CHAPTER VIII

THE NYÂYA-VAIS’E@SIKA PHILOSOPHY

Criticism of Buddhism and Sâ@mkhya from the Nyâya standpoint.

The Buddhists had upset all common sense convictions of substance and attribute, cause and effect, and permanence of

561

things, on the ground that all collocations are momentary; each group of collocations exhausts itself in giving rise to another group and that to another and so on. But if a collocation representing milk generates the collocation of curd it is said to be due to a joint action of the elements forming the cause-collocation and the modus operandi is unintelligible; the elements composing the cause-collocation cannot separately generate the elements composing the effect-collocation, for on such a supposition it becomes hard to maintain the doctrine of momentariness as the individual and separate exercise of influence on the part of the cause-elements and their coordination and manifestation as effect cannot but take more than one moment.

The supposition that the whole of the effect-collocation is the result of the joint action of the elements of cause-collocation is against our universal uncontradicted experience that specific elements constituting the cause (e.g. the whiteness of milk) are the cause of other corresponding elements of the effect (e.g. the whiteness of the curd); and we could not say that the hardness, blackness, and other properties of the atoms of iron in a lump state should not be regarded as the cause of similar qualities in the iron ball, for this is against the testimony of experience.

Moreover there would be no difference between material (_upâdâna_, e.g. clay of the jug), instrumental and concomitant causes (_nimitta_

and sahakâri, such as the potter, and the wheel, the stick etc. in forming the jug), for the causes jointly produce the effect, and

562

there was no room for distinguishing the material and the instrumental causes, as such.

Again at the very moment in which a cause-collocation is brought into being, it cannot exert its influence to produce its

275

effect-collocation. Thus after coming into being it would take the cause-collocation at least another moment to exercise its influence to produce the effect. How can the thing which is destroyed the moment after it is born produce any effect? The truth is that causal elements remain and when they are properly collocated the effect is produced. Ordinary experience also shows that we perceive things as existing from a past time. The past time is perceived by us as past, the present as present and the future as future and things are perceived as existing from a past time onwards.

The Sâ@mkhya assumption that effects are but the actualized states of the potential cause, and that the causal entity holds within it all the future series of effects, and that thus the effect is already existent even before the causal movement for the production of the effect, is also baseless. Sâ@mkhya says that the oil was already existent in the sesamum and not in the stone, and that it is thus that oil can be got from sesamum and not from the

563

stone. The action of the instrumental cause with them consists only in actualizing or manifesting what was already existent in a potential form in the cause. This is all nonsense. A lump of clay is called the cause and the jug the effect; of what good is it to say that the jug exists in the clay since with clay we can never carry water? A jug is made out of clay, but clay is not a jug.

What is meant by saying that the jug was unmanifested or was in a potential state before, and that it has now become manifest or actual? What does potential state mean? The potential state of the jug is not the same as its actual state; thus the actual state of the jug must be admitted as nonexistent before. If it is meant that the jug is made up of the same parts (the atoms) of which the clay is made up, of course we admit it, but this does not mean that the jug was existent in the atoms of the lump of clay. The potency inherent in the clay by virtue of which it can expose itself to the influence of other agents, such as the potter, for being transformed into a jug is not the same as the effect, the jug. Had it been so, then we should rather have said that the jug came out of the jug. The assumption of Sâ@mkhya that the substance and attribute have the same reality is also against all experience, for we all perceive that movement and attribute belong to substance and not to attribute. Again Sâ@mkhya holds a preposterous doctrine that buddhi is different

276

564

from intelligence. It is absolutely unmeaning to call buddhi non-intelligent. Again what is the good of all this fictitious fuss that the qualities of buddhi are reflected on puru@sa and then again on buddhi. Evidently in all our experience we find that the soul (_âtman_) knows, feels and wills, and it is difficult to understand why Sâ@mkhya does not accept this patent fact and declare that knowledge, feeling, and willing, all belonged to buddhi. Then again in order to explain experience it brought forth a theory of double reflection. Again Sâ@mkhya prak@rti is non-intelligent, and where is the guarantee that she (prak@rti) will not bind the wise again and will emancipate him once for all? Why did the puru@sa become bound down? Prak@rti is being utilized for enjoyment by the infinite number of puru@sas, and she is no delicate girl (as Sâ@mkhya supposes) who will leave the presence of the puru@sa ashamed as soon as her real nature is discovered. Again pleasure (_sukha_), sorrow (_du@hkha_) and a blinding feeling through ignorance (_moha_) are but the feeling-experiences of the soul, and with what impudence could Sâ@mkhya think of these as material substances?

