NRA Continues To Defend NICS Improvement Amendments Act: Last week, when the U.S. House of Representatives overwhelmingly passed H.R. 2640, "The NICS Improvement Amendments Act," by a voice vote, some gun owners were confused as to the exact scope and effect of this proactive reform bill. Let's look at the facts... http://www.nraila.org/Legislation/Federal/Read.aspx?id=3128 --- NRA-ILA Alerts: Alerts for the various states are posted on the NRA-ILA website. http://www.nraila.org/Legislation/State/ --- From John Farnam: 18 June 07 More sterile guns and "gunmen"! In looking through a recent issue of a popular American gun magazine, I noted an article on the subject of planes-game hunting. A smiling hunter is pictured with his deceased quarry ( an antelope) and his Ruger single-shot rifle, presumptively the one used to down the animal, obviously unloaded, out of his control, and leaning nonchalantly against the reclining beast. It must the new, accepted norm for "hunters" to pose for photographs with empty guns! It is as if they were saying, "It's okay! My gun is unloaded. I'm harmless/helpless/defenseless. We can all relax now." And, among gun-magazine publishers, it is apparently the new, unwritten rule that hunters may pose with guns, so long as all are obviously unloaded, sterile, and not being held in a way where one could possibly use them for any serious purpose. I had the unhappy experience of hunting with a British PH in South Africa several years ago who had this same pernicious habit of unloading rifles the moment the beast went down and the hunt was supposedly "over." After shooting a large Oryx with a borrowed 270 bolt gun, this PH indicated that he could now take the rifle from me. We'll, I couldn't very well tell him he couldn't have his own rifle back, but I was dismayed and not a little concerned when he promptly unloaded it, all the time complementing me on my accuracy. His congratulatory comments were, as is turns out, premature! After thirty minutes, the "dead" Oryx got back up, looking at the two of us and displaying very little discomfort! We had both been guilty of "relaxing too soon." I drew my G19, which was the only gun I still had. In an embarrassed panic, my PH tried clumsily to reload the rifle. Meanwhile, the animal, apparently bored with both of us, ran away! It was hours before I got another shot at it and finally brought it down for the final time. My PH never asked me to surrender the rifle the rest of that day, and it thus stayed loaded and under my direct control. During WWII, a far wiser General "Vinegar" Joe Stillwell, assigned to the far east, never allowed himself to be photographed while unarmed. Every picture we see of him today shows him with M1 Carbine in hand. A fifteen-round magazine is unfailingly locked in the magazine well, and I have every confidence there was always a round chambered. Joe Stillwell obviously didn't feel a need to apologize for always being ready to act, unlike many in today's generation of hunter/writers. Like Vinegar Joe, I have made it a habit of not allowing myself to be photographed on a hunt while holding an obviously empty gun or with my rifle or shotgun out of my direct control. I believe such photographs convey an arrogant, overly-casual attitude that simultaneously dishonors our quarry and does a disservice to our Art. Nor do I allow myself to be photographed using an autopistol, with slide locked to the rear, as a pointer, calling attention to bullet holes in a paper target. It's a pistol, not a pointer, and such an airheaded stunt does our Art no good service! Decades from now, I, for one, don't want my descendants to look as photos of me, as I am unarmed, clueless, inattentive, and arrogantly assumptive that the fight is over. No, I want all to say of me, if nothing else, "... now, there's a Warrior!" "A mousetrap is an example of excellent "conditioning." It's coiled spring sits expressionless. It has no personal animosity toward mice, any more than it does toward careless index fingers. So long as neither touches the cheese, there is no problem! But, when the cheese is molested, it's reaction is fleet, remorseless, and absolutely invariant." /John 21 June 07 Sage advice from criminal defense attorneys with whom I work: When I am asked by lawyers to provide them with expert consultation in shooting cases, I always make it a point to ask several, general questions about strategies for gun owners/carriers. This advice I, in turn, pass on to my students: The most dangerous and damaging single thing one can do in the wake of a lethal confrontation, the one act that fatally damages most claims of legitimate self-defense? Answering questions asked by police investigators, at