The defensive position taken up by Edward, the Black Prince, upon
Sunday the 18th of September 1356, and used by him in the decisive
action of the following day, is composed of very simple elements; which
are essentially a shallow dip (about thirty feet only in depth),
bounded by two slight parallel slopes, the one of which the
Anglo-Gascon force held against the advance of the King of France's
cosmopolitan troops from the other.
We can include all the business of that Monday's battle in a
parallelogram lying true to the points of the compass, and measuring
three miles and six furlongs from north to south, by exactly two and a
half miles from east to west; while the actual fighting is confined to
an inner parallelogram no more than two thousand yards from east to
west, by three thousand from north to south. The first of these areas
is that given upon the coloured map which forms the frontispiece of
this little book. The second is marked by a black frame within that
coloured map, the main features of which are reproduced in line upon a
larger scale on the page opposite this.
I have said that the essentials of the Black Prince's defensive plan
were:
(1) A prepared defensive position, which it might or might not be
necessary to hold, coupled with
(2) an obstacle, the Miosson River, which (when he should retreat)
he could count upon to check pursuit; especially as its little valley
was (a) fairly deeply cut, (b) encumbered by wood, and (
c) passable for troops only at the bridge of Nouaillé, which he was
free to cut when it had served him, and at a somewhat hidden ford which
I will later describe.
I must here interpose the comment that the bridge of Nouaillé, being
of stone, would not have been destroyable during a very active and
pressed retreat under the conditions of those times; that is, without
the use of high explosives. But it must be remembered that such a
narrow passage would in any case check the pursuit, that half an hour's
work would suffice to make a breach in the roadway, and perhaps to get
rid of the keystones, that a few planks thrown over the gap so formed
would be enough to permit archers defending the rear to cross over,
that these planks could then be immediately withdrawn, and that the
crush of a hurried pursuit, which would certainly be of heavily armed
and mounted knights, would be badly stopped by a gap of the kind. I
therefore take it for granted that the bridge of Nouaillé was a capital
point in Edward's plan.[3]
[Illustration]
The line along which the Black Prince threw up entrenchments was the
head of the slight slope upon the Nouaillé or eastern side of the
depression I have mentioned. It ran from the farm Maupertuis (now
called La Cardinerie) to the site of those out-buildings which surround
the modern steadings of Les Bordes, and to-day bear the name of La
Dolerie. The length of that line was, almost to a foot, one thousand
English yards, and it will easily be perceived that even with his small
force only a portion of his men were necessary to hold it. Its strength
and weakness I shall discuss in a moment. This line faces not quite due
west, indeed nearly twenty degrees north of west.[4] Its distance as
the crow flies from the Watergate of Poitiers is just under seven
kilometres, or, as nearly as possible, four miles and six hundred and
fifty English yards.[5] While its bearings from the town of Poitiers,
or the central part thereof, is a trifle south of due south-east.[6]
The line thus taken up, and the depression in front of it, are both
singularly straight, and the slope before the entrenchments, like its
counterpart opposite, is regular, increasing in depth as the depression
proceeds down towards the Miosson, which, at this point, makes a bend
upward to meet, as it were, the little valley. A trifle to the south of
the centre of the line there is a break in the uniformity of the ridge,
which comes in the shape of a little dip now occupied by some
tile-works; and on the further, or French, side a corresponding and
rather larger cleft faces it; so that the whole depression has the
shape of a long cross with short arms rather nearer its base than its
summit. Just at the end of the depression, before the ground sinks
abruptly down to the river, the soil is marshy.
Leading towards this position from Poitiers there was and is but one
road, a winding country lane, now in good repair, but until modern
times of a poor surface, and never forming one of the great high roads.
The importance of this unique road will be seen in a moment.
There had once existed, five hundred yards from the right of the
Black Prince's entrenched line, a Roman road, the traces of which can
still be discovered at various parts of its course, but which, even by
the time of Poitiers, had disappeared as a passable way. The only
approach remaining, as I have said, was that irregular lane which
formed the connection between Poitiers and Nouaillé.