Again their cosmology of a mahat, aha@mkâra, the tanmâtras, is all a series of assumptions never testified by experience nor by reason. They are all a series of hopeless and foolish blunders.

The phenomena of experience thus call for a new careful reconstruction in the light of reason and experience such as cannot be found in other systems. (See Nyâyamañjarî, pp. 452-466 and 490-496.)

565

Nyâya and Vais’e@sika sûtras.

It is very probable that the earliest beginnings of Nyâya are to be found in the disputations and debates amongst scholars trying to find out the right meanings of the Vedic texts for use in sacrifices and also in those disputations which took place between the adherents of different schools of thought trying to defeat one another. I suppose that such disputations occurred in the days of the Upani@sads, and the art of disputation was regarded even then as a subject of study, and it probably passed then by the name vâkovâkya. Mr Bodas has pointed out that Âpastamba who according to Bühler lived before the third century B.C. used the word Nyâya in the sense of Mîmâ@msâ [Footnote ref 1]. The word Nyâya derived

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1 Âpastamba, trans. by Bühler, Introduction, p. XXVII., and Bodas’s article on the Historical Survey of Indian Logic in the Bombay Branch of J.R.A.S., vol. XIX.]

277

566

from the root nî is sometimes explained as that by which sentences and words could be interpreted as having one particular meaning and not another, and on the strength of this even Vedic accents of words (which indicate the meaning of compound words by pointing out the particular kind of compound in which the words entered into combination) were called Nyâya [Footnote ref 1]. Prof. Jacobi on the strength of Kau@tilya’s enumeration of the vidyâ (sciences) as Ânvîk@sikî (the science of testing the perceptual and scriptural knowledge by further scrutiny), trayî (the three Vedas), vârttâ (the sciences of agriculture, cattle keeping etc.), and da@n@danîti (polity), and the enumeration of the philosophies as Sâ@mkhya, Yoga, Lokâyata and Ânvîk@sikî, supposes that the Nyâya sûtra was not in existence in Kau@tilya’s time 300 B.C.) [Footnote ref 2]. Kau@tilya’s reference to Nyâya as Ânvîk@sikî only suggests that the word Nyâya was not a familiar name for Ânvîk@sikî in Kau@tilya’s time. He seems to misunderstand Vâtsyâyana in thinking that Vâtsyâyana distinguishes Nyâya from the Ânvîk@sikî in holding that while the latter only means the science of logic the former means logic as well as metaphysics.

What appears from Vâtsyâyana’s statement in Nyâya sûtra I.i. 1

is this that he points out that the science which was known in his time as Nyâya was the same as was referred to as Ânvîk@sikî by Kau@tilya. He distinctly identifies Nyâyavidyâ with Ânvîk@sikî, but justifies the separate enumeration of certain logical categories such as sa@ms’aya (doubt) etc., though these were already contained within the first two terms pramâ@na (means of cognition) and

567

prameya (objects of cognition), by holding that unless these its special and separate branches (_p@rthakprasthâna_) were treated, Nyâyavidyâ would simply become metaphysics (_adhyâtmavidyâ_) like the Upani@sads. The old meaning of Nyâya as the means of determining

the right meaning or the right thing is also agreed upon by Vâtsyâyana and is sanctioned by Vâcaspati in his Nyâyavârttikatâtparya@tîkâ I.i. 1). He compares the meaning of the word Nyâya (_pramâ@nairarthaparîk@sa@nam_—to scrutinize an object by means of logical proof) with the etymological meaning of the word ânvîk@sikî (to scrutinize anything after it has been known by perception and scriptures). Vâtsyâyana of course points out that so far as this logical side of Nyâya is concerned it has the widest scope for

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Kâlidâsa’s Kumârasambhava “Udghâto pra@navayâsâm nyâyaistribhirudîra@nam,” also Mallinâtha’s gloss on it.]

[Footnote 2: Prof. Jacobi’s “_The early history of Indian Philosophy,”

Indian Antiquary_, 1918.]

