CHAPTER X

THE S’A@NKARA SCHOOL OF VEDÂNTA

Comprehension of the philosophical Issues more essential than the Dialectic of controversy.

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Pramâ@na in Sanskrit signifies the means and the movement by which knowledge is acquired, pramâtâ means the subject or the knower who cognizes, pramâ the result of pramâ@na—right knowledge, prameya the object of knowledge, and prâmâ@nya the validity of knowledge acquired. The validity of knowledge is sometimes used in the sense of the faithfulness of knowledge to its object, and sometimes in the sense of an inner notion of validity in the mind of the subject—the knower (that his perceptions are true), which moves him to work in accordance with his perceptions to adapt himself to his environment for the attainment of pleasurable and the avoidance of painful things.

The question wherein consists the prâmâ@nya of knowledge has not only an epistemological and psychological bearing but a metaphysical one also. It contains on one side a theory of knowledge based on an analysis of psychological experience, and on the other indicates a metaphysical situation consistent with the theory of knowledge. All the different schools tried to justify a theory of knowledge by an appeal to the analysis and interpretation of experience which the others sometimes ignored or sometimes regarded as unimportant. The thinkers of different schools were accustomed often to meet together and defeat one another in actual debates, and the result of these debates was frequently very important in determining the prestige of any school of thought. If a Buddhist for example could defeat a great Nyâya or Mîmâ@msâ thinker in a great public debate attended by many

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learned scholars from different parts of the country, his fame at once spread all over the country and he could probably secure a large number of followers on the spot. Extensive tours of disputation were often undertaken by great masters all over the country for the purpose of defeating the teachers of the opposite schools and of securing adherents to their own. These debates were therefore not generally conducted merely in a passionless philosophical

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mood with the object of arriving at the truth but in order to inflict a defeat on opponents and to establish the ascendency of some particular school of thought. It was often a sense of personal victory and of the victory of the school of thought to which the debater adhered that led him to pursue the debate. Advanced Sanskrit philosophical works give us a picture of the attitude of mind of these debaters and we find that most of these debates attempt to criticize the different schools of thinkers by exposing their inconsistencies and self-contradictions by close dialectical reasoning, anticipating the answers of the opponent, asking him to define his statements, and ultimately proving that his theory was inconsistent, led to contradictions, and was opposed to the testimony of experience. In reading an advanced work on Indian philosophy in the original, a student has to pass through an interminable series of dialectic arguments, and negative criticisms

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(to thwart opponents) sometimes called vita@n@dâ, before he can come to the root of the quarrel, the real philosophical divergence.

All the resources of the arts of controversy find full play for silencing the opponent before the final philosophical answer is given. But to a modern student of philosophy, who belongs to no party and is consequently indifferent to the respective victory of either side, the most important thing is the comprehension of the different aspects from which the problem of the theory of knowledge and its associated metaphysical theory was looked at by the philosophers, and also a clear understanding of the deficiency of each view, the value of the mutual criticisms, the speculations on the experience of each school, their analysis, and their net contribution to philosophy. With Vedânta we come to an end of the present volume, and it may not be out of place here to make a brief survey of the main conflicting theories from the point of view of the theory of knowledge, in order to indicate the position of the Vedânta of the S’a@nkara school in the field of Indian philosophy so far as we have traversed it. I shall therefore now try to lay before my readers the solution of the theory of knowledge (_pramâ@navâda_) reached by some of the main schools of thought. Their relations to the solution offered by the S’a@nkara Vedânta will also be dealt with, as we shall attempt to sketch the views of the Vedanta later on in this chapter.

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The philosophical situation. A Review.

Before dealing with the Vedânta system it seems advisable to review the general attitude of the schools already discussed to the main philosophical and epistemological questions which determine the position of the Vedânta as taught by S’a@nkara and his school.

The Sautrântika Buddhist says that in all his affairs man is concerned with the fulfilment of his ends and desires (_puru@sâdrtka_).

This however cannot be done without right knowledge (_samyagjñâna_) which rightly represents things to men. Knowledge is said to be right when we can get things just as we perceived them.

So far as mere representation or illumination of objects is concerned, it is a patent fact that we all have knowledge, and therefore this does not deserve criticism or examination. Our enquiry about knowledge is thus restricted to its aspect of later verification or contradiction in experience, for we are all concerned to know how far our perceptions of things which invariably precede all our actions can be trusted as rightly indicating what we want to get in our practical experience (_arthaprâdpakatva_). The perception is right (_abhrânta_ non-illusory) when following its representation we can get in the external world such things as were represented by

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it (_sa@mvâdakatva_). That perception alone can be right which is generated by the object and not merely supplied by our imagination.

When I say “this is the cow I had seen,” what I see is the object with the brown colour, horns, feet, etc., but the fact that this is called cow, or that this is existing from a past time, is not perceived by the visual sense, as this is not generated by the visual object. For all things are momentary, and that which I see now never existed before so as to be invested with this or that permanent name. This association of name and permanence to objects perceived is called kaipanâ or abhilâpa.

Our perception is correct only so far as it is without the abhilâpa association (_kalpanâpo@dha_), for though this is taken as a part of our perceptual experience it is not derived from the object, and hence its association with the object is an evident error. The object as unassociated with name—the nirvikalpa—is thus what is perceived. As a result of the pratyak@sa the manovijñâna or thought and mental perception of pleasure and pain is also determined. At one moment perception reveals the object as an

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object of knowledge (_grâhya_), and by the fact of the rise of such a percept, at another moment it appears as a thing realizable or attainable in the external world. The special features of the object undefinable in themselves as being

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what they are in themselves (_svalak@sa@na_) are what is actually perceived (_pratyak@savi@saya_) [Footnote ref 1].

