2000 COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA NO. 69299 NANCY PERUSEK : : : PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE : JOURNAL ENTRY : v. : AND : KENNETH PERUSEK : OPINION : : DEFENDANT-APPELLANT : DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION: APRIL 18, 1996 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from Domestic Relations Division, No. D-222148. JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED. DATE OF JOURNALIZATION: APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellee: Gary B. Kabat, Esq. Christina M. Janice, Esq. Kabat, Mielziner, Sobel & Janice 25550 Chagrin Boulevard, No. 403 Beachwood, OH 44122 For Defendant-Appellant: Jonell R. Glitzenstein, Esq. 5885 Landerbrook Drive Suite 205 Cleveland, OH 44124 -2- DAVID T. MATIA, J.: Kenneth Perusek, defendant-appellant/cross-appellee, appeals the decision of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, granting the parties a divorce. Defendant- appellant assigns four errors for review concerning: 1) the trial court's determination of both parties' income, 2) the trial court's failure to make specific findings supporting its spousal support award and 3) the trial court's award of attorney/expert fees. Nancy Perusek, plaintiff-appellee/cross-appellant, assigns two errors for review concerning the trial court's division of property and the spousal support award. This court, finding error, affirms in part and reverses in part the decision of the trial court and remands the case back for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. I. STATEMENT OF FACTS Kenneth Perusek, defendant-appellant/cross-appellee, and Nancy Perusek, plaintiff-appellee/cross-appellant, were married on January 25, 1969. Two children were born as issue to the marriage, to wit: Adam born October 11, 1977 and Heather born January 13, 1979. Plaintiff-appellee was granted a divorce on the grounds that defendant-appellant was guilty of gross neglect. The trial court found the duration of the marriage was from January 25, 1969 to December 31, 1994. Moreover, the parties agreed that plaintiff- appellee should be the residential parent and legal custodian of -3- the minor children and that defendant-appellant should have visitation pursuant to the guidelines set by the court. At the time of the divorce, defendant-appellant was a partner in two companies, Neotech, Inc. and Cybertron, Inc. The court determined defendant-appellant's income to be $86,000 per year, and plaintiff-appellee's annual income to be $13,000. The trial court ordered defendant-appellant to pay child support in the amount of $598.41 per month per child plus poundage until each child is emancipated and has completed high school or until further ordered by the court. Additionally, defendant-appellant was also ordered to pay spousal support in the amount of $1,500 per month for eight years from the date of journalization of the entry or until death, remarriage or cohabitation of wife. The trial court divided the marital assets equally. The court further ordered defendant-appellant to pay one-half or $13,000 of plaintiff-appellee's attorney fees and costs. Defendant-appellant timely filed this appeal. II. FIRST AND SECOND ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR Since Kenneth Perusek's, defendant-appellant/cross-appellee's, first and second assignments of error contain similar issues of law and fact, this court will consider them concurrently. I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION TO THE PREJUDICE OF APPELLANT IN IMPUTING APPELLEE'S INCOME AT $13,000.00 AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION TO THE PREJUDICE OF APPELLANT IN FINDING THAT APPELLANT'S -4- INCOME WAS $86,000.00 AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. A. ISSUE RAISED: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DETERMINING THE PARTIES' INCOMES. Defendant-appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion in determining both his and Nancy Perusek's, plaintiff-appellee's, yearly income. Specifically, as it relates to the court's determination of Nancy Perusek's income, defendant-appellant argues the figure must stem from her gross income plus any potential income. Contrary to the trial court's determination, defendant-appellant argues plaintiff-appellee was making $16,900 as opposed to $13,000 when she quit her job. According to defendant-appellant, the trial court failed to consider plaintiff-appellee's own testimony that she was making $300/month from Neotech, Inc in addition to her $13,000 salary 1 from Cybertron, Inc. Moreover, the individual who took her place was offered $18,720 and now makes $20,800. Therefore, defendant-appellant argues, not only did the trial court err in failing to consider what plaintiff-appellee would have been making had she not voluntarily quit her job, but it also erred in determining her income at the time of leaving as $13,000 as opposed to $16,600. As to defendant-appellant's own income, he argues since he is employed, his income should be his gross income, $66,300. 