278

itself as it includes all beings, all their actions, and all the sciences [Footnote ref 1]. He quotes Kau@tilya to show that in this capacity Nyâya

568

is like light illumining all sciences and is the means of all works. In its capacity as dealing with the truths of metaphysics it may show the way to salvation. I do not dispute Prof. Jacobi’s main point that the metaphysical portion of the work was a later addition, for this seems to me to be a very probable view. In fact Vâtsyâyana himself designates the logical portion as a p@rthakprasthâna (separate branch). But I do not find that any statement of Vâtsyâyana or Kau@tilya can justify us in concluding that this addition was made after Kau@tilya. Vâtsyâyana has no doubt put more stress on the importance of the logical side of the work, but the reason of that seems to be quite obvious, for the importance of metaphysics or adhyâtmavidyâ was acknowledged by all. But the importance of the mere logical side would not appeal to most people. None of the dharmas’âstras (religious scriptures) or the Vedas would lend any support to it, and Vâtsyâyana had to seek the support of Kau@tilya in the matter as the last resource. The fact that Kau@tilya was not satisfied by counting Ânvîk@sikî as one of the four vidyâs but also named it as one of the philosophies side by side with Sâ@mkhya seems to lead to the presumption that probably even in Kau@tilya’s time Nyâya was composed of two branches, one as adhyâtmavidyâ and another as a science of logic or rather of debate. This combination is on the face of it loose and external, and it is not improbable that the metaphysical portion was added to increase the popularity of the logical part, which by itself might not attract sufficient attention. Mahâmahopâdhyâya Haraprasâda

569

S’âstrî in an article in the Journal of the Bengal Asiatic Society 1905 says that as Vâcaspati made two attempts to collect the Nyâya sûtras, one as Nyâyasûci and the other as Nyâyasûtroddhâra, it seems that even in Vâcaspati’s time he was not certain as to the authenticity of many of the Nyâya sûtras. He further points out that there are unmistakable signs that many of the sûtras were interpolated, and relates the Buddhist tradition from China and Japan that Mirok mingled Nyâya and Yoga. He also

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Yena prayukta@h pravarttate tat prayojanam (that by which one is led to act is called prayojanam); yamartham abhîpsan jihâsan vâ karma ârabhate tenânena sarve prâ@nina@h sarvâ@ni karmâ@ni sarvâs’ca

vidyâ@h vyâptâ@h tadâs’rayâs’ca nyâya@h pravarttate (all those which one tries to have or to fly from are called prayojana, therefore all beings, all their actions, and all sciences, are included within prayojana, and all these depend on Nyâya). Vâtsyâyana bhâs’ya, I.i. 1.]

279

thinks that the sûtras underwent two additions, one at the hands of some Buddhists and another at the hands of some Hindu who put in Hindu arguments against the Buddhist ones. These suggestions of this learned scholar seem to be very probable, but

570

we have no clue by which we can ascertain the time when such additions were made. The fact that there are unmistakable proofs of the interpolation of many of the sûtras makes the fixing of the date of the original part of the Nyâya sûtras still more difficult, for the Buddhist references can hardly be of any help, and Prof. Jacobi’s attempt to fix the date of the Nyâya sûtras on the basis of references to S’ûnyavâda naturally loses its value, except on the supposition that all references to S’ûnyavâda must be later than Nâgârjuna, which is not correct, since the Mahâyâna sûtras written before Nâgârjuna also held the S’ûnyavâda doctrine.

edition of Vais’e@sika that the Vais’e@sika sûtras were earlier than the Nyâya. It seems to me to be perfectly certain that the Vais’e@sika sûtras were written before Caraka (80 A.D.); for he not only quotes one of the Vais’e@sika sûtras, but the whole foundation of his medical physics is based on the Vaisè@sika physics [Footnote ref 1]. The La@nkâvatâra sûtra (which as it was quoted by As’vagho@sa is earlier than 80 A.D.) also makes allusions to the atomic doctrine. There are

572

other weightier grounds, as we shall see later on, for supposing that the Vais’e@sika sûtras are probably pre-Buddhistic [Footnote ref 2].