The pramâ@naphala (result of perception) is the

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[Footnote 1: There is a difference of opinion about the meaning of the word “svalak@sa@na” of Dharmakîrtti between ray esteemed friend Professor Stcherbatsky of Petrograd and myself. He maintains that Dharmakîrtti held that the content of the presentative element at the moment of perception was almost totally empty. Thus he writes to me, “According to your interpretation svalak@sa@na mean,—the object (or idea with Vijñânavâdin) from which everything past and everything future has been eliminated, this I do not deny at all. But I maintain that if everything past and future has been taken away, what remains? The present and the present is a k@sa@na i.e. nothing…. The reverse of k@sa@na is a k@sa@nasamtâna

or simply sa@mtâna and in every sa@mtâna there is a synthesis ekîbhâva of moments past and future, produced by the intellect (buddhi = nis’caya =

kalpana = adhyavasâya)…There is in the perception of a jug something (a k@sa@na of sense knowledge) which we must distinguish from the idea of

Sâ@mkhya understood the difference between knowledge and material events. But so far as knowledge consisted in being the copy of external things, it could not be absolutely different from the objects themselves; it was even then an invisible translucent sort of thing, devoid of weight and grossness such as the external objects possessed. But the fact that it copies those gross objects makes it evident that knowledge had essentially the same substances though in a subtler form as that of which the objects were made. But though the matter of knowledge, which assumed the form of the objects with which it came in touch, was probably thus a subtler combination of the same elementary substances of which matter was made up, yet there was in it another element, viz. intelligence, which at once distinguished it as utterly different from material combinations. This element of intelligence is indeed different from the substances or content of the knowledge itself, for the element of intelligence is like a stationary light, “the self,” which illuminates the crowding, bustling knowledge which is incessantly changing its form in accordance with the objects with which it comes in touch. This light of intelligence is the same that finds its manifestation in consciousness as the “I,” the changeless entity amidst all the fluctuations of the changeful procession of knowledge. How this element of light which is foreign to the substance of knowledge

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[Footnote 1: See Nyâyamañjarî on pramâ@na.]

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relates itself to knowledge, and how knowledge itself takes it up into itself and appears as conscious, is the most difficult point of the Sâ@mkhya epistemology and metaphysics. The substance of knowledge copies the external world, and this copy-shape of knowledge is again intelligized by the pure intelligence (_puru@sa_) when it appears as conscious. The forming of the buddhi-shape of knowledge is thus the pramâ@na (instrument and process of knowledge) and the validity or invalidity of any of these shapes is criticized by the later shapes of knowledge and not by the external objects (_svata@h-prâmâ@nya_ and svata@h-aprâmâ@nya). The pramâ@na however can lead to a pramâ or right knowledge only when it is intelligized by the puru@sa. The puru@sa comes in touch with buddhi not by the ordinary means of physical contact but by what may be called an inexplicable transcendental contact.

It is the transcendental influence of puru@sa that sets in motion the original prak@rti in Sâ@mkhya metaphysics, and it is the same transcendent touch (call it yogyatâ according to Vâcaspati or samyoga according to Bhik@su) of the transcendent entity of puru@sa that transforms the non-intelligent states of buddhi into consciousness. The Vijñânavâdin Buddhist did not make any

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distinction between the pure consciousness and its forms (_âkâra_) and did not therefore agree that the âkâra of knowledge was due to its copying the objects. Sâ@mkhya was however a realist who admitted the external world and regarded the forms as all due to copying, all stamped as such upon a translucent substance (_sattva_) which could assume the shape of the objects.

But Sâ@mkhya was also transcendentalist in this, that it did not think like Nyâya that the âkâra of knowledge was all that knowledge had to show; it held that there was a transcendent element which shone forth in knowledge and made it conscious. With Nyâya there was no distinction between the shaped buddhi and the intelligence, and that being so consciousness was almost like a physical event. With Sâ@mkhya however so far as the content and the shape manifested in consciousness were concerned it was indeed a physical event, but so far as the pure intelligizing element of consciousness was concerned it was a wholly transcendent affair beyond the scope and province of physics. The rise of consciousness was thus at once both transcendent and physical.

The Mîmâ@msist Prabhâkara agreed with Nyâya in general as regards the way in which the objective world and sense contact

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induced knowledge in us. But it regarded knowledge as a

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unique phenomenon which at once revealed itself, the knower and the known. We are not concerned with physical collocations, for whatever these may be it is knowledge which reveals things—the direct apprehension that should be called the pramâ@na.

Pramâ@na in this sense is the same as pramiti or pramâ, the phenomenon of apprehension. Pramâ@na may also indeed mean the collocations so far as they induce the pramâ. For pramâ or right knowledge is never produced, it always exists, but it manifests itself differently under different circumstances.

The validity of knowledge means the conviction or the specific attitude that is generated in us with reference to the objective world. This validity is manifested with the rise of knowledge, and it does not await the verdict of any later experience in the objective field (_sa@mvâdin_). Knowledge as nirvikalpa (indeterminate) means the whole knowledge of the object and not merely a non-sensible hypothetical indeterminate class-notion as Nyâya holds. The savikalpa (determinate) knowledge only reestablishes the knowledge thus formed by relating it with other objects as represented by memory [Footnote ref 1].

