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### Viewing cable 09RIYADH181, SAUDI EXCHANGE WITH RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR ON IRAN'S

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
09RIYADH181 | 2009-01-28 15:03 | SECRET | Embassy Riyadh

`

    VZCZCXRO7076
    OO RUEHDE RUEHDIR
    DE RUEHRH #0181/01 0281550
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 281550Z JAN 09
    FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9987
    INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
    RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 4849
    RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 4355
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
    RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
    RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RIYADH 000181

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/27/2019
    TAGS: PARM PREL MARR MNUC IR SA RU
    SUBJECT: SAUDI EXCHANGE WITH RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR ON IRAN'S
    NUCLEAR PLANS

    Classified By: P/M COUNSELOR SCOTT MCGEHEE
    REASONS 1.4 (b) (d).

    ¶1. (C) SUMMARY & COMMENT:  Netherlands Ambassador Ron
    Strikker, Russian Ambassador Victor Gibinvish, and Embassy
    Riyadh Pol/Mil Counselor Scott McGehee met on January 25 with
    Dr. Prince Turki Al-Kabeer, Undersecretary for Multilateral
    Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to deliver a
    joint demarche on the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear
    Terrorism (GICNT).  The meeting evolved into a pointed
    exchange between the Russian Ambassador and Dr. Prince Turki
    on Iran's nuclear ambitions.  Prince Turki warned that if
    Iran tried to produce nuclear weapons, other countries in the
    Gulf region would be compelled to do the same, or to permit
    the stationing of nuclear weapons in the Gulf to serve as a
    deterrent to the Iranians.  Turki then pointedly demanded
    that the US keep Saudi officials informed about US plans for
    Iran.

    ¶2. (C) Dr. Prince Turki is not a decision-maker, but he is a
    reliable transmitter of official Saudi thinking.  Most of
    what he said is not new, although this is the most explicit
    mention we have heard of Saudi willingness to see nuclear
    weapons deployed in the GCC as a deterrent to Iran.  His
    concern that the United States will negotiate a "grand
    bargain" with Iran without consulting Saudi Arabia is a
    concern we have heard often in recent weeks. End summary &
    comment.

    ¶3. (C) After hearing a brief verbal demarche from Ambassador
    Strikker on the upcoming June Plenary of the GICNT, Dr. Turki
    turned to Ambassador Gibinvish, saying, "On this issue, what
    concerns us most is how to get our neighbor to change its
    policy on enrichment." Iran needs to be convinced to enter a
    dialogue on this matter, he continued, noting that Saudi
    Arabia is also concerned about the Russian-built reactor at
    Bushehr.  A leakage from a plant at that location could bring
    an environmental catastrophe to Saudi Arabia, pointing out
    that it is located less than 300 kilometers away from Saudi
    shores, across open water.

    ¶4. (C) Ambassador Gibinvish was able to say only "Sure, I
    agree!" before Prince continued, "The location is so
    dangerous! Not just to us, but to the world economy!"  He
    urged that Russia use its influence to have the reactor moved
    north, suggesting that a location on the shore of the Caspian
    Sea would be much better, where there is water available for
    reactor cooling, and where mountains rise behind to contain
    any possible leakage from moving south.  Perhaps more
    troubling, he said, is Iran's pursuit of nuclear enrichment.
    He explained that if Iran tries to produce nuclear weapons,
    other countries in the Gulf region would be compelled to do
    the same, or to permit the stationing of nuclear weapons in
    the Gulf to serve as a deterrent to the Iranians.

    ¶5. (C) Amb. Gibinvish responded that Iran's desire to enrich
    uranium reflected its fears that it will someday be attacked
    by Israel or the United States and also a sign of Iran's
    desire to establish its "supremacy" in the region.  Prince
    Turki interjected:  "And we cannot accept Iranian supremacy
    in the region.  We are okay with nuclear electrical power and
    desalination, but not with enrichment."  He said that the
    prospect of Iranian enrichment raises troubling questions
    about their motivations for doing so: "they do not need it!"

    ¶6. (S) Amb. Gibinvish noted that "some experts in Russia
    believe that Iran will have a bomb in 10 to 15 years."
    Russia, he said, is concerned about this matter as well, and
    has "put forward initiatives" with Iran.  Russia hopes to
    discuss this further with Saudi Arabia in the near future,
    and he said that an "important delegation" would be coming to
    Riyadh in about two months to discuss this with the Saudi
    leadership.  Prince Turki said that the Russian delegation
    would be welcomed, stressing that "we must work together to
    get them to abandon their effort to acquire nuclear weapons.
    Israel too, he said, must be convinced to surrender its
    nuclear arsenal.  But you deal with them, you have influence,
    that is why I raise this with you."  Amb. Gibinvish pledged
    that "we will do what we can.  But the Iranians are difficult
    partners."  At this point, Prince Turki turned to Pol/Mil
    Counselor who had momentarily stopped taking notes.  Prince
    Turki said "Please write this down. Whatever is discussed
    with the Iranians, we must be kept informed!  Any

    RIYADH 00000181  002 OF 002

    negotiations with the Iranians must take into account the
    interests of Saudi Arabia, otherwise, we will not accept it!
    We should be told -- in advance! -- of what you plan to say."

    RUNDELL

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