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### Viewing cable 10PARIS71, STAFFDEL KESSLER ENGAGES THE FRENCH ON IRAN,

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
10PARIS71 | 2010-01-22 17:05 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Paris

`

    VZCZCXYZ0004
    RR RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHFR #0071/01 0221744
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH (CCY AD133C36 MSI9843-695)
    R 221744Z JAN 10
    FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
    TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8101

` `

    S E C R E T PARIS 000071

    NOFORN
    SIPDIS

    C O R R E C T E D COPY CAPTION
    H PASS TO HOUSE STAFFER KESSLER'S OFFICE

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/20/2020
    TAGS: PGOV PREL IR AF PK FR
    SUBJECT: STAFFDEL KESSLER ENGAGES THE FRENCH ON IRAN,
    SANCTIONS AND AFGHANISTAN

    REF: 09 PARIS 1671

    Classified By: Pol M/C Allegrone for Reasons 1.4 b and d.

    ¶1. (C) Staffdel Kessler, representing the House Committee on
    Foreign Affairs, visited Paris January 12-14 to engage French
    officials, non-government entities and the private sector
    regarding Iran, sanctions, non-proliferation and Afghanistan.
     With a main focus of discussing potential U.S. sanctions
    legislation related to Iranian efforts to develop weapons of
    mass destruction, the staffdel heard from a wide spectrum of
    French players.  Most of the opinions supported USG efforts
    as France has been a strong ally, especially regarding Iran
    and Afghanistan.  While the usefulness of sanctions continues
    to be debated, French officials said their government was
    moving forward with haste, and bringing the European Union
    (EU) with it, to prepare enhanced sanctions against Iran.
    Even the French political opposition appears on board with
    this plan.  While challenges abound in Afghanistan, the
    Government of France (GOF) remains firmly committed to NATO's
    mission there.  Total company senior representatives
    explained to the staffdel members that its activities in Iran
    are completely legal, small in scope and that it has not been
    able to complete its buy out program there due to
    foot-dragging by the Tehran regime.  Highlights of Staffdel
    Kessler's meetings in Paris are as follows.  End summary.

    IRAN: OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT'S VIEW
    ------------------------------------

    ¶2. (S/NF) In a January 13 meeting with members of Staffdel
    Kessler, Francois Richier, Strategic Affairs Advisor to
    President Sarkozy, addressed the issue of imposing enhanced
    sanctions against Iran.  Richier explained that the GOF was
    developing a package of measures that largely targeted the
    Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps because of its economic
    holdings and its role as a weapons proliferator.  This
    package would include:

    --Finance - The GOF is willing to include the Iranian Central
    Bank in targeted sanctions, most likely through some of its
    subsidiary bodies.  Paris is also trying to target an Iranian
    Sovereign Wealth Fund which it recently learned has a branch
    in Germany.  France would also seek to impose sanctions that
    would cut Iran's ability to conduct "correspondent banking."

    --Transport - These sanctions would ban Iranian ships from
    ports and harbors in Europe.  The French envision the
    possibility of enhanced sanctions that would trace Iranian
    ships that have been re-flagged to obscure their origin.  In
    addition, Iranian air cargo planes would be banned from EU
    airports.

    --Insurance and re-insurance - Given the limited number of
    actors in the re-insurance industry, France believes
    prohibiting re-insurance coverage in Iran would be an
    effective sanction.

    --Oil and Gas - Paris proposes a ban on technical cooperation
    and investment in Iran, a well as prohibiting exports of
    refinery equipment and spare parts for oil and gas
    industries.

    ¶3. (S/NF) Richier said he expects the EU will agree to
    "complement" any eventual UN Security Council Resolution
    (UNSCR) and France hopes for a short timeline to secure a new
    UNSCR in early February before securing approval at the
    Council of EU Foreign Ministers later that month.  Richier
    said that we will have to decide whether to accept grudging
    Russian concessions in order to get a UNSCR that may be weak
    and limited, or whether to "waste time" trying to lobby for a
    UNSCR that will be, at best, only marginally better.  Richier
    noted that it would be helpful if the U.S. Congress did not
    act on sanctions legislation at least until the UNSCR debate
    is concluded and he said it might be best to have U.S.
    sanctions legislation reference the new UN resolution.
    Regarding potential Chinese opposition, he hoped for
    agreement on a new UNSCR (as the prior ones were unanimous),
    but would accept a simple abstention.  Richier expects Russia
    will support the measure because the Russians were "shocked"
    by the discovery of the uranium enrichment site in Qom.
    Nevertheless, the Russians still need time to adjust their
    thinking to this reality.