Prabhâkara rejected the Sâ@mkhya conception of a dual element in consciousness as involving a transcendent intelligence (_cit_) and a material part, the buddhi; but it regarded consciousness as an unique thing which by itself in one flash represented both the knower and the known. The validity of knowledge did not depend

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upon its faithfulness in reproducing or indicating (_pradars’akatva_) external objects, but upon the force that all direct apprehension (_anubhûti_) has of prompting us to action in the external world; knowledge is thus a complete and independent unit in all its self-revealing aspects. But what the knowledge was in itself apart from its self-revealing character Prabhâkara did not enquire.

Kumârila declared that jñâna (knowledge) was a movement brought about by the activity of the self which resulted in producing consciousness (_jñâtatâ_) of objective things. Jñâna itself cannot be perceived, but can only be inferred as the movement necessary for producing the jñâtatâ or consciousness of things.

Movement with Kumârila was not a mere atomic vibration, but was a non-sensuous transcendent operation of which vibration

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[Footnote 1: Sâ@mkhya considered nirvikalpa as the dim knowledge of the first moment of consciousness, which, when it became clear at the next moment, was called savikalpa.]

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was sometimes the result. Jñâna was a movement and not the result of causal operation as Nyâya supposed. Nyâya would

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not also admit any movement on the part of the self, but it would hold that when the self is possessed of certain qualities, such as desire, etc., it becomes an instrument for the accomplishment of a physical movement. Kumârila accords the same self-validity to knowledge that Prabhâkara gives. Later knowledge by experience is not endowed with any special quality which should decide as to the validity of the knowledge of the previous movement. For what is called sa@mvâdi or later testimony of experience is but later knowledge and nothing more [Footnote ref 1]. The self is not revealed in the knowledge of external objects, but we can know it by a mental perception of self-consciousness. It is the movement of this self in presence of certain collocating circumstances leading to cognition of things that is called jñâna [Footnote ref 2].

Here Kumârila distinguishes knowledge as movement from knowledge as objective consciousness. Knowledge as movement was beyond sense perception and could only be inferred.

The idealistic tendency of Vijñânavâda Buddhism, Sâ@mkhya, and Mîmâ@msâ was manifest in its attempt at establishing the unique character of knowledge as being that with which alone we are in touch. But Vijñânavâda denied the external world, and thereby did violence to the testimony of knowledge. Sâ@mkhya admitted the external world but created a gulf between the content of knowledge and pure intelligence; Prabhâkara ignored this difference, and was satisfied with the introspective assertion that knowledge

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was such a unique thing that it revealed with itself, the knower and the known, Kumârila however admitted a transcendent element of movement as being the cause of our objective consciousness, but regarded this as being separate from self. But the question remained unsolved as to why, in spite of the unique character of knowledge, knowledge could relate itself to the world of objects, how far the world of external objects or of knowledge could be regarded as absolutely true. Hitherto judgments were only relative, either referring to one’s being prompted to the objective world, to the faithfulness of the representation of objects, the suitability of fulfilling our requirements, or to verification by later

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[Footnote 1: See Nyâyaratnamâla, svata@h-prâmâ@nya-nir@naya.]

[Footnote 2: See Nyâyamañjari on Pramâ@na, S’lokavârttika on Pratyak@sa, and Gâgâ Bha@t@ta’s Bha@t@tâcintama@ni on Pratyak@sa.]

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uncontradicted experience. But no enquiry was made whether any absolute judgments about the ultimate truth of knowledge and matter could be made at all. That which appeared was regarded as the real. But the question was not asked, whether

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there was anything which could be regarded as absolute truth, the basis of all appearance, and the unchangeable, reality. This philosophical enquiry had the most wonderful charm for the Hindu mind.

Vedânta Literature.

It is difficult to ascertain the time when the Brahmasûtras were written, but since they contain a refutation of almost all the other Indian systems, even of the S’ûnyavâda Buddhism (of course according to S’a@nkara’s interpretation), they cannot have been written very early. I think it may not be far from the truth in supposing that they were written some time in the second century B.C. About the period 780 A.D. Gau@dapâda revived the monistic teaching of the Upani@sads by his commentary on the Mâ@n@dûkya Upani@sad in verse called Mâ@n@dûkyakârikâ. His disciple Govinda was the teacher of S’a@nkara (788—820 A.D.). S’a@nkara’s commentary on the Brahmasûtras is the root from which sprang forth a host of commentaries and studies on Vedântism of great originality, vigour, and philosophic insight. Thus Ânandagiri, a disciple of S’a@nkara, wrote a commentary called Nyâyanir@naya, and Govindânanda wrote another commentary named Ratnaprabhâ.

(1247—1260 A.D.) wrote his Kalpataru on it, and Apyayadik@sita (1550 A.D.) son of Ra@ngarâjadhvarîndra of Kâñcî wrote his Kalpataruparimala on the Kalpataru. Another disciple of S’a@nkara, Padmapâda, also called Sanandana, wrote a commentary on it known as Pañcapâdikâ. From the manner in which the book is begun one would expect that it was to be a running commentary on the whole of S’a@nkara’s bhâsya, but it ends abruptly at the end of the fourth sûtra. Mâdhava (1350), in his S’a@nkaravijaya, recites an interesting story about it. He says that Sures’vara received S’a@nkara’s permission to write a vârttika on the bhâsya.

