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CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

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### Viewing cable 09BAKU175, IRAN'S MONEY LAUNDERERS, SANCTIONS-BUSTERS, AND

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
09BAKU175 | 2009-03-06 09:09 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Baku

`

    VZCZCXRO1853
    PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
    DE RUEHKB #0175/01 0650955
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    P 060955Z MAR 09
    FM AMEMBASSY BAKU
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0863
    INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAKU 000175

    NOFORN
    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/08/2019
    TAGS: PREL ETRD SNAR ECON AJ TU RU IR
    SUBJECT: IRAN'S MONEY LAUNDERERS, SANCTIONS-BUSTERS, AND
    REVOLUTIONARY GUARD MONEY MAKERS: A BAKU SAMPLER

    REF: A) BAKU 139 B) BAKU 132 C) BAKU 80 D) 2008 BAKU
         917

    Classified By: POLECON CHIEF ROB GARVERICK, REASON 1.5 (B and D)

    Summary
    ---------

    ¶1.  (S)  According to widespread rumor, many Iranians in Baku
    are involved full- or part-time in Iranian regime-related
    profit making, sanctions-busting, money laundering, and
    similar activities.  Activities range from assisting Iranian
    interests "on the side" of pursuing private activities, to
    working primarily for Iranian government entities.  These
    Iranians' formal businesses in Azerbaijan include factories,
    construction companies, trading companies, and shops, some of
    which may be hollow companies hiding illicit or semi-licit
    activities.  Some are also said to be significant actors in
    obtaining spare parts and equipment for the Revolutionary
    Guard, raising revenues and managing money for it and/or
    regime figures, or managing Iran-origin narcotics
    trafficking.  The list is a "sampler" of the types of
    personnel and activities singled out to Iran watcher by
    multiple sources as actively involved in Iranian
    regime-supportive financial and procurement activities.  The
    list suggests the extensive and complex interconnection of
    Iranian figures and activities that reportedly support
    Iranian security organizations and regime figures.  End
    Summary.

    ¶2.  (S) Baku Iran watcher received the information below from
    a wide variety of independent Iranian and Azerbaijani sources
    (strictly protect), including Baku-based Iranian students,
    business figures, and human rights activists; a Tehran-based
    Iranian exporter; a prominent businessman working in Iran;
    the Executive Director of AmCham in Azerbaijan; an
    Azerbaijani oil company executive; and a local partner in a
    leading international management consulting firm.  In almost
    all cases the information below was related/confirmed
    separately by at least three of the above sources.

    ¶3.  (S) Please note that, while serious efforts have been
    made to cross-check the information below and ignore
    "indirect" claims, Iran watcher has no independent ability to
    verify these allegations.  Although some of these figures are
    well known in Baku and/or among the resident Iranian
    community, Baku Iran watcher has never met any of them.  The
    information below should be interpreted in this context.

    ¶4.  (S) Begin List:

    ¶A.  (S) Jamal Allavi.  Three Iranian sources claimed that
    Allavi is a close relative of the ex-Mayor of Ardebil, and a
    former colleague/friend of President Ahmedinajad.  He now
    runs several Iranian companies (mostly trading), and is the
    head of a provincial cooperative organization "Tavanee
    Marzneshinan Fedayan Velayat," entitled to export and import
    items with reduced restrictions.  Allavi has a house in Baku
    and frequently travels on business to Azerbaijan, Russia,
    China, and Kazakhstan.  He uses his businesses as a cover for
    procuring and importing military spare parts and other items
    needed by the Revolutionary Guard and other Iranian security
    forces, bribing customs officials as necessary.  A fourth
    Iranian source noted that, while he did not know Allavi, the
    company name is a "giveaway" of Revolutionary Guard/regime
    connections.

    ¶B.  (S) FNU "Lotfi".  Runs a large artificial leather factory
    in Ardebil ("Kharkhaneye Charmeh Masnui)", and other
    businesses based in Iranian Azerbaijan.  He is a close
    associate of Jamal Allavi (entry "A" above), with whom he
    cooperates in smuggling activities.  He is an officer in the
    Revolutionary Guard (possibly retired), and his businesses
    are actually Revolutionary Guard-owned.  He travels to
    Malaysi, Singapore, Dubai, Turkey, and Iraq as well as
    zerbaijan on Revolutionary Guard business.  He als assists
    Revolutionary Guard and/or Iranian intelligence operations by
    "getting for them what they need," including communications
    equipment and technical information.

