Currently released so far... 243 / 251,287

### Articles

Brazil

### Browse by release date

2010/11

### Browse by creation date

66 72 79 86 89 90 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02
1979/08
1986/05
1989/12
1990/01
2004/01 2004/12
2005/03 2005/05 2005/06 2005/12
2006/04 2006/08 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D H I J K L M P R S T U
Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bishkek Embassy Berlin Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad
Embassy Cairo Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Doha Embassy Damascus Consulate Dubai
Embassy Harare
Iran RPO Dubai Consulate Istanbul
Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kabul
Embassy London
Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Manama Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich
Embassy Prague Embassy Paris Embassy Panama
Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh
Secretary of State Embassy Sanaa Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa
USEU Brussels UNVIE

### Browse by tag

A B C E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U X Y Z
AE ASEC AM AF AR AU AORC AJ AG
BA BR BH BY BU
CVIS CH CASC CF COUNTERTERRORISM CD CV
ETRD ECON ELAB EFIN ENRG EG ETTC EPET EINV EFIS EXTERNAL EAID EUN EU ECUN EAIR EZ EAGR ELTN ECPS
FR
GM GG GR GOI GE GA
HO
IR IAEA IS IZ INRB IN IRAJ IQ IT
JO JA
KNNP KHLS KJUS KDEM KSPR KPKO KUNR KWBG KWMN KPAL KCRM KU KG KHIV KPRP KZ KN KTFN KGHG KSCA KMDR KPAO KCOR KACT KIRF KS KTIA KISL
LE LY LG
MNUC MPOS MARR MU MASS MOPS MCAP MOPPS MK MAR MTCRE MY ML MR
NATO NG
OPDC OEXC OIIP OVIP OPRC OTR OTRA
PGOV PREL PARM PTER PINR PHUM PINS PREF PM PEPR PROP PK PBIO PA PBTS PECON POLITICAL PARTIES
QA
RU RS RW
SA SYR SY SO SU SF SCUL SM SNAR SOCI SENV SP SG
TRGY TU TI TX TC TSPA
US UZ UE UK UNESCO UP UNSC UV
XF XA
YM
ZP ZR ZF ZI

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page

### Viewing cable 89PANAMA8545, PANAMANIANS HOPE FOR A SUCCESSFUL COUP

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #89PANAMA8545.
Help us extend and defend this work

Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
89PANAMA8545 | 1989-12-13 19:07 | SECRET | Embassy Panama

`

    P 131914Z DEC 89
    FM AMEMBASSY PANAMA
    TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7213
    INFO SECDEF WASHDC
    DIA WASHDC
    USIA WASHDC 8090
    USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PM
    PANCANAL COMM
    USLO CARIBBEAN
    AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
    AMEMBASSY CARACAS
    AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
    AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
    AMEMBASSY PARIS
    AMEMBASSY ROME
    AMEMBASSY MADRID
    AMEMBASSY BONN

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 PANAMA 08545

    E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
    TAGS: PGOV PREL PM US
    SUBJECT: PANAMANIANS HOPE FOR A SUCCESSFUL COUP
    -- NORIEGA PLANS FOR A NEW YEAR IN POWER

    ¶1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

    --------------------------------
    SUMMARY
    --------------------------------
    ¶2. THROUGHOUT 1989, RAPIDLY UNFOLDING POLITICAL
    DEVELOPMENTS HELD OUT HOPE TO MANY PANAMANIANS FOR
    A RESOLUTION TO PANAMA’S POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
    CRISIS: THE ELECTION OF MAY 7, THE SUBSEQUENT OAS
    NEGOTIATIONS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEADLINE OF
    SEPTEMBER 1, THE COUP ATTEMPT OF OCTOBER 3, AND
    THE TREATY DEADLINE OF JANUARY 1, 1990.
    PROJECTING INTO THE FIRST HALF OF 1990, NO SUCH
    HOPEFUL EVENTS AND DATES ARE READILY APPARENT.
    THE OPPOSITION’S MAIN OBJECTIVE WILL BE TO SURVIVE
    POLITICALLY, ECONOMICALLY, AND LITERALLY UNTIL THE
    NEXT COUP. NORIEGA WILL HAVE TO TRY AND
    CONSOLIDATE HIS CONTROL OVER THE PANAMA DEFENSE
    FORCES (FDP) AND AVOID ANOTHER UPRISING.

