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### Viewing cable 10PARIS174, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE GATES'S MEETING WITH FRENCH FOREIGN

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
10PARIS174 | 2010-02-12 16:04 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Paris

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    VZCZCXRO2856
    RR RUEHSL
    DE RUEHFR #0174/01 0431656
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    R 121656Z FEB 10
    FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8309
    INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP/ISA/ISA-EURNATO//
    RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0959
    RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 6561
    RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 2179
    RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 3941
    RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1787
    RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
    RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
    RHMCSUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

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    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 000174

    NOFORN
    SIPDIS

    E.O 12958:  DECL:  02/08/20
    TAGS: PREL MOPS MARR FR IR AF NATO
    SUBJECT: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE GATES'S MEETING WITH FRENCH FOREIGN
    MINISTER KOUCHNER, FEBRUARY 8, 2010

    Classified By: Alexander Vershbow, ASD/ISA.  Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

    ¶1.  (S/NF)  SUMMARY: At the request of the French Ministry of Foreign
    Affairs, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates (SecDef) met with French FM
    Bernard Kouchner in Paris on February 8, 2010.  Discussions included
    how to persuade the Chinese and others to support sanctions against
    Iran, and the importance of targeting the Iranian government rather
    than the people. On Afghanistan, Kouchner confirmed that France would
    maintain its position that it could not add additional combat troops
    for the time being but was open to the possibility of sending
    additional trainers.  Both Kouchner and SecDef lauded recent progress
    in Pakistan.  Discussing NATO, Kouchner argued for a stronger European
    pillar, which SecDef supported with the caution that pursuit of an
    independent European security role risked reducing the already limited
    capabilities available to the Alliance.  SecDef also raised the need
    for reform and for examination of future NATO missions, which he would
    define narrowly rather than broadly. END SUMMARY

    ----
    Iran
    ----

    ¶2.  (S/NF)  Kouchner said that the U.S. and France were working well
    together in New York on an Iran sanctions resolution - all the problems
    now are with the Chinese.  Kouchner had met Chinese FM Yang twice the
    previous week, but said that right now it was difficult to predict
    whether the Chinese would veto or abstain.  He noted that the Chinese
    were furious over the U.S.-Taiwan arms deal, which would make it
    difficult to get a resolution passed in February.

    ¶3.  (S/NF) SecDef observed that Russia usually followed China's lead on
    North Korea, whereas China usually followed Russia on Iran. Therefore
    we should try to get the Russians to persuade the Chinese to support
    the Iran sanctions resolution.  MFA political director Jacques Audibert
    remarked that the Russians had been helpful during the last P5-plus-one
    teleconference, but he worried that the Russians would water down the
    content of the resolution. Kouchner said that President Medvedev seemed
    strongly on board, and there was daylight between his position and that
    of Foreign Minister Lavrov.  SecDef said he suspected that China
    ultimately would not want to be isolated and would abstain.

    ¶4.  (S/NF) SecDef urged Kouchner not to exaggerate the Chinese concern
    over Taiwan - they would need a little more time and, in the end, an
    abstention might be a good enough result for us.  He added that we
    should urge the Saudis to weigh in with Beijing since China has more at
    stake in its relations with Saudi Arabia than Iran.  He commented that
    the Saudis always want to "fight the Iranians to the last American,"
    but that now it is time for them to get into the game.

    ¶5.  (S/NF) Raising his concerns about bringing non-permanent UNSC
    members on board, SecDef reported that in Ankara he had impressed upon
    PM Erdogan the dangers of proliferation to other Middle East countries
    or an Israeli strike if the Iranian nuclear program couldn't be
    stopped.  Kouchner expressed his doubts about Turkey's desire for a
    constructive role in region, describing Erdogan's comments to
    Ahmadinejad defending the Iranian nuclear program as dangerous.

    ¶6.  (S/NF) Kouchner then asked SecDef for his perspectives on the
    popular protests in Iran.  In the French view, the internal
    developments were very important - the most significant change in
    decades.  He urged careful thought about how to avoid discouraging the
    protesters with sanctions, bearing in mind that the protesters did not
    support Tehran's ambitions for nuclear weapons.  He further emphasized
    his belief that human rights issues should receive attention as well.

    ¶7.  (S/NF) SecDef said that Kouchner's argument underscored the need to
    focus sanctions on the IRGC and companies it owns, in order to minimize
    the hardship for the Iranian people.  He remarked that Iranians across
    the political spectrum support a peaceful nuclear program, but it was
    not clear whether they favored acquisition of nuclear weapons.
    Therefore, our political strategy should reaffirm Iran's right to have
    a civilian nuclear program as long as it is safeguarded and in
    compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

    ¶8.  (S/NF) Further explaining the U.S. position, SecDef said that while
    our understanding of the Iranian leadership was opaque, we do know that
    they do not like to be isolated.  The USG would soon be designating
    several IRGC companies under the Iran Sanctions Act.  His own view was
    that it was important to get the UNSCR passed quickly, even if it were
    not as harsh as we might wish.  Once a resolution is passed, he
    explained, it will offer a legal platform on which the EU and
    individual states can impose harsher sanctions.