the scene, without first insisting on having your attorney present. Even seemingly innocent-sounding statements like, "I didn't mean to....", "It was an accident.....", "This is terrible....", and "I can't believe I did that...." are, in fact, monstrously incriminating. Attorneys tell me that the strongest part of the prosecutor's case is almost always directly founded upon indiscreet statements made, at the scene, by the accused, to police. On the other hand, saying nothing to police carries risks also. When those on one side of the incident talk freely to the police, and those on the other side say nothing, talkers automatically go into the "victim" column on the investigator's notebook, while the silent go into the "perpetrator" column. Those assigned distinctions tend to be permanent and will color the investigation from that point forward. The best compromise is to have your well-rehearsed tape loops ready to go. Tape loops need to be emphatic and unmistakable, but neither rude nor insulting: "Officers, I want to cooperate, but I want my attorney here first" , "I'll be happy to answer all your questions just as soon as my attorney is here." At that point, police are obligated to stop questioning you. However, they may say something to you like, "You can go the 'lawyer-route' is you want, but it won't do you any good.", "You better start answering questions now, while you still have the chance.", "All we want to do is just clear this up.", "You'll feel much better after you talk with us." or, "We only have a few questions, strictly routine..." What they are trying to do is persuade you to definitively rescind your demand that you have a lawyer to represent you during questioning. Once you say,"Okay, I'll talk with you," they will assume, correctly, that you've changed your mind and no longer want a lawyer. Don't do it! Continue to remind investigators that you still want a lawyer and continue to politely decline to answer questions. So, when first confronting arriving police officers, (1) assume a non-threatening posture, with both palms turned outward and clearly visible. Make sure no guns or other weapons are visible. (2) Get into the "victim" column" right away with, "Officers, thank God you're here!" Then (3) identify yourself by saying, "I'm the one who called." VCAs don't call the police very often! When asked what happened, say: "That man tried to murder us," pointing in the direction of the perpetrator. Then comes (4) "I'll be happy to answer all your questions just as soon as my attorney is here." Beyond that, shut your mouth. Don't sign anything and don't "consent" to anything. If arrested, submit peacefully and without comment. When asked if you understand your rights, say "No." When asked what you don't understand, say, "I don't understand any of it." Tape loops need to be practiced every time we go to the range. None of the foregoing may seem important, until the unthinkable happens. Then, I promise you, the nightmare will begin, made all that much worse when you don't know your lines! /John 23 June 07 Why do we adamantly refuse to learn? This, from an LEO friend in the SE: "I attended a one-day conference on LE Crisis Negotiation last week. The session focused on active shooters. One hundred local LEOs attended, along with military MPs and others. We were on a college campus. Most attendees were dressed in BDUs or 'duty-casual' (511 pants, golf shirt w/department logo). Many were in full uniform. Others wore logo-emblazoned blazers. Precious few attendees were armed! I was just about the only one. Most displayed a shiny badge clipped next to an empty holster. Even those in uniform showed up with empty holsters. Nearly all left their guns in their cars before entering the campus. They apparently look upon their personal weapons as inconsequential accouterments, to be discarded at a whim when in a 'safe' environment, and this in the very wake of the VA Tech shootings! Unbelievable! Will we ever learn?" Comment: So long as this civilization looks upon helplessness/defenselessness as "virtues," we will continue to see this kind of institutionalized stupidity, this lemming-like allegiance to enforced impotence, even among LEOs. And, few even question it! /John (Because I was carrying revolvers, whose ammunition would not fit into the pistols on which we were working, I was allowed to remain armed in the three pistol armorer courses I took at last month's IALEFI conference. I nearly bit through my tongue when one of the instructors made a remark that he was sure that all of us would agree that it was very unlikely that anyone would attack us through the back door of the room. Let's see, I'm a terrorist and some of the top