Now in most terrains where feudal cavalry was concerned, the
existence or non-existence of a road, and its character, would be of
little moment in the immediate neighbourhood of the action: for though
a feudal army depended (as all armies always must) upon roads for its
strategics, it was almost independent of them in its tactics
upon those open fields which were characteristic of mediæval
agriculture. The mounted and armoured men deployed and charged across
the stubble. Those who have read the essay upon the Terrain of Crécy,
which preceded this in the present series, will appreciate that the
absence of a road uniting the English and French positions in that
battle was of no significance to the result.
But in the particular case of Poitiers this road, and a certain
cart-track leading off it, must be carefully noted, because between
them they determine all that happened; and the reason of this is that
the front of the English position was covered with vines.
The French method of cultivating the vine, and the condition of that
cultivation in the middle of September (in all but a quite
exceptionally early year so far north as Poitou), makes of a vineyard
the most complete natural obstacle conceivable against the use of
cavalry, and at the same time a most formidable entanglement to the
advance of infantry, and a tolerable cover for missile weapons at short
range.
The vine is cultivated in France upon short stakes of varying height
with varying districts, but usually in this neighbourhood somewhat over
four feet above the ground; that is, covering most of a man's figure,
even as he would stand to arms with a long-bow, yet affording space
above for the discharge of the weapon. These stakes are set at such
distances apart as allow ordered and careful movement between them, but
close enough together to break and interfere with a pressed advance:
their distances being determined by the fulness of the plant before the
grapes are gathered, a harvest which falls in that region somewhat
later than the date of the action.
Wherever a belt of vineyard is found, cultivated after this fashion,
the public ways through it are the only opportunities for advance; for
land is so valuable under the grape that various allotments or
properties are cultivated to their outermost limit. The vineyards
(which have now disappeared, but which then stood upon the battlefield)
could only be pierced by the roads I have mentioned.[7]
This line, then, already well protected by the vineyards, was
further strengthened by the presence of a hedge which bounded them and
ran along their eastern edge upon the flat land above the depression.
I have mentioned a cart-track, which branched off on the main lane,
and which is marked upon my map with the letters “A-A.” It formed,
alongside with the lane, a second approach through the English line,
and it must be noticed that, like the main lane, a portion of it, where
it breasted the slope, was sunk in those times below the level of the
land on either side.
The first thought that will strike the modern student of such a
position is that a larger force, such as the one commanded by the King
of France, should have been able easily to turn the defensive upon its
right.
Now, first, a feudal army rarely manoeuvred. For that matter, the
situation was such that if John had avoided a fight altogether, and had
merely marched down the great south-western road to block Prince
Edward's retreat, the move would have had a more complete effect than
winning a pitched battle. The reader has also heard how the Black
Prince's sense of his peril was such that he had been prepared to treat
upon any but the most shameful terms. It is evident, therefore, that if
the French fought at all it was because they wanted to fight, and that
they approached the conflict in the spirit (which was that of all their
time) disdainful of manoeuvring and bound in honour to a frontal
attack. A modern force as superior in numbers as was John's to the
Black Prince's would have “held” the front of the defensive with one
portion of its effectives, while another portion marched round that
defensive's right flank. But it is impossible to establish a comparison
between developed tactics and the absolutely simple plan of feudal
warfare. It is equally impossible to compare a modern force with a
feudal force of that date. It had not the unity of command and the
elasticity of organisation which are necessary to divided and
synchronous action. It had no method of attack but to push forward
successive bodies of men in the hope that the weight of the column
would tell.
Secondly, Edward defended that right flank from attack by
establishing there his park of waggons.
None the less, the Black Prince could not fail to see the obvious
danger of the open right upon the plateau beyond the Roman road; even
in the absence of any manoeuvring, the mere superior length of the
French line might suffice to envelop him there. It was presumably upon
this account that he stationed a small body of horse upon that slightly
higher piece of land, five hundred yards behind Maupertuis and a little
to the right of it, which is now the site of the railway station; and
this mounted force which he kept in reserve was to prove an excellent
point of observation during the battle. It was the view over towards
the French position obtained from it which led, as will be seen in the
next section, to the flank charge of the Captal de Buch.
There remains to be considered such environments of the position as
would affect the results of the battle. I have already spoken of the
obstacle of the Miosson, of Nouaillé, of the passages of the river, and
of the woods which would further check a pursuit if the pressure
following upon a partial defeat, or upon a determination to retire
without accepting action, should prove serious. I must now speak of
these in a little more detail.
