about the "soft overthrow" of the
    existing order, he cautioned against dissolution from within,
    saying that the only way to prevent this was to remain true to
    religion, revolutionary principles, and to Khomeini's teachings.
      The recent Presidential election with its massive turnout
    proved to the world that "regardless of whom the people voted
    for" they still believed in the system.  Referring to Iran's
    position on the international stage, Khamenei said Iran took
    pride in standing against the oppressive nature of its enemies
    and that Iran wouldn't be cowed into relinquishing its rights,
    "nuclear or non-nuclear."  He called for a large turnout on the
    September 18 Qods Day march in support of the Palestinian
    people, although warning that this event should not be used to
    "sow dissension," an implied reference to the fact that "Green
    Path" oppositionists are reportedly seeking a massive turn-out
    on this day as a show of strength.

    ¶2. (C) SUMMMARY (CONT): Although Supreme Leader Khamenei 's tone
    was consistently mild, Iranian press and IRPO contacts have
    interpreted this speech as a clear warning to the "Green Path"
    oppositionist leaders to cease and desist, an interpretation
    reinforced by the contemporaneous release of a Judiciary panel
    report stating that Mehdi Karrubi's allegations of prisoner
    abuse were both baseless and also politically motivated, and the
    forwarding of this case to judicial authorities for possible
    prosecution (reftel). END SUMMARY.

    ¶3. (U) On September 11, Supreme Leader Khamenei gave both Tehran
    Friday Prayer Sermons (normally there are two, the first
    covering ostensibly religious topics, the second focusing more
    on issues of the day).  As the date fell on the anniversary of
    the martyrdom of Imam Ali, the first Shia Imam, the topic of his
    first sermon was the government of Imam Ali.  Although
    putatively non-political in nature, Khamenei used this sermon to
    set the stage for themes to which he would refer back in his
    second, political, sermon.  He pointed out the moral nature of
    Imam Ali's government, adding that "when religion is separated
    from politics, politics becomes immoral and secular."  In an
    implicit comparison with current times, he also stressed that
    Imam Ali consistently preferred to be lenient in dealing with
    those who opposed him, until and unless there was a threat to
    the system, at which point he would act decisively.

    TYPES OF CONFLICT

    ¶4. (U) In the start of his second, political speech, Supreme
    Leader Khamenei said he wished to address his remarks to those
    in Iran's political sphere.  Dissension had been a feature of
    the Islamic Republic since its founding.  These conflicts have
    had different causes, to include theoretical differences of
    opinion, conflicts of interest and clashing personalities.
    Referring implicitly to his comments on the management style of
    Imam Ali, Khamenei said that Khomeini's normal method for
    dealing with dissension and conflict was to use moderation and
    leniency.  In an implicit reference to Mir Hossein Mousavi and
    Mehdi Karrubi, each of whom has referred back to his own
    revolutionary credentials, Khamenei said that at times Khomeini
    had to deal with conflicts even with those who had solid
    revolutionary backgrounds, at the level of the Prime Minister
    (i.e. Mousavi himself), President (Khamenei himself) and even at
    levels above the President (a reference to Khomeini's dismissal
    of Supreme Leader-designate Ayatollah Montazeri).

    ¶5. (U) Khamenei said the system didn't seek to stifle those who
    "think differently" (note: 'digar andishan," a term used to
    refer to the intellectual current associated, inter alia, with
    the Khatami-ist 'Second of Khordad' movement).  It was good for
    Iran's officials to have critics point out weaknesses if those

    DUBAI 00000379  002.2 OF 003

    doing so act within and accept the basic principles of the
    system, and the government will not move against such criticism.

    ¶6. (U) However, again drawing the link to Imam Ali, Khamenei
    said that during Khomeini's time if there were danger of
    infiltration of "harmful principles" into the system, and if
    this conflict were in some way a threat to core principles,
    Khomeini would then "act decisively." The regime, much like any
    human being, had to defend itself against such an attack.
    Linking his actions to those of Imam Ali and Khomeini, Khamenei
    said that today also the regime will act if it senses that
    someone is acting against its principles and security.

    AVOIDING CORRUPTION FROM WITHIN

    ¶7. (U) In keeping with recent dominant public warnings about
    "soft overthrow" and "soft wars," Khamenei turned to the theme
    of corruption from within, both at an individual and societal
    level.  At an individual level, deviation from principles and
    susceptibility to corruption were to be avoided at all costs, as
    small slips and mistakes could lead to larger ones in a slow and
    gradual process.  The cure for such threats is self-awareness,
    piety and the ongoing moral policing of friends and family.  If
    such impiety is happening to a government official the problem
    is worse, as it affects society.

