But this is not the case with our perceptions of the world-appearance, for our present perceptions cannot prove that these will never be contradicted in future, and inference and s’ruti are also against it. The mere fact that I perceive the world-appearance cannot prove that what I perceive is true or real, if it is contradicted by inference. We all perceive the sun to be small, but our perception in this case is contradicted by inference and we have hence to admit that our perceptions are erroneous. We depend (_upajîvya_) indeed for all our transactions on perception, but such dependence cannot prove that that on which we depend is absolutely valid. Validity or reality can only be ascertained by proper examination and enquiry (_parîk@sâ_), which may convince us that there is no error in it. True it is that by the universal testimony of our contemporaries and by the practical fruition and

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realization of our endeavours in the external world, it is proved beyond doubt that the world-appearance before us is a reality.

But this sort of examination and enquiry cannot prove to us with any degree of satisfaction that the world-appearance will never be contradicted at any time or at any stage. The Vedânta also admits that our examination and enquiry prove to us that the world-appearance now exists as it appears; it only denies that it cannot continue to exist for all times, and a time will come when to the emancipated person the world-appearance will cease to exist. The experience, observation, and practical utility of the objects as perceived by us cannot prove to us that these will never be contradicted at any future time. Our perception of the world-appearance cannot therefore disprove the Vedânta inference that the world-appearance is false, and it will demonstrate itself to be so at the time when the right knowledge of Brahman as one dawns in us. The testimony of the Upani@sads also contradicts the perception which grasps the world-appearance in its manifold aspect.

Moreover we are led to think that the world-appearance is false, for it is not possible for us to discover any true relation between the consciousness (_d@rk_) and the objects of consciousness (_d@rs’ya_). Consciousness must be admitted to have some kind of

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connection with the objects which it illumines, for had it not been so there could be any knowledge at any time irrespective of its connections with the objects. But it is not possible to imagine any kind of connection between consciousness and its objects, for it can neither be contact (_sa@myoga_) nor inherence (_samavâya_); and apart from these two kinds of connections we know of no other. We say that things are the objects of our consciousness, but what is meant by it is indeed difficult to define. It cannot be that objectivity of consciousness means that a special effect like the jñâtatâ of Mîmâ@msâ is produced upon the object, for such an effect is not admissible or perceivable in any way; nor can objectivity also mean any practical purpose (of being useful to us) associated with the object as Prabhakâra thinks, for there are many things which are the objects of our consciousness but not considered as useful (e.g. the sky). Objectivity also cannot mean that the thing is the object of the thought-movement (_jñâna-kâra@na_) involved in knowledge, for this can only be with reference to objects present to the perceiver, and cannot apply to objects of past time about which one may be conscious, for if the thing is not present how can it be made an object of thought-movement?

Objectivity further cannot mean that the things project their own forms on the knowledge and are hence called objects, for though this may apply in the case of perception, it cannot be true of inference, where the object of consciousness is far away and does

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not mould consciousness after its own form. Thus in whatever way we may try to conceive manifold things existing separately and becoming objects of consciousness we fail. We have also seen that it is difficult to conceive of any kind of relation subsisting between objects and consciousness, and hence it has to be admitted that the imposition of the world-appearance is after all nothing but illusory.

Now though all things are but illusory impositions on consciousness yet for the illumination of specific objects it is admitted even by Vedânta that this can only take place through specific sense-contact and particular mental states (_v@rtti_) or modes; but if that be so why not rather admit that this can take place even on the assumption of the absolute reality of the manifold external world without? The answer that the Vedânta gives to such a question is this, that the phenomenon of illumination has not to undergo any gradual process, for it is the work of one

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flash like the work of the light of a lamp in removing darkness; so it is not possible that the external reality should have to pass through any process before consciousness could arise; what happens is simply this, that the reality (_sat_) which subsists in all things as the same identical one reveals the object as soon as its

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veil is removed by association with the v@rtti (mental mould or state). It is like a light which directly and immediately illuminates everything with which it comes into relation. Such an illumination of objects by its underlying reality would have been continuous if there were no veils or covers, but that is not so as the reality is hidden by the veil of ajñâna (nescience). This veil is removed as soon as the light of consciousness shines through a mental mould or v@rtti, and as soon as it is removed the thing shines forth. Even before the formation of the v@rtti the illusory impositions on the reality had still been continuing objectively, but it could not be revealed as it was hidden by ajñâna which is removed by the action of the corresponding v@rtti; and as soon as the veil is removed the thing shines forth in its true light. The action of the senses, eye, etc. serves but to modify the v@rtti of the mind, and the v@rtti of the mind once formed, the corresponding ajñâna veil which was covering the corresponding specific part of the world-appearance is removed, and the illumination of the object which was already present, being divested of the veil, shows itself forth. The illusory creations were there, but they could not be manifested on account of the veil of nescience. As soon as the veil is removed by the action of the v@rtti the light of reality shows the corresponding illusory creations. So consciousness in itself is the ever-shining light of reality which is never generated but ever exists; errors of perception (e.g. silver in the conch-shell) take place not because the do@sa consisting of the defect of the

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eye, the glaze of the object and such other elements that contributed to the illusion, generated the knowledge, but because it generated a wrong v@rtti. It is because of the generation of the wrong v@rtti that the manifestation is illusory. In the illusion “this is silver” as when we mistake the conch-shell for the silver, it is the cit, consciousness or reality as underlying the object represented to us by “this” or “_idam_” that is the basis (_adhi@s@thâna_) of the illusion of silver. The cause of error is our nescience or non-cognition (_ajñâna_) of it in the form of the conch-shell, whereas the right knowledge is the cognition of it as conch-shell. The

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basis is not in the content of my knowledge as manifested in my mental state (_v@rtti_), so that the illusion is not of the form that the “knowledge is silver” but of “this is silver.” Objective phenomena as such have reality as their basis, whereas the expression of illumination of them as states of knowledge is made through the cit being manifested through the mental mould or states. Without the v@rtti there is no illuminating knowledge.