law-enforcement trainers in the US are going to be sitting in rooms in large groups here...I recall an incident in Torrance CA, over a decade ago, where an armed robber attempted to take down a conference of officials from a nearby city, including two unarmed police officers. As I recall, one officer was shot fatally and the robber died of a crushed neck.) --- From Force Science Research Center: ======================================= The Force Science News is provided by The Force Science Research Center, a non-profit institution based at Minnesota State University, Mankato. Subscriptions are free and sent via e-mail. To register for your free, direct-delivery subscription, please visit www.forcesciencenews.com and click on the registration button. For reprint clearance, please e-mail: info@forcesciencenews.com. ======================================= I. NEW STUDY: WE'RE GETTING BETTER PREPARED TO WIN ON THE STREET AND IN COURT Part 1 of a 2-part series --A high percentage of officers leave law enforcement after they're involved in a shooting. --Suspects who try to kill officers are usually drunk, drugged, or deranged. --When multiple cops are in an armed confrontation, they'll likely experience "contagion fire" and blast off a wild fusillade of rounds. --In matters of deadly force, when you're sued, you're screwed. Right? Maybe not. Based on a new study of lethal force, it may be time to dump these and other venerable "truths" about police encounters into the dustbin of myth. What is true, according to the latest findings by Dr. Darrell Ross, long-time police trainer, researcher, and expert witness, is hearteningly positive: modern training is paying off for officers in high-stress situations, and the life-or-death decisions they're forced to make "in nanoseconds" are being overwhelmingly supported in the judicial process. In short, says Ross, his study reveals "a resounding common trend: We're getting better prepared for the realities of the street, and we're winning there and in court." Because of the select nature of Ross' research sample, "it cannot necessarily be generalized to all police shootings," observes Dr. Bill Lewinski, executive director of the Force Science Research Center at Minnesota State University-Mankato. "But his excellent and important work brings to light fascinating discoveries about some force encounters that should encourage and motivate trainers, as well as stimulate additional research." Ross, who heads the Dept. of Law Enforcement and Justice Administration at Western Illinois University, presented his research into suspect behavior, "contextual cues," and officer performance, during a 4-hr. session at this year's annual conference of the International Law Enforcement Educators and Trainers Assn. (ILEETA). He recently supplemented his remarks in lengthy interviews with Force Science News. We begin our series of reports on his important findings with his sometimes-surprising discoveries about officer/subject factors in deadly clashes and the aftermaths that swirl in the wake of controversial cases. Ross analyzed roughly "10 years' worth of case material" from 86 lethal force incidents. These confrontations involved 121 officers from 94 municipal, county, state, and campus LE agencies, large and small, from across the U.S., although predominantly (45%) from the Central states. All told, these officers fired 340 shots. Ninety-seven per cent of the suspects were killed, but all officers survived, although about 4 in 10 suffered injuries requiring treatment. "All were high-profile incidents in which I was an expert witness for officers and their agencies in lawsuits, usually Section 1983 [federal civil rights] actions," Ross explains. Wrongful and excessive force was universally alleged. Because of his expert status, Ross had extensive access to reports, investigative files, crime scene evidence, detailed personal interviews, depositions, sworn testimony, training records, and other revealing documentation. He personally visited 65% of the shooting locations under time and weather conditions that mimicked the event to accurately perceive the atmosphere. For the most part, the shootings occurred in 1 of 4 circumstances: the investigation of a suspicious person or activity (32%), during a domestic call (20%), during a vehicle stop (18%), or after a vehicle pursuit (15%). All officers and all suspects were male. Of officers, 55% were white, 30% black, 15% Asian. Their average age was 34, average time in LE 11 years. Some 80% had at least 2 years of college. Seventy per cent were working patrol at the time of the shooting, and for 93%, the shooting analyzed was their first. Seining through thousands of facts in his