It is certain that even the logical part of the present Nyâya sûtras was preceded by previous speculations on the subject by thinkers of other schools. Thus in commenting on I.i. 32 in which the sûtra states that a syllogism consists of five premisses (_avayava_) Vâtsyâyana says that this sûtra was written to refute the views of those who held that there should be ten premisses [Footnote ref 3]. The Vais’e@sika sûtras also give us some of the earliest types of inference, which do not show any acquaintance with the technic of the Nyâya doctrine of inference [Footnote ref 4].

Does Vais’e@sika represent an Old School of Mîmâ@msâ?

The Vais’e@sika is so much associated with Nyâya by tradition that it seems at first sight quite unlikely that it could be supposed to represent an old school of Mîmâ@msâ, older than that represented in the Mîmâ@msâ sûtras. But a closer inspection of the Vais’e@sika sûtras seems to confirm such a supposition in a very remarkable way. We have seen in the previous section that Caraka quotes a Vais’e@sika sûtra. An examination of Caraka’s Sûtrasthâna (I.35-38) leaves us convinced that the writer of the verses had some compendium of Vais’e@sika such as that of the Bhâ@sâpariccheda

[Footnote 3: Vâtsyâyana’s Bhâ@sya on the Nyâya sûtras, I.i.32. This is undoubtedly a reference to the Jaina view as found in Das’avaikâlikaniryukti as noted before.]

[Footnote 4: Nyâya sûtra I.i. 5, and Vais’e@sika sûtras IX. ii. 1-2, 4-5, and III. i. 8-17.]

281

heaviness (_gurutva_), liquidity (_dravatva_), oiliness(_sneha_), elasticity (_sa@mskâra_), merit (_dharma_) and demerit (_adharma_);

574

in one part of the sûtra the enumeration begins with “para”

(universality) and ends in “prayatna,” but buddhi (cognition) comes within the enumeration beginning from para and ending in prayatna, whereas in Caraka buddhi does not form part of the list and is separately enumerated. This leads me to suppose that Caraka’s sûtra was written at a time when the six gu@nas left out in the Vais’e@sika enumeration had come to be counted as gu@nas, and compendiums had been made in which these were enumerated.

Bhâ@sâpariccheda (a later Vais’e@sika compendium), is a compilation from some very old kârikâs which are referred to by Vis’vanâtha as being collected from “_atisa@mk@siptacirantanoktibhi@h_”—(from very ancient aphorisms [Footnote ref 1]); Caraka’s definition of sâmânya and vis’e@sa shows that they had not then been counted as separate categories as in later Nyâya-Vais’e@sika doctrines; but though slightly different it is quite in keeping with the sort of definition one finds in the Vais’e@sika sûtra that sâmânya (generality) and vi’se@sa are relative to each other [Footnote ref 2]. Caraka’s sûtras were therefore probably written at a time when the Vais’e@sika doctrines were undergoing changes, and well-known compendiums were beginning to be written on them.

The Vais’e@sika sûtras seem to be ignorant of the Buddhist doctrines. In their discussions on the existence of soul, there is no reference to any view as to nonexistence of soul, but the argument turned on the point as to whether the self is to be an

575

object of inference or revealed to us by our notion of “I.” There is also no other reference to any other systems except to some Mîmâ@msâ doctrines and occasionally to Sâ@mkhya. There is no reason to suppose that the Mîmâ@msâ doctrines referred to allude to the Mîmâ@msâ sûtras of Jaimini. The manner in which the nature of inference has been treated shows that the Nyâya phraseology of “_pûrvavat_” and “_s’e@savat_” was not known.

Vais’e@sika

sûtras in more than one place refer to time as the ultimate cause [Footnote ref 3]. We know that the S’vetâs’vatara Upani@sad refers to

those who regard time as the cause of all things, but in none of the

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Professor Vanamâlî Vedântatîrtha’s article in J.A.S.B., 1908.]

[Footnote 2: Caraka (I.i. 33) says that sâmânya is that which produces unity and vis’e@sa is that which separates. V.S. II. ii. 7. Sâmânya and vis’e@sa depend upon our mode of thinking (as united or as separate).]

[Footnote 3: Vais’e@sika sûtra (II. ii. 9 and V. ii. 26).]