Phenomenal creations are there in the world moving about as shadowy forms on the unchangeable basis of one cit or reality, but this basis, this light of reality, can only manifest these forms when the veil of nescience covering them is temporarily removed by their coming in touch with a mental mould or mind-modification

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(_v@rtti_). It is sometimes said that since all illumination of knowledge must be through the mental states there is no other entity of pure consciousness apart from what is manifested through the states. This Vedânta does not admit, for it holds that it is necessary that before the operation of the mental states can begin to interpret reality, reality must already be there and this reality is nothing but pure consciousness. Had there been no reality apart from the manifesting states of knowledge, the validity of knowledge would also cease; so it has to be admitted that there is the one eternal self-luminous reality untouched by the characteristics of the mental states, which are material and suffer origination and destruction. It is this self-luminous consciousness that seems to assume diverse forms in connection with diverse kinds of associations or limitations (_upâdhi_). It manifests ajñâna (nescience) and hence does not by itself remove the ajñâna, except when it is reflected through any specific kind of v@rtti. There is of course no difference, no inner and outer varieties between the reality, the pure consciousness which is the essence, the basis and the ground of all phenomenal appearances of the objective world, and the consciousness that manifests itself through the mental states. There is only one identical pure consciousness or reality, which is at once the basis of the phenomena as well, is their interpreter by a reflection through the mental states or v@rttis.

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The phenomena or objects called the drs’ya can only be determined in their various forms and manifestations but not as to their ultimate reality; there is no existence as an entity of any relation such as sa@myoga (contact) or samavâya (inherence)

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between them and the pure consciousness called the d@rk; for the truth is this, that the d@rk (perceiver) and the d@rs’ya (perceived) have one identical reality; the forms of phenomena are but illusory creations on it.

It is sometimes objected that in the ordinary psychological illusion such as “this is silver,” the knowledge of “this” as a thing is only of a general and indefinite nature, for it is perceived as a thing but its special characteristics as a conch-shell are not noticed, and thus the illusion is possible. But in Brahman or pure consciousness there are neither definite nor indefinite characteristics of any kind, and hence it cannot be the ground of any illusion as the piece of conch-shell perceived indefinitely as a mere “this” can be. The answer of Vedânta is that when the Brahman stands as the ground (_adhi@s@thâna_) of the world-appearance its characteristic as sat or real only is manifested, whereas its special character as pure and infinite bliss is never noticed; or rather it may be said that the illusion of world-appearance is possible

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because the Brahman in its true and correct nature is never revealed to us in our objective consciousness; when I say “the jug is,”

the “isness,” or “being,” does not shine in its purity, but only as a characteristic of the jug-form, and this is the root of the illusion.

In all our experiences only the aspect of Brahman as real shines forth in association with the manifold objects, and therefore the Brahman in its true nature being unknown the illusion is made possible. It is again objected that since the world-appearance can serve all practical purposes, it must be considered as real and not illusory. But the Vedânta points out that even by illusory perceptions practical effects are seen to take place; the illusory perception of a snake in a rope causes all the fear that a real snake could do; even in dreams we feel happy and sad, and dreams may be so bad as to affect or incapacitate the actual physical functions and organs of a man. So it is that the past impressions imbedded in us continuing from beginningless time are sufficient to account for our illusory notions, just as the impressions produced in actual waking life account for the dream creations.

According to the good or bad deeds that a man has done in previous lives and according to the impressions or potencies (_sa@mskâra_) of his past lives each man has a particular kind of world-experience for himself and the impressions of one cannot affect the formation of the illusory experience of the other. But

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the experience of the world-appearance is not wholly a subjective creation for each individual, for even before his cognition the phenomena of world-appearance were running in some unknowable state of existence (_svena adhyastasya sa@mskârasya viyadâdyadhyâsajanakatvopapatte@h tatpratîtyabhâvepi tadadhyâsasya pûrvam sattvât k@rtsnasyâpi vyavahârikapadârthasya ajñâtasattvâbhyupagamât_). It is again sometimes objected that illusion is produced by malobserved similarity between the ground (_adhi@s@thâna_)

and the illusory notion as silver in “this is silver,” but no such similarity is found between the Brahman and the world-appearance.

To this Vedânta says that similarity is not an indispensable factor in the production of an illusion (e.g. when a white conch is perceived as yellow owing to the defect of the eye through the influence of bile or pitta). Similarity helps the production of illusion by rousing up the potencies of past impressions or memories; but this rousing of past memories may as well be done by ad@r@s@ta—the unseen power of our past good or bad deeds.

In ordinary illusion some defect is necessary but the illusion of this world-appearance is beginningless, and hence it awaits no other do@sa (defect) than the avidyâ (nescience) which constitutes the appearance. Here avidyâ is the only do@sa and Brahman is the only adhi@s@thâna or ground. Had there not been the Brahman, the self-luminous as the adhi@s@thâna, the illusory creations could not

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have been manifested at all The cause of the direct perception of illusion is the direct but indefinite perception of the adhi@s@thâna.

Hence where the adhi@s@thâna is hidden by the veil of avidyâ, the association with mental states becomes necessary for removing the veil and manifesting thereby the self-luminous adhi@s@thâna.

As soon as the adhi@s@thâna, the ground, the reality, the blissful self-luminous Brahman is completely realized the illusions disappear.

The disappearance of the phenomena means nothing more than the realization of the self-luminous Brahman.

The Definition of Ajñâna (nescience).