resource pool, Ross has netted a number of factors that he feels are particularly significant in terms of force dynamics, training, and performance. Some examples: SUSPECT DEMOGRAPHICS. In contrast to the persistent belief that most offenders shot by police are chemically or emotionally disturbed, 85% of the suspects in Ross' study were sober. A minority (25%) were "mentally impaired." More than 1/3 had no prior criminal history. "Officers need to be aware," Ross says, "that they can get dangerous resistance from virtually anyone. People do crazy wild stuff even sober, and without a hard-core criminal past." Also, 65% of the suspects shot were white, challenging the media- and activist-fueled impression that police deadly force involves "just white officers killing blacks." VEHICULAR WEAPONS. Forty per cent of the offenders in this study used or tried to use a motor vehicle as a weapon, and more than 1/4 of the officers involved were actually struck--figures that Ross considers surprisingly high. "Is this a new national trend, or something just true of this sample?" he wonders. He isn't sure. But training in avoiding vehicular assault, such as the pioneering program launched for the Tempe (AZ) PD by Sgt. Craig Stapp, an advisor to the Force Science Research Center, certainly seems prescient to these circumstances. MULTIPLE-SHOOTER IMPACT. In all but 3 of Ross' cases there was a lone suspect and he confronted a lone officer 43% of the time. In 27% of the encounters, multiple officers were present but only 1 fired. Even when multiple officers discharged their weapon (usually a Glock handgun), they averaged just 4 rounds apiece. Media-hyped scenarios in which multiple officers perforate a single suspect with unrestrained volleys are rare anomalies indeed, Ross points out. Much more commonly, even in the presence of other officers "each individual tends to display a disciplined discernment of threat and an understanding of when it is appropriate for him to use deadly force." With multiple rounds flying, "you would think that errant shots might hit innocent bystanders," Ross notes, "but I found no cases of this." Interestingly, officers shoot better when they're alone. Those facing a suspect by themselves delivered their rounds with an 80% accuracy rate. With multiple officers firing, the group accuracy fell to 60%. PHYSICAL PRELUDE. Few shootings evolved from a static, flat-footed stance. In most cases, officers were physically active shortly before shooting, either conducting a foot pursuit (30%), grappling with the suspect (20%), and/or exerting other movement (40%). Four out of 10 said they had to shoot while moving, with 3% firing while being dragged by a vehicle. "All this affects heart rate, breathing, and other physiological responses, and needs to be accommodated for in training," Ross says. He believes officers in the study benefited from a generally high level of physical fitness. Ninety per cent reported maintaining some type of aerobic and strength-conditioning workout at least once a week, with 34% hitting the gym 3-4 days a week and 15% 5 days a week. COVER. Only 15% of the officers had the luxury of using cover. The rest were caught unprotected and even if they tried to move to cover, they didn't have time to reach it before the shooting was over. Amazingly, 1 out of 4 was not wearing soft body armor. TIMING. About 75% of the shootings occurred after the involved officer had been on duty from 4 to 10 hours, from 1/2 to 2/3 into their shift. About 15% were working overtime. Would this suggest that fatigue may have been a factor in the decision to shoot? Ross says he detected no evidence of this in his interviews with the shooters, which typically lasted 3 hours and extensively probed influences on the officers' frame of mind. "But be prepared for plaintiffs' attorneys trying to drag this in as a red herring to bolster a weak case." FIREARMS TRAINING. Modern training methods were strongly evident in the shooters' backgrounds. All had trained in shooting from varied positions and extensively in shooting at night. Seventy-five per cent had practiced instinct shooting, 85% had experience with Simunitions rounds, and 3/4 had scenario-based firearms instruction and exposure to FATS-type systems. Forty per cent had been to a Street Survival Seminar, 55% had trained in reading body language, and roughly 1/3 practiced mental imagery exercises. "All this reflects really good academy and in-service training, employing a wave of techniques that have emerged over the last decade," Ross says. "As officers and as total personalities, these men were very squared away, well prepared for their deadly force encounters." AFTERMATH. Encouragingly, Ross