    ¶3. PRESSURES ON NORIEGA HAVE INCREASED ACROSS THE
    BOARD, BUT HE SEEMS TO HAVE DETERMINED THAT HE CAN
    MANAGE THEM. DESPITE NEW U.S. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS,
    THE MOST PRECIPITOUS ECONOMIC DROP IS OVER FOR
    NOW, FOLLOWING A TWO-YEAR, 25 PERCENT DROP IN
    GDP. INTERNATIONAL ISOLATION REMAINS AN IRRITANT
    TO THE REGIME, BUT IT IS NOT A SERIOUS PROBLEM FOR
    NORIEGA’S STABILITY. U.S. ACTIONS, FROM THE
    APPOINTMENT OF AN ACTING CANAL ADMINISTRATOR TO
    RUMORED COVERT PLANS AGAINST NORIEGA AS WELL AS
    NEW ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, ALLOW NORIEGA TO BEAT THE
    NATIONALISTIC DRUM AND MAKE IT APPEAR AS IF
    DOMESTIC SUPPORT FOR HIM IS GROWING.

    ¶4. NORIEGA’S WEAKEST POINT REMAINS HIS OWN
    INSTITUTION. WHISPERS THAT “THE OCTOBER 3 COUP IS
    NOT OVER” CONTINUE AND NORIEGA CONTINUES TO HOLD
    ON MAINLY BY BRUTAL REPRESSION OF ANY POTENTIAL
    NEW INSIDE OPPONENTS. WHEN ANOTHER ACTION TO
    REMOVE NORIEGA WILL TAKE PLACE IS UNCERTAIN, BUT
    WAITING FOR THAT POSSIBILITY IS THE MAIN PROSPECT
    FOR PANAMA IN 1990. END SUMMARY.

    ---------------------------------------
    THE CRISIS GRINDS ON
    ---------------------------------------
    ¶5. THE PANAMA CRISIS CONTINUES TO GRIND ON WITH
    NO CLEAR END IN SIGHT. NORIEGA TENACIOUSLY HOLDS
    ON TO POWER, INTIMIDATING HIS OPPONENTS AND FIRING
    UP HIS SUPPORTERS WITH SLOGANS CALLING FOR
    RETRIBUTION AGAINST “PANAMANIAN TRAITORS AND THEIR
    U.S. MASTERS,” SHOULD ANYTHING HAPPEN TO HIM.
    NORIEGA IS WEAKER THAN HE WAS AT THIS TIME LAST
    YEAR, BUT THE IMPACT OF THE CURRENT SET OF
    PRESSURES HAVE SO FAR FAILED TO EJECT HIM FROM
    OFFICE.

    ¶6. NEVERTHELESS, RECENT PRESS REPORTS OF AN
    ALLEGED U.S. COVERT ACTION PLAN AGAINST NORIEGA
    HAVE ONCE AGAIN RAISED HOPES OF SOME PANAMANIANS
    THAT THIS MAY BE THE BEGINNING OF HIS END.
    NORIEGA HIMSELF IS APPARENTLY ATTACHING SOME
    CREDIBILITY TO THE PRESS REPORTS. HE HAS REACTED
    NERVOUSLY BY STEPPING UP HARASSMENT OF THE
    OPPOSITION AND INCREASING THE SIZE, TRAINING,
    ACTIVITY, AND ARMAMENT OF HIS “DIGNITY
    BATTALIONS.” THE OPPOSITION LEADERSHIP IS
    CONCERNED OVER THE NEW “EYE FOR AN EYE”
    PARA-MILITARY CAMPAIGN, WHICH NORIEGA HAS USED TO
    REMIND THE OPPOSITION OF ITS VULNERABILITY.