(though probably the last great work on Vedânta) is the Advaitasiddhi of Madhusûdana Sarasvatî who followed Dharmarâjâdhvarîndra.

This has three commentaries known as Gau@dabrahmânandî, Vi@t@thales’opadhyâyî and Siddhivyâkhyâ. Sadânanda Vyâsa wrote also a summary of it known as Advaitasiddhisiddhântasâra.

Sadânanda wrote also an excellent elementary work named Vedântasâra which has also two commentaries Subodhinî and Vidvanmanorañjinî. The Advaitabrahmasiddhi of Sadânanda Yati though much inferior to Advaitasiddhi is important, as it touches on many points of Vedânta interest which are not dealt with in other Vedânta works. The Nyâyamakaranda of Ânandabodha Bha@t@târakâcâryya treats of the doctrines of illusion very

Bhagavadgîtâ. The proofs in support of the view that the Bhagavadgîtâ is a Vai@s@nava work will be discussed in the 2nd volume of the present work in the section on Bhagavadgîtâ and its philosophy.]

[Footnote 2: Indian Antiquary, 1915.]

[Footnote 3: See Vâcaspati Mis’ra’s Bhâmatî on S’a@nkara’s bhâsya on Brahmasûtra, II. ii.]

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I do not know of any evidence that would come in conflict with this supposition. The fact that we do not know of any Hindu writer who held such monistic views as Gau@dapâda or S’a@nkara, and who interpreted the Brahmasûtras in accordance with those monistic ideas, when combined with the fact that the dualists had been writing commentaries on the Brahmasûtras, goes to show that the Brahmasûtras were originally regarded as an authoritative work of the dualists. This also explains the fact that

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the Bhagavadgîtâ, the canonical work of the Ekânti Vai@s@navas, should refer to it. I do not know of any Hindu writer previous to Gau@dapâda who attempted to give an exposition of the monistic doctrine (apart from the Upani@sads), either by writing a commentary as did S’a@nkara, or by writing an independent work as did Gau@dapâda. I am inclined to think therefore that as the pure monism of the Upani@sads was not worked out in a coherent manner for the formation of a monistic system, it was dealt with by people who had sympathies with some form of dualism which was already developing in the later days of the Upani@sads, as evidenced by the dualistic tendencies of such Upani@sads as the S’vetâs’vatara, and the like. The epic S’a@mkhya was also the result of this dualistic development.

It seems that Bâdarâya@na, the writer of the Brahmasûtras, was probably more a theist, than an absolutist like his commentator S’a@nkara. Gau@dapâda seems to be the most important man, after the Upani@sad sages, who revived the monistic tendencies of the Upani@sads in a bold and clear form and tried to formulate them in a systematic manner. It seems very significant that no other kârikâs on the Upani@sads were interpreted, except the Mân@dûkyakârikâ by Gau@dapâda, who did not himself make any reference to any other writer of the monistic school, not even Bâdarâya@na. S’a@nkara himself makes the confession that the absolutist (_advaita_) creed was recovered from

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the Vedas by Gau@dapâda. Thus at the conclusion of his commentary on Gau@dapâda’s kârikâ, he says that “he adores by falling at the feet of that great guru (teacher) the adored of his adored, who on finding all the people sinking in the ocean made dreadful by the crocodiles of rebirth, out of kindness for all people, by churning the great ocean of the Veda by his great churning rod of wisdom recovered what lay deep in the heart of the Veda, and is hardly attainable even by the immortal

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gods [Footnote ref l].” It seems particularly significant that S’a@nkara should credit Gau@dapâda and not Bâdarâya@na with recovering the Upani@sad creed. Gau@dapâda was the teacher of Govinda, the teacher of S’a@nkara; but he was probably living when S’a@nkara was a student, for S’a@nkara says that he was directly influenced by his great wisdom, and also speaks of the learning, self-control and modesty of the other pupils of Gau@dapâda [Footnote ref 2]. There is some dispute about the date of S’a@nkara, but accepting the date proposed by Bha@n@darkar, Pa@thak and Deussen, we may consider it to be 788 A.D. [Footnote ref 3], and suppose that in order to be able to teach S’a@nkara, Gau@dapâda must have been living till at least 800 A.D.

Gau@dapâda thus flourished after all the great Buddhist teachers As’vagho@sa, Nâgârjuna, Asa@nga and Vasubandhu; and

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I believe that there is sufficient evidence in his kârikâs for thinking that he was possibly himself a Buddhist, and considered that the teachings of the Upani@sads tallied with those of Buddha.

Thus at the beginning of the fourth chapter of his kârikâs he says that he adores that great man (_dvipadâm varam_) who by knowledge as wide as the sky realized (_sambuddha_) that all appearances (_dharma_) were like the vacuous sky (_gaganopamam_ [Footnote ref 4].

He

then goes on to say that he adores him who has dictated (_des’ita_) that the touch of untouch (_aspars’ayoga_—probably referring to Nirvâ@na) was the good that produced happiness to all beings, and that he was neither in disagreement with this doctrine nor found any contradiction in it (_avivâda@h aviruddhas’ca_).

Some disputants hold that coming into being is of existents, whereas others quarrelling with them hold that being (_jâta_) is of nonexistents (_abhûtasya_); there are others who quarrel with them and say that neither the existents nor nonexistents are liable to being and there is one non-coming-into-being (_advayamajâtim_). He agrees with those who hold that there is no coming into being [Footnote ref 5]. In IV. 19 of his kârikâ he again says that the Buddhas have shown that there was no coming into being in any way (_sarvathâ Buddhairajâti@h paridîpita@h_).