    ¶C.  (S) Adil Sharabiani.  An Iranian currency exchange dealer
    with "close links" to Tehran.  He was formerly a manager of

    BAKU 00000175  002 OF 004

    Bank Melli Iran, and currently has a close business
    relationship with the Xalq Bank, a medium-sized bank in Baku.
     He came to Azerbaijan after going bankrupt in Iran under
    murky circumstances.  He is wealthy and reportedly works
    closely with the Iranian "Foundation for the Oppressed"
    (Banyadeh Mostazafan), overseeing its business and investment
    activities in Azerbaijan, and advising the management of the
    Foundation-owned Darya Soap Detergent company in Azerbaijan
    (headed by one "Farzandeh").  He also assists another Iranian
    foundation that is providing financial assistance to
    Azerbaijani refugees from Karabagh with up to 300 Manat per
    family per month (about $350).

    An Iranian contact said that a friend had recently witnessed
    Sharabiani delivering five million dollars in cash "from
    Iran" to the Bank of Baku that was not entered on the books.
    The Iranian source did not know whether the money represented
    a personal payment to Sharabiani or a disbursement entrusted
    to him for some other purpose.  The anti-regime source
    alleged that Sharabiani "periodically" makes such deliveries
    to the Bank.  An Iranian businessman separately told Iran
    watcher that Sharabiani has "very good relations" with the
    Iranian government, and is widely assumed by other Iranians
    to be assisting both regime organizations and individual
    regime/clerical figures in investment and money laundering
    activities.

    Note: The Xalq Bank was established using former staff of the
    Bank of Baku (see 'E" below).  It is one of the most popular
    Baku banking venues in Azerbaijan for Iranian businesses and
    Iranians in Iran.  Two other popular banks for Iranians are
    the "Royal Bank of Baku," owned by an Iranian-American (ref
    C), and the "Bank of Baku."  End Note).

    ¶D.  (S) Kamal Darvishi.  This individual and his three
    brothers were famous fighters during the Iran-Iraq war.
    Kamil  rose to the rank of General in the Revolutionary
    Guard, and formerly had important Teheran-area security and
    intelligence duties.  He and his brother Keyoumars began
    coming to Azerbaijan regularly ten years ago.  Although from
    a very poor family, they are both extremely wealthy.  Kamal
    owns several road and other infrastructure construction
    companies in Iran, and formerly effectively controlled much
    of this sector in Iran (according to a Teheran businessman,
    "no roads in Iran could be built without him or his friends
    as a partner.)"

    Darvishi formerly ran the "NASR" company, an alleged
    Revolutionary Guard-controlled business in Iran.  Some of his
    business activities and networking reportedly aroused
    suspicion, resulting in his official "retirement" from the
    Revolutionary Guard.  In recent years Darvishi has developed
    a close business relationship/friendship with Azerbaijan
    Minister of Transportation Ziya Mammedov, and  with
    Mammedov's assistance has won at least eight major road
    construction and rehabilitation contracts, including
    contracts for construction of the Baku-Iranian Astara
    highway, the Baku-Guba highway, and the BaQ ring highway.
    (Comment: We assume Mammedov is a silent partner in these
    contracts.  Mammedov's immediate family owns Azerbaijan's
    largest commercial development company, and he is notoriously
    corrupt even for Azerbaijan.  Iran watcher has heard many
    allegations from Azerbaijani contacts of creative corrupt
    practices involving highway construction here.  End Comment).

    Iranian business and student contacts asserted that Darvishi
    maintains close relations with the Revolutionary Guard and
    Iranian intelligence.  Two noted that he travels freely
    abroad, in violation of ten-year legal limitations on
    personal foreign travel by retired senior Revolutionary Guard
    officers.  An Iranian student reported that Darvishi is
    recruiting among Iranian students in Azerbaijan for work in a
    new company he is establishing here.

