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CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

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### Viewing cable 09TELAVIV457, CODEL CARDIN DISCUSSES IRAN, SYRIA, PALESTINIANS,

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Reference ID | Date | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | ---
09TELAVIV457 | 2009-02-26 12:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tel Aviv

`

    VZCZCXRO3204
    PP RUEHROV
    DE RUEHTV #0457/01 0571219
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 261219Z FEB 09
    FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0661
    INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 000457

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2019
    TAGS: PREL PGOV KPAL IS IR SY
    SUBJECT: CODEL CARDIN DISCUSSES IRAN, SYRIA, PALESTINIANS,
    AND ISRAEL ELECTION WITH BENJAMIN NETANYAHU

    Classified By: DCM Luis G. Moreno, Reason 1.4 (b) (d)

    ¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY  During their trip to Israel, CODEL Cardin
    discussed Iran, Syria, Israel-Palestinian negotiations, and
    the Israeli elections with Likud Party leader and candidate
    for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.  Netanyahu described a
    nuclear Iran as the greatest threat facing Israel, and urged
    strong economic sanctions backed by a viable military option
    to confront a problem that he said threatened the region and
    could prove a "tipping point" in world history.  Describing
    his approach to "economic peace" with the Palestinians,
    Netanyahu suggested he would cut through bureaucratic
    obstacles to Palestinian economic development to build a
    "pyramid" from the "bottom up" that would strengthen the
    Palestinian Authority, and offer the Palestinians  a viable
    alternative to radicalism.  Netanyahu expressed support for
    the concept of land swaps, and emphasized that he did not
    want to govern the West Bank and Gaza but rather to stop
    attacks from being launched from there.  Netanyahu suggested
    Syrian interest in peace negotiations with Israel were really
    overtures to the United States, and described the Syrians as
    firmly in the Iranian camp.  Netanyahu expressed confidence
    that President Peres would offer him rather than Kadima Party
    leader Livni the opportunity of forming a coalition because
    the bloc of center-right/right wing parties in the new
    Knesset amounted to 65 seats.  Netanyahu said his desire
    would be to form a unity government with Kadima, but would
    not agree to a rotating prime ministership.  END SUMMARY

    ¶2.  (SBU)  As part of their February 14-17 visit to Israel,
    CODEL Cardin met with Likud Party leader and candidate for
    Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on February 16 in
    Jerusalem.  Netanyahu was at the center of intense political
    speculation about the formation of a governing coalition
    following the extremely close Israeli national election of
    February 10, which did not produce a clear winner.  The CODEL
    met with Netanyahu following meetings the previous day with
    President Peres, and prior to meetings later in the day with
    Prime Minister Olmert and Palestinian Authority Prime
    Minister Fayyad.

    ----
    IRAN
    ----

    ¶3.  (C)  Netanyahu quickly launched into his oft-stated
    position that Iran is the greatest threat facing Israel.
    Noting that "Persia" already had two bases on the
    Mediterranean (referring to Hizballah and Hamas), Netanyahu
    complained that Iran's "tentacles" were choking Israel, and
    that a new one grew back whenever one was cut off.  Netanyahu
    charged that Iran was developing nuclear weapons with the
    express purpose of wiping out Israel, and described
    preventing Iran from developing a nuclear capability as
    Israel's  highest policy priority.  Netanyahu described five
    threats that he saw emanating from Iranian nuclear
    development: a direct threat to Israel; a direct threat to
    other regional states; increased terrorist power under an
    Iranian nuclear umbrella; a Middle East nuclear arms race;
    and a destabilized Middle East, with  Arab regimes
    "terrified" of Iran in his view.  Netanyahu, commenting that
    he normally avoided political jargon, pointed to one phrase
    that he said applied to this issue - "a tipping point."
    According to Netanyahu, if Iran develops a nuclear weapon
    capability it will "topple the peace process" and "change the
    history of the world."

    ¶4.  (C)  When asked what advice he offered to the United
    States, Netanyahu reported that he had spoken to
    then-candidate Obama and said the method was less important
    than the goal, and asked rhetorically whether the President
    would allow Iran to "cross the nuclear threshold ... on his
    watch."  Netanyahu suggested there were many ways to pressure
    Iran, which he saw as economically weak at the moment due to
    plunging oil prices at the same time that the U.S. President
    had strong international backing, a situation Netanyahu
    described as the opposite of the past few years.  He said he
    would look forward (as Prime Minister) to discussing  with
    President Obama concrete measures to be taken against Iran.
    Netanyahu said these would not be a substitute for
    Palestinian negotiations, but that any result from such
    negotiations would be "washed away" by Iran's attaining a
    nuclear bomb.

