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### Viewing cable 09MANAMA611, AFCENT COMMANDER'S MEETING WITH CROWN PRINCE

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
09MANAMA611 | 2009-10-19 10:10 | SECRET | Embassy Manama

`

    VZCZCXRO3314
    RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHTRO
    DE RUEHMK #0611/01 2921055
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    R 191055Z OCT 09
    FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8977
    INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
    RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
    RHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT
    RHMFISS/USCENTAF SHAW AFB SC
    RUQVSAN/USCENTAF DEPLOYED
    RHIUFAA/USCENTAF SWA

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAMA 000611

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/2029
    TAGS: PREL MARR IR AF BA
    SUBJECT: AFCENT COMMANDER'S MEETING WITH CROWN PRINCE
    SALMAN FOCUSES ON IRAN

    REF: MANAMA 599

    Classified By: CDA Christopher Henzel for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

     ¶1.  (S) SUMMARY: During USAFCENT Commander Mike Hostage and
    CDA's October 12 meeting with Crown Prince Shaikh Salman bin
    Hamad al Khalifa, the CP assured them that Bahrain would keep
    the pressure on Iran to live up to the commitments it made in
    Geneva (reftel).  Lt Gen Hostage explained that the threat
    posed by Iran was leading the U.S. to pursue a Regional
    Integrated Air and Missile Defense (RIAMD) strategy with GCC
    countries.  Shaikh Salman welcomed this and stressed that
    Bahrain wanted to be part of the solution to the GCC's
    defense integration challenges.  Lt Gen Hostage and the
    Charge thanked him for Bahrain's commitment to contribute a
    small contingent for the effort in Afghanistan.  End Summary.

    IRAN AND REGIONAL AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE:
    ------------------------------------------

    ¶2.  (S) On October 12, U.S. Air Forces Central (USAFCENT)
    Commander Lt Gen Mike Hostage and Charge d'Affaires called on
    the Crown Prince.  The CP commended COMAFCENT for now being
    forward deployed to Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar because it was
    important to spend time with the U.S.' counterparts in the
    Gulf.  If more U.S. troops were added into Afghanistan, and
    Iran tried to delay the process begun in Geneva, Shaikh
    Salman commented that there would be tough months ahead for
    the region.  As the P5 1 pursued its carrot and stick
    approach with Iran, Salman wondered if Tehran would pursue a
    "tit for tat" in its military posture.  Because of the lack
    of sophisticated intelligence gathering among the Gulf
    states, the CP observed that the press "plays a propaganda
    war into our psyche."  He decried Iran's interference in Iraq.

    ¶3.  (S) Lt Gen Hostage explained that, because of the threat
    posed by Iran to the region, his primary goal was to work on
    establishing Regional Integrated Air and Missile Defense
    (RIAMD) between the U.S. and the GCC states.  First, this
    involved integrating the U.S.' own air and missile defense
    assets (Navy Aegis, Army Patriots, etc.).  Then he would
    offer to link each Gulf state into a Shared Early Warning
    (SEW) Common Operating Picture (COP), to the extent that each
    government was willing to participate.  The U.S. would share
    the same picture to all, and each could add as much
    information as it liked, while keeping data it did not wish
    to share behind a secure firewall.

    ¶4.  (S) The CP responded that this would be the largest game
    changer because it would be a permanent fixture and would
    affect Iran's ability to project power.  He thanked the U.S.
    for the two U.S. Patriot batteries stationed here and said he
    would like to help further integrate the Gulf states into
    RIAMD project because it would not be enough without
    everyone's participation.  He cautioned, however, that the
    U.S. would have to lead the effort and it would have to be
    bilaterally with each government, with a multilateral system
    as the long-term goal.  He asked whether and where the U.S.
    would deploy a THAAD (Theater High Altitude Air Defense)
    system to the Gulf.  Gen Hostage replied that the location
    was not yet certain, but yes, THAAD would be deployed within
    a year, and would prove to be a very capable mid-course
    intercept system.  Prince Salman worried that, in an attack
    scenario, Iran would try to swarm and overwhelm specific
    targets and we would all have to be ready for that.

    ¶5.  (S) Lt Gen Hostage pointed to the Air Warfare Center in
    the UAE as a Center of Excellence (COE).  A COE for RIAMD
    could be established there as well as a training vehicle to
    help the Gulf states get comfortable with the technical
    solutions so they could share information.  Shaikh Salman
    said he wanted Bahrain to be part of the solution.  He noted
    that Bahrain had been the first GCC government to participate
    in Task Force 152 and it liked to be a leader.  "Consider us
    serious partners," he stated.

    IRAN: TO DEGRADE OR DETER?
    --------------------------

    ¶6.  (S) Lt Gen Hostage asked for the CP's views of Iran's
    willingness to deal in good faith with the P5 1.  Shaikh
    Salman said his views had not changed - Iran's behavior would
    continue to be problematic.  However, he speculated that the
    reason Iran had changed course and cooperated with the P5 1
    in Geneva was due to Russian President Medvedev's comment at
    UNGA that sometimes sanctions were unavoidable.  CDA pointed

    MANAMA 00000611  002 OF 002

    out that as the P5 1 pursued a dual track strategy of
    engagement and preparing for sanctions, the GCC countries'
    roles would be important.  Confirming that Bahrain would do
    what it could to keep the pressure on Iran, the CP lamented
    that Gulf countries had few levers on China.  He thought that
    if Saudi Arabia were to sell more oil to China, it would help
    provide some leverage.

    ¶7.  (S) The CP asked whether Russia had shipped its S-300 air
    defense system to Iran yet.  Lt Gen Hostage said no.  Salman
    said he was  sure that the international community would have
    to wait until the next election in Iran to see real internal
    changes.  The regime was still in firm control and
    Ahmadinejad was consolidating his power, even as the economy
    was failing.  The world would need a strategy led by the U.S.
     "We are still a ways away from knowing whether force is
    necessary," the CP stated.

    BAHRAIN'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE EFFORT IN AFGHANISTAN
    --------------------------------------------- ------

    ¶9.  (C) The CP asked whether the U.S. was changing its goals
    in Afghanistan to a strategy of reconciliation and power
    sharing with some elements of the Taliban while targeting
    senior Al Qaeda figures.  Lt Gen Hostage said a way had to be
    found to let the Afghans live in their, not our, version of
    peace, but he wondered whether it could be done on our
    timeline.  Shaikh Salman counseled patience as with the
    implementation of the surge in Iraq.  Lt Gen Hostage and
    Charge thanked him for Bahrain's commitment to contribute a
    company from its security forces to provide inner perimeter
    security at a coalition base in Afghanistan.  Shaikh Salman
    stated that  his father King Hamad had approved a budget of
    USD 13 million for the deployment the day before, so the
    troops would have the necessary equipment.

    ¶10.  (C) The CP asked whether the U.S. would still need to
    deploy aerial refueling tankers to Isa Air Base.  Lt Gen
    Hostage related that AFCENT's problems with the Manas Air
    Base (Transit Center) in Kyrgyzstan had been resolved.

    HENZEL

`