1 We note defendant-appellant's figure for projected income of $16,900 is in error as $300/month for twelve months plus a base of $13,000 is $16,600/year. -5- Defendant-appellant argues the trial court erred by adding $10,000 to his income based upon a $200/week raise his partner took only a month before trial which he never took. Moreover, defendant-appellant argues the trial court erred in adding another $10,000 to his income based upon perquisites he received through his corporations. The defendant-appellant argues the exact dollar amount of these perquisites was never established at trial. Defendant-appellant's first and second assignments of error are well taken in part. B. STANDARD OF REVIEW: ABUSE OF DISCRETION. Relevant to these assignments of error is a recitation of R.C. 3113.215(A) which states in pertinent part: (1) "Income" means either of the following: (a) For a parent who is employed to full capacity, the gross income of the parent; (b) For a parent who is unemployed or underemployed, the sum of the gross income of the parent, and any potential income of the parent. (2) "Gross income" means, ***, the total of all earned and unearned income from all sources during a calendar year, whether or not the income is taxable, and includes, but is not limited to income from salaries, wages, ***, and all other 2000 sources of income ***. (3) "Self-generated income" means gross receipts received by a parent from self- employment, proprietorship of a business, joint ownership or closely held corporation, and rents minus ordinary and necessary expenses incurred by the parent in generating the gross receipts. "Self-generating income" -6- includes expense reimbursements or in-kind payments received by a parent from self- employment, the operation of a business, or rents, including, but not limited to, company cars, free housing, reimbursed meals, and other benefits, if the benefits are significant and reduce personal living expenses. * * * (5) "Potential income" means both of the following for a parent that the court, ***, determines is voluntarily unemployed or voluntarily underemployed. (a) Imputed income that the court or agency determines the parent would have earned if fully employed as determined from the parent's employment potential and probable earnings based on the parent's recent work history, the parent's occupational qualifications, and the prevailing job opportunities and salary levels in the community in which the parent resides; * * * The definition of "income" as set forth in R.C. 3113.215 is intended to be both broad and flexible. See, e.g., Williams v. Williams (1991), 74 Ohio App.3d 838; Rapp v. Rapp (1993), 89 Ohio App.3d 85. Moreover, it is axiomatic that a trial court must have discretion to do what is equitable upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Cherry v. Cherry (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 348. Accordingly, a trial court's determination as to what constitutes each parties' income will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. See Rock v. Cabral (1993) 67 Ohio St.3d 108. "The term `abuse of discretion' connotes more than an -7- error of law or judgment; it implies that the court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable." Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217. See, also, Booth v. Booth (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 142. C. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN CALCULATING PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE'S INCOME. In the case sub judice, the trial court found Nancy Perusek, plaintiff-appellee, to be fully capable of working. The court stated: Plaintiff has a work history as a bookkeeper. She last worked at Cybertron for $13,000 per year (her replacement was paid $18,000.00 at time of hire and at time of trial was making $20,000.00 per year). Plaintiff essentially testified at trial that she quit working at Cybertron because she wanted to spend more time with her children. * * * Mrs. Perusek is fully capable of working, her children will be emancipated in two (2) years. Given the financial posture of the family, it is reasonable to expect Mrs. Perusek to work and to impute Mrs. Perusek's final income at Cybertron of $13,000.00 to her. Thus, from a review of the trial court's own "Memorandum of Decision with Findings of Fact," the court did in fact consider the fact that plaintiff-appellee's replacement was hired at $18,000 and was, at the time of trial, making approximately $20,000. Moreover, from a review of the record, one of the reasons plaintiff-appellee left employment was the fact that the companies were growing and would be requiring an employee who not only could put in more hours than she could, but also someone who -8- was more skilled. Accordingly, we cannot find the trial court abused its discretion in failing to make an upward adjustment in recognition of plaintiff-appellee's replacement's starting and/or present day salary. However, we do find the trial court abused its discretion in failing to include $300/month to plaintiff-appellee's "income". From a review of the record, it is apparent the trial court based its decision upon what plaintiff-appellee had been making at the time she voluntarily left employment. However, it is undisputed that plaintiff-appellee was at that time earning $13,000/year from Cybertron, Inc. and $300/month (or $3,600/year) from Neotech Inc. As such, plaintiff-appellee's total income at the time she voluntarily left employment was $16,600/year. The trial court therefore abused its discretion in failing to consider this additional income. D. