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### Viewing cable 07PARIS257, FRENCH NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR'S VIEWS ON MIDDLE

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
07PARIS257 | 2007-01-22 17:05 | SECRET | Embassy Paris

`

    VZCZCXRO4762
    OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV
    DE RUEHFR #0257/01 0221722
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 221722Z JAN 07
    FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4369
    INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1101

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 000257

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2016
    TAGS: FR KDEM LE PGOV PREL SY
    SUBJECT: FRENCH NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR'S VIEWS ON MIDDLE
    EAST

    REF: PARIS 170

    Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
    1.4 (b) and (d).

    ¶1. (S) Summary: French NSA-equivalent Maurice
    Gourdault-Montagne (MGM) told the Ambassador on January 22
    that "some" are calling for France to freeze plans for
    establishing an international tribunal on Lebanon until next
    autumn, in the hope that this delay would allow Lebanese PM
    Siniora to break the political deadlock in Beirut.  MGM said
    that President Chirac did not espouse a delay, but suggested
    (more than once) that the Lebanese themselves might request
    one.  Turning to Iran, he provided a somewhat unpersuasive
    explanation of Chirac's rationale for contemplating the
    dispatch of a high-level envoy to Tehran, saying such an
    envoy might help to dispel misunderstandings of French policy
    aims on a number of regional questions, and indicating that
    he himself would not serve as an envoy to Tehran and neither
    would FM Douste-Blazy.  On Iraq, MGM said that France wanted
    to see Iraq serve once again as a buffer against Iranian
    expansionism, but doubted that the West had sufficient
    resources to end Iranian influence in Iraq while
    simultaneously solving the country's economic problems.  On
    Afghanistan, he reviewed the achievements of the Riga
    Conference with satisfaction but said no European country was
    prepared to send additional troops at this time. End summary.

    Lebanon: Putting the Tribunal on Ice
    ------------------------------------

    ¶2. (S) The Ambassador hosted French NSA-equivalent Maurice
    Gourdault-Montagne (MGM) for breakfast on January 22.  MGM
    cheerfully reviewed preparations for the January 25 Lebanon
    Conference, saying France would announce a contribution of
    500 million euros, while Germany would pledge somewhere in
    the neighborhood of 80 million euros.  He observed with
    pleasure that British FM Beckett was now planning to attend
    (a reversal he gratefully attributed to U.S. encouragement).
    The only disappointment, he said, was Russia, which would be
    represented by Special Middle East Envoy Saltanov, even
    though FM Lavrov's schedule could have permitted him to
    attend at least the opening session.

    ¶3. (S) MGM said he saw little chance of resolving Lebanon's
    domestic political crisis prior to the Lebanese presidential
    election in November 2007.  Consequently, some had raised the
    idea of "putting the tribunal in the freezer" until that
    time, in hopes that a delay in setting up the tribunal would
    aid PM Siniora to break the political deadlock.  "Of course,
    we (neither he nor Chirac) are not advocating this idea," MGM
    stressed at several points.  Nevertheless, he continued, the
    Lebanese themselves might ask the French and the U.S. to put
    the tribunal on ice, in part because Siniora would need the
    opposition's help in order to deliver the economic reforms
    that the GOL is promising at this week's conference.  The
    only other option, MGM continued, would be to change the
    scope of the tribunal itself -- something France found
    unacceptable.  When pressed on why the French were
    contemplating a change in their approach to the tribunal at
    this point -- especially when it was unclear that Lebanon's
    opposition had the upper hand -- MGM made another (and
    somewhat jumbled) reference to the need to obtain the
    opposition's support for economic reform.

    Chirac's Iran Envoy: Is the Idea Dead or Not?
    ---------------------------------------------

    ¶4. (S) Turning to recent media reports concerning President
    Chirac's plans to send a high level envoy to Iran, MGM said
    he was strongly reminded of how a few years ago internal USG
    discussion of possible changes in Iran policy had been leaked
    to the Wall Street Journal, thereby killing the proposed
    discussion before it had a chance to take place.  He said
    Chirac's envoy proposal had suffered much the same fate after
    those opposed to any change in the French approach to Iran
    (MGM did not speculate on who they might be) leaked the
    content of sensitive MFA-Elysee discussions to Le Monde.
    (Although Le Monde approached him for comment before running
    with the piece, MGM said the journalist already had "the
    whole story.")

    ¶5. (S) MGM acknowledged that the Elysee had two concerns
    about sending an envoy to Tehran.  First, one could argue
    (and Saudi King Abdallah did, in the strongest terms) that
    sending an envoy to engage the Iranians on Lebanon would
    merely consecrate Iran's role in Lebanon.  (The

    PARIS 00000257  002 OF 003

    counterargument, MGM said, was that Iran's influence is a
    fact, like it or not.)  The second concern was that the
    Iranians might try to parley the overture into an invitation
    to attend the January 25 Lebanon Conference.  "But even if
    they had asked, we weren't going to invite them," MGM assured
    the Ambassador.

