Currently released so far... 243 / 251,287

### Articles

Brazil

### Browse by release date

2010/11

### Browse by creation date

66 72 79 86 89 90 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02
1979/08
1986/05
1989/12
1990/01
2004/01 2004/12
2005/03 2005/05 2005/06 2005/12
2006/04 2006/08 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D H I J K L M P R S T U
Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bishkek Embassy Berlin Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad
Embassy Cairo Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Doha Embassy Damascus Consulate Dubai
Embassy Harare
Iran RPO Dubai Consulate Istanbul
Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kabul
Embassy London
Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Manama Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich
Embassy Prague Embassy Paris Embassy Panama
Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh
Secretary of State Embassy Sanaa Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa
USEU Brussels UNVIE

### Browse by tag

A B C E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U X Y Z
AE ASEC AM AF AR AU AORC AJ AG
BA BR BH BY BU
CVIS CH CASC CF COUNTERTERRORISM CD CV
ETRD ECON ELAB EFIN ENRG EG ETTC EPET EINV EFIS EXTERNAL EAID EUN EU ECUN EAIR EZ EAGR ELTN ECPS
FR
GM GG GR GOI GE GA
HO
IR IAEA IS IZ INRB IN IRAJ IQ IT
JO JA
KNNP KHLS KJUS KDEM KSPR KPKO KUNR KWBG KWMN KPAL KCRM KU KG KHIV KPRP KZ KN KTFN KGHG KSCA KMDR KPAO KCOR KACT KIRF KS KTIA KISL
LE LY LG
MNUC MPOS MARR MU MASS MOPS MCAP MOPPS MK MAR MTCRE MY ML MR
NATO NG
OPDC OEXC OIIP OVIP OPRC OTR OTRA
PGOV PREL PARM PTER PINR PHUM PINS PREF PM PEPR PROP PK PBIO PA PBTS PECON POLITICAL PARTIES
QA
RU RS RW
SA SYR SY SO SU SF SCUL SM SNAR SOCI SENV SP SG
TRGY TU TI TX TC TSPA
US UZ UE UK UNESCO UP UNSC UV
XF XA
YM
ZP ZR ZF ZI

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page

### Viewing cable 10STATE9124, MOBILIZING PRESSURE TO PERSUADE IRAN'S

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #10STATE9124.
Help us extend and defend this work

Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
10STATE9124 | 2010-01-29 03:03 | CONFIDENTIAL | Secretary of State

`

    VZCZCXRO0917
    OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDBU RUEHKUK RUEHMR RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
    RUEHTRO
    DE RUEHC #9124/01 0290351
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O P 290343Z JAN 10
    FM SECSTATE WASHDC
    TO IAEA MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
    EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
    RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
    RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO IMMEDIATE 3003
    RUEHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE IMMEDIATE 6188
    RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA IMMEDIATE 0260
    RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 2152
    RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO IMMEDIATE 0510
    RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA IMMEDIATE 0095
    RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI IMMEDIATE 2312
    RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH IMMEDIATE 4840
    RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE 0422
    RUEHMS/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT IMMEDIATE 1808
    RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA IMMEDIATE 1943
    RUEHKU/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE 7765
    RUEHMK/AMEMBASSY MANAMA IMMEDIATE 7395
    RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 4807
    INFO IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 STATE 009124

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2030
    TAGS: PARM PREL IR UNSC
    SUBJECT: MOBILIZING PRESSURE TO PERSUADE IRAN'S
    ENGAGEMENT ON ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM

    Classified by NEA Assistant Secretary Jeffrey D. Feltman
    for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

    REF A: STATE 120288

    ¶1.  (U) This is an action request.  Please see
    paragraphs 2-5.

    SUMMARY
    -------

    ¶2.  (C) The United States, along with its partners, has
    made an unprecedented effort to engage Iran in an effort
    to diplomatically resolve the international community's
    concerns with Iran's nuclear program.  Iran's lack of
    constructive response so far, and its continued
    reluctance to cooperate with international efforts to
    build confidence and transparency in its nuclear
    program, demand a response.  Department requests posts
    to draw on the attached narrative to explain our
    rationale for why  sharpening the choice that Iran
    faces, by increasing pressure, is necessary at this
    point, and to secure the cooperation of host governments
    in these efforts.  End Summary.

    OBJECTIVES
    ----------

    ¶3.  (C) FOR ALL POSTS (except Moscow, Paris, Beijing,
    London and Berlin): Please draw on narrative beginning
    in paragraph 11 to:

    -- Highlight U.S. efforts to mobilize diplomatic
    engagement with Iran in 2009;

    -- Underscore the lack of a meaningful Iranian response
    to those efforts, especially since the P5+1 political
    directors meeting with Iran in Geneva on October 1,
    2009;

    -- Outline U.S. view of next steps, including increasing
    pressure on Iran; and

    -- Seek enhanced bilateral cooperation to increase
    pressure.