    ¶8. (U) At a societal and governmental level, deviation from
    principles and susceptibility to corruption can happen in much
    the same manner.  The decay comes from within, and although on
    the outside the society can still appear like an  "Islamic
    Republic," on the inside it could suffer degradation and decay.
     In this regard, societal dynamics can either be positive or
    negative.  Positive dynamics means moving ever closer towards
    justice and religion, which improves social, political and
    economic conditions and also improves society's abilities to
    stand up to one's enemies.  But a society with negative dynamics
    will have growing class and social differences and worsening
    political and economic conditions.  Instead of using freedom for
    growth, such a decaying society will abuse freedom to pursue
    corruption, sin and dissension.  Such negative dynamics also
    cause the society to "feel weak and retreat" in the face of
    one's enemy, unilateral disarmament and relinquishing one's
    rights, nuclear and non-nuclear, which is another sign of
    societal decline.

    ELECTION

    ¶9. (U) Supreme Leader Khamenei said the June 12 Presidential
    election with its massive turnout was a glorious triumph for the
    Islamic Revolution.  The turnout demonstrated to the world that
    the Iranian people believed in their system of government now
    more than ever, "regardless of who voted for whom.  After the
    election, the enemy sought to create disturbances in order to
    diminish Iran's achievement and weaken the peoples' confidence
    in the system, but to no effect.  There will be similarly large
    turnout in future elections, Khamenei predicted, showing the
    ongoing support of the people.

    IRAN'S ENEMIES

    ¶10. (U) Supreme Leader Khamenei said all governments have
    enemies, but what is important to note is the nature of one's
    friends and enemies.  Iran's friends are Muslim nations and
    peoples throughout the world, and the oppressed of the world.
    Its enemies are the thieves and oppressors of the world, and
    Iran should not be scared to be the enemies of the U.S. and the
    U.K.  It was important for Iran to show strength in the face of
    such enemies.

    DUBAI 00000379  003.2 OF 003

    QODS DAY

    ¶11. (U) Supreme Leader Khamenei said that many on the global
    stage have tried to bury the issue of Palestine, but Iran has
    prevented that, a fact which has upset "the U.S. and the
    Zionists."  He called for a massive turnout of support on the
    September 18 Qods Day Rally in Tehran, and cautioned all that no
    one should use this event to sow dissension, an implicit
    reference to "Green Path" opposition plans to use this
    authorized march as a show of its own strength.

    ¶12. (C) COMMENT: Although his tone was mild, Iran oppositionist
    press in addition to IRPO interlocutors with ties to the "Green
    Path" opposition have said that, in the words of one source,
    "Khameni's speech was being viewed ominously in Iran,"
    especially when viewed in conjunction with the contemporaneous
    release of a Judiciary panel report stating that Mehdi Karrubi's
    allegations of prisoner abuse were both baseless and also
    politically motivated, and forwarding the case to judicial
    authorities for possible prosecution (reftel).  According to one
    executive branch official, Khamenei's speech has made "the
    specter of the arrest of Karrubi - and possibly even Mousavi at
    a later stage" all the more probable.

    ¶13. (C) COMMENT (CONT): Contrary to Khamenei's assertions and as
    evidenced by recent comments by IRGC Commander Jaafari, the
    regime's interpretation of legitimate dissent has constricted
    dramatically, with Jaffari equating "soft overthrow" with those
    seeking to change Iran's behavior in any way.   Certainly,
    Khamenei seems to be trying to regain the high ground he
    forfeited by descending so openly into the political fray, as
    shown by his attempts to draw comparisons among himself,
    Khomeini, and Imam Ali.  Separately, the Supreme Leader's
    formulation of "relinquishing ones rights, nuclear or
    non-nuclear" as a sign of societal dissolution and immorality
    indicates that Iran will continue to adhere to its hard public
    line in advance of any future negotiations.  Finally, it is also
    worth noting that Supreme Leader Khamenei made no endorsement,
    either explicit or implicit, of President Ahmadinejad, saying
    only that the recent Presidential election was good due to the
    turnout, "regardless of who voted for whom."   END COMMENT.
    EYRE

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