    ¶4. (S/NF) European countries face three main difficulties in
    deciding on sanctions against Iran, according to Richier, and
    he outlined them as follows:

    --Most European countries want a UN framework, including a
    new UNSCR.  Richier pointed out that a signal from the Obama
    administration that we are also prepared to move forward

    would be very helpful.

    --Determining the nature of sanctions: Some EU countries want
    to put the UN decision into EU law, but the French want to go
    beyond that and target different sanctions that we are
    unlikely to get from the next UNSCR.

    --Some countries simply hesitate to support sanctions for a
    variety of reasons, whether protecting their own economic
    interests, or on ideological grounds.  This is manageable,
    but complicated by individual circumstances, according to
    Richier.

    ¶5. (S/NF) The GOF remains  concerned about enforcing
    sanctions with Brazil and Turkey, said Richier, because both
    have considerable ties to Iran.  He said that Turkey has made
    clear it does not want to suffer economically, as it has in
    the past.  Richier noted France's concern over Turkey's
    "regional policy" towards Iran, whereas it views Brazil's
    engagement as being more nave and possibly based on
    misinterpretation of the Obama decision to try engagement
    first (without Brazil knowing what limits on that engagement
    should be).

    ¶6. (S/NF) Richier was skeptical that sanctions aimed at
    exporters of refined oil to Iran would be effective, although
    the GOF has pushed for this, because such a policy would
    require a verification mechanism requiring an investment of
    military ships along Iran's long coastline and other
    resources.  Richier believes such a policy would send a
    signal to exporters worldwide, but it would be too hard to
    implement, and would likely only dissuade the honest
    exporters.  When asked about French oil company Total and
    pending U.S. congressional legislation, Richier replied Total
    has not made new investments in Iran, although it is involved
    in a buy-back arrangement and said sales of Total's refined
    products in Iran are declining.

    IRAN: MFA SHARES ELYSEE'S VIEWS
    -------------------------------

    ¶7. (S/NF) On January 14, Martin Briens, the Foreign
    Ministry's DAS-equivalent for Non-Proliferation, largely
    confirmed what Richier had said, but he provided additional
    information.  Briens also highlighted French ambitions to get
    a new UNSCR approved and implemented at the February 25
    Foreign Ministers meeting.  However he said "tough and fast"
    in the UNSC was unlikely, so we would probably have to settle
    for fast.  A total arms embargo, which Russia had previously
    opposed but China had not, would be a major victory, assuming
    Russia actually supported it.

    ¶8. (S/NF) Briens asserted that the June election in Iran and
    its aftermath had "changed the equation" within the EU with
    respect to Iran.  He allowed that pending U.S. measures will
    "also enter into the equation."  Several countries besides
    France, including Spain, have come to the conclusion that it
    is time to move from sanctions that specifically target
    proliferation activities to ones that have a broader impact.
    Given the delays in implementing the last UNSCR on Iran,
    France and close partners had received EU approval to prepare
    modalities of implementation "in parallel" to negotiations in
    the UN.  The GOF has come to the view that the EU should take
    "autonomous" measures that are not merely a magnified
    application of UNSCRs, but it is still unclear how far EU
    partners would go in this direction.  France has noted the
    UKs adoption of a process to designate individual foreign
    entities for sanctions and it is now considering doing the
    same.  The GOF also believes that national governments can do
    more through Financial Action Task Force decisions made by
    the G8.

    ¶9. (S/NF) In addition to the potential package of sanctions
    outlined by Richier (para 2), Briens said the GOF wants the
    EU to:

    --Impose a "prior authorization" approach on all Iran Central
    Bank transactions which would allow truly sovereign
    operations by the Central Bank to be approved, but it would
    allow greater scrutiny and control, and would slowdown the
    processing of transactions.

    --Cast a wide net in banning/targeting IRGC persons and
    entities.

    --Ban trade in equipment for internal repression and identify
    people involved.

    Briens shared Richier's doubts on the efficacy of trying to
    block refined petroleum products ("the bad guys will just get
    rich") but the technology and parts for the oil and gas

    sectors, especially for refining should also be denied to
    Iran.  Finally, on the issue of gaining China's
    participation, he suggested emphasizing regional stability
    and recruiting countries in the region to put pressure on
    China as well.