Ajñâna the cause of all illusions is defined as that which is beginningless, yet positive and removable by knowledge (_anâdibhâvarupatve

sati jñânanivartyatvam_). Though it manifests itself in all ordinary things (veiled by it before they become objects of perception) which have a beginning in time, yet it itself has no beginning, for it is associated with the pure consciousness which

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is beginningless. Again though it has been described as positive (_bhâvarûpa_) it can very well constitute the essence of negation (_abhâva_) too, for the positivity (_bhâvatva_) does not mean here the

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opposite of abhâva (negation) but notes merely its difference from abhâva (_abhâva-vilak@sa@natvamâtram vivak@sitam_). Ajñâna is not a positive entity (_bhâva_) like any other positive entity, but it is called positive simply because it is not a mere negation (_abhâva_).

It is a category which is believed neither to be positive in the ordinary sense nor negative, but a third one which is different both from position as well as from negation. It is sometimes objected that ajñâna is a mere illusory imagination of the moment caused by defect (_do@sa_) and hence it cannot be beginningless (_anâdi_); but Vedânta holds that the fact that it is an imagination or rather imposition, does not necessarily mean that it is merely a temporary notion produced by the defects; for it could have been said to be a temporary product of the moment if the ground as well as the illusory creation associated with it came into being for the moment, but this is not the case here, as the cit, the ground of illusion, is ever-present and the ajñâna therefore being ever associated with it is also beginningless. The ajñâna is the indefinite which is veiling everything, and as such is different from the definite or the positive and the negative. Though it is beginningless yet it can be removed by knowledge, for to have a beginning or not to have it does not in any way determine whether the thing is subject to dissolution or not for the dissolution of a thing depends upon the presence of the thing which can cause it; and it is a fact that when knowledge comes the illusion is destroyed; it does not matter whether the cause which

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produced the illusion was beginningless or not. Some Vedântists however define ajñâna as the substance constituting illusion, and say that though it is not a positive entity yet it may be regarded as forming the substance of the illusion; it is not necessary that only a positive entity should be the matter of any thing, for what is necessary for the notion of a material cause (_upâdâna_) is this, that it should continue or persist as the same in all changes of effects. It is not true that only what is positive can persist in and through the effects which are produced in the time process.

Illusion is unreal and it is not unnatural that the ajñâna which also is unreal should be the cause of it.

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Ajñâna established by Perception and Inference.

Ajñâna defined as the indefinite which is neither positive nor negative is also directly experienced by us in such perceptions as “I do not know, or I do not know myself or anybody else,”

or “I do not know what you say,” or more particularly “I had been sleeping so long happily and did not know anything.” Such perceptions point to an object which has no definite characteristics, and which cannot properly be said to be either positive or negative.

It may be objected that the perception “I do not know” is not

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the perception of the indefinite, the ajñâna, but merely the negation of knowledge. To this Vedânta says that had it been the perception of a negation merely, then the negation must have been associated with the specific object to which it applied.

A negation must imply the thing negatived; in fact negation generally appears as a substantive with the object of negation as a qualifying character specifying the nature of the negation.

But the perception “I do not know or I had no knowledge” does not involve the negation of any particular knowledge of any specific object, but the knowledge of an indefinite objectless ignorance. Such an indefinite ajñâna is positive in the sense that it is certainly not negative, but this positive indefinite is not positive in the same sense in which other definite entities are called positive, for it is merely the characterless, passive indefinite showing itself in our experience. If negation meant only a general negation, and if the perception of negation meant in each case the perception of a general negation, then even where there is a jug on the ground, one should perceive the negation of the jug on the ground, for the general negation in relation to other things is there.

Thus negation of a thing cannot mean the general notion of the negation of all specific things; similarly a general negation without any specific object to which it might apply cannot manifest itself to consciousness; the notion of a general negation of knowledge is thus opposed to any and every knowledge, so that if the latter is present the former cannot be, but the perception “I do

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not know” can persist, even though many individual objects be known to us. Thus instead of saying that the perception of “I do not know” is the perception of a special kind of negation, it is rather better to say that it is the perception of a different category namely the indefinite, the ajñâna. It is our common experience

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that after experiencing the indefinite (_ajñâna_) of a specific type we launch forth in our endeavours to remove it. So it has to be admitted that the perception of the indefinite is different from the perception of mere negation. The character of our perceiving consciousness (_sâk@si_) is such that both the root ajñâna as well as its diverse forms with reference to particular objects as represented in mental states (_v@rtti-jñâna_), are comprehended by it.

Of course when the v@rttijñâna about a thing as in ordinary perceptions of objects comes in, the ajñâna with regard to it is temporarily removed, for the v@rttijñâna is opposed to the ajñâna.

But so far as our own perceiving consciousness (_sâk@sicaitanya_) is conceived it can comprehend both the ajñâna and the jñâna (knowledge) of things. It is thus often said that all things show themselves to the perceiving consciousness either as known or as unknown. Thus the perceiving consciousness comprehends all positives either as indefinite ajñâna or as states of knowledge or as specific kinds of ajñâna or ignorance, but it is unable to

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comprehend a negation, for negation (_abhâva_) is not a perception, but merely the absence of perception (_anupalabdhi_). Thus when I say I do not know this, I perceive the indefinite in consciousness with reference to that thing, and this is not the perception of a negation of the thing. An objection is sometimes raised from the Nyâya point of view that since without the knowledge of a qualification (_vis’e@sana_) the qualified thing (_vis’i@s@ta_) cannot be known, the indefinite about an object cannot be present in consciousness without the object being known first. To this Vedânta replies that the maxim that the qualification must be known before the qualified thing is known is groundless, for we can as well perceive the thing first and then its qualification. It is not out of place here to say that negation is not a separate entity, but is only a peculiar mode of the manifestation of the positive.