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[Footnote 1: S’a@nkara’s bhâ@sya on Gau@dapâda’s kârikâ, Anandâs’rama edition, p. 214.]

[Footnote 2: Anandâs’rama edition of S’a@nkara’s bhâ@sya on Gau@dapâda’s

kârikâ, p. 21.]

[Footnote 3: Telang wishes to put S’a@nkara’s date somewhere in the 8th century, and Ve@nkates’vara would have him in 805 A.D.-897 A.D., as he did not believe that S’a@nkara could have lived only for 32 years.

J.R.A.S. 1916.]

[Footnote 4: Compare Lankâvatâra, p. 29, Katha@m ca gaganopamam.]

[Footnote 5: Gau@dapâda’s kârikâ, IV. 2, 4.]

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Again, in IV. 42 he says that it was for those realists (_vastuvâdi_), who since they found things and could deal with them and were afraid of non-being, that the Buddhas had spoken of origination (_jâti_). In IV. 90 he refers to agrayâna which we know to be a name of Mahâyâna. Again, in IV. 98 and 99

he says that all appearances are pure and vacuous by nature.

These the Buddhas, the emancipated one (_mukta_) and the leaders

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know first. It was not said by the Buddha that all appearances (_dharma_) were knowledge. He then closes the kârikâs with an adoration which in all probability also refers to the Buddha [Footnote ref 1].

Gau@dapâda’s work is divided into four chapters: (i) Âgama (scripture), (2) Vaitathya (unreality), (3) Advaita (unity), (4) Alâtas’ânti (the extinction of the burning coal). The first chapter is more in the way of explaining the Mâ@n@dûkya Upani@sad by virtue of which the entire work is known as Mâ@n@dûkyakârikâ.

The second, third, and fourth chapters are the constructive parts of Gau@dapâda’s work, not particularly connected with the Mâ@n@dûkya Upani@sad.

In the first chapter Gau@dapâda begins with the three apparent manifestations of the self: (1) as the experiencer of the external world while we are awake (_vis’va_ or vais’vânara âtmâ), (2) as the experiencer in the dream state (_taijasa âtmâ_), (3) as the experiencer in deep sleep (_su@supti_), called the prâjña when there is no determinate knowledge, but pure consciousness and pure bliss (_ânanda_). He who knows these three as one is never attached to his experiences. Gau@dapâda then enumerates some theories of creation: some think that the world has proceeded as a creation from the prâ@na (vital activity), others consider creation as an expansion (_vibhûti_) of that cause

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from which it has proceeded; others imagine that creation is like dream (_svapna_) and magic (_mâyâ_); others, that creation proceeds simply by the will of the Lord; others that it proceeds from time; others that it is for the enjoyment of the Lord (_bhogârtham_) or for his play only (_kri@dârtham_), for such is the nature (_svabhâva_) of the Lord, that he creates, but he cannot have any longing, as all his desires are in a state of fulfilment.

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[Footnote 1: Gau@dapâda’s kârikâ IV. 100. In my translation I have not followed S’a@nkara, for he has I think tried his level best to explain away even the most obvious references to Buddha and Buddhism in Gau@dapâda’s kârikâ. I have, therefore, drawn my meaning directly as Gau@dapâda’s kârikâs seemed to indicate. I have followed the same principle in giving the short exposition of Gau@dapâda’s philosophy below.]

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Gau@dapâda does not indicate his preference one way or the other, but describes the fourth state of the self as unseen (_ad@r@s@ta_), unrelationable (_avyavahâryam_), ungraspable (_agrâhyam_), indefinable (_alak@sa@na_), unthinkable (_acintyam_), unspeakable (_avyapades’ya_),

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the essence as oneness with the self (_ekâtmapratyayasâra_), as the extinction of the appearance (_prapañcopas’ama_), the quiescent (_s’ântam_), the good (_s’ivam_), the one (_advaita_) [Footnote ref 1]. The world-appearance (_prapañca_) would have ceased if it had existed, but all this duality is mere mâyâ (magic or illusion), the one is the ultimately real (_paramârthata@h_). In the second chapter Gau@dapâda says that what is meant by calling the world a dream is that all existence is unreal. That which neither exists in the beginning nor in the end cannot be said to exist in the present. Being like unreal it appears as real. The appearance has a beginning and an end and is therefore false. In dreams things are imagined internally, and in the experience that we have when we are awake things are imagined as if existing outside, but both of them are but illusory creations of the self.

What is perceived in the mind is perceived as existing at the moment of perception only; external objects are supposed to have two moments of existence (namely before they are perceived, and when they begin to be perceived), but this is all mere imagination. That which is unmanifested in the mind and that which appears as distinct and manifest outside are all imaginary productions in association with the sense faculties. There is first the imagination of a perceiver or soul (_jîva_) and then along with it the imaginary creations of diverse inner states and the external world. Just as in darkness the rope is imagined to be a snake, so the self is also imagined by its own illusion in diverse forms.

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There is neither any production nor any destruction (_na nirodho, na cotpatti@h_), there is no one who is enchained, no one who is striving, no one who wants to be released [Footnote ref 2]. Imagination finds itself realized in the nonexistent existents and also in the sense

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[Footnote 1: Compare in Nâgârjuna’s first kârikâ the idea of prapañcopas’amam s’ivam.