    AFGHANISTAN: KARZAI NEEDS TO
    FOLLOW UP ON INAUGURATION SPEECH
    --------------------------------

    ¶10. (C) On January 14 Jasmine Zerinini, head of the GOF's
    interagency Afghanistan-Pakistan cell, acknowledged that
    public opposition in France to the troop presence in
    Afghanistan has grown steadily over the past several years,
    but that this has not resulted in calls for withdrawal or
    even a significant change in strategy.  Regarding
    coordination between the International Security Assistance
    Forces, Zerinini said that there had been a great deal of
    improvement, but that the approach was still too fragmented.
    She said that France has recognized for the past year that
    the forces stationed in the north of the country were unable
    to handle the growing insurgency there.  General McChrystal
    understands this, she added, but this has not translated into
    action.

    ¶11. (C) On civilian assistance, Zerinini said U.S. and French
    plans to deploy more civilians are unlikely to bear fruit,
    because ultimately only the Afghans themselves can bring
    effective development.  However, she opined, the Karzai
    administration has not shown that it is capable of doing
    this.  Although Karzai's inauguration speech in November was
    a good first step, he has done nothing since then.
    Therefore, she said, the London conference is coming far too
    early - the goal of London was to renew our partnership with
    Karzai, but this is difficult without a real roadmap for
    progress from the Afghans.

    PAKISTAN: REINFORCING POLITICAL RELATIONS
    -----------------------------------------

    ¶12. (C) Zerinini said France is working to reinforce its
    political relations with Pakistan, and was expecting
    President Sarkozy to visit Pakistan "early in the second
    quarter" of 2010.  The GOF does not want to return to a
    relationship based on military equipment sales, as in the
    1980s, and is instead focusing on counter terrorism in
    addition to economic and trade links.  France is also trying
    to support an EU-Pakistan dialogue, but she said Pakistan
    makes it difficult by rejecting conditionality and attempting
    to focus exclusively on economic issues.  Zerinini said the
    Pakistani government is eager for trade concessions, but does
    not want any political dialogue unless it is focused on
    Kashmir.

    ¶13. (C) On the role of the Pakistani military, Zerinini said
    General Kayani has "learned the lesson of Musharraf" and was
    staying behind the scenes.  However, he is manipulating the
    government and parliament, including to prevent change on
    Pakistan's policy towards Federally Administered Tribal Areas
    (FATA) along the Afghan border, and also to stir up
    controversy regarding the Kerry-Lugar bill that ties
    continued U.S. aid to increased civilian control of the
    military.  Zerinini also argued that the west had missed its
    opportunity to push the Pakistani military to crush the
    Afghan Taliban taking refuge in Pakistan.  Citing Jalaladin
    Haqqani as an example, Zerinini said in 2004 he had standing
    as a leader in the jihadi community, but did not have the
    organization to represent a significant military threat.
    However, since then, large amounts of funding, predominately
    from Gulf donors, have allowed Haqqani to create a network
    that would be difficult for the Pakistani military to defeat,
    even if it had the will to do so.

    ¶14. (C) Zerinini said that bilateral measures alone to
    strengthen civilian government were unlikely to be effective,
    and that more coordination was needed among donors,
    especially the United States.  She said the Group of Friends
    of Democratic Pakistan, while imperfect, was designed to
    transform Pakistan's political elite and give them more
    leverage over the military.  However, Zerinini said it is not
    being utilized.  She said the U.S. was making significant
    efforts to help develop Pakistan's energy sector, but she
    added "I have not seen any of this in the energy working
    group of the Friends of Democratic Pakistan."

    THE FRENCH LEFTIST OPPOSITION
    -----------------------------

    ¶15. (C) Staffdel members met opposition figures from the
    French Parliament and Senate including Deputy Pierre
    Moscovici (former Minister of European Affairs), Senator

    Jean-Pierre Chevenement (former Minister of Defense), Senator
    Monique Cerisier ben Guiga (author of "Going Nuclear in the
    Middle East"), and Deputy Jean-Michel Boucheron to learn
    their views on Iran and the Middle East Peace Process.  With
    respect to Iran, the group generally thought President
    Sarkozy's tone had been too harsh and they supported giving
    dialogue more time to bear fruit.  Moscovici was the most
    alarmed at the prospect of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons
    capability and he emphasized that he would not rule out any
    means in dealing with it.  Boucheron and Cerisier ben Guiga
    accepted the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran with equanimity
    because they felt Iran was only seeking to enhance its power
    rather than seeking to use nuclear weapons for hostile
    purposes, while Boucheron was more concerned that the West's
    focus on this issue was preventing movement on a host of
    other issues where Iran might be helpful, including Iraq,
    Afghanistan, Lebanon and Gaza.  Chevenement said he was
    prepared to support sanctions on Iran, but he argued that
    achieving progress towards peace between the Israelis and
    Palestinians would be the most effective way of improving
    relations with the Iranian regime.