Even the naiyâyikas would agree that in the expression “there is no negation of a jug here,” no separate negation can be accepted, for the jug is already present before us. As there are distinctions and differences in positive entities by illusory impositions, so negations are also distinguished by similar illusory impositions and appear as the negation of jug, negation of cloth, etc.; so all distinctions between negations are unnecessary, and it may be accepted that negation like position is one which appears as many on account of illusory distinctions and impositions. Thus the

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content of negation being itself positive, there is no reason to object that such perceptions as “I do not know” refer to the perception of an indefinite ajñâna in consciousness. So also the perception “I do not know what you say” is not the perception of negation, for this would require that the hearer should know first what was said by the speaker, and if this is so then it is impossible to say “I do not know what you say.”

So also the cognition “I was sleeping long and did not know anything” has to be admitted as referring to the perception of the indefinite during sleep. It is not true as some say that during sleep there is no perception, but what appears to the awakened man as “I did not know anything so long” is only an inference; for, it is not possible to infer from the pleasant and active state of the senses in the awakened state that the activity had ceased in the sleep state and that since he had no object of knowledge then, he could not know anything; for there is no invariable concomitance between the pleasant and active state of the senses and the absence of objects of knowledge in the immediately preceding state. During sleep there is a mental state of the form of the indefinite, and during the awakened state it is by the impression (_sa@mskâra_) of the aforesaid mental state of ajñâna that one remembers that state and says that “I did not perceive anything so long.” The indefinite (_ajñâna_) perceived in

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consciousness is more fundamental and general than the mere negation of knowledge (_jñânâbhâva_) and the two are so connected that though the latter may not be felt, yet it can be inferred from the perception of the indefinite. The indefinite though not definite is thus a positive content different from negation and is perceived as such in direct and immediate consciousness both in the awakened state as well as in the sleeping state.

The presence of this ajñâna may also be inferred from the manner in which knowledge of objects is revealed in consciousness, as this always takes place in bringing a thing into consciousness which was not known or rather known as indefinite before we say “I did not know it before, but I know it now.” My present knowledge of the thing thus involves the removal of an indefinite which was veiling it before and positing it in consciousness, just as the first streak of light in utter darkness manifests itself by removing the darkness[Footnote ref 1]. Apart from such an inference its existence

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[Footnote 1: See Pañcapâdikâvivara@na, Tattvadîpana, and Advaitasiddhi.]

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is also indicated by the fact that the infinite bliss of Brahman does not show itself in its complete and limitless aspect. If there was no ajñâna to obstruct, it would surely have manifested itself in its fullness. Again had it not been for this ajñâna there would have been no illusion. It is the ajñâna that constitutes the substance of the illusion; for there is nothing else that can be regarded as constituting its substance; certainly Brahman could not, as it is unchangeable. This ajñâna is manifested by the perceiving consciousness (_sâk@si_) and not by the pure consciousness. The perceiving consciousness is nothing but pure intelligence which reflects itself in the states of avidyâ (ignorance).

Locus and Object of Ajñâna, Aha@mkâra, and Anta@hkara@na.

This ajñâna rests on the pure cit or intelligence. This cit or Brahman is of the nature of pure illumination, but yet it is not opposed to the ajñâna or the indefinite. The cit becomes opposed to the ajñâna and destroys it only when it is reflected through the mental states (_v@rtti_). The ajñâna thus rests on the pure cit and not on the cit as associated with such illusory impositions as go to produce the notion of ego “_aham_” or the individual soul. Vâcaspati Mis’ra however holds that the ajñâna does not rest on the pure cit but on the jîva (individual soul). Mâdhava reconciles this view of

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Vâcaspati with the above view, and says that the ajñâna may be regarded as resting on the jîva or individual soul from this point of view that the obstruction of the pure cit is with reference to the jîva (_Cinmâtrâs’ritam ajñânam jîvapak@sapâtitvât jîvâs’ritam ucyate_

Vivara@naprameya, p. 48). The feeling “I do not know” seems however to indicate that the ajñâna is with reference to the perceiving self in association with its feeling as ego or “I”; but this is not so; such an appearance however is caused on account of the close association of ajñâna with anta@hkara@na (mind) both of which are in essence the same (see Vivara@naprarneyasa@mgraha, p. 48).

The ajñâna however does not only rest on the cit, but it has the cit as its visaya or object too, i.e. its manifestations are with reference to the self-luminous cit. The self-luminous cit is thus the entity on which the veiling action of the ajñâna is noticed; the veiling action is manifested not by destroying the self-luminous character, nor by stopping a future course of luminous career on the part of the cit, nor by stopping its relations with the vi@saya,

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but by causing such an appearance that the self-luminous cit seems so to behave that we seem to think that it is not or it does not shine (_nâsti na prakâs’ate iti vyavahâra@h_) or rather there is no

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appearance of its shining or luminosity. To say that Brahman is hidden by the ajñâna means nothing more than this, that it is such {_tadyogyatâ_) that the ajñâna can so relate itself with it that it appears to be hidden as in the state of deep sleep and other states of ajñâna-consciousness in experience. Ajñâna is thus considered to have both its locus and object in the pure cit. It is opposed to the states of consciousness, for these at once dispel it. The action of this ajñ@ana is thus on the light of the reality which it obstructs for us, so long as the obstruction is not dissolved by the states of consciousness. This obstruction of the cit is not only with regard to its character as pure limitless consciousness but also with regard to its character as pure and infinite bliss; so it is that though we do not experience the indefinite in our pleasurable feelings, yet its presence as obstructing the pure cit is indicated by the fact that the full infinite bliss constituting the essence of Brahman is obstructed; and as a result of that there is only an incomplete manifestation of the bliss in our phenomenal experiences of pleasure. The ajñâna is one, but it seems to obstruct the pure cit in various aspects or modes, with regard to which it may be said that the ajñâna has many states as constituting the individual experiences of the indefinite with reference to the diverse individual objects of experience. These states of ajñâna are technically called tulâjñâna or avasthâjñâna. Any state of consciousness (v@rttijñâna) removes a manifestation of the ajñâna as tulâjñâna and reveals itself as the knowledge of an object.