    ¶E.  (S) Jamsheed "Jushkar" Mahmudoglu. He and his brothers
    are Iranian Azerbaijanis who have obtained Turkish
    citizenship.  They are large shareholders in the Bank of
    Baku, which is sometimes presented as a "Turkish bank."  They
    are originally from Tabriz, where the family were wealthy
    gold and currency dealers who lost their business after the
    Iranian Revolution.  The family fled to Turkey and ultimately

    BAKU 00000175  003 OF 004

    obtained Turkish passports.  Their business deals in
    Azerbaijan and Iran are frequently entwined with the Oromi
    brothers, another former Tabrizi-now-Turkish family active in
    Azerbaijan and Iran.  They and the Oromis set up the Silsila
    General Trading company in Dubai under the aegis of the NAB
    Group.  In Iran they jointly own a company which produces
    boilers on license from a German company (Bosch).  In
    Azerbaijan they cooperated in the establishment of the Baku
    Electronics company and the Bank of Baku (the latter in
    partnership with the family of former Minister of Economic
    Development Farhad Aliyev, see below).  Unlike the Oromis,
    Jamsheed reportedly remains a major shareholder in this bank.

    Two Iranian sources repeated "rumors" that this son is
    working with a son of Ayatollah Rafsanjani in several
    business ventures.  Jamsheed has relations with prominent
    Azerbaijani and Iranian business and government figures, and
    allegedly does favors for Iranian government personnel,
    including facilitating of desired foreign items and money
    laundering.  The President of AmCham in Baku (protect)
    confirmed that Jamsheed is a major bank shareholder, and
    originally from Iran.  She nd other sources opined that the
    bank is one of he more "professionally run" in Baku.
    (Comment: The bank is known for its relations with Turkish
    companies.  The Bank of Baku was formerly controlled by the
    brother of Farhad Aliyev, a former Azerbaijani Minister of
    Economic Development who is currently jailed.  According to a
    prominent Azerbaijani business consultant (strictly protect),
    Aliyev's position has been divided between the Azerbaijani
    Minister of Transportation Ziya Mammedov, and the Head of
    Presidential Security, Vahid Akhundov.  End Comment).

    ¶F.  (S) Shahram Oromi.  An Iranian Azerbaijani who obtained
    Turkish citizenship after the Iranian revolution.
    Nonetheless, he attended university in Iran, graduating from
    Iran Azad university (1993).  He and his brothers Nadir and
    Bahram established the "Turkish" NAB Foreign Trade company
    (Deesh Ticaret Limited Sherkati) in 1988.  The company
    (headquartered in Istanbul) does extensive trading between
    Turkey and the Middle East and Iran.  It is active in
    Azerbaijan, and also present in Russia and other CIS
    countries.  Since 1995 this company has been the distributor
    of Hyundai cars in Azerbaijan, and a member of the family is
    reportedly the Agent for Samsung in Turkey and Azerbaijan.
    The consultant describes the Oromi brother's business mode as
    based on "establishing insider monopolies or advantages via
    relations with powerful government individuals and their
    relatives" in the various countries in which they operate,
    "using bribes, 'gifts,' or offers of a share in their
    business."

    The Oromis helped set up the Bank of Baku (see item "E'
    above), and Shahram served in various positions (ranging from
    Chief of the Financial Audit Department to Chairman) between
    1999-2007, however they have recently sold most of their
    shares in this bank to influential Azerbaijanis.  The Oromi's
    allegedly work cooperatively in areas requested by senior
    Iranian figures, and several of their businesses may
    facilitate regime (or regime member) interests.  Shahram was
    and remains close to former Iranian Ambassador to Azerbaijan
    Ahmed Qazai.

    ¶G.  (S) "Asgar" LNU (commonly known in Baku as "Agaya Asgar).
     His private company is located at #16 Gorbanov Street in
    Baku, next to the Nizami metro station.  His formal business
    is Iran-Russia timber and wood products export/import via
    Azerbaijan.  A native of Iranian Azerbaijan, Asgar has an
    Azerbaijani wife and has lived in Baku for several years.
    He works closely with political officers based at the Iran
    Culture House (ref B).  His wife is the cousin of the
    Azerbaijani Minister of Education Misir Mardanov, and
    Mardanov's brother is one of his business partners.  Irada
    Afetgizi, an Iranian who helped organize an anti-Israel
    "Islamic world" conference held at the Baku Media Center in
    2007, works in his office.  Asgar owns two homes in Baku and
    hosts visiting Iranian clerics and relatives of Iranian
    regime officials and senior Revolutionary Guard officers.  He
    has close ties to Iranian government and Revolutionary Guard
    organizations and individuals, and assists them in business
    activities.  He often travels to Moscow.