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN CALCULATING DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S INCOME. It is undisputed that defendant-appellant's annual income from his partnership dealings amounted to approximately $66,300. The trial court stated: The Court finds that throughout the Perusek/Kain partnership, Messrs. Perusek and Kain drew the same salaries. During the divorce proceedings, Kain "gave himself" a $10,000.00 a year raise, Perusek did not. Perusek claimed he did not "deserve" one, but the evidence was overwhelming that the money was in the corporation to be drawn upon, and the Court finds Mr. Perusek's refusal to draw the raise was motivated more by the divorce proceedings than any humble declination of entitlement. -9- Defendant's base pay plus the available- but-not-taken raise, is $76,000.00 annually. He receives additional "perks" from the company (automobile maintenance, insurance, health coverage, automobile allowance) of approximately $10,000.00 per year. Hence, the Court finds Mr. Perusek's income to be $86,000.00 per year. Again, "self-generating income" includes expense reimbursements or in-kind payments received by a parent. R.C. 3113.215(A)(3). Therefore it was not improper for the trial court to consider an adjustment based upon the above stated "perks." From a review of the record we find sufficient evidence supporting the trial court's valuation of defendant-appellant's "perks" to be approximately $10,000 annually. With regards to the court's decision to impute his partner's $10,000/year raise to defendant-appellant, we note there exists sufficient credible evidence in the record supporting the trial court's determination that corporations at issue did in fact have the money available to be drawn upon by defendant-appellant. Keeping in mind that the weight to be given this evidence as well as the credibility of the witnesses is primarily a function for the trier of fact, State v. DeHass (1983), 20 Ohio St.2d 230, we cannot find the court abused its discretion in finding defendant- appellant's refusal to draw his raise from said corporations was based primarily on the divorce proceedings. D. CONCLUSION. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining defendant-appellant's annual income to be $86,000. However, the -10- trial court did err by failing to take into consideration the fact that plaintiff-appellee made an additional $3,600/year from Neotech, Inc. at the time she voluntarily left employment. Therefore, the case is remande 2000 d back to the trial court for a re- calculation of plaintiff-appellee's income and for any changes in the child/spousal support the court deems proper. III. THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR Kenneth Perusek, defendant-appellant/cross-appellee, states as his third assignment of error: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION TO THE PREJUDICE OF APPELLANT IN FAILING TO MAKE SPECIFIC FINDINGS AS TO APPELLEE'S NEEDS IN SUFFICIENT ENOUGH DETAIL FOR A REVIEWING COURT TO MAKE A DETERMINATION AS TO THE FAIRNESS AND EQUITABLENESS OF THE SPOUSAL SUPPORT AWARD. A. ISSUE RAISED: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO INDICATE ITS BASIS FOR THE SPOUSAL SUPPORT AWARD. Defendant-appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion in failing to support its spousal support award in sufficient detail. Specifically, defendant-appellant argues the trial court failed to make specific findings to demonstrate plaintiff-appellee's "needs" at the time of the trial which would support the spousal support award. Defendant-appellant's third assignment of error is not well taken. B. STANDARD OF REVIEW: SUSTENANCE ALIMONY AWARD. In Ohio, alimony is comprised of two components: a division of marital assets and liabilities, and periodic payments for -11- sustenance and support. Cherry v. Cherry (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 348. "Sustenance alimony is based on need, and the trial court must have latitude to examine all the evidence before it awards an amount that is reasonable and equitable to both parties." Kaechele v. Kaechele (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 93, 95. Although the trial court has discretion in determining the nature, amount, and manner, of payment of spousal support, R.C. 3105.18(C)(1) sets forth relevant factors the court must consider in its determination. See Gullia v. Gullia (1994), 93 Ohio App.3d 653. These factors are listed as follows: (a) The income of the parties, from all sources, including, but not limited to, income derived from property divided, disbursed, or distributed under section 3105.171 [3105.17.1] of the Revised Code. (b) The relative earning abilities of the parties; (c) The ages and the physical, mental, and emotional conditions of the parties; (d) The retirement benefits of the parties; (e) The duration of the marriage; (f) The extent to which it would be inappropriate for a party, because he will be custodian of a minor child of the marriage, to seek employment outside the home; (g) The standard of living of the parties