did not find evidence of the profound personal and professional nosedive that some observers would have us believe commonly follows in the wake of a shooting. Two years afterward, 90% of the involved officers were still employed in law enforcement. Indeed, 30% had achieved promotions in rank and responsibility. Only 25% said they had experienced post-shooting stress, usually relatively mild transitory events like nightmares, sleep disruption, temporary substance abuse, obsessively dwelling on the incident, job and relationship problems, and such. Twenty per cent said they had experienced some marital problems in the aftermath, but only half of that group ended up divorcing and most reported that the special stress of the shooting was only one of many factors contributing to the split. Eight out of 10 said their departments were supportive, providing access to critical incident debriefing, counseling, legal assistance, and/or other indications of "being behind the officer," Ross reports. "The better the department gave the officers positive support and encouragement, the better they were able to deal with post-shooting stress issues." Having lived through a shooting experience, would the officers hesitate to pull the trigger if faced with similar circumstances again? Eighty-eight per cent said No. The 12% who said they might pause, potentially putting their lives at greater danger, are a "small but important minority," Ross says, "who represent a training challenge that should not be overlooked." LEGAL OUTCOME. Overwhelmingly, officers and departments in the study fared well in the lawsuits against them. More than half won without even going to trial, when judges ruled in their favor with summary judgments. Of the 1/3 who went to trial, all won, thanks in part to officers "testifying well in court and writing solid reports," Ross says. Fourteen per cent settled out of court, (not necessarily indicative of bad cases but more likely of risk-management jitters, Ross speculates). None was charged criminally. Even though 35% of the suspects who were shot turned out not to have a lethal weapon, judges and juries seemed to understand the severe limitations officers were operating under when making their decisions. For instance, 65% of the shootings occurred outdoors at night or in low-light conditions. And while contact with a suspect may have gone on for several minutes, officers in 95% of the cases had less than 2 seconds (less than 1 second for 70%) to perceive a sudden threat and react to it. "Legally," Ross points out, "an officer's force decisions don't have to be perfect, they just have to be objectively reasonable given the totality of circumstances." Ross cites several arguments commonly advanced by plaintiffs' expert witnesses in an effort to discredit the force decisions the officers made in the cases he reviewed: --The officer "created the harm or put himself in harm's way" because he used poor tactics. --Officers are trained to use lethal force only as a "last resort." --Officers are trained to use "the least amount of force necessary." --Officers "must demonstrate a 'rational fear' of an imminent threat to justify shooting." --Officers are "directed to use levels of force incrementally over several seconds;" i.e., to advance gradually, step by step through trial and error, up the force continuum. All these assertions are erroneous, Ross insists, and were recognized by judicial reviewers in his study as not representing modern constitutional standards. The strength of Ross' study, he says, is that it highlights "trends and patterns that officers, trainers, and administrators need to know about. These are officers who survived on the street and in court because of their decision-making. Their experiences reflect what's happening in the field. "Training should be designed to match reality. If you want your officers to be as successful as these officers, you have to devote the time and money in training to model what they were challenged to cope with and hope you get the same results." [NEXT: Ross' study explores "contextual cues." With limited time to assess a situation, what indicators helped officers detect imminent threatening behavior by suspects and decide when to shoot in self-defense?] ================ (c) 2007: Force Science Research Center, www.forcescience.org. Reprints allowed by request. For reprint clearance, please e-mail: info@forcesciencenews.com. FORCE SCIENCE is a registered trademark of The Force Science Research Center, a non-profit organization based at Minnesota State University, Mankato. ================ -- Stephen P. Wenger Firearm safety - It's a matter for education, not legislation. http://www.spw-duf.info .