    ¶4.  (C) FOR MOSCOW, PARIS, BEIJING, LONDON, AND BERLIN:
    Posts may share the general tenor of our message but do
    not need to deploy the points themselves with host
    governments.

    ¶5.  (C) Points should be deployed by Ambassadors to most
    appropriate senior counterparts.  Posts may not leave
    any part of this message in writing with host
    governments.

    DEADLINE
    --------

    ¶6.  (U) Posts should report any substantive response to
    their efforts by February 3.  Elisa Catalano (NEA/FO,
    catalanoe@state.sgov.gov, 647-9533) and Richard Nephew
    (ISN/RA, nephewrm@state.sgov.gov, 647-7680) are the
    Department's POCs.

    BACKGROUND
    ----------

    ¶7.  (SBU) With its P5+1 partners, the U.S. has been
    pursuing a policy towards Iran that includes engagement

    STATE 00009124  002 OF 006

    and incentives, as well as pressure.  Since the 1
    October 2009 meeting of the P5+1 Political Directors and
    representatives from Iran, the United States has been
    working closely with its partners to engage with Iran to
    build international confidence in the peaceful nature of
    its nuclear program.  Based on the agreement in
    principle reached with Iran in Geneva, we have focused
    on supporting the IAEA's proposal for refueling the
    Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), facilitating the IAEA's
    investigation of the previously clandestine uranium
    enrichment plant at Qom, and pressing for a follow-on
    meeting between P5+1 Political Directors and Iranian
    representatives explicitly on Iran's nuclear program.

    ¶8.  (C) The results since October 1 have been
    disappointing.  Iran has not accepted the IAEA's TRR
    proposal; instead, Iran has rejected a series of updated
    and more flexible proposals from the IAEA and our
    partners on some terms of the proposal (REF A), and has
    offered a substantially different counterproposal which
    fails to address the concerns about its nuclear program,
    does not fulfill the objective of building confidence in
    Iran's nuclear intentions, and, as EU High
    Representative Lady Ashton described, in effect rejects
    the IAEA's proposal.  Iran has also announced its intent
    to expand its nuclear program, including its intention
    to start enriching uranium to higher levels to make its
    own TRR fuel if its terms are not accepted on the fuel
    deal.  Although Iran granted IAEA access to the facility
    at Qom, its cooperation was limited and there remain
    serious questions about Iran's intentions for the
    facility, which is in open defiance of five UN Security
    Council resolutions.  Finally, Iran to date has gone
    back on its earlier commitment to meet again with the
    P5+1 to discuss its nuclear program.

    ¶9.  (SBU) Former IAEA Director General El-Baradei
    released his latest report on Iran on November 16, 2009,
    and the IAEA Board of Governors (BoG) adopted a
    resolution on Iran on November 27, 2009.  The resolution
    notes the Board of Governors' serious concern that Iran
    continues to defy the requirements and obligations
    contained in UNSC resolutions and IAEA resolutions.  The
    Board of Governors also expressed its serious concern
    that contrary to the request of the Board of Governors
    and requirements of the UN Security Council, Iran has
    neither implemented the Additional Protocol nor provided
    the access necessary for the IAEA to provide assurance
    as to the absence of additional undeclared nuclear
    activities.

    ¶10.  (U) President Obama, Secretary Clinton, and other
    P5+1 leaders identified the end of 2009 as a key period
    for assessing Iran's responsiveness.  While the offer of
    engagement remains on the table, we have begun to work
    with partners to prepare new measures to increase
    pressure on Iran.

    DIPLOMATIC POLICY NARRATIVE
    ---------------------------

    ¶11.  (U)  Begin talking points:

    Overview: Where We've Been, and Where We Are
    --------------------------------------------

    -- The President made clear his readiness to open a new
    page in our relations with Iran, based on mutual
    respect. This new approach featured our offer to engage
    Iran directly, as well as our readiness to become a full
    and active participant in the P5+1's efforts to resolve
    international concerns about Iran's nuclear program
    through negotiations.

    -- We stated clearly our support for Iran's right to the
    peaceful uses of nuclear energy provided Iran meets its

    STATE 00009124  003 OF 006

    international obligations and carries out its
    responsibilities within the NPT framework.

