# taz.de -- Migration policy in France: Colonial legacy and wall building
> Although France has a long history of immigration, the country is
> increasingly looking to curb the number of people crossing its borders.
> Actively negotiating with migrants’ home nations is its strategy.
(IMG) Bild: The „Jungle“ in Calais being forcefully evacuated
Compared to its European neighbours, France has a long tradition of being a
land of inward migration. Eighteen million French citizens (almost one
third of the population) are purported to have at least one grandparent who
originates from another country.
Since the 1980s and the early 1990s, a series of conservative,
economic-liberal right-wing governments have embraced a 'zero immigration’
policy. In theory, the aim was to restrict any form of new immigration that
would add to existing numbers. However, in practice this approach quickly
turned out to be untenable as certain minimum legal safeguards – family
reunification, the right of spouses married to French nationals to enter
the country – needed to be guaranteed and national as well as international
obligations upheld.
Whilst left-wing parties and some sections of civil society protested
against the official policy, claiming it went against political and social
principles, many ruling governments also came under fire from members of
the right: the right-wing Front National wasted no time criticising the
country’s leaders for their broken promises and calling out their lack of
consistency.
When a new social democrat government was elected in June 1997, its key
figures and experts tried to relieve some of the internal political
pressure and to reach what they saw as a “sensible compromise“ with
sections of the conservative camp. On 31 July 1997, university professor
Patrick Weil presented an expert report, which was frequently cited at the
time, to President Lionel Jospin’s government, putting forward a policy
designed on a utilitarian basis, i.e. focusing on the benefits to society.
## Explicit demands
Despite a considerably restrictive discourse on the issue of immigration,
the next incoming president, Nicolas Sarkozy, retained the core of this
utilitarian idea despite being a right-wing politician. The fundamental
change that came about under his presidency was in France’s economic
relations to its former colonies and to third countries: it was decided
that these partnerships would now be explicitly and unashamedly linked to
the willingness of these countries’ governments to assist in controlling
migration.
During this time a series of readmission agreements concerning unwanted
migrants from a whole host of countries were negotiated. Between 2008 and
2009, these agreements were at the core of a new generation of bilateral
deals concerning migration that comprised more comprehensive formal
documents.
Prior to this, France had signed a series of agreements that concerned only
readmission for foreign nationals who were undesired or who had committed a
criminal offence. These were mainly with other European states, such as the
Benelux countries (16 May 1964), Croatia (27 January 1995) and Bulgaria (29
May 1996) as well as Switzerland and Liechtenstein (28 October 1998). Deals
were also signed with Latin American countries, e.g. Argentina (1 February
1995), Brazil (28 May 1996) and Venezuela (25 January 1999). However,
agreements up until this point still did not include countries on the
African continent, nor did they factor in other principal countries of
origin for migrants.
From the mid-2000s, some new readmission agreements were issued, which
affected those countries who had high numbers of citizens migrating to
France (agreements were signed with the former Union of Serbia and
Montenegro on 25 April 2006 and with Kosovo on 2 December 2009). The island
of Mauritius became the first African country to sign an agreement with
France, which it did on 15 November 2007.
## Bilateral agreements with African states
During the same period, however, negotiations were taking place on a new
generation of general migration agreements containing regulations on the
“concerted management of migration flows“. These agreements were usually
based on the premise that countries of origin – in exchange for visas for
students and some qualified professionals – would commit to better regulate
outward flows of their nationals and, crucially, to readmit citizens who
had been removed from France. The latter obligation also applied to
third-country nationals who had demonstrably entered France via the
territory in question. Similar agreements were signed with certain African
states: Senegal (23 September 2006), Gabon (5 July 2007), Republic of the
Congo (25 October 2007), Benin (28 November 2007), Tunisia (28 April 2008),
the Cape Verde islands (24 November 2008) as well as Burkina Faso (10
January 2009) and Cameroon (21 May 2009).
Subsequent governments did not challenge these institutional frameworks but
chose to keep existing bilateral agreements. The incumbent social democrat
administration (as of the end of 2016) is trying to call as little
attention to the issue of immigration as possible in an attempt to avoid
domestic controversy and conflict. Instead, the aim has been to maintain
some form of technocratic consensus between the parties of the centre right
and centre left.
On 7 March 2016, what was to be the final reform of France’s immigration
law came into force. Despite being met with criticism from civil society
groups and anti-racism NGOs, the legislation was barely mentioned in public
debate. The reform introduced multiannual residence cards – ranging from
the previously used (limited) 'one-year card’ and the (essentially
unlimited) ‚ten-year card’ – for qualified professionals who fall under
certain categories. This applies to researchers and scientists, for
example, as well as artists and those employed in the cultural sector.