282

576

systems that we have can we trace any upholding of this ancient view [Footnote ref 1]. These considerations as well as the general style of the work and the methods of discussion lead me to think that these sûtras are probably the oldest that we have and in all probability are pre-Buddhistic.

The Vais’e@sika sûtra begins with the statement that its object is to explain virtue, “dharma” This is we know the manifest duty of Mîmâ@msâ and we know that unlike any other system Jaimini begins his Mîmâ@msâ sûtras by defining “dharma”. This at first seems irrelevant to the main purpose of Vais’e@sika, viz, the description of the nature of padartha [Footnote ref 2]. He then defines dharma as that which gives prosperity and ultimate good (_nihsreyasa_) and says that the Veda must be regarded as valid, since it can dictate this. He ends his book with the remarks that those injunctions (of Vedic deeds) which are performed for ordinary human motives bestow prosperity even though their efficacy is not known to us through our ordinary experience, and in this matter the Veda must be regarded as the authority which dictates those acts [Footnote ref 3].

The fact that the Vais’e@sika begins with a promise to describe dharma and after describing the nature of substances, qualities and actions and also the ad@r@s@ta (unknown virtue) due to dharma (merit accruing from the performance of Vedic deeds) by which many of our unexplained experiences may be explained, ends his book by saying that those Vedic works which are not seen to produce

577

any direct effect, will produce prosperity through adrsta, shows that Ka@nâda’s method of explaining dharma has been by showing that physical phenomena involving substances, qualities, and actions can only be explained up to a certain extent while a good number cannot be explained at all except on the assumption of ad@r@s@ta (unseen virtue) produced by dharma. The

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: S’vetâs’vatara I.i.2]

[Footnote 2: I remember a verse quoted in an old commentary of the Kalâpa

Vyâkara@na, in which it is said that the description of the six categories by Ka@nâda in his Vais’e@sika sûtras, after having proposed to describe the nature of dharma, is as irrelevant as to proceed towards the sea while intending to go to the mountain Himavat (Himâlaya).

“_Dnarma@m vyâkhyâtukâmasya @sa@tpadârthopavar@nana@m Himavadgantukâmasya

sâgaragamanopamam_.”]

[Footnote 3: The sutra “_Tadvacanâd âmnâyasya prâmâ@nyam_ (I.i.3 and X.ii.9) has been explained by Upaskâra as meaning “The Veda being the word of Îs’vara (God) must be regarded as valid,” but since there is no mention of Îs’vara anywhere in the text this is simply reading the later

578

Nyâya ideas into the Vais’e@sika. Sûtra X.ii.8 is only a repetition of VI.ii.1.]

283

description of the categories of substance is not irrelevant, but is the means of proving that our ordinary experience of these cannot explain many facts which are only to be explained on the supposition of ad@r@s@ta proceeding out of the performance of Vedic deeds. In V.i. 15 the movement of needles towards magnets, in V. ii. 7 the circulation of water in plant bodies, V. ii. 13 and IV. ii. 7 the upward motion of fire, the side motion of air, the combining movement of atoms (by which all combinations have taken place), and the original movement of the mind are said to be due to ad@r@s@ta. In V. ii. 17 the movement of the soul after death, its taking hold of other bodies, the assimilation of food and drink and other kinds of contact (the movement and development of the foetus as enumerated in Upaskara) are said to be due to ad@r@s@ta. Salvation (moksa) is said to be produced by the annihilation of ad@r@s@ta leading to the annihilation of all contacts and non production of rebirths Vais’esika marks the distinction between the drsta (experienced) and the ad@r@s@ta. All the categories that he describes are founded on drsta (experience) and those unexplained by known experience are due to ad@r@s@ta These are the acts on which depend all

579

life-process of animals and plants, the continuation of atoms or the construction of the worlds, natural motion of fire and air, death and rebirth (VI. ii. 15) and even the physical phenomena by which our fortunes are affected in some way or other (V. ii. 2), in fact all with which we are vitally interested in philosophy.

Ka@nâda’s philosophy gives only some facts of experience regarding substances, qualities and actions, leaving all the graver issues of metaphysics to ad@r@s@ta But what leads to ad@r@s@ta? In answer to this, Ka@nâda does not speak of good or bad or virtuous or sinful deeds, but of Vedic works, such as holy ablutions (_snana_), fasting, holy student life (_brahmacarya_), remaining at the house of the teacher (_gurukulavasa_), retired forest life (_vanaprastha_), sacrifice (_yajña_), gifts (_dana_), certain kinds of sacrificial sprinkling and rules of performing sacrificial works according to the prescribed time of the stars, the prescribed hymns (mantras) (VI. ii. 2).