Anirodhamanutpâdamanucchedamas’âs’vatam anekârthamanânârthamanâgamamanirgamam ya@h pratîtyasamutpâdam prapañcopas’amam s’ivam des’ayâmâva sambuddhastam vande vadatâmvaram.

Compare also Nâgârjuna’s Chapter on Nirvâ@naparîk@sâ, Pûrvopalambhopas’ama@h prapañcopas’ama@h s’iva@h na kvacit kasyacit kas’cit dharmmo buddhenades’ita@h. So far as I know the Buddhists were the first to use the words prapañcopas’aman s’ivam.]

[Footnote 2: Compare Nâgârjuna’s k@arikâ, “anirodhamanutpâdam” in Mâdhyamikav@rtti, B.T.S., p. 3.]

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of unity; all imagination either as the many or the one (_advaya_) is false; it is only the oneness (_advayatâ_) that is good. There is no many, nor are things different or non-different (_na nânedam

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…na p@rthag nâp@rthak_) [Footnote ref 1]. The sages who have transcended

attachment, fear, and anger and have gone beyond the depths of the Vedas have perceived it as the imaginationless cessation of all appearance (nirvikalpa@h prapañcopas’ama@h_), the one [Footnote ref 2].

In the third chapter Gau@dapâda says that truth is like the void(_âkâs’a_) which is falsely concieved as taking part in birth and death, coming and going and as existing in all bodies; but howsoever it be conceived, it is all the while not different from âkâs’a. All things that appear as compounded are but dreams (_svapna_) and mâyâ (magic). Duality is a distinction imposed upon the one (_advaita_) by mâyâ. The truth is immortal, it cannot therefore by its own nature suffer change. It has no birth. All birth and death, all this manifold is but the result of an imposition of mâyâ upon it [Footnote ref 3]. One mind appears as many in the dream, as also in the waking state one appears as many, but when the mind activity of the Togins (sages) is stopped arises this fearless state, the extinction of all sorrow, final ceasation. Thinking everything to be misery (_du@hkham sarvam anusm@rtya_) one should stop all desires and enjoyments, and thinking that nothing has any birth he should not see any production at all. He should awaken the mind (_citta_) into its final dissolution (_laya_) and pacify it when distracted; he should not move it towards diverse objects when it stops. He should not taste any pleasure (_sukham_) and by wisdom remain unattached, by strong effort making it motionless

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and still. When he neither passes into dissolution nor into distraction; when there is no sign, no appearance that is the perfect Brahman. When there is no object of knowledge to come into being, the unproduced is then called the omniscent (_sarvajña_).

In the fourth chapter, called the Alats’ânti, Gau@dapâda further

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[Footnote 1: Compare Mâdhyamikakârikâ, B.T.S._, p.3 anekârtham anânârtham, etc.]

[Footnote 2: Compare Lankâvatârasûtra, p.78, Advayâsamsâraparinirvâ@nvatsarvadharmâ@h tasmât tarhi mahâmate S’unyatânutpâdâdvayani@hsvabhâvalak@sa@ne yoga@h kara@niya@h; also 8,46, Yaduta svacittavi@sayavikalpad@r@s@tyânavabodhanât vijñânânâm

svacittad@r@s@tyamâtrânavatâre@na mahâmate vâlaprthagjanâ@h bhâvâbhâvasvabhâvaparamârthad@r@s@tidvayvâdino bhavanti.]

[Footnote 3: Compare Nâgârjuna’s kârikâ, B.T.S. p. 196, Âkâs’am s’as’as’@r@ngañca bandhyâyâ@h putra eva ca asantas’câbhivyajyante tathâbhâvena kalpanâ, with Gau@dapâda’s kârikâ, III. 28, Asato mâyayâ janma tatvato naiva jâyate bandhyâputro na tattvena mâyâya vâpi jâyate.]

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describes this final state [Footnote ref l]. All the dharmas (appearances) are without death or decay [Footnote: ref 2].

Gau@dapâda then follows a dialectical form of argument which reminds us of Nâgârjuna. Gau@dapâda continues thus: Those who regard kâra@na (cause) as the kâryya (effect in a potential form) cannot consider the cause as truly unproduced (_aja_), for it suffers production; how can it be called eternal and yet changing?

If it is said that things come into being from that which has no production, there is no example with which such a case may be illustrated. Nor can we consider that anything is born from that which has itself suffered production. How again can one come to a right conclusion about the regressus ad infinitum of cause and effect (_hetu_ and phala)? Without reference to the effect there is no cause, and without reference to cause there is no effect.

Nothing is born either by itself or through others; call it either being, non-being, or being-non-being, nothing suffers any birth, neither the cause nor the effect is produced out of its own nature (_svabhâvatah_), and thus that which has no beginning anywhere cannot be said to have a production. All experience (_prajñapti_) is dependent on reasons, for otherwise both would vanish, and there would be none of the afflictions (_sa@mkles’a_) that we suffer. When we look at all things in a connected manner they seem to be dependent, but when we look at them from the point of view of

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reality or truth the reasons cease to be reasons. The mind (_citta_) does not come in touch with objects and thereby manifest them, for since things do not exist they are not different from their manifestations in knowledge. It is not in any particular case that the mind produces the manifestations of objects while they do not exist so that it could be said to be an error, for in present, past, and future the mind never comes in touch with objects which only appear by reason of their diverse manifestations.