    PARIS 00000174  002 OF 003

    ¶9.  (S/NF) Kouchner agreed, but added that another problem was to get
    the nine votes needed in the UNSC.  He said that Lebanon was one of
    France's prime targets in this respect, but he doubted that France
    would be able to bring the resolution to a vote during its presidency,
    as February is a very short month.  Gabon, which takes the chair in
    March, is a "good asset for France," he commented.  Audibert
    interjected that the Russians had supported deleting some sections of
    the draft UNSCR, but had approved including sanctions on the IRGC.
    Kouchner said that France had to proceed carefully since a French woman
    had been taken hostage in Tehran.  He disparaged FM Mottaki's
    duplicitous performance in Munich.

    -----------
    Afghanistan
    -----------

    ¶10.  (S/NF) On Afghanistan, Kouchner confirmed that France would
    maintain its position that it could not add additional combat troops
    for the time being.  Pledging that France would stay "until the very
    end," he said that the French would send 80 French trainers to Kabul on
    their own, but were also looking into joint training opportunities with
    Germany - possibly an OMLT.

    ¶11.  (S/NF) Kouchner solicited SecDef's reaction to Karzai's idea of
    local non-combat zones.  Gates said that he was not familiar with this
    proposal but was skeptical about declaring zones where the government
    could not use force since we could not enforce similar restraint on the
    Taliban.

    ¶12.  (S/NF) The U.S., SecDef said, supports reintegration and has money
    in its military budget to support short-term efforts at integration
    similar to the Sons of Iraq initiative in Anbar province.  Kouchner
    commented that a key was to provide higher salaries to the ANA and ANP.
     SecDef agreed, noting that salary increases in late 2009 had led to an
    increase in recruits.  Kouchner said that this made sense as we were
    fighting misery as well as terrorism.

    --------
    Pakistan
    --------

    ¶13.  (S/NF) Turning to Pakistan, SecDef described the dramatic changes
    that had taken place over the past year.  It was astonishing that
    President Zadari had remained in power and that the Pakistanis had
    conducted such effective COIN operations.  He noted that coordination
    between ISAF and Pakistan's armed forces was improving - and this was
    creating a more difficult situation for the Taliban along the border.
    The Pakistan operation in South Waziristan had flushed out Taliban and
    Al Qaeda elements; they were more vulnerable on the move.  Moreover,
    Pakistan's aggressive campaign against the insurgency had won broad
    political support among all political parties.  Operations in the West
    and North-West had begun to accrue respect for Pakistan Army that
    Musharraf had squandered.  It is important for all of us to talk to the
    Pakistanis and provide economic assistance.  SecDef commented that one
    can never be an optimist about Pakistan, but that the changes had been
    striking.  Kouchner agreed with SecDef's analysis that the changes in
    both the political and military spheres were "nothing short of a
    miracle."

    -----
    NATO
    -----

    ¶14.  (C) Kouchner then raised NATO, declaring that France was ready to
    play its role in defining the Alliance's future strategy.  He said that
    General Abrial (Supreme Allied Commander - Transformation) has offered
    input, but emphasized that it was critical to come up with real
    strategy that we could explain in debates in Parliament.  Kouchner
    stressed that we needed to clarify NATO's roles and missions, as well
    as its role in combating the threats of terrorism, poverty and
    oppression.  SecDef agreed that the Strategic Concept should deal with
    21st century security threats Q with an emphasis on the word
    "security."   He said the Strategic Concept should also incorporate
    lessons learned from Afghanistan - particularly the need for
    comprehensive civil-military strategies and better partnership between
    NATO and the EU and UN.

    ¶15.  (C) SecDef said that NATO reform should proceed hand-in-hand with
    an examination of Alliance threats and missions, either as a parallel
    process or as a part of the Strategic Concept itself.  In this regard,
    the Alliance cannot afford so many headquarters and needs to take steps

    PARIS 00000174  003 OF 003

    to reduce overhead.

    ¶16.  (C) SecDef also stated that the Alliance should be clear as to
    what NATO's limits are -- for example, it does not have role in the
    Pacific.  We should adhere to the basic principle that NATO is about
    the security of its member states.  We all face terrorist risks, and
    there are many other new threats, but SecDef would be inclined to
    define future missions narrowly rather than broadly.

    ¶17. (S/NF) Kouchner highlighted piracy as an emerging issue on which
    the EU and NATO were working together, although the real problem was
    inside Somalia.  As an aside, he mentioned that France was willing to
    support the training of additional troops for the TFG.

    ¶18. (C) Kouchner argued that strengthening the European pillar in NATO
    was necessary: the EU cannot exist without defense, the U.S. needs
    strong European Allies, and a strong European pillar was not in
    contradiction with NATO.  SecDef replied that during his time as
    SecDef, he has felt the need for a better way for EU and NATO to work
    together.  While NATO is primarily a security alliance, it can't do its
    job without a civilian component.  The EU is primarily a
    political-economic organization, but he was willing to acknowledge that
    it had some security role -- such as counterpiracy or peacekeeping in
    Chad.  SecDef said that while each organization might have its primary
    role and mission, they could both perform both functions.

    ¶19. (C) Interpreting SecDef's latter comment as prohibiting an EU
    security role, Kouchner dissented and said that since 500 million
    people live in the European Union, the EU needed to be able to
    adequately protect them.  Gates observed that France was just one of 5
    or 6 nations that spent more than 2 percent of GDP on defense, and that
    if the EU decided it needed an independent security role, it could
    reduce number of forces available to NATO and cripple the Alliance.
    Even now, NATO had insufficient resources. Kouchner said that we needed
    to share burdens among all nations, and that it was hard to make people
    spend more on defense in the midst of an economic crisis.

    ¶20. (U) This cable has been cleared by SecDef.  Drafted by OSD staff.

    RIVKIN

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