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CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

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### Viewing cable 06ANKARA4688, TURKEY'S FOREIGN POLICY SPLIT - THE PM'S CIRCLE TO

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
06ANKARA4688 | 2006-08-11 14:02 | CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN | Embassy Ankara

`

    VZCZCXYZ0015
    PP RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHAK #4688/01 2231453
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 111453Z AUG 06
    FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7906
    INFO RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 5386
    RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0316
    RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 1549
    RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 3053
    RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 5290
    RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 0075
    RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL PRIORITY 1083
    RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 004688

    SIPDIS

    NOFORN
    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/08/2021
    TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL TU
    SUBJECT: TURKEY'S FOREIGN POLICY SPLIT - THE PM'S CIRCLE TO
    THE FORE

    Classified By: DCM Nancy McEldowney, reasons 1.4 (b), (d)

    1.(C)  The long-standing split between the professional MFA
    diplomats and the tight circle of advisers around PM Erdogan
    has widened noticeably in recent weeks.  This gap has existed
    under Erdogan,s Justice and Development Party (AKP)
    government, largely because of the close links that both PM
    Erdogan and FM Gul have with PM adviser Davutoglu, who has
    been willing to undertake numerous initiatives.  Until
    recently, however, such strains have usually been more
    effectively papered over.  This internal debate now affects
    every step the GOT takes on the international stage.

    2.(C) The Turkish diplomatic corps is highly educated and
    well attuned to what will sell in the U.S. or Europe; less so
    on the domestic political front.  PM Erdogan,s core of AKP
    advisers, including Davutoglu and the AKP vice chairs,
    understand what will play well with their constituencies.
    Their sense of how policy will play outside of Ankara is
    handicapped, however, by their Turkey- and Islam-centric
    vision of how they want the world to operate.

    ¶3. (C/NF)  Decoupling MFA from the PM,s advisers can produce
    a greater willingness to take chances.  At the same time, it
    can also create greater room for misunderstandings or
    wrongfooted efforts.  In the run-up to the February 2006
    Hamas visit to Ankara, for example, MFA was kept in the dark.
     The AKPers who dealt with the visit did so in a haphazard
    and uncoordinated manner.  MFA, uninformed, was unable to
    preview it with us.  The backlash from the U.S. in particular
    truly took AKP aback.  It took weeks -) even months -)
    before limited understanding dawned on the depth of the
    displeasure the Hamas venture had spawned, and why.  It did
    not (and still does not) fit within their frame of reference.

    ¶4. (C/NF)  Most startling, perhaps, to AKP were those in the
    U.S. and elsewhere who, in the aftermath of the Hamas visit,
    asked how AKP would feel if we met with PKK leaders.  For
    Erdogan,s circle, it is not analogous: for them, terrorism
    equals the PKK.  It is difficult for PM Erdogan to believe
    that his philanthropist Islamic friend Al Kadi could be
    involved in terrorist financing, just as it is alien to their
    frame of reference to view specific Islamic groups as
    terrorists.  Hamas and Hizballah are the result of western
    policies gone awry, a response from desperate people )- not
    truly terrorists.  Allow them to talk reason to these people,
    exert Turkish influence, and the Hamases of the world will
    change.  This has been evident in other Turkish efforts
    throughout the region as well -- with Iran (FM Mottaki,s
    visit here; Erdogan,s talks with Ahmedinejad on the margins
    of international conferences); with Syria (the Turks believe
    they were instrumental in getting Syria,s Asad to agree to
    pull troops out of Lebanon, and to certain aspects of the
    Hariri investigation); with the current conflict in Lebanon
    and the Gaza strip.

    5.(C/NF) A more recent example of the PM circle-MFA
    disconnect involved Davutoglu,s trip to Damascus the first
    week of July, where he met not only with Asad but Misha,al
    as well.  The MFA was cut out and furious (their Ambassador
    to Damascus reportedly cooled his heels outside while
    Davutoglu met with Asad).

    6.(C) As the Israel-Lebanon crisis intensified, so has this
    tendency within Erdogan,s small circle.  AKP sees own its
    back to the public opinion wall.  Instead of exercising
    leadership, Erdogan -- in populist pre-election mode -- has
    followed.  He is playing to AKP,s constituency; to those
    within the party who have never been positively inclined
    toward Israel; and to the greater regional Sunni audience
    that he is trying to court.  Two early results, aimed at
    these audiences, were (1) the PM,s participation in the
    August 3 extraordinary OIC executive council meetin in Kuala
    Lumpur, where he again met with Irnian president Ahmedinejad
    and uttered strong anti-Israeli statements; and (2) FM Gul,s
    August 3 op-ed piece in the Washington Post, which aired GOT
    ire in an unhelpful way and blindsided the professional
    Turkish diplomats in Washington.

    7.(C/NF) Complicit or not (we believe the former), Gul has
    had his name sullied by a number of these efforts.  He  will
    have to decide whether to give the MFA renewed weight -)

    Foreign Ministry officials could be key in bridging certain
    delicate issues, particularly Cyprus, with both the
    government and the military, for example -) or go with the
    PM,s circle.

    Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
    http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/

    WILSON

`