Currently released so far... 243 / 251,287

### Articles

Brazil

### Browse by release date

2010/11

### Browse by creation date

66 72 79 86 89 90 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02
1979/08
1986/05
1989/12
1990/01
2004/01 2004/12
2005/03 2005/05 2005/06 2005/12
2006/04 2006/08 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D H I J K L M P R S T U
Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bishkek Embassy Berlin Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad
Embassy Cairo Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Doha Embassy Damascus Consulate Dubai
Embassy Harare
Iran RPO Dubai Consulate Istanbul
Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kabul
Embassy London
Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Manama Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich
Embassy Prague Embassy Paris Embassy Panama
Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh
Secretary of State Embassy Sanaa Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa
USEU Brussels UNVIE

### Browse by tag

A B C E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U X Y Z
AE ASEC AM AF AR AU AORC AJ AG
BA BR BH BY BU
CVIS CH CASC CF COUNTERTERRORISM CD CV
ETRD ECON ELAB EFIN ENRG EG ETTC EPET EINV EFIS EXTERNAL EAID EUN EU ECUN EAIR EZ EAGR ELTN ECPS
FR
GM GG GR GOI GE GA
HO
IR IAEA IS IZ INRB IN IRAJ IQ IT
JO JA
KNNP KHLS KJUS KDEM KSPR KPKO KUNR KWBG KWMN KPAL KCRM KU KG KHIV KPRP KZ KN KTFN KGHG KSCA KMDR KPAO KCOR KACT KIRF KS KTIA KISL
LE LY LG
MNUC MPOS MARR MU MASS MOPS MCAP MOPPS MK MAR MTCRE MY ML MR
NATO NG
OPDC OEXC OIIP OVIP OPRC OTR OTRA
PGOV PREL PARM PTER PINR PHUM PINS PREF PM PEPR PROP PK PBIO PA PBTS PECON POLITICAL PARTIES
QA
RU RS RW
SA SYR SY SO SU SF SCUL SM SNAR SOCI SENV SP SG
TRGY TU TI TX TC TSPA
US UZ UE UK UNESCO UP UNSC UV
XF XA
YM
ZP ZR ZF ZI

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page

### Viewing cable 09ABUDHABI347, ABU DHABI CROWN PRINCE REITERATES IRAN CONCERNS FOR S/SRAP

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ABUDHABI347.
Help us extend and defend this work

Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
09ABUDHABI347 | 2009-04-05 12:12 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Abu Dhabi

`

    VZCZCXRO9925
    OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
    DE RUEHAD #0347 0951254
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 051254Z APR 09
    FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2332
    INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
    RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
    RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0644

` `

    S E C R E T ABU DHABI 000347

    NOFORN
    SIPDIS

    FOR S, S/SRAP HOLBROOKE AND S/SAGSWA ROSS
    DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARP AND NEA/IR

    E.O. 12958: 03/24/2019
    TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL PARM MOPS IR AF PK AE
    SUBJECT: ABU DHABI CROWN PRINCE REITERATES IRAN CONCERNS FOR S/SRAP
    HOLBROOKE

    CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR RICHARD G. OLSON FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D.

    ¶1. (S/NF) Summary: During a March 24 meeting with Special
    Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke, Abu
    Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ) expressed his grave
    concerns about the Iranian threat to the region.  MbZ said the
    Iranian response to the Nowruz message was primarily for domestic
    consumption, but that the Iranian leadership is concerned that
    dialogue with the West represents a regime threat.  He said Iran
    would obtain a nuclear weapon unless the regime could be "split from
    inside" before nuclear capability was achieved.  Foreign Minister
    Abdullah bin Zayed argued for continued Gulf consultation in
    conjunction with any U.S. efforts to engage Iran.  (Other topics
    reported septel.)  End Summary.

    NOWRUZ STATEMENT
    ----------------

    ¶2. (S/NF) MbZ began by telling Amb. Holbrooke that Khamenei's
    response to President's Nowruz statement was designed to send a
    message to the millions of Iranians who saw the statement on the
    Internet that there will be no debate on engagement with the United
    States and/or the West.  MbZ opined that Khamenei had to deliver the
    message personally as an Ahmedinejad response would have fueled
    domestic debate.  Commenting that Khamenei was conveying Iran's
    fundamental lack of trust in the United States, MbZ said the Iranians
    want an apology "for everything from Carter to Bush."  He added that
    the uncharacteristic speed of Khamenei's response indicates the
    extent of the perceived threat that improved relations with the West
    might represent to the leadership's control over the country.
    Specifically, the Iranian regime fears the United States will demand
    the renunciation of its nuclear program, which would be politically
    impossible.

    NUCLEAR WEAPONS A CERTAINTY, UNLESS REGIME FALLS
    --------------------------------------------- ---

    ¶3. (S/NF) MbZ told Holbrooke he was "100 percent" convinced Iran will
    complete its nuclear weapons program.  He candidly stated his
    personal belief that negotiations with Iran were irrelevant and a
    military solution would only delay the program, not derail it.  MbZ
    said that there was a "third way" between these unacceptable options:
     Iran is domestically very fragile, and the only way to prevent it
    from acquiring nuclear weapons was to "split them from inside."

    ¶4. (S/NF) Turning to his concerns about an armed confrontation, MbZ
    said war with Iran would only harm the UAE.  He is deeply concerned
    that the current Israeli government will initiate military action
    without consultation.  An Israeli attack on Iran would have little
    impact on Iran's capabilities, but MbZ was certain Iran would
    respond.  MbZ argued that the leadership believes its own lies, which
    were "proven" by Iran's success in Basra.  Today's conventional
    Iranian weapons would target the Gulf, while Iran continues to expand
    its missile program with the hope of reaching the West.

    CONSULT US
    ----------

    ¶5. (S/NF) UAE Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan
    (AbZ) stressed the importance of a continuation of the P5 plus 1 plus
    GCC plus 3 coordination on Iran.  AbZ said that such consultation in
    2008 "agitated" Iran, but sent a message to Russia and China and
    European allies that the Gulf is seriously concerned about Iranian
    hegemony.  Iran's regional hegemony and nuclear program are two
    issues that the West cannot tackle separately.  AbZ noted that
    countries in the region ("some friends") are concerned that the
    United States, especially under the current administration, would
    engage Iran at the expense of ties with the region.  AbZ said the
    President's Nowruz message supported this theory.  He concluded, "The
    more you engage Iran, the more you must engage the Gulf states."
    (Ambassador Olson's comment:  Abdullah's reference to "friends" was
    Emirati politesse - the UAE is deeply concerned that we are preparing
    to trade, and is interpreting the Nowruz greeting in that way.)

    ¶6. (SBU) Ambassador Holbrooke has cleared this message.
    OLSON

`