    ---------------------------------------
    REGIME POLITICAL ACTIVITY
    ---------------------------------------
    ¶7. THE RODRIGUEZ ADMINISTRATION, UNSURPRISINGLY,
    REMAINS INEFFECTUAL, BUT CONTINUES TO LIMP ALONG.
    REGIME SOURCES INDICATE WITH SOME DEGREE OF
    CERTITUDE THAT NORIEGA IS UNHAPPY WITH HIS
    CIVILIAN PUPPETS, THAT HE MAY EVEN FIRE RODRIGUEZ,
    AND PLANS TO TAKE OVER THE FORMAL REIGNS OF
    GOVERNMENT SOON. THE ASSEMBLY OF 510 LOCAL
    DISTRICT REPRESENTATIVES (ANRC) CONFIRMED HIM AS
    ”NATIONAL COORDINATOR” ON NOVEMBER 22. THIS
    BRINGS HIM ONE STEP CLOSER TO BEING NAMED “HEAD OF
    GOVERNMENT”, WHICH HE AND OTHERS AROUND HIM HAVE
    HINTED AT FOR SOME TIME.

    ¶8. MANY VIEW THIS NORIEGA MOVE AS THE FINAL STEP
    TOWARD A TOTALITARIAN REGIME AND FURTHER SEVERE
    REPRESSION. SOME SEE THIS AS A PENDING NORIEGA
    MISTAKE. AS “HEAD OF GOVERNMENT”, HE WOULD HAVE
    TO BEAR FULL OFFICIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR REGIME
    ACTIONS. AT THE SAME TIME, BY INTRODUCING A NEW
    ELEMENT -- HIS GOVERNMENTAL ROLE -- INTO THE STALE
    POLITICAL SITUATION, NORIEGA MAY BE ABLE TO USE
    HIS USUAL MIXTURE OF OBFUSCATION AND INTIMIDATION
    TO BUY HIMSELF MORE TIME AND POLITICAL BREATHING
    SPACE.

    ------------------------------------------
    THE OPPOSITION
    ------------------------------------------
    ¶9. NORIEGA’S MOST RECENT PARA-MILITARY SHOW OF
    FORCE FURTHER CONVINCED THE OPPOSITION THAT
    POLITICAL ACTION WILL RESULT ONLY IN GREATER
    REGIME BRUTALITY AGAINST THEM, NOT NORIEGA’S
    DEPARTURE. THE OPPOSITION LEADERSHIP QUIETLY
    HOPES THAT CLANDESTINE (AND OTHER) U.S. ACTION,
    POSSIBLY COUPLED WITH ANOTHER COUP WILL REMOVE
    NORIEGA. THE LEADERS SEE THEMSELVES PLAYING A
    ROLE IN THE NEXT COUP ATTEMPT AND THEIR CURRENT
    PREPARATIONS ARE FOCUSED ON BEING ABLE TO MOVE IN
    TO FILL THE GOVERNMENT VACUUM IF THE NEXT EFFORT
    SHOULD SUCCEED. THE CIVILIAN OPPOSITION
    RECOGNIZES THE POLITICAL REALITY THAT THE MILITARY
    IS THE MAIN POLITICAL FORCE IN PANAMA.

    ¶10. AS THE MEMORY -- AND TO SOME EXTENT THE
    LEGITIMACY -- OF THE MAY ELECTION RECEDES, THE
    PRESSURE ON THE LEADERSHIP FROM WITHIN THE
    OPPOSITION RANKS “TO DO SOMETHING” TO MAINTAIN
    POLITICAL LEGITIMACY IS GROWING, HOWEVER.
    OPPOSITION ABILITY TO CULTIVATE POLITICAL SUPPORT
    AND TRUST IN THE ADOC LEADERSHIP ARE HAMPERED BY
    EFFECTIVE NORIEGA INTIMIDATION AT THE GRASS ROOTS
    LEVEL. MEANWHILE, U.S. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE
    CONTINUING TO HURT AND NEW MEASURES ARE
    UNPOPULAR. THE OPPOSITION LEADERSHIP FEARS THAT
    MANY PANAMANIANS -- INCLUDING THEIR FOLLOWERS --
    WILL INCREASINGLY DEMAND THAT THE AMERICANS GET
    OFF THEIR BACKS, IF NORIEGA WON’T.