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The most important action of this ajñâna as obstructing the pure cit, and as creating an illusory phenomenon is demonstrated in the notion of the ego or aha@mkâra. This notion of aha@mkâra is a union of the true self, the pure consciousness and other associations, such as the body, the continued past experiences, etc.; it is the self-luminous characterless Brahman that is found obstructed in the notion of the ego as the repository of a thousand limitations, characters, and associations. This illusory creation of the notion of the ego runs on from beginningless time, each set of previous false impositions determining the succeeding set of impositions and so on. This blending of the unreal associations held up in the mind (_anta@hkara@na_) with the real, the false with

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the true, that is at the root of illusion. It is the anta@hkara@na taken as the self-luminous self that reflects itself in the cit as the notion of the ego. Just as when we say that the iron ball (red hot) burns, there are two entities of the ball and the fire fused into one, so, here also when I say “I perceive”, there are two distinct elements of the self, as consciousness and the mind or antahkarana fused into one. The part or aspect associated with sorrow, materiality, and changefulness represents the anta@hkara@na, whereas that which appears as the unchangeable perceiving consciousness is the self.

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Thus the notion of ego contains two parts, one real and other unreal.

We remember that this is distinctly that which Prabhâkara sought to repudiate. Prabhâkara did not consider the self to be self-luminous, and held that such is the threefold nature of thought (_tripu@ti_), that it at once reveals the knowledge, the object of knowledge, and the self. He further said, that the analogy of the red-hot iron ball did not hold, for the iron ball and the fire are separately experienced, but the self and the anta@hkara@na are never separately experienced, and we can never say that these two are really different, and only have an illusory appearance of a seeming unity. Perception (_anubhava_) is like a light which illuminates both the object and the self, and like it does not require the assistance of anything else for the fulfilment of its purpose. But the Vedânta objects to this saying that according to Prabhakara’s supposition, it is impossible to discover any relation between the self and the knowledge. If knowledge can be regarded as revealing itself, the self may as well be held to be self-luminous; the self and the knowledge are indeed one and the same. Kumârila thinks this thought (_anubhava_), to be a movement, Nyâya and Prabhâkara as a quality of the self [Footnote ref 1]. But if it was a movement like other movements, it could not affect itself as illumination. If it were a substance and atomic in size, it would only manifest a small portion of

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a thing, if all pervasive, then it would illuminate everything, if of medium size, it would depend on its parts for its own

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[Footnote 1: According to Nyâya the âtman is conscious only through association with consciousness, but it is not consciousness(_cit_).

Consciousness is associated with it only as a result of suitable collocations. Thus, Nyâyamañjarî in refuting the doctrine of self-luminosity {_svaprakâs’a_) says (p.432)

sacetanas’citâ yogâttadyogena vinâ ja@da@h nârthâvabhâsadanyaddhi caitanya@m nâma manma@he.]

It is true that on waking from deep sleep one feels “I slept happily and did not know anything”; yet what happens is this, that during deep sleep the anta@hkara@na and the aha@mkâra are altogether submerged in the ajñâna, and there are only the ajñâna and the self; on waking, this aha@mkâra as a state of anta@hkar@na is again generated, and then it associates the perception of the ajñâna in the sleep and originates the perception “I did not know anything.” This aha@mkâra which is a mode (v@rtti_) of the anta@hkara@na is thus constituted by avidyâ, and is manifested as jñânas’akti (power of knowledge) and kriyâs’akti (power of work). This kriyâs’akti of the aha@mkâra is illusorily imposed upon the self, and as a result of that the self appears to be an active agent in knowing and willing. The aha@mkâra itself is regarded, as we have already seen, as a mode or v@rtti of the anta@hkara@na, and as such the aha@mkâra of a past period can now be associated; but even then the v@rtti of anta@hkara@na, aha@mkâra, may be regarded as only the active side or aspect of the anta@hkara@na. The same anta@hkara@na is called manas in its capacity as doubt buddhi in its capacity as achieving certainty of knowledge, and citta in its capacity as remembering [Footnote ref 2]. When the pure cit shines forth in association with this anta@hkara@na, it is called a jîva. It is clear from the above account that the ajñâna is not a mere nothing, but is the principle of the phenomena. But

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it cannot stand alone, without the principle of the real to support it (_âs’raya_); its own nature as the ajñâna or indefinite is perceived directly by the pure consciousness; its movements as originating the phenomena remain indefinite in themselves, the real as underlying

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[Footnote 1: See Nyâyamakaranda, pp. 130-140, Citshkha and Vivara@naprameyasa@mgraha, pp. 53-58.]

[Footnote 2: See Vedântaparibhâ@sâ, p. 88, Bombay edition.]

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these phenomenal movements can only manifest itself through these which hide it, when corresponding states arise in the anta@hkara@na, and the light of the real shines forth through these states. The anta@hkara@na of which aha@mkâra is a moment, is itself a beginningless system of ajñâna-phenomena containing within it the associations and impressions of past phenomena as merit, demerit, instincts, etc. from a beginningless time when the jîva or individual soul began his career.

Anirvâcyavâda and the Vedânta Dialectic.