    ¶6. (S) As for the virtues of engaging with Tehran, MGM argued
    that it would be useful to dispel Iranian misperceptions of
    France's policy aims in the Middle East without engaging in a
    debate on those aims.  Hence, Chirac had mulled the
    possibility of arming his envoy with a letter to Supreme
    Leader Khamenei, which would spell out France's position on
    Israel (i.e., that it has a right to exist), on UNSCR 1701
    (that all states are obligated to work toward its full
    implementation), and on Iran's need to promote regional
    stability (code for stop interfering in Iraq).  In addition,
    Chirac and his advisors reasoned that an envoy's visit might
    strengthen the hand of President Ahmadinejad's critics.

    ¶7. (S) MGM stressed that the idea of sending Foreign Minister
    Douste-Blazy was no longer an option, not only because of the
    Le Monde leak but also because of vehement opposition from
    Saudi Arabia and Egypt.  MGM also made it clear that he
    himself would not be an envoy to Tehran, given the likelihood
    that the Iranians would try to oblige him to see President
    Ahmadinejad (which neither Chirac nor his advisers will do,
    given Ahmadinejad's public declarations on Israel).  However,
    MGM did not categorically exclude the possibility that Chirac
    would not send someone else (e.g., Jean-Claude Cousseran) as
    an envoy.

    UNIFIL: A Solution on Drones?
    -----------------------------

    ¶8. (S) MGM indicated that France was searching for a solution
    to the problem of operating UAVs (i.e., "drones") over
    southern Lebanon in the wake of recent statements by
    Hizballah claiming that France would share with Israel any
    intelligence collected by the drones.  MGM said France would
    not allow Hizballah to draw red-lines impinging upon the
    operations of French peacekeepers; Hizballah had attempted
    this once before with respect to the deployment of Leclerc
    tanks, and the French had deployed the tanks anyway.
    However, he confirmed a difference of opinion between the
    Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs: the military was
    determined to operate the drones (which were shipped to
    UNIFIL at the request of UNDPKO), whereas the diplomats
    advised caution.  Consequently, MGM said the French were
    leaning towards a "demonstration flight" held in the presence
    of members of the Lebanese Armed Forces with "maximum
    transparency" so that it would be clear to the Lebanese
    public that the UAV flights would not be used as a source of
    intelligence for Israel.  The final decision, he emphasized,
    would only be made by Chirac himself.

    ¶9. (S) Noting that on the ground cooperation between Lebanese
    civilians living in UNIFIL's area of operations and French
    peacekeepers ended overnight following FM Douste-Blazy's
    ill-considered declaration that Hizballah was an enemy to
    France, MGM said France "must walk a fine line" while not
    allowing Hizballah to dictate terms to UNIFIL.  If necessary,
    France could reinforce its military presence by deploying the
    second of two battalions pledged to UNIFIL last year.  MGM
    confirmed that in February, the French would conduct a
    6-month review of their participation in UNIFIL.  While he
    foresaw no change in France's participation as a result of
    this review, he conceded that any attack against French
    peacekeepers would likely lead to further evaluation of
    France's role.  Moreover, he admitted that the French are
    deeply concerned that Hizballah might attempt to kidnap
    French peacekeepers in the run-up to the French presidential
    elections this Spring.

    Syria
    -----

    ¶10. (S) Noting ruefully that a velvet revolution does not
    appear to be in prospect any time soon in Damascus, MGM
    expressed mild concern over the future of France's Syria
    policy once Chirac leaves office.  "Any new government will
    be tempted to think that talking to the Syrians is the
    answer," he said, adding that while Socialist Party candidate
    Segolene Royal had indicated her agreement with the general
    thrust of current French policy, Interior Minister Sarkozy
    remained somewhat vague on the issue.  MGM noted that FM
    Muallim has summoned the French ambassador in Damascus to a

    PARIS 00000257  003 OF 003

    meeting on January 25, in what the French were regarding as a
    sign of Syrian anxiety about the success of the International
    Conference for Lebanon.

    Afghanistan
    -----------

    ¶11. (S) MGM expressed satisfaction with the outcome of the
    NATO Summit in Riga, and, looking ahead to the informal
    ministerial on January 26, he emphasized that no EU country
    was prepared to send additional troops to Afghanistan at this
    time.  However, he said there was a willingness to undertake
    further consultation on how to combine civil/military
    objectives in Afghanistan (e.g., counternarcotics).  While
    offering a justification for France's proposed contact group,
    MGM did no press the point.
    Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
    http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm

    STAPLETON

`