    ¶11. PANAMA’S OPPOSITION AND PANAMANIANS IN
    GENERAL RAN UP MANY SHORT TERM HILLS IN 1989 -
    WITH THE END ALWAYS JUST OVER THE HORIZON. MAY
    ELECTIONS, THE OAS NEGOTIATIONS, SEPTEMBER 1,
    OCTOBER 3, AND NOW JANUARY 1, 1990 HAVE ALL TOO
    EASILY BEEN ACCEPTED AS TARGETS FOR WHEN THE
    PANAMA CRISIS WOULD “HAVE TO” BE SOLVED. ALREADY
    ADOC LEADER GUILLERMO “BILLY” FORD IS TALKING OF
    FEBRUARY 25 (NICARAGUAN ELECTION DAY) AS A DATE
    BEFORE WHICH NORIEGA MUST FALL IF THE U.S. DOES
    NOT WISH TO HAVE THE PRECEDENT OF AN ANNULLED
    ELECTION REPEATED IN NICARAGUA . OVERALL,
    HOWEVER, THE OPPOSITION HAS LITTLE ENERGY LEFT TO
    CHARGE UP ANOTHER HILL UNLESS CONVINCED IT IS THE
    LAST ONE. ONLY ANOTHER COUP HOLDS OUT SUCH A
    PROMISE, BUT THE OPPOSITION IS NOT ABLE TO
    INFLUENCE THAT TO ANY SIGNIFICANT DEGREE.

    ---------------------------------------
    THE NEXT COUP ATTEMPT
    ---------------------------------------
    ¶12. THE MOST (AND MAYBE ONLY) HOPEFUL SIGN FOR
    NORIEGA’S OPPONENTS IN 1990 IS THAT TROUBLES
    INSIDE THE FDP ARE WORSE THAN THEY HAVE EVER
    BEEN. REASSIGNMENTS AND PROMOTIONS FLOWING FROM
    THE POST-COUP PURGE ARE JUST NOW BEING MADE --
    MORE THAN TWO MONTHS AFTER THE EVENT. MANY OF THE
    MORE “PROFESSIONAL” FDP OFFICERS AND NCO’S WERE
    KILLED, TORTURED, OR DISMISSED AFTER OCTOBER 3.
    THE SUCCESSOR CROP OF TRUE BELIEVERS HAS NEITHER
    THE EXPERIENCE, TRAINING OR INTELLIGENCE TO FILL
    THE SHOES OF THEIR PREDECESSORS. NORIEGA HAS HAD
    TO RELY MAINLY ON HIMSELF OR THE SUPPORT OF THIS
    SMALL CLIQUE OF LOYALISTS SINCE THE COUP ATTEMPT.
    HIS INCREASED USE OF DIGNITY BATTALIONS IS ALSO
    WEARING ON THE CAREER SOLDIERS. WHAT LITTLE
    MILITARY PRIDE THEY HAVE LEFT HAS BEEN INJURED BY
    THE ACTIVITIES OF THIS PARA-MILITARY RABBLE WHICH
    THEY FEAR WILL GET OUT OF CONTROL AND ULTIMATELY
    HURT THE INSTITUTION. WITH THE DIGNITY BATTALIONS
    AND OTHER IRREGULARS OVER 2000 IN NUMBER THE IMAGE
    OF A COMPETING PARA-MILITARY FORCE IS BEGINNING TO
    ARISE.