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We have already seen that the indefinite ajñâna could be experienced in direct perception and according to Vedânta there are only two categories. The category of the real, the self-luminous Brahman, and the category of the indefinite. The latter has for its ground the world-appearance, and is the principle by which the one unchangeable Brahman is falsely manifested in all the diversity of the manifold world. But this indefinite which is different from the category of the positive and the negative, has only a relative existence and will ultimately vanish, when the true knowledge of the Brahman dawns. Nothing however can be known about the nature of this indefinite except its character as indefinite. That all the phenomena of the world, the fixed order of events, the infinite variety of world-forms and names, all these are originated by this avidyâ, ajñâna or mâyâ is indeed hardly comprehensible. If it is indefinite nescience, how can all these well-defined forms of world-existence come out of it? It is said to exist only relatively, and to have only a temporary existence beside the permanent infinite reality. To take such a principle and to derive from it the mind, matter, and indeed everything else except the pure self-luminous Brahman, would hardly appeal to our reason. If this system of world-order were only seeming appearance, with no other element of truth in it except pure being, then it would be indefensible in the light of reason.

It has been proved that whatever notions we have about the

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objective world are all self-contradictory, and thus groundless and false. If they have all proceeded from the indefinite they must show this character when exposed to discerning criticism. All categories have to be shown to be so hopelessly confused and to be without any conceivable notion that though apparent before us yet they crumble into indefiniteness as soon as they are

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examined, and one cannot make such assertion about them as that they are or that they are not. Such negative criticisms of our fundamental notions about the world-order were undertaken by S’rîhar@sa and his commentator and follower Citsukha. It is impossible within the limits of this chapter, to give a complete account of their criticisms of our various notions of reality.

I shall give here, only one example.

Let us take the examination of the notion of difference (_bheda_)from Kha@n@danakha@n@dakhâdya. Four explanations are possible about the notion of difference: (1) the difference may be perceived as appearing in its own characteristics in our experience (_svarûpa-bheda_) as Prabhâkara thinks; (2) the difference between two things is nothing but the absence of one in the other (_anyonyâbhâva_), as some Naiyâyikas and Bhâ@t@tas think; (3) difference means divergence of characteristics (_vaidharmya_) as the

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Vais’e@sikas speak of it; (4) difference may be a separate quality in itself like the p@rthaktva quality of Nyâya. Taking the first alternative, we see that it is said that the jug and the cloth represent in themselves, by their very form and existence, their mutual difference from each other. But if by perceiving the cloth we only perceive its difference from the jug as the characteristic of the cloth, then the jug also must have penetrated into the form of the cloth, otherwise how could we perceive in the cloth its characteristics as the difference from the jug?

i.e. if difference is a thing which can be directly perceived by the senses, then as difference would naturally mean difference from something else, it is expected that something else such as jug, etc. from which the difference is perceived, must also be perceived directly in the perception of the cloth. But if the perception of “difference” between two things has penetrated together in the same identical perception, then the self-contradiction becomes apparent. Difference as an entity is not what we perceive in the cloth, for difference means difference from something else, and if that thing from which the difference is perceived is not perceived, then how can the difference as an entity be perceived? If it is said that the cloth itself represents its difference from the jug, and that this is indicated by the jug, then we may ask, what is the nature of the jug? If the difference from the cloth is the very nature of the jug, then the cloth itself is also involved in the nature of the jug. If it is said that

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the jug only indicates a term from which difference is intended to be conveyed, then that also becomes impossible, for how can we imagine that there is a term which is independent of any association of its difference from other things, and is yet a term which establishes the notion of difference? If it is a term of difference, it cannot be independent of its relation to other things from which it is differentiated. If its difference from the cloth is a quality of the jug, then also the old difficulty comes in, for its difference from the cloth would involve the cloth also in itself; and if the cloth is involved in the nature of the jug as its quality, then by the same manner the jug would also be the character of the cloth, and hence not difference but identity results. Moreover, if a cloth is perceived as a character of the jug, the two will appear to be hanging one over the other, but this is never so experienced by us. Moreover, it is difficult to ascertain if qualities have any relation with things; if they have not, then absence of relation being the same everywhere, everything might be the quality of everything. If there is a relation between these two, then that relation would require another relation to relate itself with that relation, and that would again require another relation and that another, and so on. Again, it may be said that when the jug, etc. are seen without reference

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to other things, they appear as jug, etc., but when they are viewed with reference to cloth, etc. they appear as difference.

But this cannot be so, for the perception as jug is entirely different from the perception of difference. It should also be noted that the notion of difference is also different from the notions of both the jug and the cloth. It is one thing to say that there are jug and cloth, and quite another thing to say that the jug is different from the cloth. Thus a jug cannot appear as difference, though it may be viewed with reference to cloth.

The notion of a jug does not require the notions of other things for its manifestation. Moreover, when I say the jug is different from the cloth, I never mean that difference is an entity which is the same as the jug or the cloth; what I mean is that the difference of the cloth from the jug has its limits in the jug, and not merely that the notion of cloth has a reference to jug. This shows that difference cannot be the characteristic nature of the thing perceived.

Again, in the second alternative where difference of two

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things is defined as the absence of each thing in the other, we find that if difference in jug and cloth means that the jug is not in the cloth or that cloth is not in jug, then also the same

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difficulty arises; for when I say that the absence or negation of jug in the cloth is its difference from the jug, then also the residence of the absence of jug in the cloth would require that the jug also resides in the cloth, and this would reduce difference to identity. If it is said that the absence of jug in the cloth is not a separate thing, but is rather the identical cloth itself, then also their difference as mutual exclusion cannot be explained. If this mutual negation (_anyonyabhâva_) is explained as the mere absence of jugness in the cloth and of clothness in the jug, then also a difficulty arises; for there is no such quality in jugness or clothness that they may be mutually excluded; and there is no such quality in them that they can be treated as identical, and so when it is said that there is no jugness in cloth we might as well say that there is no clothness in cloth, for clothness and jugness are one and the same, and hence absence of jugness in the cloth would amount to the absence of clothness in the cloth which is self-contradictory. Taking again the third alternative we see that if difference means divergence of characteristics (_vaidharmya_), then the question arises whether the vaidharmya or divergence as existing in jug has such a divergence as can distinguish it from the divergence existing in the cloth; if the answer is in the affirmative then we require a series of endless vaidharmyas progressing ad infinitum. If the answer is in the negative then there being no divergence between the two divergences they become identical, and hence divergence of characteristics

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as such ceases to exist. If it is said that the natural forms of things are difference in themselves, for each of them excludes the other, then apart from the differences—the natural forms—the things are reduced to formlessness (_ni@hsvarûpatâ_). If natural forms (_svarûpa_) mean special natural forms (_svarûpa-vis’e@sa_) then as the special natural forms or characteristics only represent difference, the natural forms of the things as apart from the special ones would appear to be identical. So also it may be proved that there is no such quality as p@rthaktva (separateness) which can explain differences of things, for there also the questions would arise as to whether separateness exists in different things or similar ones or whether separateness is identical with the thing in which it exists or not, and so forth.