    -- When we met with the Iranian delegation in Geneva on
    October 1, along with our P5+1 partners, we sought
    Iran's commitment to three concrete actions, which would
    demonstrate its intentions for its nuclear program:

    --  support the IAEA's proposal for refueling the
    Tehran Research Reactor;

    --  facilitate the IAEA's full investigation of the
    previously clandestine uranium enrichment plant at
    Qom;

    --  agree to a follow-on meeting between P5+1
    Political Directors and Iranian representatives by
    the end of October, explicitly focused on nuclear
    issues but also open to discussion of any issues
    raised by any party.
    -- Each of these agreed actions presented Iran with an
    important opportunity to begin to assure the
    international community about its intentions for its
    nuclear program and to pursue together a diplomatic
    resolution to our differences.

    -- Iran has not followed through on any of these three
    commitments.

    -- President Obama also stated last year that we would
    continually assess Iran's responsiveness to these
    offers, and that the end of the year would present a key
    period of assessment.

    -- It is increasingly clear that Iran has not taken
    advantage of the opportunities we have offered.

    -- A year into the Obama administration, Iran has not
    taken practical, concrete steps that would begin to
    create confidence in its nuclear intentions.  Iran:

    --  Continues to enrich uranium despite UNSC
    requirements that it suspend such operations;

    --  Revealed it had been building a secret uranium
    enrichment facility at a military base near Qom, in
    violation of its safeguards agreement and UN
    Security Council resolutions;

    --  Continues to refuse cooperation with the IAEA
    in addressing the full range of IAEA questions
    about the peaceful purposes of its nuclear program;

    --  Has not accepted the IAEA proposal to refuel
    the TRR, which was a response to an Iranian
    request, despite U.S. and our partners' significant
    efforts to be flexible and address Iranian concerns
    with the deal; and

    --  Since meeting with representatives of the five
    permanent members of the Security Council and
    Germany in Geneva on October 1, has refused all
    subsequent efforts to schedule another meeting to
    discuss its nuclear program.

    --  Iran has not been able to say "yes" to a balanced
    IAEA proposal that would provide fuel for its Tehran
    Research Reactor and begin to build mutual trust and
    confidence, notably by transferring 1,200kgs of its low
    enriched uranium abroad as an indication of Iran's
    peaceful nuclear intent.

    --  Underscoring the significance of the IAEA's TRR
    proposal, in November 2009, former IAEA DG ElBaradei
    said that the proposal had "extensive built-in
    guarantees...the Russians are guaranteeing implementation.

    STATE 00009124  004 OF 006

    The Americans are ready for the first time to guarantee
    the implementation.  The [IAEA] will take custody of
    Iran's material so the international community as a
    whole will guarantee" implementation.

    --  On Iran's desire to retain possession of its nuclear
    material under delivery of the fuel (which is the basis
    of Iran's counterproposal), Dr. ElBaradei rejected this
    approach, saying publicly in November after Iran first
    raised this idea that this would "defeat the whole
    purpose of the IAEA's agreement...this is not a
    solution.";

    --  While it allowed IAEA inspectors to visit its newly
    revealed enrichment site near Qom, it did not provide
    the IAEA with the full access the organization
    requested, notably by agreeing to the IAEA's request for
    access to specific Iranian nuclear officials and
    answering IAEA questions regarding the history and
    purpose of the facility.  The clandestine construction
    of this facility was inconsistent with Iran's IAEA
    Safeguards Agreement, and is in open defiance of UN
    Security Council resolutions.

    --  As the IAEA reported in November 2009, Iran
    continues to develop its nuclear program regardless of
    international concerns and IAEA, NPT, and UNSC
    requirements - most starkly in its construction of a
    secret uranium enrichment facility at a military base
    near Qom.  As former Director General El-Baradei's
    report on November 16 outlines, this facility and the
    circumstances surrounding it raises the persistent
    question of additional such undeclared facilities.

    --  The IAEA report makes clear that Iran has failed to
    cooperate fully and transparently with the IAEA,
    answering questions about the use of this facility and
    the possibility of other facilities.

    --  Iran has failed to take advantage of the creative
    TRR proposal, engage with us constructively on other
    elements of its nuclear program, and cooperate fully
    with the IAEA.  It also still defies UNSC requirements
    that it suspend its enrichment program, instead
    announcing an expansion of its nuclear program.  Even
    more, it is threatening to begin enriching its LEU to
    higher levels of enrichment if the international
    community does not accept a TRR deal on its terms, terms
    that would not build confidence as they would reduce and
    delay transfers of LEU from Iran.

    --  Iran's continued nuclear activities and its refusal
    to engage meaningfully with the international community
    risks a possible arms race in the region and undermines
    the global international nonproliferation regime as a
    whole.

    --  As you know, Israel has stated that an Iran with
    nuclear weapons poses a great threat to its security and
    that it reserves the right to defend itself.  We believe
    Iran's continued non-compliance with its international
    obligations regarding its nuclear program poses serious
    threats to stability in the region.  Presenting Iran
    with a united global front is the best avenue to resolve
    the Iranian nuclear issue through diplomatic means.