    ¶16. (C) The group generally agreed that the USG was not
    moving fast enough on the Middle East peace process.
    Moscovici thought President Obama could both be a friend to
    Israel, as well as being firm when necessary.  The opposition
    members said the USG was not putting enough pressure on
    Israel and that the temporary settlement freeze announced by
    the Nentanyahu government is inadequate.  The group's
    expectations for what the Obama Administration could
    accomplish in the Middle East were high, and the perceived
    absence of concrete results could lead to disappointment on
    the French left.

    FRENCH ENERGY MAJOR TOTAL IN IRAN
    ---------------------------------

    ¶17. (C) Total's Vice President for International Relations
    Hubert des Longchamps told staffdel members that the
    company's current activities in Iran are legal.  Much in line
    with recent statements (see reftel), Longchamps said Total's
    focus is on recouping funds, in the form of cash payments,
    from previous investments in the development of Iran's oil
    and gas blocks.  He added that Total has no operational
    responsibility in the South Pars field, and talks to finalize
    buy-back arrangements to reimburse Total a "few hundred
    thousand dollars" should have ended in 2008.  In addition,
    Total provides limited technical services to the Iranians to
    safeguard its remaining property interest.  Longchamps said
    to walk away from these interests would only reward the
    Tehran regime.  He added that Total from "time to time" sells
    excess gasoline supplies to Iran when demand drops in Europe.
     Longchamps did not quantify the value of this trade, but he
    said if such deals carried a high political risk, Total was
    willing to forego the business.  He reiterated that there is
    no existing regulation prohibiting such sales, and if Total
    withdrew entirely from the refined petroleum product markets,
    the Indians, Koreans, and Chinese would remain active
    players.

    18 (C) Like other energy companies, Total plans to return to
    Iran in the future when the political situation improves,
    Longchamps explained.  Therefore, Total offers financial
    support to local communities to develop social and medical
    projects.  These programs help maintain a dialogue with the
    Iranian society and is a channel of communication that Total
    wants to keep open.  He pointed out that Total has not
    violated any U.N., EU or French laws.  Longchamps cautioned
    the U.S. against imposing sanctions in Iran because they
    would hurt typical Iranians without impacting the political
    leadership.  When the Total Vice President asked the staffdel
    if pending U.S. legislation could penalize energy companies
    for selling refined petroleum to Iran, staffdel members
    responded the legislation could possibly impact Total's
    recent shale-gas investments in the U.S.

    THINK TANK: EFFECTIVENESS OF SANCTIONS
    --------------------------------------

    ¶19. (C) French officials are divided over the effectiveness
    of sanctions as a response to Iran's continued pursuit of
    nuclear enrichment, according to Bruno Tertrais, senior
    researcher at the Foundation for Strategic Research (a think
    tank focusing on international security and defense issues
    whose main client is the GOF).  Tertrais told staffdel
    members that he believes sanctions can be efficient, but he
    noted the importance of defining the end goal.  He stated the
    purpose of sanctions on Iran is not to stop the nuclear
    program immediately but to exert pressure on the regime and
    to elicit a gradual change.  He listed the successful use of
    sanctions in the past on four different countries -- South

    Africa, Libya, Iraq, and North Korea -- the fact that
    sanctions on Iran have put a strain on its imports, and the
    accelerated debate within Iranian leadership as factors that
    back the argument that sanctions can be effective.  He
    caveated his statements throughout the meeting by saying
    sanctions would be ineffective if nothing was done to address
    the black market and business circuits to Dubai.  Regarding
    the GOF's stance on sanctions, Tertrais noted that the Office
    of the Presidency (Elysee) was more supportive of further
    sanctions and mindful of strategic issues than the MFA, which
    tended to take a regional approach and be more dovish.
    Tetrais stated that the history of the late 1980s showed that
    the more pressure foreign governments placed on the Tehran
    regime, the more the Iranians backed down.

    ¶20. (C) Embassy comment: Staffdel Kessler's engagement with a
    broad audience on these issues helped advance our mutual
    understanding of the challenges and strategies to advance our
    common interests in Iran and Afghanistan, and on the
    effectiveness of sanctions.

    ¶21. (U) Staffdel Kessler did not clear this cable.
    RIVKIN

`