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The earliest beginnings of this method of subtle analysis and dialectic in Indian philosophy are found in the opening chapters of Kathâvatthu. In the great Mahâbha@sya on Pâ@nini by Patañjali also we find some traces of it. But Nâgârjuna was the man who took it up in right earnest and systematically cultivated it in all its subtle and abstruse issues and counter-issues in order to prove that everything that appeared as a fixed order or system was nonexistent, for all were unspeakable, indescribable and

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self-contradictory, and thus everything being discarded there was only the void (_s’ûnya_). S’a@nkara partially utilized this method in his refutations of Nyâya and the Buddhist systems; but S’rîhar@sa again revived and developed it in a striking manner, and after having criticized the most important notions and concepts of our everyday life, which are often backed by the Nyâya system, sought to prove that nothing in the world can be defined, and that we cannot ascertain whether a thing is or is not. The refutations of all possible definitions that the Nyâya could give necessarily led to the conclusion that the things sought to be defined did not exist though they appeared to do so; the Vedântic contention was that this is exactly as it should be, for the indefinite ajñâna produces only appearances which when exposed to reason show that no consistent notions of them can be formed, or in other words the world-appearance, the phenomena of mâyâ or ajñâna, are indefinable or anirvacanîya. This great work of S’rîhar@sa was followed by Tattvadîpikâ of Citsukha, in which he generally followed S’rîhar@sa and sometimes supplemented him with the addition of criticisms of certain new concepts. The method of Vedânta thus followed on one side the method of S’ûnyavâda in annulling all the concepts of world-appearance and on the other Vijñânavâda Buddhism in proving the self-illuminating character of knowledge and ultimately established the self as the only self-luminous ultimate reality.

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The Theory of Causation.

The Vedânta philosophy looked at the constantly changing phenomena of the world-appearance and sought to discover the root whence proceeded the endless series of events and effects.

The theory that effects were altogether new productions caused by the invariable unconditional and immediately preceding antecedents, as well as the theory that it was the cause which evolved

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and by its transformations produced the effect, are considered insufficient to explain the problem which the Vedãnta had before it. Certain collocations invariably and unconditionally preceded certain effects, but this cannot explain how the previous set of phenomena could be regarded as producing the succeeding set.

In fact the concept of causation and production had in it something quite undefinable and inexplicable. Our enquiry after the cause is an enquiry after a more fundamental and primary form of the truth of a thing than what appears at the present moment when we wished to know what was the cause of the jug, what we sought was a simpler form of which the effect was only a more complex form of manifestation, what is the ground, the root, out of which the effect has come forth? If

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apart from such an enquiry we take the pictorial representation of the causal phenomena in which some collocations being invariably present at an antecedent point of time, the effect springs forth into being, we find that we are just where we were before, and are unable to penetrate into the logic of the affair. The Nyãya definition of cause and effect may be of use to us in a general way in associating certain groups of things of a particular kind with certain other phenomena happening at a succeeding moment as being relevant pairs of which one being present the other also has a probability of being present, but can do nothing more than this. It does not answer our question as to the nature of cause. Antecedence in time is regarded in this view as an indispensable condition for the cause. But time, according to Nyãya, is one continuous entity; succession of time can only be conceived as antecedence and consequence of phenomena, and these again involve succession; thus the notions of succession of time and of the antecedence and consequence of time being mutually dependent upon each other (_anyonyâs’raya_) neither of these can be conceived independently. Another important condition is invariability. But what does that mean? If it means invariable antecedence, then even an ass which is invariably present as an antecedent to the smoke rising from the washerman’s house, must be regarded as the cause of the smoke [Footnote ref 1]. If it means such an antecedence as contributes to the happening of the effect, it becomes again difficult to understand anything about its contributing

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[Footnote 1: Asses are used in carrying soiled linen in India. Asses are always present when water is boiled for washing in the laundry.]

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to the effect, for the only intelligible thing is the antecedence and nothing more. If invariability means the existence of that at the presence of which the effect comes into being, then also it fails, for there may be the seed but no shoot, for the mere presence of the seed will not suffice to produce the effect, the shoot. If it is said that a cause can produce an effect only when it is associated with its accessory factors, then also the question remains the same, for we have not understood what is meant by cause.

Again when the same effect is often seen to be produced by a plurality of causes, the cause cannot be defined as that which happening the effect happens and failing the effect fails. It cannot also be said that in spite of the plurality of causes, each particular cause is so associated with its own particular kind of effect that from a special kind of cause we can without fail get a special kind of effect (cf. Vâtsyâyana and Nyâyamañjarî), for out of the same clay different effects come forth namely the jug, the plate, etc. Again if cause is defined as the collocation of factors, then

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the question arises as to what is meant by this collocation; does it mean the factors themselves or something else above them? On the former supposition the scattered factors being always present in the universe there should always be the effect; if it means something else above the specific factors, then that something always existing, there should always be the effect. Nor can collocation (_sâmagrî_) be defined as the last movement of the causes immediately succeeding which the effect comes into being, for the relation of movement with the collocating cause is incomprehensible.

