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CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

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### Viewing cable 07ANKARA1842, TURKISH ELECTIONS: ANALYSTS ASSESS MILITARY

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
07ANKARA1842 | 2007-07-19 11:11 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Ankara

`

    VZCZCXRO7097
    PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
    DE RUEHAK #1842/01 2001139
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 191139Z JUL 07
    FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
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    RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0993
    RUEHKB/AMEMBASSY BAKU PRIORITY 1521
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    RUEHYE/AMEMBASSY YEREVAN PRIORITY 1293
    RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 5826
    RHMFISS/39ABG INCIRLIK AB TU PRIORITY
    RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 0785
    RHMFISS/425ABS IZMIR TU//CC// PRIORITY
    RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2427
    RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
    RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
    RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-3/J-5// PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP:PDUSDP/ISA:EUR/ISA:NESA/DSCA// PRIORITY

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001842

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2017
    TAGS: PGOV PREL TU
    SUBJECT: TURKISH ELECTIONS: ANALYSTS ASSESS MILITARY
    CONFIDENCE IN ELECTION OUTCOME

    Classified By: DCM Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4 (b,d).

    ¶1. (C) Summary: Experts on civil-military relations in Ankara
    contend the Turkish General Staff (TGS) is satisfied with the
    process set in motion by its April 27 warning and the
    Constitutional Court's subsequent decision on the presidency
    vote which brought Turkey to early elections.  Analysts claim
    that the military and pro-secular opposition parties, buoyed
    by mass pro-secular demonstrations in May and June, believe
    that even if the AKP emerges from July 22 elections able to
    form a single-party government, it will be forced to accept a
    consensus candidate for the presidency.  Despite these claims
    of confidence, the military continues to work to exploit
    debate over a cross-border operation against PKK terrorists,
    as well as press allegations that the US is either directly
    or indirectly providing weapons to the PKK, to make the AKP
    government appear weak on security.  And of course there is
    the possibility of a last ditch attempt by the military --
    via public statements, policy maneuvering, or partisan
    manipulation -- to sway undecided voters towards secular
    opposition parties.  Military reaction to the elections may
    be affected by the TGS's all-consuming annual exercise of the
    Supreme Military Council, which starts August 1.  End Summary

    ¶2. (C) The crisis atmosphere following the TGS's April 27
    warning, which led many to fear some kind of military
    intervention, has been replaced by more traditional
    politicking in the final stretch to July 22 national
    elections.  After public sparring with the government in May
    and June over who would take responsibility for a
    cross-border operation against PKK terrorists in northern
    Iraq -- designed to show the AKP government as soft on
    terrorism -- the TGS has refrained from public statements on
    domestic political issues for the past two weeks.  Chief of
    Defense Gen Buyukanit and Deputy CHOD Saygun enjoyed
    scheduled vacations on the coast in late June and early July.

    ¶3. (C) According to Ankara University professor Tanel
    Demirel, the TGS achieved its primary short-term objective
    via the April 27 announcement: preventing Abdullah Gul from
    becoming president and ensuring a Constitutional Court ruling
    raising the vote threshold for president to 367.  The head of
    the secular and nationalist Ataturk Thought Association
    (ADD), retired General Sener Eruygur, pointed to the large
    turn-out at pro-secular rallies in Istanbul, Izmir and other
    cities as proof pro-secular forces are rising to challenge
    the AKP.

    ¶4. (C) Several observers, such as Bilkent University
    professor and military analyst Umit Cizre, identify the
    pivotal moment in the AKP's relations with the military as
    the private May 4 meeting between PM Erdogan and CHOD
    Buyukanit at the Dolmabahce palace in Istanbul.  Although
    Cizre and other analysts are not sure what happened during
    the 2.5 hour session, they conclude that Buyukanit and
    Erdogan reached some understanding.  Ankara University
    professor Nuran Yildiz believes Buyukanit made military "red
    lines" over the presidency clear to Erdogan at that
    encounter.  All agree that the situation relaxed considerably
    after that.

    ¶5. (C) Analysts' views vary widely on the significance of the
    military's April 27 internet warning that it was ready to
    intervene to protect Turkey's secular democracy.  Cizre and
    Demirel believe the April 27 statement was both harmful and
    unnecessary since the Constitutional Court was poised anyway
    to affirm a 367 quorum requirement for the presidency and
    thus defeat Gul's candidacy, precipitating early elections.
    Yildiz and others, including retired general Riza Kucukoglu
    at Ankara's Eurasian Studies Institute (ASAM), assert the
    military has played its role correctly in counterbalancing
    AKP attempts to monopolize all major power centers.  Even
    critics of the military's announcement, such as Ankara
    University professor Bedriye Poyraz, believe that the AKP
    provoked military intervention by blatant attempts to fill

    ANKARA 00001842  002 OF 002

    the government bureaucracy with its supporters and its
    ill-considered nomination of Gul for president.  They
    acknowledge that, despite criticism of the military's
    intervention by some intellectuals and pundits, most Turks
    see it as natural, if not appropriate, for the generals to
    make their political views known.

    ¶6. (C) Looking at post-election scenarios, most observers
    with whom we have spoken tell us the military can live with
    another AKP government, as long as the president is a secular
    figure selected by consensus.  The prospect of the AKP
    cooperating with independent Kurdish deputies in order to
    form a government is more controversial, as this would bring
    together the military and secular establishment's two
    archenemies: "Islamists and separatists."  While Cizre
    believes the generals could tolerate an alliance of AKP and
    Kurdish independents as long as the president is secular,
    ADD's Eruygur termed such an alliance a "nightmare" for
    Turkey.  ASAM's Kucukoglu asserted that the military would be
    uncomfortable with independent Kurdish MPs, citing their past
    behavior (in the early 1990s, the previous iteration of
    pro-Kurdish MPs attempted to take the parliamentary oath in
    Turkish and made statements that triggered the lifting of
    their parliamentary immunity and eventual prosecution).  He
    claimed, however, that military coups are no longer
    necessary, now that the majority of Turks who favor
    secularism have found their voice.

    ¶7. (C) Comment: Despite analysts' claims of military
    confidence, the generals are clearly working behind the
    scenes, using ongoing PKK terrorism and the debate over the
    necessity of a cross-border operation into northern Iraq to
    portray the AKP as weak on terrorism.  We also detect the
    military's hand behind recent allegations that the U.S. has,
    either directly or indirectly, provided weapons to the PKK in
    northern Iraq.   This is also designed to weaken AKP's
    national security credentials and encourage undecided voters
    to turn to "tougher" pro-secular parties.  While the military
    could roil the waters and make a public statement on the
    elections at any time, its post-election reaction may be
    delayed by the August 1 start of annual, and all-consuming,
    Supreme Military Council (YAS) promotions and assignments
    deliberations.  End Comment.

    Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
    http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/

    WILSON

`