    ¶13. DISCONTENT AND FEELINGS OF REVENGE CONTINUE
    TO FESTER INSIDE THE FDP AND THERE ARE NUMEROUS
    REPORTS THAT THERE ARE “INDIVIDUALS” WHO ARE
    PREPARED TO ACT ON THESE EMOTIONS. ONE REGIME
    INSIDER RECENTLY CLAIMED THAT NORIEGA’S NOMINAL
    NUMBER 2, COLONEL MARCO JUSTINES, IS HIMSELF
    LOOKING FOR WAYS TO INCH OUT HIS BOSS. MEANWHILE,
    NOTORIOUS CIVILIAN SUPPORTERS OF NORIEGA, SUCH AS
    XXXXXXXXXXXXXX(STRICTLY PROTECT),
    ARE ALREADY LOOKING BEYOND NORIEGA’S DEPARTURE IN
    ADVOCATING WITH EMBOFFS AN OPPOSITION DECLARATION
    OF AMNESTY FOR REGIME SUPPORTERS. SOURCES NOW
    INDICATE THAT NORIEGA SUSPECTS ANOTHER ATTEMPT TO
    UNSEAT HIM AS EARLY AS DECEMBER 15.

    ------------------------------------------
    THE STATUS OF “UNRELENTING PRESSURES”
    ------------------------------------------

    INTERNATIONAL
    -------------
    ¶14. THE RECENT RESOLUTION OF THE OASGA CONFIRMED
    NORIEGA’S ISOLATION IN THE HEMISPHERE, BUT WAS MET
    WITH ONLY FLEETING INTEREST IN PANAMA. THE FDP’S
    DISINVITATION TO THE RECENT CONFERENCE OF THE
    AMERICAN ARMIES IN GUATEMALA WAS POTENTIALLY A
    MORE SERIOUS BLOW TO FDP MORALE, BUT THIS COLD
    SHOULDER FROM THEIR LATIN COLLEAGUES PASSED
    LARGELY UNNOTICED BECAUSE OF NORIEGA’S ABSOLUTE
    CONTROL OF INFORMATION INSIDE AND OUTSIDE HIS
    INSTITUTION.

    ¶15. AMBASSADORS OF MOST NATIONS REMAIN OUTSIDE
    PANAMA, EITHER ON VACATION OR CONSULTATIONS, BUT
    LOCAL DIPLOMATIC ISOLATION MAY BE IN DANGER. THE
    FRENCH AMBASSADOR RECENTLY RETURNED FROM HIS
    ”VACATION” TO REJOIN HIS ITALIAN AND SPANISH
    COLLEAGUES WHO NEVER LEFT. SEVERAL AMBASSADORS
    AND MILITARY ATTACHES (E.G. MEXICO) MAY VISIT
    THEIR FAMILIES WHICH ARE RESIDING HERE AT
    CHRISTMAS. NORIEGA IS MAKING ALL HE CAN OUT OF
    CONTACTS WITH THE USSR, THE PRC, LIBYA, CUBA,
    NICARAGUA, AND EVEN U.S. ANTI-ESTABLISHMENT
    GROUPS. HE WILL ALSO SEEK TO CONJURE UP SOME
    LIMITED LEGITIMACY IN HIS PLEA FOR LATIN
    SOLIDARITY OVER THE CANAL ADMINISTRATOR ISSUE.

    ECONOMIC
    --------
    ¶16. THE REGIME CONTINUES TO HAVE CASH FLOW
    PROBLEMS, BUT THE ECONOMIC DOWNWARD SPIRAL HAS
    LEVELED OFF FOR NOW. NORIEGA IS ABLE TO COMBAT
    THE WORST DISRUPTIONS BY SALARY ADJUSTMENTS AND
    CONTINUED GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT OF LOYALISTS.
    UNEMPLOYMENT OVERALL IS ON THE RISE, BUT ONE OF
    THE “PILLARS” OF THE PANAMANIAN SERVICE ECONOMY --
    THE COLON FREE ZONE -- IS HAVING RECORD SALES AND
    PROVIDES SOMEWHAT INCREASING EMPLOYMENT IN THE
    POLITICALLY VOLATILE COLON AREA.