He described what is pure and what is impure food, pure food being that which is sacrificially purified (VI. ii. 5) the contrary being impure, and he says that the taking of pure food leads to prosperity through ad@r@s@ta. He also described how

284

feelings of attachment to things are also generated by ad@r@s@ta.

580

Throughout almost the whole of VI. i Ka@nâda is busy in showing the special conditions of making gifts and receiving them. A reference to our chapter on Mîmâ@msâ will show that the later Mîmâ@msâ writers agreed with the Nyâya-Vaisè@sika doctrines in most of their views regarding substance, qualities, etc. Some of the main points in which Mîmâ@msâ differs from Nyâya-Vaisè@sika are (1) self-validity of the Vedas, (2) the eternality of the Vedas, (3) disbelief in any creator or god, (4) eternality of sound (s’abda), (5) (according to Kumârila) direct perception of self in the notion of the ego.

Of these the first and the second points do not form any subject of discussion in the Vais’e@sika. But as no Îs’vara is mentioned, and as all ad@r@s@ta depends upon the authority of the Vedas, we may assume that Vais’e@sika had no dispute with Mîmâ@msâ. The fact that there is no reference to any dissension is probably due to the fact that really none had taken place at the time of the Vaisè@sika sûtras. It is probable that Ka@nâda believed that the Vedas were written by some persons superior to us (II. i. 18, VI. i.

1-2). But the fact that there is no reference to any conflict with Mîmâ@msâ suggests that the doctrine that the Vedas were never written by anyone was formulated at a later period, whereas in the days of the Vais’e@sika sûtras, the view was probably what is represented in the Vais’e@sika sûtras. As there is no reference to Îs`vara and as ad@r@s@ta proceeding out of the performance of actions in accordance with Vedic injunctions is made the cause of all atomic movements, we can very well assume that Vais’e@sika was

581

as atheistic or non-theistic as the later Mîmâ@msâ philosophers.

As regards the eternality of sound, which in later days was one of the main points of quarrel between the Nyâya-Vais’e@sika and the Mîmâ@msâ, we find that in II. ii. 25-32, Ka@nâda gives reasons in favour of the non-eternality of sound, but after that from II. ii. 33

till the end of the chapter he closes the argument in favour of the eternality of sound, which is the distinctive Mîmâ@msâ view as we know from the later Mîmâ@msâ writers [Footnote ref 1]. Next comes the question

of the proof of the existence of self. The traditional Nyâya view is

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: The last two concluding sûtras II. ii. 36 and 37 are in my opinion wrongly interpreted by S’a@nkara Mis’ra in his Upaskâra (II. ii.

36 by adding an “_api_” to the sûtra and thereby changing the issue, and II. ii. 37 by misreading the phonetic combination “samkhyabhava” as sâ@mkhya and bhava instead of sâ@mkhya and abhava, which in my opinion

is the right combination here) in favour of the non-eternality of sound as we find in the later Nyâya Vais’e@sika view.]

285

that the self is supposed to exist because it must be inferred as the seat of the qualities of pleasure, pain, cognition, etc. Traditionally

582

this is regarded as the Vais’e@sika view as well. But in Vais’e@sika III. ii. 4 the existence of soul is first inferred by reason of its activity and the existence of pleasure, pain, etc., in III. ii. 6-7 this inference is challenged by saying that we do not perceive that the activity, etc. belongs to the soul and not to the body and so no certainty can be arrived at by inference, and in III. ii. 8 it is suggested that therefore the existence of soul is to be accepted on the authority of the scriptures (_âgama_). To this the final Vais’e@sika conclusion is given that we can directly perceive the self in our feeling as “I” (_aham_), and we have therefore not to depend on the scriptures for the proof of the existence of the self, and thus the inference of the existence of the self is only an additional proof of what we already find in perception as “I” (_aham_) (III. ii.

10-18, also IX. i. 11).