The depression, which was the main feature of the battlefield, is
carved like its fellows out of a general and very level plateau of a
height some four hundred to four hundred and fifty feet above the sea.
This formation is so even that all the higher rolls of the land are
within ten or twenty feet of the same height. They are, further, about
one hundred feet, or a little more, higher than the water level of the
local streams. This tableland, and particularly the ravine of the
Miosson, nourishes a number of woods. One such wood, not more than a
mile long by perhaps a quarter broad, covers Nouaillé, and intervenes
between that town and the battlefield. On the other side of the Miosson
there is a continuous belt of wood five miles long, with only one gap
through it, which gap is used by the road leading from Nouaillé to
Roches and to the great south-western road to Bordeaux.
In other words, the Black Prince had prepared his position just in
front of a screen of further defensible woodland.
I have mentioned one last element in the tactical situation of which
I have spoken, and which needs careful consideration.
Over and above the passage of the Miosson by a regular bridge and a
proper road at Nouaillé, the water is fordable in ordinary weather at a
spot corresponding to the gap between the woods, and called “Man's
Ford” or “Le Gué d'Homme.” Now, of the several accounts of the action,
one, the Latin chronicler Baker, mentions the ford, while another, the
rhymed French story of the Chandos Herald, speaks of Edward's
having begun to retire, and of part of his forces having already
crossed the river before contact took place. I will deal later with
this version; but in connection with the ford and whether Edward either
did or intended to cross by it, it is worthy of remark that the only
suggestion of his actually having crossed it, and of his intention to
do so in any case, is to be found in the rhymed chronicle of the
Chandos Herald; and the question arises—what reliance should be
placed on that document?
It is evident on the face of it that the detail of the retreat was
not invented. Everyone is agreed that the rhymed chronicle of the
Chandos Herald does not carry the same authority as prose
contemporary work. It is not meant to. It is a literary effort rather
than a record. But there would be no reason for inventing such a point
as the beginning of a retreat before an action—not a very glorious or
dramatic proceeding—and the mere mention of such a local feature as
the ford in Baker is clear proof that what we can put together from the
two accounts is based upon an historical event and the memory of
witnesses.
On the other hand, the road proper ran through Nouaillé, and when
you are cumbered with a number of heavy-wheeled vehicles, to avoid a
road and a regular bridge and to take a bye-track across fields down a
steep bank and through water would seem a very singular proceeding.
Further, this track would lose all the advantages which the wood of
Nouaillé gave against pursuit, and, finally, would mean the use of a
passage that could not be cut, rather than one that could.
Again, we know that the Black Prince when he was preparing the
position on Sunday morning, covered its left flank, exactly as his
father had done at Crécy ten years before, with what the Tudors called
a “leaguer,” or park of waggons.
Further, we have a discrepancy between the story of this retreat by
the ford and the known order of battle arranged the day before. In that
order of battle he put in the first line, just behind his archers, who
lined the hedge bounding the vineyards, a group of men-at-arms under
Warwick and Oxford. He himself commanded the body just behind these,
and the third or rearmost line was under the command of Salisbury and
Suffolk.
How are these contemporary and yet contradictory accounts to be
reconciled? What was the real meaning of movement on the ford?
I beg the reader to pay a very particular attention to the
mechanical detail which I am here examining, because it is by criticism
such as this that the truth is established in military history between
vague and apparently inconsistent accounts.
If you are in command of a force such as that indicated upon the
following plan, in which A and B together form your front line, C your
second, and D your third, all three facing in the direction of the
arrow, and expecting an attack from that direction; and if, after
having drawn up your men so, you decide there is to be no attack, and
determine to retreat in the direction of X, your most natural plan will
be to file off down the line towards X, first with your column D, to be
followed by your column C, with A and B bringing up the rear. And this
would be all the more consonant with your position, from the fact that
the very men A and B, whom you had picked out as best suited to take
the first shock of an action, had an action occurred, would also in the
retreat form your rearguard, and be ready to fight pursuers should a
pursuit develop and press you. That is quite clear.