    ¶H.  (S) Jabrail Naveed "Azerbaijani."  A famous "fixer" for

    BAKU 00000175  004 OF 004

    Iranians in Azerbaijan (hence his nickname).  He was head of
    the Iranian Trader's Association in Azerbaijan until that
    organization closed in the late 1990's.  An Iranian
    manufacturer and exporter from Tehran who has known the
    family for years (strictly protect) noted that "he is very
    wealthy, but doesn't flaunt it."  He said that Naveed's wife
    formerly worked in Iran as an officer in Bank Melli, where
    she facilitated loans to unqualified regime bigwigs and their
    cronies.

    Three contacts separately claimed that Naveed has facilitated
    Iran-related energy business ventures with the State Oil
    Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR), and illicitly exports (falsely
    labeled) Pelite and other oil drilling materials and
    chemicals and propane gas.  Naveed also reportedly owns the
    "Pingvin" iron workshop in Azerbaijan.  The Tehran
    businessman said that Naveed helps facilitate import of
    sanctioned products into Iran from Russia and elsewhere via
    the Azerbaijani enclave of Nakchevan, and said that he
    himself is one of "many" legitimate Iranian exporters who
    have been pressured into cooperating in this activity.
    Naveed is a close friend of the head of Baku's Husseiniya
    ("Iranian") mosque, Mullah Ogagnejad, and oversees the
    mosques' administration.  Ogagnejad is a son-in-law of the
    late Ayatollah Meshkini, and the personal religious
    representative of Ayatollah Khameini in Azerbaijan (ref B).

    ¶I.  (S) Safa Naveed.  Son of Jabrail Naveed (above).  A
    graduate of Baku's Kavkaz university, he is currently a
    Revolutionary Guard officer working at the Iranian Embassy in
    Baku.  He is a leadliaison with Iranian students in
    Azerbaijan.  AnIranian student described Safa's duties as
    "spyig on" Iranian students in Baku, and an Iranian
    businessman who has known the family for years told Iran
    watcher that Safa Naveed has frequently boasted to him about
    his and Iran's knowledge of what goes on in Azerbaijan,
    extensive information networks here, and "ability to get
    anything it needs."  One contact described Safa as
    "fanatically anti-Western."

    ¶J.  (S) Asgar Jabbari.  One of the "two Asgars" widely known
    among Iranians in Baku (see "F" above).  Son of the late
    "Mullah Natiq," a famous hard-line orator during the Iranian
    revolution and the Iran-Iraq war.  Jabbari's wife is from
    Azerbaijan, he owns a house here, and travels back and forth
    regularly between Iran and Azerbaijan.  His main official
    business is exporting Iranian marble from Isfahan, where he
    works with a large factory, which is actually a Revolutionary
    Guard front company (Note: Iranian marble is commonly used in
    Baku residential and office-building construction, which has
    been undergoing a boom here until recently.  End Note.)
    Jabbari has close business relationships with senior Iranian
    government officials, and carries out business activities and
    buys real estate on their behalf.  (Note: Jabbari's name is
    of Arabic origin, but is more likely to imply religious piety
    than Arabic heritage.  End Note).

    ¶K.  (S) Sabir Shaheen.  Though reportedly mild-mannered and
    well dressed, Shaheen is a well known mafia-like figure from
    Iranian Azerbaijan who reportedly acts as a "liaison" between
    the Iranian and Russian/Azerbaijani narcotics traffickers.
    Although he officially operates a marble store on Baku's Karl
    Marx street, the store is generally closed and Shaheen
    himself is generally seen holding court at restaurants and
    cafes along 28 May Street.  (Note: Iran reportedly has one of
    the highest per capita rates of heroin addiction in the
    world, and heroin and other narcotics trafficking from Iran
    to Russia and Europe via Azerbaijan has skyrocketed over the
    last two years.  See ref (D).

    End List.
    DERSE

`