established during the marriage; (h) The relative extent of education of the parties; (i) The relative assets and liabilities of the parties, including but not limited to any court-ordered payments by the parties; -12- (j) The contribution of each party to the education, training, or earning ability of the other party, including but not limited to, any party's contribution to the acquisition of a professional degree of the other party; (k) The time and expense necessary for the spouse who is seeking spousal support to acquire education, training, or job experience so that the spouse will be qualified to obtain appropriate employment, provided the education, training, or job experience, and employment is, in fact, sought; (l) The tax consequences, for each party, of an award of spousal support; (m) The lost income production capacity of either party that resulted from that party's marital responsibilities; (n) Any other factor that the court expressly finds to be relevant and equitable. Addressing these statutory guidelines, the Ohio State Supreme Court in Kaechele, supra, held in paragraph one and two of the syllabus: 1. In making a sustenance alimony award, the trial court must consider all the factors listed in R.C. 3105(B) [now R.C. 3105.18(C)] and not base its determination upon any one of those factors taken in isolation. 2. In allocating property between the parties to a divorce and in making an award of sustenance alimony, the trial court must indicate the basis for its award in sufficient detail to enable a reviewing court to determine that the award is fair, equitable and in accordance of law. Finally, we again note that a trial court is provided with broad discretion in deciding what is equitable upon the facts and -13- circumstances of each case, however, such discretion is not limited. Kunkle v. Kunkle (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 64, 76. A reviewing court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the trial court unless, considering the totality of the circumstances, the trial court abused its discretion. As we noted in Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, for an abuse of discretion to exist, the court's attitude must be unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable and not merely an error of law or judgment. With these principles in mind, we address plaintiff- appellant's third assignment of error. C. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY FAILING TO INDICATE THE BASIS FOR ITS SPOUSAL SUPPORT DETERMINATION. After a review of the trial court's "Memorandum of Decision With Findings of Fact" it is clear that in making its spousal support determination, the trial court considered the assets and liabilities of the parties, the relative earning capabilities of the parties along with all of the other factors set forth in R.C. 3105.18. As a result of these considerations, the trial court held plaintiff-appellee's needs clearly exceeded her imputed income and therefore she was in need of spousal support. D. CONCLUSION. Accordingly, since there is sufficient credible evidence establishing the trial court considered the guidelines set forth in R.C. 3105.18(C) in determining its spousal support award, we cannot hold that the trial court abused its discretion. -14- Defendant-appellant's third assignment of error is not well taken. IV. FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR Kenneth Perusek, defendant-appellant/cross-appellee, states as his fourth assignment of error: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION TO THE PREJUDICE OF APPELLANT IN AWARDING AS AND FOR ADDITIONAL SPOUSAL SUPPORT A PORTION OF APPELLEE'S ATTORNEY FEES AND EXPERT FEES AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. A. ISSUE RAISED: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING ATTORNEY/EXPERT FEES. Defendant-appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion in ordering defendant-appellant to pay $13,000 for plaintiff-appellee's attorney fees. Defendant-appellant argues the trial court: 1) failed to consider all of the relevant factors necessary for its award, 2) the trial court based the award solely upon defendant-appellant's ability to pay after the court held after the division of assets, "neither party would have sufficient assets to pay 2000 the admittedly high attorney fees" and 3) the trial court failed to account for $4,000 plaintiff- appellee testified she took from Cybertron, Inc., $2,000 of which she used to pay her attorney fees. Defendant-appellant's fourth assignment of error is well taken in part. B. STANDARD OF REVIEW: ATTORNEY FEES. The award of attorney fees is promulgated through R.C. 3105.18(H) which reads: -15- In divorce or legal separation proceedings, the court may award reasonable attorney's fees to either party at any stage of the proceedings, including but not limited to, any appeal, any proceeding arising from a motion to modify a prior order or decree, and any proceeding to enforce a prior order or decree, if it determines that the other party has the ability to pay the attorney's fees that the court awards. When the court determines whether to award reasonable attorney's fees to any party pursuant to this division, it shall determine whether either party will be prevented from fully litigating his rights and adequately protecting his interests if it does not award reasonable attorney fees. The awarding of attorney fees is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Swanson v. Swanson (1976), 48 Ohio App.2d 85. Upon appeal, the questions for inquiry are whether the factual conclusions upon which the trial court based the exercise of its discretion were against the manifest weight of the evidence or whether there was an abuse of discretion. Id. at 90. See, also, Gullia v. Gullia (1994), 93 Ohio App.3d 653, 661; Birath v. Birath (1988), 53 Ohio App.3d 31. C. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES. In the case sub judice, the trial court stated in its "Memorandum of Decision with Findings of Fact": The Court finds that after the division of assets above, neither party will have sufficient liquid assets to pay the admittedly high attorney fees necessitated above. *** The trial court then stated in its "Supplemental Memorandum": -16- Defendant's income as compared to that of Plaintiff justifies his sharing in Plaintiff's attorney fees and costs. Defendant should contribute the sum of $13,000 toward Plaintiff's fees and costs as and for additional spousal support. While wife's income is insufficient to pay the balance of this debt, she does own a house with a minimal mortgage capable of paying the balance of her fees and costs. The trial court's recognition that neither party presently had sufficient liquid assets to cover the costs of the attorney fees does not necessarily mean that neither party had the ability to pay attorney fees. From a review of the record it is clear the trial court did consider the factors set forth in R.C. 3105.18 in determining the parties' income and relative earning capabilities. From this determination, the trial court held defendant-appellant had the ability to pay the attorney fees the court awarded pursuant to R.C. 3105.18(H). Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney fees as additional spousal support. However, there is conflicting testimony as to whether plaintiff-appellee had permission to withdraw approximately $4,000 from her Cybertech, Inc.'s money market account. On the other hand, it is undisputed that from this $4,000, plaintiff-appellee paid $2,000 towards her attorney fees. From a review of the record, we are unable to ascertain if the trial court considered this payment when making its award of attorney fees and if it did, how the $2,000 affects the overall attorney fee charged to defendant-appellant. D. CONCLUSION. -17- As this case is being remanded back to the trial court for a re-calculation of plaintiff-appellee's income, we remand the trial court's award of attorney fees for further findings consistent with this opinion. Defendant-appellant's fourth assignment of error is well taken in part. V. FIRST CROSS-ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR Nancy Perusek, plaintiff-appellee/cross-appellant, states as her first assignment of error: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ADOPTING THE FIGURE OF $157,000.00 AS THE VALUE OF APPELLANT'S CORPORATE INTERESTS FOR PURPOSES OF PROPERTY DIVISION, AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. A. ISSUE RAISED: WHETHER THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ITS VALUATION OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S CORPORATE INTERESTS. Plaintiff-appellee argues the trial court abused its discretion in valuating the worth of defendant-appellant's corporate interests in Cybertron, Inc. and Neotech, Inc. Specifically, plaintiff-appellee argues the trial court abused its discretion in adopting a figure for the company's inventory which all three expert witnesses testified was unreliable. Since the trial court failed to make the proper adjustments to compensate for the unreliable inventory figure, plaintiff- appellee argues the trial court abused its discretion in valuating defendant-appellant's interest in Cybertron, Inc. and Neotech, Inc. at $157,000 thereby reducing the property settlement awarded to her. -18- Plaintiff-appellee's first cross-assignment of error is not well taken. B. STANDARD OF REVIEW: DIVISION OF MARITAL PROPERTY. When dividing marital property, if there exists conflicting testimony as to the value of a certain property, the determination of which value to accept is a question of credibility of the witnesses that is to be resolved by the trier of fact. See Willis v. Willis (1984), 19 Ohio App.3d 45. However, the trial court must justify the value it chooses by providing sufficient credible evidence in its entry supporting and explaining its decision. See Bollas v. Bollas (Dec. 1, 1984), Trumball App. No. 88-T-4089, unreported. Failure to adequately support its valuation of marital property constitutes an abuse of discretion by the trial court. See Kaechele v. Kaechele (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 93. C. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN VALUATING DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S CORPORATE INTERESTS. In the case sub judice, a review of the trial court's "Memorandum of Decision with Findings of Fact" establishes that the trial court was fully aware of the unreliability surrounding the inventory conducted for valuation purposes. However, it was at that time the best figure available. The court then stated that it found the adjustments proposed by one of the evaluators, and plaintiff-appellee, to be speculative. It is clear that the trial carefully analyzed all three valuations, understood the reasons for the discrepancies, and chose what it felt to be the -19- most accurate assessment of the present fair market value of defendant-appellant's corporate interest. D. CONCLUSION. Since the trial court substantiated its valuation of defendant-appellant's corporate interest with sufficient credible evidence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Plaintiff-appellee's first cross-assignment of error is not well taken. VI. SECOND CROSS-ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR Nancy Perusek, plaintiff-appellee/cross-appellant, states as 150c her second assignment of error: THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY FAILING TO AWARD APPELLEE LIFETIME SPOUSAL SUPPORT. A. ISSUE RAISED: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING SPOUSAL SUPPORT. Plaintiff-appellee argues the trial court abused its discretion in limiting the spousal support award to a period of eight years. Specifically, plaintiff-appellee argues she is entitled to lifetime spousal support since: 1) the marriage was of a long duration, to wit: twenty five (25) years, 2) plaintiff- appellee is forty-five (45) years old and 3) plaintiff-appellee has only a high school degree and an earning ability of no greater than $13,000. For these reasons, plaintiff-appellee argues she will not be able to become self-supporting to the extent that she would have a standard of living comparable to that which the parties enjoyed while they were married. -20- Plaintiff-appellee's second cross-assignment of error is not well taken. B. STANDARD OF REVIEW: SPOUSAL SUPPORT PAYMENTS. In Ohio, alimony consists of two components: a division of marital assets and liabilities, and periodic payments of sustenance and support. Kaechele v. Kaechele (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 93. The trial court is given broad discretion in determining the appropriate spousal support based upon the particular facts and circumstances of each case, and such determination will not be disturbed by this court absent an affirmative showing that the trial court abused its discretion. Cherry v. Cherry (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 348; Pendleton v. Pendleton (1989), 65 Ohio App.3d 763. In Kunkle v. Kunkle (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 64, 68-69, the Ohio State Supreme Court summarized the approach to be used by a trial court regarding a termination date for spousal support payments: Hence, it follows that a trial court must determine whether there is a need for sustenance alimony, and, if so, the amount needed and the duration of the need. Need is "[a] relative term, the conception of which must, within reasonable limits, vary with the personal situation of the individual employing it. [The] [t]erm means to have urgent or essential use ***." After determining a need exists, the court is then confronted with the often difficult task of determining the duration of the need. The modern trend favors terminating alimony on a date certain. The reason for awarding sustenance alimony payable only to a date certain is that the payee's need requiring support ceases, when, under reasonable circumstances, the payee can become self- -21- supporting. Conversely, if under reasonable circumstances a divorced spouse does not have the resources, ability or potential to become self-supporting, then an award of sustenance alimony for life would be proper. (Citations omitted.) (Emphasis in original.) With these principles in mind, we address plaintiff-appellee's second assignment of error. C. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN LIMITING THE DURATION OF THE SPOUSAL SUPPORT AWARD. In the present case it is undisputed plaintiff-appellee voluntarily quit her job. Moreover, being only forty-five (45) years old with experience as a business/accounting bookkeeper, the trial court found plaintiff-appellee was fully capable of working and that it was reasonable to expect her to work. Based upon a review of the record, we cannot find that the trial court abused its discretion in making these determinations. D. CONCLUSION. There exists ample evidence supporting the trial court's conclusion that plaintiff-appellee was capable of returning to the work force and becoming self-supporting. Plaintiff- appellee's second cross-assignment of error is not well taken. Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. -22- This cause is affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion herein. It is, therefore, considered that said appellant and said appellee shall bear their own costs. It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. HARPER, P.J. and PORTER, J., CONCUR. DAVID T. MATIA JUDGE N.B. This entry is made pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 22(D), Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is an announcement of decision (see Rule 26). Ten (10) days from the date hereof this document will be stamped to indicate . 0