Moreover if movement is defined as that which produces the effect, the very conception of causation which was required to be proved is taken for granted. The idea of necessity involved in the causal conception that a cause is that which must produce its effect is also equally undefinable, inexplicable, and logically inconceivable. Thus in whatsoever way we may seek to find out the real nature of the causal principle from the interminable series of cause-effect phenomena we fail. All the characteristics of the effects are indescribable and indefinable ajñâna of mâyâ, and in whatever way we may try to conceive these phenomena in themselves or in relation to one another we fail, for they are all carved out of the indefinite and are illogical and illusory, and some day will vanish for ever. The true cause is thus the pure being, the reality which is unshakable in itself, the ground upon

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which all appearances being imposed they appear as real. The true cause is thus the unchangeable being which persists through all experience, and the effect-phenomena are but impositions upon it of ajñâna or avidyâ. It is thus the clay, the permanent, that is regarded as the cause of all clay-phenomena as jug, plates, etc. All the various modes in which the clay appears are mere appearances, unreal, indefinable and so illusory. The one truth is the clay. So in all world-phenomena the one truth is being, the Brahman, and all the phenomena that are being imposed on it are but illusory forms and names. This is what is called the satkâryavâda or more properly the satkâra@navâda of the Vedânta, that the cause alone is true and ever existing, and phenomena in themselves are false. There is only this much truth in them, that all are imposed on the reality or being which alone is true. This appearance of the one cause the being, as the unreal many of the phenomena is what is called the vivarttavâda as distinguished from the sâ@mkhyayogapari@nâmavâda,

in which the effect is regarded as the real development of the cause in its potential state. When the effect has a different kind of being from the cause it is called vivartta but when the effect has the same kind of being as the cause it is called pari@nâma (kâra@nasvalak@sa@nânyathâbhâva@h pari@nâma@h tadvilak@sa@no

vivartta@h or vastunastatsamattâko’nyathâbhâva@h pari@nâma@h

tadvi@samasattâka@h vivartta@h). Vedânta has as much to object against the Nyâya as against the pari@nâma theory of causation of the Sâ@mkhya; for movement, development, form, potentiality, and actuality—all these are indefinable and inconceivable in the light of reason; they cannot explain causation but only restate things and phenomena as they appear in the world. In reality however though phenomena are not identical with the cause, they can never be defined except in terms of the cause (_Tadabhedam vinaiva tadvyatireke@na durvacam kâryyam vivartta@h)_.

This being the relation of cause and effect or Brahman and the world, the different followers of S’a@nkara Vedânta in explaining the cause of the world-appearance sometimes lay stress on the mâyâ, ajñâna or avidyâ, sometimes on the Brahman, and sometimes on them both. Thus Sarvaj@nâtmamuni, the writer of Sa@nk@sepa-s’ârîraka and his followers think that the pure Brahman should be regarded as the causal substance (_upâdâna_) of the world-appearance, whereas Prakâs’âtman Akhan@dânanda, and

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Mâdhava hold that Brahman in association with mâyâ, i.e. the mâyâ-reflected form of Brahman as Îs’vara should be regarded as the cause of the world-appearance. The world-appearance is an evolution or pari@nâma of the mâyâ as located in Îs’vara,

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whereas Îs’vara (God) is the vivartta causal matter. Others however make a distinction between mâyâ as the cosmical factor of illusion and avidyâ as the manifestation of the same entity in the individual or jîva. They hold that though the world-appearance may be said to be produced by the mâyâ yet the mind etc. associated with the individual are produced by the avidyâ with the jîva or the individual as the causal matter (_upâdâna_). Others hold that since it is the individual to whom both Îs’vara and the world-appearance are manifested, it is better rather to think that these are all manifestations of the jîva in association with his avidyâ or ajñâna. Others however hold that since in the world-appearance we find in one aspect pure being and in another materiality etc., both Brahman and mâyâ are to be regarded as the cause, Brahman as the permanent causal matter, upâdâna and mâyâ as the entity evolving in pari@nâma.

Vâcaspati Mis’ra thinks that Brahman is the permanent cause of the world-appearance through mâyâ as associated with jîva.

Mâyâ is thus only a sahakâri or instrument as it were, by which the one Brahman appears in the eye of the jîva as the manifold world of appearance. Prakâs’ânanda holds however in his Siddhânta Muktâvalî that Brahman itself is pure and absolutely unaffected even as illusory appearance, and is not even the causal matter of the world-appearance. Everything that we see in the phenomenal world, the whole field of world-appearance, is the product of mâyâ, which is both the instrumental and the upâdâna

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(causal matter) of the world-illusion. But whatever these divergences of view may be, it is clear that they do not in any way affect the principal Vedânta text that the only unchangeable cause is the Brahman, whereas all else, the effect-phenomena, have only a temporary existence as indefinable illusion. The word mâyâ was used in the @Rg-Veda in the sense of supernatural power and wonderful skill, and the idea of an inherent mystery underlying it was gradually emphasized in the Atharva Veda, and it began to be used in the sense of magic or illusion. In the B@rhadâra@nyaka, Pras’na, and Svetâs’vatara Upani@sads the word means magic. It is not out of place here to mention that in the older Upani@sads

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the word mâyâ occurs only once in the B@rhadâra@nyaka and once only in the Pras’na. In early Pâli Buddhist writings it occurs only in the sense of deception or deceitful conduct. Buddhagho@sa uses it in the sense of magical power. In Nâgârjuna and the Lankâvatâra it has acquired the sense of illusion. In S’a@nkara the word mâyâ is used in the sense of illusion, both as a principle of creation as a s’akti (power) or accessory cause, and as the phenomenal creation itself, as the illusion of world-appearance.