[Illustration]
Now, if, for reasons of internal organisation or what not, you
desired to keep your vanguard still your vanguard in retreat, as it was
on the field, your middle body still your middle body on the march, and
what was your rearguard on the field still your rearguard in the long
column whereby you would leave that field, the manoeuvre by which you
would maintain this order would be filing off by the left; that is,
ordering A to form fours and turn from a line into a column, facing
towards the point E, and, having done so, to march off in the direction
of X. You would order B to act in the same fashion next. When A and B
had got clear of you and had reached, say, F, you would make C form
fours and follow after; and when C had marched away so far as to leave
things clear for D, the last remaining line, you would make D in its
turn form fours and close up the column.
Now, suppose the Black Prince had been certain on that Monday
morning that there would be no attack, nor even any pursuit. Suppose
that he were so absolutely certain as to let him dispense with a
rearguard—then he might have drawn off in the second of the two
fashions I have mentioned. Warwick and Oxford (A and B) would have gone
first, C (the Black Prince, in the centre) would have gone next, and
Salisbury, D, would have closed the line of the retreat. This would
have been the slowest method he could have chosen for getting off the
field, it would have had no local tactical advantage whatsoever, and to
adopt such a method in a hurried departure at dawn from the
neighbourhood of a larger force with whom one had been treating for
capitulation the day before, would be a singular waste of time in any
case. But, at any rate, it would be physically possible.
What is quite impossible is that such a conversion and retirement
should have been attempted; for we know that a strong rearguard was
left, and held the entrenchments continuously.
To leave the field in the second fashion I have described is
mathematically equivalent to breaking up your rearguard and ceasing to
maintain it for the covering of your retreat. It is possible only if
you do not intend to have a rearguard at all to cover your retirement,
because you think you do not need it. As a fact, we know that all
during the movement, whatever it was, a great body of troops remained
on the field not moving, and watching the direction from which the
French might attack. So even if there was a beginning of retirement, a
strong rearguard was maintained to cover that movement. We further know
that the Black Prince and the man who may be called chief of his staff,
Chandos, planned to keep that very strong force in position in any
case, until the retirement (if retirement it were) was completed; and
we further know that the fight began with a very stout and completely
successful resistance by what must have been a large body posted along
the ridge, and what even the one account which speaks of the retirement
describes as the bulk of the army.
To believe, then, that Warwick filed off by the left, followed by
the vehicles, and then by the main command under the Prince, and that
all this larger part of the army, including its wheeled vehicles, had
got across the ford before contact took place and an action developed,
is impossible. It is not only opposed to any sound judgment, it is
mathematically impossible. It also conflicts with the use of a park of
vehicles to defend the left of the entrenched line, and with the
natural use of the line of retreat by Nouaillé. I can only conclude
that what really happened was something of this sort:
Edward intended to retreat if he were left unmolested. He intended
to retreat through Nouaillé and by its bridge, but for safety and to
disencumber the road he sent the more valuable of the loot-waggons by
the short cut over the ford.
The Prince had got the bulk of his force standing on the entrenched
position upon that Monday morning, and bidden it wait and see whether
the enemy would attempt to force them or no. As there was no sign of
the enemy's approach from the northwest, and as he was not even watched
by any scout of the enemy's, he next put Salisbury in command of the
main force along the hedge, put Warwick and Oxford at the head of a
strong escort for leading off the more valuable of the booty—which
would presumably be in few waggons—and began to get these waggons away
down the hill towards the ford. They would thus be taking a short cut
to join the road between Nouaillé and Roches later on, and they would
relieve the congestion upon the main road of retreat through Nouaillé.
It is possible that the Black Prince oversaw this operation himself
upon the dawn of that day, involving, as it did, the negotiation of a
steep bank with cumbersome vehicles, and those vehicles carrying the
more precious and portable loot of his raid. This would give rise to
the memory of his having crossed the stream. But, meanwhile, the mass
of army was still standing where it was posted, prepared for retreat on
the bridge of Nouaillé if it were not molested, or for action if it
were. Just as this minor detachment of the more valuable vehicles, with
its escort, had got across the water, messengers told Edward that there
were signs of a French advance. He at once came back, countermanded all
provisional orders for the retirement, and recalled the escort, save
perhaps some small party to watch the waggons which had got beyond the
river. Thus, returning immediately, Edward was ready to instruct and
fight the action in the fashion described in all the other accounts.
This, I think, is the rational reconciliation of several stories
which are only in apparent contradiction, and which are rather
confusing than antagonistic.