These considerations lead me to think that the Vais’e@sika represented a school of Mîmâ@msâ thought which supplemented a metaphysics to strengthen the grounds of the Vedas.

Philosophy in the Vais’e@sika sûtras.

The Vais’e@sika sûtras begin with the ostensible purpose of explaining virtue (_dharma_) (I.i. 1) and dharma according to it is that by which prosperity (_abhyudaya_) and salvation (_ni@hs’reyasa_)

583

are attained. Then it goes on to say that the validity of the Vedas depends on the fact that it leads us to prosperity and salvation. Then it turns back to the second sûtra and says that salvation comes as the result of real knowledge, produced by special excellence of dharma, of the characteristic features of the categories of substance (_dravya_), quality (_gu@na_), class concept (_sâmdânya_), particularity (_vis’e@sa_), and inherence (_samavâyay_) [Footnote ref 1].

The dravyas are earth, water, fire, air, ether, time, space, soul, and mind. The gu@nas are colour, taste, odour, touch, number, measure, separations, contact, disjoining, quality of belonging to high genus or to species [Footnote ref 2]. Action (_karma_) means upward movement

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Upaskâra notes that vis’e@sa here refers to the ultimate differences of things and not to species. A special doctrine of this system is this, that each of the indivisible atoms of even the same element has specific features of difference.]

[Footnote 2: Here the well known qualities of heaviness (_gurutva_), liquidity (_dravatva_), oiliness (_sneha_), elasticity (_sa@mskâra_), merit (_dharma_), and demerit (_adharma_) have been altogether omitted.

These are all counted in later Vais’e@sika commentaries and compendiums.

It must be noted that “_gu@na_” in Vas’e@sika means qualities and not subtle reals or substances as in Sâ@mkhya Yoga. Gu@na in Vas’e@sika would

584

be akin to what Yoga would call dharma.]

286

downward movement, contraction, expansion and horizontal movement. The three common qualities of dravya, gu@na and karma are that they are existent, non-eternal, substantive, effect, cause, and possess generality and particularity. Dravya produces other dravyas and the gu@nas other gu@nas. But karma is not necessarily produced by karma. Dravya does not destroy either its cause or its effect but the gu@nas are destroyed both by the cause and by the effect. Karma is destroyed by karma. Dravya possesses karma and gu@na and is regarded as the material (_samavayi_) cause.

Gu@nas inhere in dravya, cannot possess further gu@nas, and are not by themselves the cause of contact or disjoining. Karma is devoid of gu@na, cannot remain at one time in more than one object, inheres in dravya alone, and is an independent cause of contact or disjoining. Dravya is the material cause (samavayi) of (derivative) dravyas, gu@na, and karma, gu@na is also the non-material cause (_asamavayi_) of dravya, gu@na and karma. Karma is the general cause of contact, disjoining, and inertia in motion (_vega_). Karma is not the cause of dravya. For dravya may be produced even without karma [Footnote ref 1]. Dravya is the general effect of dravya. Karma is dissimilar to gu@na in this that it does not produce karma. The numbers two, three, etc, separateness, contact

585

and disjoining are effected by more than one dravya. Each karma not being connected with more than one thing is not produced by more than one thing [Footnote ref 2]. A dravya is the result of many contacts (of the atoms). One colour may be the result of many colours. Upward movement is the result of heaviness, effort and contact. Contact and disjoining are also the result of karma. In denying the causality of karma it is meant that karma is not the cause of dravya and karma [Footnote ref 3].

In the second chapter of the first book Ka@nâda first says that if there is no cause, there is no effect, but there may be the cause even though there may not be the effect. He next says that genus (_samanya_) and species (_visesa_) are relative to the understanding;

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: It is only when the karya ceases that dravya is produced. See Upaskara I.i. 22.]

[Footnote 2: If karma is related to more than one thing, then with the movement of one we should have felt that two or more things were moving.]

[Footnote 3: It must be noted that karma in this sense is quite different from the more extensive use of karma as meritorious or vicious action which is the cause of rebirth.]

586

287

being (_bhâva_) indicates continuity only and is hence only a genus. The universals of substance, quality and action maybe both genus and species, but visesa as constituting the ultimate differences (of atoms) exists (independent of any percipient).