Therefore neither the mind nor the objects seen by it are ever produced. Those who perceive them to suffer production are really traversing the reason of vacuity (_khe_), for all production is but false imposition on the vacuity. Since the unborn is perceived as being born, the essence then is the absence of

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[Footnote 1: The very name Alâta@sânti is absolutely Buddhistic. Compare Nâgârjuna’s kârikâ, B.T.S., p. 206, where he quotes a verse from the S’ataka.]

[Footnote 2: The use of the word dharma in the sense of appearance or entity is peculiarly Buddhistic. The Hindu sense is that given by Jaimini, “Codanâlak@sa@nah arthah, dharmah.” Dharma is determined by the injunctions

of the Vedas.]

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production, for it being of the nature of absence of production it could never change its nature. Everything has a beginning and an end and is therefore false. The existence of all things is like a magical or illusory elephant (_mâyâhastî_) and exists only as far as it merely appears or is related to experience. There is thus the appearance of production, movement and things, but the one knowledge (_vijñâna_) is the unborn, unmoved, the unthingness (_avastutva_), the cessation (s’ântam). As the movement of burning charcoal is perceived as straight or curved, so it is the movement (_spandita_) of consciousness that appears as the perceiving and the perceived. All the attributes (e.g. straight or curved) are imposed upon the charcoal fire, though in reality it does not possess them; so also all the appearances are imposed upon consciousness, though in reality they do not possess them. We could never indicate any kind of causal relation between the consciousness and its appearance, which are therefore to be demonstrated as unthinkable (_acintya_). A thing (_dravya_) is the cause of a thing (_dravya_), and that which is not a thing may be the cause of that which is not a thing, but all the appearances are neither things nor those which are not things, so neither are appearances produced from the mind (_citta_) nor is the mind produced by appearances. So long as one thinks of cause and effect he has to suffer the cycle of

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existence (_sa@msâra_), but when that notion ceases there is no sa@msâra. All things are regarded as being produced from a relative point of view only (_sa@mv@rti_), there is therefore nothing permanent (_s’âs’vata_). Again, no existent things are produced, hence there cannot be any destruction (_uccheda_). Appearances (_dharma_) are produced only apparently, not in reality; their coming into being is like mâyâ, and that mâyâ again does not exist. All appearances are like shoots of magic coming out of seeds of magic and are not therefore neither eternal nor destructible.

As in dreams, or in magic, men are born and die, so are all appearances. That which appears as existing from an imaginary relative point of view (_kalpita sa@mv@rti_) is not so in reality (_para-mârtha_), for the existence depending on others, as shown in all relative appearance, is after all not a real existence. That things exist, do not exist, do exist and not exist, and neither exist nor not exist; that they are moving or steady, or none of those, are but thoughts with which fools are deluded.

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It is so obvious that these doctrines are borrowed from the Mâdhyamika doctrines, as found in the Nâgârjuna’s kârikâs and the Vijñânavâda doctrines, as found in La@nkâvatâra, that it is needless to attempt to prove it, Gau@dapâda assimilated all the

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Buddhist S’ûnyavâda and Vijñânavâda teachings, and thought that these held good of the ultimate truth preached by the Upani@sads.

It is immaterial whether he was a Hindu or a Buddhist, so long as we are sure that he had the highest respect for the Buddha and for the teachings which he believed to be his. Gau@dapâda took the smallest Upani@sads to comment upon, probably because he wished to give his opinions unrestricted by the textual limitations of the bigger ones. His main emphasis is on the truth that he realized to be perfect. He only incidentally suggested that the great Buddhist truth of indefinable and unspeakable vijñâna or vacuity would hold good of the highest âtman of the Upani@sads, and thus laid the foundation of a revival of the Upani@sad studies on Buddhist lines. How far the Upani@sads guaranteed in detail the truth of Gau@dapâda’s views it was left for his disciple, the great S’a@nkara, to examine and explain.

Vedânta and Sá@nkara (788-820 A.D.).

Vedânta philosophy is the philosophy which claims to be the exposition of the philosophy taught in the Upani@sads and summarized in the Brahmasûtras of Bâdarâya@na. The Upani@sads form the last part of the Veda literature, and its philosophy is therefore also called sometimes the Uttara-Mîmâ@msâ or the Mîmâmsâ (decision) of the later part of the Vedas as distinguished

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from the Mîmâ@msâ of the previous part of the Vedas and the Brâhma@nas as incorporated in the Pûrvamîmâ@msâ sûtras of Jaimini. Though these Brahmasûtras were differently interpreted by different exponents, the views expressed in the earliest commentary on them now available, written by S’a@nkarâcârya, have attained wonderful celebrity, both on account of the subtle and deep ideas it contains, and also on account of the association of the illustrious personality of S’a@nkara. So great is the influence of the philosophy propounded by Sá@nkara and elaborated by his illustrious followers, that whenever we speak of the Vedânta philosophy we mean the philosophy that was propounded by S’a@nkara. If other expositions are intended the names of the exponents have to be mentioned (e.g. Râmânuja-mata, Vallabha-mata, etc.), In this

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chapter we shall limit ourselves to the exposition of the Vedânta philosophy as elaborated by S’a@nkara and his followers. In S’a@nkara’s work (the commentaries on the Brahmasûtra and the ten Upani@sads) many ideas have been briefly incorporated which as found in S’a@nkara do not appear to be sufficiently clear, but are more intelligible as elaborated by his followers. It is therefore better to take up the Vedânta system, not as we find it in S’a@nkara, but as elaborated by his followers, all of whom openly declare that they are true to their master’s philosophy.