    ¶17. MEANWHILE, PARA-MILITARY DIGNITY BATTALIONS
    ARE ENLISTING OR SCARING THE UNEMPLOYED.
    BUSINESSMEN, HURT BY NORIEGA AND U.S. SANCTIONS,
    ARE INCREASINGLY MORE LIKELY TO MOVE TOWARD
    ACCOMMODATION WITH NORIEGA. MANY FEEL THEY HAVE
    TO GIVE PRIORITY TO BEING ABLE TO STAY IN BUSINESS.

    U.S. PRESSURES
    --------------
    ¶18. FURTHER U.S. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS HEIGHTEN THE
    SENSE OF CRISIS IN PANAMA, CREATING THE PARADOX OF
    REGIME-OPPOSITION-CHURCH AGREEMENT IN OPPOSING
    THEM. THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE U.S. PORT BAN FOR
    PANAMANIAN FLAGGED VESSELS AND THE APPOINTMENT OF
    A TEMPORARY CANAL ADMINISTRATOR CREATE NEW
    PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR NORIEGA. BANNING
    PANAMANIAN FLAGGED VESSELS FROM THE U.S. WILL ROB
    NORIEGA AND HIS CRONIES OF A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT
    OF INCOME. SOME OF THE LATTER MAY EVEN JUMP SHIP
    AND TURN ON HIM. BUT IN THE END RESULT, MANY MORE
    MAY REALIZE THAT IT WAS THEY WHO DEPENDED ON HIM,
    NOT HE ON THEM.

    ¶19. THE CANAL ADMINISTRATOR APPOINTMENT OFFERS
    NORIEGA SOME ADDITIONAL NATIONALISTIC PEGS TO
    SUPPORT HIS SEARCH FOR DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL
    SUPPORT. BLOWING THE TREATY VIOLATION AND
    NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY WHISTLE MAY WELL GAIN HIM
    SOME SUPPORT. PLAYED WELL, HE MAY AGAIN BE ABLE
    TO DO WHAT HE DOES BEST: BUY TIME.

    ---------------------------------------------
    THE FUTURE OF THE PANAMA CRISIS
    ---------------------------------------------
    ¶20. DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN OPPOSITION TO NORIEGA IS
    SHOWING SIGNS OF FATIGUE. FOREIGN ATTENTION IN
    PARTICULAR IS DISTRACTED BY MUCH HIGHER PROFILE
    REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL EVENTS, FROM EL
    SALVADOR TO BERLIN. OF COURSE, NORIEGA TOO IS
    TIRING, EXEMPLIFIED IN HIS SLOWNESS IN SETTLING
    THE TURMOIL INSIDE HIS OWN INSTITUTION. BUT HE IS
    A MASTER OF SURVIVAL AND ABLE TO BUILD ON THE
    FATIGUE OF OTHERS. RENEWED NOISES IN RECENT
    REGIME PRONOUNCEMENTS OF A WILLINGNESS TO “TALK”
    ARE A CLASSIC MANIFESTATION OF TRIED AND TRUE
    NORIEGA TIME-BUYING TACTICS.

    ¶21. THE POLITICAL TENSION IN PANAMA, INCREASED BY
    RECENT PRESS REVELATIONS AND U.S. SANCTIONS
    ANNOUNCEMENTS, WILL LIKELY EBB IN EARLY 1990,
    ABSENT SOME MAJOR EVENT. NORIEGA IS SHOWING NO
    SIGNS THAT HE HAS ANY INTENTION OF LEAVING
    VOLUNTARILY. GIVEN BROAD POLITICAL REALITIES IN
    THIS COUNTRY, THE ONLY HOPE FOR A FIRST STEP IN
    CRISIS RESOLUTION IS ANOTHER COUP. WAITING FOR
    THAT TO HAPPEN IS THE MAIN POLITICAL PROSPECT FOR
    PANAMA IN 1990.

    BUSHNELL

`