# A Refutation of Traditional Dualism (2005)

No theory has yet been generally accepted as a sound, valid argument for or against the existence of the mind as distinct from the body.  There exist several attempts at rationalizing the various options posited in the debate over the mind-body problem.  The two extremes of thought on this issue – Idealism and Behaviorism – do not provide acceptable answers.  Idealism is the belief everything is mental, while Behaviorism follows a strict Materialism believing that all mental possibilities are only behaviors with no subjectivity.  While it may be comforting to think that all that exists, exists within our minds (in the manner that the Hindus believe all that exists, exists within the Brahman) or that all things are purely material and that humans have no possibility of mental causation, these philosophies do not support what is commonly known (in the sense that we know the sun will come up tomorrow) among living, thinking humans – that we have the ability to choose between actions, to feel, to think, to
 desire, etc. and that we are made up of physical bodies which can interact with a physical world and produce knowledge of that world.  Traditional Dualism attempts to reconcile these two beliefs, but does so in a manner that is not supported by reason, empiricism, or experience.  This form of Dualism holds that there exist at least two distinct substances – the material or physical of which the body is made and the mental or non-material mind.  Traditional Dualism claims that the body has certain attributes exclusive to its nature, such as size, shape, and mass, while the mind has its own exclusive attributes, such as thinking (Preview 163).

There are several arguments for the case of Dualism.  One involves a so-called principle of life, described here:

    A living organism is something over and above the matter of which its body is composed; that it is, in short, an expression of a principle of life, and that life is a force, stream, entity, spirit, call it what you will, that cannot be described or accounted for in material terms; that in human beings this principle of life expresses itself at the level of what is called mind, and that this mind is distinct from both body and brain, … and that no account of mind action which is given in terms of brain action, gland activity, or bodily responses to external stimuli can, therefore, be completely satisfactory. (Joad 167)

This argument firmly asserts that the mind is distinct from the brain – something in direct contradiction with the fact that influences on the brain, such as injury or artificial stimulation or inhibition, can cause changes in the mind of an individual.  Pre-frontal lobotomies were performed in the past by doctors hoping to cure patients of excessive aggressiveness, schizophrenia, and severe mental illness which had common consequences of “apathy, loss of the ability to plan and take initiative, memory disorders, distractibility, and a loss of emotional expressions” (Kalat 99).  The claim that life or the mind cannot be explained in material terms in a completely satisfactory manner is debatable.  There may be the possibility that the mind is nothing more than a side-effect of brain activity, which can be explained in the same sense that a computer programmer can explain the code that makes his software work.  There is also the possibility, as held by the philosophy of Emergent Materialism (and likely 
compatible with Revised Dualism, but not the Traditional variety), that there can be no explanation of the attributes of mind based solely on physical brain activity and that the mind may be an emergent property of the brain, one that is of a higher order than brain activity and inexplicable from the framework of its origins.  This higher order mind, though, through what are called ‘mental forces’, may have the ability to cause mental and physical changes (which is supported by some studies of the mind) while not being (in the words of Roger Sperry, around 1970) “…any disembodied supernatural forces independent of the brain mechanism” and being “inseparably tied to the cerebral structure and its functional organization” (Schwartz 41).  

In any case, Traditional Dualism provides further arguments that do not convince one of its cases.  One such argument is that of “Foresight and Expectation” – Premise 1: Human beings are influenced by the thoughts they have of future events not yet existent; Premise 2: This cannot be explained on the basis of a material response to a physical stimulus; Conclusion 3: Therefore we need to suppose the existence of an immaterial mind.  Premise 1 can be held to be true, while Premise 2 is questionable in its nature, and the Conclusion does not follow.  A Materialistic response could be proposed in a manner following this pattern: the basis of all possible thoughts about possible future events is language (which is a form of physical stimuli, stored in memory from which, also, new language is derived) or insight (clear understanding of complex issues, which can be explained by the natural cognitive functions of the brain); a mind can reason about the future based on language or insight; foresight can be expl
ained by external physical or internal mental stimuli; therefore we do not need to suppose the existence of an immaterial mind.  Another argument for Traditional Dualism is that of purposiveness: Premise 1: People act through conation (in a manner that seems to point to the existence of a spontaneous impulse or need to bring about some other situation which does not yet exist); Premise 2: People will attempt to overcome obstacles impeding these needs; Conclusion 3: A living, creative impulse caused by an immaterial mind is needed to explain this activity (Joad 167).  The premises do not support the conclusion for the same reason that the argument from foresight is not supported – there is no need to explain this impulse through the means of an immaterial mind.  The Emergent form of Materialism provides groundwork for an explanation of these impulses through the means of psychology and a materialistic view without the major drawbacks of other forms of materialism.
	
Some of the arguments against Traditional Dualism include the following.  First is an argument against the interaction of material and immaterial things and therefore the principle of life:  Premise 1: The mind is immaterial; Premise 2: The body is material; Premise 3: The Laws of Conservation of Energy, Mass, and Momentum prevent the interaction of immaterial things with material things; Premise 4: The mind is conscious and able to effect change in the body; Conclusion 5: The mind is not immaterial (Fodor 198).  Secondly, a reasoning that leaves out the separate mind and therefore the problem of mind-body interaction: Premise 1: Men think, feel, desire, choose, etc; Premise 2: Men have bodies; Conclusion 3: Some bodies think, feel, desire, choose, etc (Taylor 187).  Finally, the argument that creating a soul or distinct mind does not explain what it is or how it works; it removes it from the material level, though, and into the immaterial level, where the answer could just as easily be applied to the materi
al level and then avoid the problems inherent in a Traditional Dualistic philosophy as have been laid out earlier. 

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

“Preview”.  Philosophy: Contemporary Perspectives on Perennial Issues 4th edition.  New York, St. Martin’s Press.

Joad, C.E.M.  “The Mind as Distinct from the Body.” Philosophy: Contemporary Perspectives on Perennial Issues 4th edition.  New York, St. Martin’s Press.

Taylor, Richard. “The Case for Materialism.” Philosophy: Contemporary Perspectives on Perennial Issues 4th edition.  New York, St. Martin’s Press.

Fodor, Jerry A. “The Mind-Body Problem.” Philosophy: Contemporary Perspectives on Perennial Issues 4th edition.  New York, St. Martin’s Press.

Kalat, James W. Biological Psychology 8th Edition.  Belmont, CA. Wadsworth/Thomson Learning

Schwartz, Jeffrey M., Sharon Begley.  The Mind and the Brain.  New York, Regan Books