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For the other Hindu systems of thought, the sûtras (_Jaimini sûtra, Nyâya sûtra,_ etc.) are the only original treatises, and no foundation other than these is available. In the case of the Vedânta however the original source is the Upani@sads, and the sûtras are but an extremely condensed summary in a systematic form. S’a@nkara did not claim to be the inventor or expounder of an original system, but interpreted the sûtras and the Upani@sads in order to show that there existed a connected and systematic philosophy in the Upani@sads which was also enunciated in the sûtras of Bâdarâya@na. The Upani@sads were a part of the Vedas and were thus regarded as infallible by the Hindus. If S’a@nkara could only show that his exposition of them was the right one, then his philosophy being founded upon the highest authority would be accepted by all Hindus. The most formidable opponents in the way of accomplishing his task were the Mîma@msists, who held that the Vedas did not preach any philosophy, for whatever there was in the Vedas was to be interpreted as issuing commands to us for performing this or that action. They held that if the Upani@sads spoke of Brahman and demonstrated the nature of its pure essence, these were mere exaggerations intended to put the commandment of performing some kind of worship of Brahman into a more attractive form.

S’a@nkara could not deny that the purport of the Vedas as found in the Brâhma@nas was explicitly of a mandatory nature as declared

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by the Mîmâ@msâ, but he sought to prove that such could not be the purport of the Upani@sads, which spoke of the truest and the highest knowledge of the Absolute by which the wise could attain salvation. He said that in the karmak@n@da—the (sacrificial injunctions) Brâhma@nas of the Vedas—the purport of the Vedas was certainly of a mandatory nature, as it was intended for ordinary people who were anxious for this or that pleasure,

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and were never actuated by any desire of knowing the absolute truth, but the Upani@sads, which were intended for the wise who had controlled their senses and become disinclined to all earthly joys, demonstrated the one Absolute, Unchangeable, Brahman as the only Truth of the universe. The two parts of the Vedas were intended for two classes of persons. S’a@nkara thus did not begin by formulating a philosophy of his own by logical and psychological analysis, induction, and deduction. He tried to show by textual comparison of the different Upani@sads, and by reference to the content of passages in the Upani@sads, that they were concerned in demonstrating the nature of Brahman (as he understood it) as their ultimate end. He had thus to show that the uncontradicted testimony of all the Upani@sads was in favour of the view which he held. He had to explain all doubtful and apparently conflicting texts, and also to show that none of the

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texts referred to the doctrines of mahat, prak@rti, etc. of the Sâ@mkhya. He had also to interpret the few scattered ideas about physics, cosmology, eschatology, etc. that are found in the Upani@sads consistently with the Brahman philosophy. In order to show that the philosophy of the Upani@sads as he expounded it was a consistent system, he had to remove all the objections that his opponents could make regarding the Brahman philosophy, to criticize the philosophies of all other schools, to prove them to be self-contradictory, and to show that any interpretation of the Upani@sads, other than that which he gave, was inconsistent and wrong. This he did not only in his bhâsya on the Brahmasûtras but also in his commentaries on the Upani@sads. Logic with him had a subordinate place, as its main value for us was the aid which it lent to consistent interpretations of the purport of the Upani@sad texts, and to persuading the mind to accept the uncontradicted testimony of the Upani@sads as the absolute truth.

had been left out or slightly touched by S’a@nkara were discussed fully by his followers. But it should always be remembered that philosophical reasonings and criticisms are always to be taken as but aids for convincing our intellect and strengthening our faith in the truth revealed in the Upani@sads. The true work of logic is to adapt the mind to accept them. Logic used for upsetting the instructions of the Upani@sads is logic gone astray. Many lives of S’a@nkarâcârya were written in Sanskrit such as the S’a@nkaradigvijaya, S’a@nkaravijaya-vilâsa, S’a@nkarajaya, etc. It is regarded as almost certain that he was born between 700

and 800 A.D. in the Malabar country in the Deccan. His father S’ivaguru was a Yajurvedi Brâhmin of the Taittirîya branch. Many miracles are related of S’a@nkara, and he is believed to have been the incarnation of S’iva. He turned ascetic in his eighth year and became the disciple of Govinda, a renowned sage then residing in a mountain cell on the banks of the Narbuda. He then came over to Benares and thence went to Badarikâs’rama. It is said that he wrote his illustrious bhâ@sya on the Brahmasûtra in his twelfth year. Later on he also wrote his commentaries on ten Upani@sads.

He returned to Benares, and from this time forth he decided to travel all over India in order to defeat the adherents of other schools of thought in open debate. It is said that he first went to

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meet Kumârila, but Kumârila was then at the point of death, and he advised him to meet Kumârila’s disciple. He defeated Ma@n@dana and converted him into an ascetic follower of his own. He then travelled in various places, and defeating his opponents everywhere he established his Vedânta philosophy, which from that time forth acquired a dominant influence in moulding the religious life of India.

S’a@nkara carried on the work of his teacher Gaudapâda and by writing commentaries on the ten Upani@sads and the Brahmasûtras tried to prove, that the absolutist creed was the one which was intended to be preached in the Upani@sads and the Brahmasûtras [Footnote: 1]. Throughout his commentary on the Brahmasûtras, there is ample evidence that he was contending against some other rival interpretations of a dualistic tendency which held that the Upani@sads partly favoured the Sâ@mkhya cosmology