    --  In addition to its disregard of its nuclear-related
    obligations, Iran continues to support terrorist
    organizations like Hamas and Hezbollah, and militant
    groups in Iraq.  It also provides some support to the
    Taliban to facilitate attacks against ISAF forces in
    Afghanistan.

    --  Also of deep concern to the international community
    is the dramatic uptick in repression inside Iran.  As
    Secretary Clinton said recently, we are deeply disturbed

    STATE 00009124  005 OF 006

    by the ruthless repression that Iran is exercising
    against its citizens who seek to exercise their
    universal right to free expression and assembly.

    The Pressure Aspect of the Strategy: Making the Case
    --------------------------------------------- -------

    --  The two elements of the P5+1 strategy -
    engagement/incentives and pressure -- were always
    intended to run in parallel, because without a credible
    threat of consequences, it is unlikely that Iran will
    make a strategic or even tactical change in direction.

    --  For that reason, we have always recognized the
    possibility that we would need to increase pressure to
    sharpen the choice that Iran faces in order to persuade
    Iran that the international community is serious.

    --  Still, our emphasis over the course of this year has
    been on outreach and engagement rather than pressure.
    Unfortunately, to date, Iran has failed to respond
    constructively.

    --  Pressure is not an end in itself; it is a means to
    encourage Iran to recalculate costs and benefits, and to
    return to a course of constructive engagement at the
    negotiating table.  But without unmistakable and
    meaningful consequences, there seems little prospect for
    such a return.

    --  The international community has already imposed
    strict measures on Iran via various multilateral fora to
    demonstrate that Iran cannot ignore its responsibilities
    without cost.  We believe a more aggressive enforcement
    of this existing and robust international framework,
    along with the application of significant additional
    pressure, will illustrate to Iran the sharp choices it
    faces should it continue to rebuff efforts to resolve
    our differences diplomatically.

    --  Unity among members of the international community
    is absolutely essential to demonstrate to Iran that
    there are serious consequences for its continued refusal
    to engage constructively with the international
    community over its nuclear program.  Such unity was
    clear when the IAEA Board of Governors adopted its Iran
    resolution in November. It was also clear in the
    European Council's declaration on Iran issued in
    December.  Both were useful and immediate opportunities
    to increase pressure on Iran.

    --  We believe Iran's continued non-compliance regarding
    its nuclear program deserves the full and urgent
    attention of the international community.

    Next Steps
    ----------

    -- We stand behind our offer to engage with Iran, but we
    are rapidly approaching the moment when we will have to
    give full meaning to all elements of our strategy.  We,
    along with our partners, believe that the time has come
    to increase pressure on Iran.  Such pressure is
    necessary to uphold the integrity of the UNSC and IAEA,
    and demonstrate that continued non-compliance has
    consequences.

    -- The U.S. believes that multilateral pressure would be
    best achieved through new UN Security Council action and
    swift implementation of that action.

    -- However, UN action alone may not be sufficient to
    persuade Iran to change course.  There is much more that
    can and should be done immediately to implement measures
    already required under the existing international
    sanctions framework.  We therefore ask our partners to

    STATE 00009124  006 OF 006

    ensure that we are collectively enforcing all those
    measures that are already in place as comprehensively as
    possible.

    -- We regret that Iran has missed repeated opportunities
    for meaningful engagement.  Our intent is not to
    escalate a conflict, but to press for a diplomatic
    resolution.  Inaction is what the Iranians are hoping
    for, as they draw closer to achieving a nuclear weapons
    capability.

    -- On January 16, we and our P5+1 partners met to take
    stock and discuss next steps regarding Iran.  As the
    Chair's statement reflects, we agreed that Iran has
    failed to follow up on the key understandings reached in
    our meeting with the Iranian delegation on October 1,
    ¶2009.  We are united and remain committed to our
    approach - while we will continue to seek a negotiated
    diplomatic solution, we believe it is time for
    consideration of appropriate further measures.

    -- We are here today to intensify our consultations with
    you, as one of our partners in the international
    community, on next appropriate steps aimed to persuade
    Iran to bring its nuclear program into full compliance
    with its international obligations.

    -- We urge these steps with steady determination that we
    must do everything we can, including applying greater
    pressure, to encourage Iran to return to a constructive
    course of engagement.

    FOR EU MEMBER STATES, USEU, AND TOKYO ONLY:

    -- As we move ahead with and beyond the UN process, we
    also will want to work with you to agree on additional
    actions we could take on a coordinated, national basis
    to magnify the impact of a new Security Council
    Resolution and demonstrate to Iran our seriousness of
    purpose.
    CLINTON

`