    ¶5.  (C)  When asked how Iran could be isolated, Netanyahu
    suggested a blockade as one possibility.  The nuclear program
    could be stopped if the U.S. led the international community
    to "ratchet up" economic sanctions, but that these sanctions
    would only work if Iran knew that the U.S. military option
    remained viable.  Netanyahu said he did not object to a U.S.
    dialogue with Iran provided the talks were close ended,
    perhaps two months, with fixed results, otherwise Iran would

    TEL AVIV 00000457  002 OF 003

    "take you to the cleaners."  He said he agreed with the
    Europeans' urging the U.S. to postpone any talks until past
    the Iranian elections in June.  Netanyahu said he did not
    know for certain how close Iran was to developing a nuclear
    weapons capability, but that "our experts" say Iran was
    probably only one or two years away and that was why they
    wanted open ended negotiations.  He again urged "tough
    negotiations" if military means were not used  (and added
    that Special Envoy Mitchell was both nice and tough.)
    Netanyahu described the Iranian regime as crazy, retrograde,
    and fanatical, with a Messianic desire to speed up a violent
    "end of days."  That was not the whole country, however, in
    his view, as he said that "75 percent of the Iranian people"
    oppose the regime, but that it governed with terror and would
    be hard to overthrow.  There was no single view from
    Iranians, therefore, but there was from the powers that
    dominate.  He reiterated that strong economic action could
    stop their nuclear development or possibly even bring down
    the regime - as could "the U.S. military process."

    -----------------
    PALESTINIAN TRACK
    -----------------

    ¶6.  (C)  Turning to peace with the Palestinians, Netanyahu
    said the reason  the process had not worked so far was that
    while 70 percent of Israelis were willing to make
    concessions, the same number were convinced that there was no
    real Palestinian partner.  Netanyahu warned that when Israel
    left Lebanon is created a first Iranian base, that when it
    left Gaza it created a second Iranian base, and if Israel
    "promised" a third retreat from the West Bank it would see
    the same results.  There were three options, according to
    Netanyahu - withdrawing to the 1967 borders (that would "get
    terror, not peace"); doing nothing ("just as bad"); or
    "rapidly building a pyramid from the ground up."  Netanyahu
    suggested a rapid move to develop the West Bank economically,
    including "unclogging" bureaucratic "bottlenecks."  He
    promised to "take charge personally" (as Prime Minister) to
    facilitate this bureaucratic reform, which would occur in
    tandem with political negotiations and cooperation with
    Jordan to build up Palestinian Authority security capacity.
    Netanyahu noted that there  were larger demonstrations
    against the  Gaza operation in Madrid and London than in the
    West Bank.  He said this was because the West Bankers
    recognized that Hamas represents  the prospect of "violent,
    crazy" people in charge of their society; they  should be
    offered real alternatives in order to have the strength to
    resist the radicals.

    ¶7.  (C)  Netanyahu said his "new approach"  would also
    include not continuing to fund a  "bloated" Palestinian
    bureaucracy.  It would be aimed at direct development.
    Netanyahu, noting that he had previously "turned around" the
    Israeli economy (as Finance Minister), gave one example of a
    problem he would fix as an electric powerline in the West
    Bank that was held up by conflicting and competing agencies.
    He said this powerline was needed and would create jobs, but
    was held up not because the Palestinians were targeted, but
    because that was how the Israeli bureaucracy worked for
    everyone, including Israelis.  When asked whether these
    reforms could include room to modify security arrangements,
    Netanyahu agreed that some of what the GOI calls security is
    in fact bureaucracy.  Pointing to what he described as strong
    but unpublicized trade between Haifa port and Iraq via
    Jordan, he suggested assembly points could be set up in the
    West Bank for some goods, which would create thousands of
    jobs.  This would not be a substitute for a political
    settlement, according to Netanyahu, but economic prosperity
    would make peace possible, as occurred in Northern Ireland.