However, the legislation now allows the state to withdraw a residency
permit even if it is still valid. The state is also able to declare a
permit invalid if the authorities judge that the prerequisites for the
granting of the permit are no longer met. This had previously only been
relevant when applying for an extension.
## Approval rate rising
The failures of the French asylum system have often been highlighted in
recent years, one of the most obvious examples being the substantial
shortfalls of housing schemes for individuals awaiting the outcome of their
asylum claim. This is in spite of the fact that the number of asylum
seekers in the country is significantly lower than those applying for
refugee status in Germany. In 2014, a total of 68,811 applications for
asylum were submitted in France. The success rate for applications
processed by the two main national bodies (the French Office for the
Protection of Refugees and Stateless People, OFPRA, and the National Court
of Asylum, CNDA) across the year stood at 28 percent; in 2014 it was 24.5
percent.
In 2015, a total of 80,075 applications for asylum were submitted in
France. In this year the percentage of applications accepted rose to 33.7
percent, but this increase is almost exclusively due to the growing numbers
of asylum applications from Syrian nationals, who are, in most cases,
granted asylum status automatically. Leading members of the French
government have criticised Angela Merkel’s decision to open Europe’s
borders to refugees in the summer of 2015. Perhaps the loudest and most
notable critic has been former Prime Minister Manuel Valls, a member on the
right wing of the Socialist Party (see interview in the Süddeutschen
Zeitung from 25 November 2015).
In 2015/16, France took on a leading role as the EU drew up plans for the
‘distribution’ of migrants, who had entered EU territory in Greece and
Italy, across the union’s 28 member states. The task was to initially find
places for 120,000 refugees within two years. This was then changed to
66,000 by the end of 2017. Due to strong opposition from a number of
central eastern European states – Slovakia was strongly opposed to the
plan, and the Polish government started a campaign against it – most parts
of the agreement were blocked. In August 2016, a mere 2,845 migrants had
been moved from Greece and resettled in another EU state. In the months
that followed, the French government took a back seat when it came to
political initiatives at EU level; at home, the issue all but vanished from
the agenda.
For a brief period in the autumn of 2016, the clearance of the so-called
'jungle’, an informal makeshift camp that had been built on the outskirts
of Calais, became a major domestic issue. The Treaty of Le Touquet (signed
in 2003) meant France had made a pledge to the United Kingdom to keep
migrants on the French side of the Channel and to prevent immigrants
crossing illegally to the British Isles. However, the camp, which had
swelled to around 10,000 people, was rapidly becoming a highly contentious
issue at home with various commentators often referring to it as an
“eyesore“. Between 24 and 26 October 2016 the camp was cleared and
destroyed, but some of the previous occupants managed to evade the
authorities.
Around 5,500 adults and 1,900 unaccompanied minors were taken by bus to one
of 450 temporary accommodation sites in other parts of the country. Once
there, they were only guaranteed refuge for three months. Furthermore, and
contrary to what was originally promised, deportations to other EU
countries (Italy in particular) immediately resumed under the Dublin III
Regulation.
Essentially, the aim was to simply move the perceived problem elsewhere. At
the beginning of 2017, many of those affected who weren’t able to
successfully claim asylum in France once again found themselves with
nothing. In many cases, they also wound up back on the road.
In addition, large parts of the port of Calais are now off limits to
migrants, who might be looking to use the site as a transit point. As of 1
December 2016, a law currently used to enforce the state of emergency
(which is set to be in place at least until 15 July 2017) was applied to
declare the RN 216 access road a specific hazard zone for pedestrians.
Trespassers (in de facto terms, migrants) can be punished with up to six
months’ imprisonment.
In addition to the barriers and fences already in place around the port of
Calais, on 20 September 2016 work began on the construction of a
four-metre-high and one-kilometre-long wall. This will be fitted with CCTV
cameras and searchlights. The aim is to prevent trespassers setting foot on
the road that leads to the port area, a spot where migrants have repeatedly
attempted to smuggle themselves on board lorries and ferries. The bill for
construction (€2.7 million) is being footed by the British government.
Construction on the wall was officially completed on 12 December 2016.
12 Dec 2016
## AUTOREN
(DIR) Bernard Schmid
## TAGS
(DIR) migControl
(DIR) EU-Afrika-Gipfel
## ARTIKEL ZUM THEMA
(DIR) Strategien gegen Migration: Die Wiederentdeckung Afrikas
Mehrere Gipfeltreffen wollen Afrikas Märkte öffnen und Grenzen schließen.
Der Kontinent soll unseren Wünschen gehorchen.