    -----
    SYRIA
    -----

    ¶8.  (C)  Netanyahu said he was actually more optimistic about
    dealing with the Palestinians than with Syria, because he was
    confident that the Palestinian Authority wants Iran and its
    proxies out.  He said he was less sanguine about Syria, which
    he complained straddles the fence all the time.  The Syrians
    might "talk about" a new (U.S.) relationship, but he did not
    see them disconnecting from Iran.  Netanyahu suggested that
    Israel "giving up" the Golan would just result in assurances
    that Syria would later "tear up."  Describing King Hussein as
    heroic, and noting that the King came from his "death bed" in
    1998 to get then-Prime Minister Netanyahu and
    then-Palestinian Authority Chairman Arafat to reach an
    agreement at the Wye River talks, Netanyahu said that when
    Saddam Hussein took Kuwait, even King Hussein "snuggled up"
    to the Iraqi leader out of necessity.  Such is the reality in
    the Middle East.

    TEL AVIV 00000457  003 OF 003

    -------------------
    COALITION FORMATION
    -------------------

    ¶9.  (C)  Despite finishing one Knesset seat behind Kadima and
    its candidate Tzipi Livni in the February 10 Israeli national
    elections, Netanyahu expressed complete confidence that
    President Peres would offer him the opportunity to form a
    government because the bloc of center-right/right wing
    parties in the new Knesset has 65 seats compared to Livni's
    potential bloc of 45 seats for center-left/left wing parties
    plus 11 seats for Arab parties.  Netanyahu said his desire
    would be to form a unity government with Kadima, but would
    not agree to a rotating prime ministership with Ms. Livni.
    He explained that the one time Israel had a rotation came as
    a result of an exact tie between the two political
    coalitions, but this time the right wing bloc was much
    larger.

    ¶10.  (C) When asked about Avigdor Lieberman's Yisrael
    Beiteinu party, Netanyahu reminded the CODEL that Kadima had
    in fact included Lieberman in their government in its earlier
    stages.  Netanyahu stressed repeatedly that he preferred a
    unity government, and said the large security and economic
    problems facing Israel called for the strength that a unity
    government would offer.  Livni "collapsed" left- wing votes
    (from Labor and other parties) to score a one vote margin for
    Kadima over Likud in the elections, but took no votes away
    from the right, according to Netanyahu.  When asked what he
    might offer to Kadima, Netanyahu suggested Kadima would get a
    few key ministerial portfolios, but did not elaborate.  He
    said that he while he was convinced a rotating Prime
    Ministership would not happen, he was confident a unity
    government could.  Netanyahu said the government would not
    include the Arab parties.

    ¶11.  (C)  Netanyahu promised that as Prime Minister his
    government would not "go back" to unilateral withdrawals, and
    would have a clear focus.  On the economy, he said Israel was
    not a huge economy such as the United States or China, and
    that he would be able to turn things around quickly, as "a
    small share of a declining market" was big for Israel. Asked
    about settlements, Netanyahu noted that he had not
    established any new settlements when he was Prime Minister.
    Half of the West Bank, the area east of the ridge line and
    the Jordan Valley, is virtually unpopulated and only contains
    a few settlements.  In the other half, Israeli and
    Palestinian populations are intertwined.  Once the
    Palestinian Authority develops into a real partner it will be
    possible to negotiate an agreement over territory,
    settlements and "refined" Palestinian sovereignty without an
    army or control over air space and borders.  Netanyahu said
    it would be too hard to negotiate agreements over Jerusalem
    and refugees until the other issues are resolved.  Claiming
    that many Palestinians accept this point, Netanyahu said he
    was not talking about a delaying tactic but rather a
    temporary freeze, adding that he hoped PA Prime Minister
    Fayyad would still be around since Fayyad also thinks along
    economic lines.

    ¶12.  (SBU)  As an example of economic development, Netanyahu
    spoke about expanding faith tourism.  He said that it "defied
    imagination" that the well-known site on the Jordan River
    where John the Baptist baptized Jesus was "paralyzed" by a
    GOI/PA jurisdiction dispute.  With Jericho only a mile away,
    Netanyahu offered to give an "easy", secure "envelope" for
    transporting tourists from the Galilee to this part of the
    West Bank.  That would lead to "co-production" that would
    provide large revenue streams of tourist dollars to the
    Palestinians, from a population that was already coming to
    Israel.  He asked why Israelis would be  less disposed to
    make concessions to a viable Palestinian government and
    society.  Netanyahu agreed that West Bank checkpoints take
    too long, and offered to look into express lanes, increased
    staffing, and other possible solutions - as Prime Minister.

    ¶13.  (U) CODEL Cardin has cleared this cable.

    ********************************************* ********************
    Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website:
    http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv
    ********************************************* ********************
    CUNNINGHAM

`