In connection with this he says that the ultimate genus is being (_sattâ_) in virtue of which things appear as existent, all other genera may only relatively be regarded as relative genera or species. Being must be regarded as a separate category, since it is different from dravya, gu@na and karma, and yet exists in them, and has no genus or species. It gives us the notion that something is and must be regarded as a category existing as one identical entity in all dravya, gu@na, and karma, for in its universal nature as being it has no special characteristics in the different objects in which it inheres. The specific universals of thingness (_dravyatva_) qualitiness (_gu@natva_) or actionness (_karmatva_)

are also categories which are separate from universal being (_bhâva_ or sattâ) for they also have no separate genus or species and yet may be distinguished from one another, but bhâva or being was the same in all.

In the first chapter of the second book Ka@nâda deals with substances. Earth possesses colour, taste, smell, and touch, water,

587

colour, taste, touch, liquidity, and smoothness (_snigdha_), fire, colour and touch, air, touch, but none of these qualities can be found in ether (_âkâs’a_). Liquidity is a special quality of water because butter, lac, wax, lead, iron, silver, gold, become liquids only when they are heated, while water is naturally liquid itself [Footnote ref 1]. Though air cannot be seen, yet its existence can be inferred by touch, just as the existence of the genus of cows may be inferred from the characteristics of horns, tails, etc. Since this thing inferred from touch possesses motion and quality, and does not itself inhere in any other substance, it is a substance (dravya) and is eternal [Footnote ref 2]. The inference of air is of the type of inference of imperceptible things from certain known characteristics called sâmânyato d@r@s@ta. The name of air “_vâyu_” is derived from the scriptures. The existence of others different from us has (_asmadvis’i@s@tânâ@m_) to be admitted for accounting for the

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: It should be noted that mercury is not mentioned. This is important for mercury was known at a time later than Caraka.]

[Footnote 2: Substance is that which possesses quality and motion. It should be noted that the word “_adravyatvena_” in II. i. 13 has been interpreted by me as “_adravyavattvena_.”]

588

288

giving of names to things (_sa@mjñâkarma_). Because we find that the giving of names is already in usage (and not invented by us) [Footnote ref 1]. On account of the fact that movements rest only in one thing, the phenomenon that a thing can enter into any unoccupied space, would not lead us to infer the existence of âkâs’a (ether). Âkâs’a has to be admitted as the hypothetical substance in which the quality of sound inheres, because, since sound (a quality) is not the characteristic of things which can be touched, there must be some substance of which it is a quality. And this substance is âkâs’a. It is a substance and eternal like air. As being is one so âkâs’a is one [Footnote ref 2].

In the second chapter of the second book Ka@nâda tries to prove that smell is a special characteristic of earth, heat of fire, and coldness of water. Time is defined as that which gives the notion of youth in the young, simultaneity, and quickness. It is one like being. Time is the cause of all non-eternal things, because the notion of time is absent in eternal things. Space supplies the notion that this is so far away from this or so much nearer to this. Like being it is one. One space appears to have diverse inter-space relations in connection with the motion of the sun. As a preliminary to discussing the problem whether sound is eternal or not, he discusses the notion of doubt, which arises

589

when a thing is seen in a general way, but the particular features coming under it are not seen, either when these are only remembered, or when some such attribute is seen which resembles some other attribute seen before, or when a thing is seen in one way but appears in another, or when what is seen is not definitely grasped, whether rightly seen or not. He then discusses the question whether sound is eternal or non-eternal and gives his reasons to show that it is non-eternal, but concludes the discussion with a number of other reasons proving that it is eternal.

The first chapter of the third book is entirely devoted to the inference of the existence of soul from the fact that there must be some substance in which knowledge produced by the contact of the senses and their object inheres.

The knowledge of sense-objects (_indriyârtha_) is the reason by

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: I have differed from Upaskâra in interpreting “_sa@mjñâkarma_” in II. i. 18, 19 as a genitive compound while Upaskâra makes it a dvandva compound. Upaskâra’s interpretation seems to be far-fetched. He wants to twist it into an argument for the existence of God.]

590

[Footnote 2: This interpretation is according to S’a@nkara Mis’ra’s Upaskâra.]

289

which we can infer the existence of something different from the senses and the objects which appear in connection with them. The types of inferences referred to are (1) inference of nonexistence of some things from the existence of some things, (2) of the existence of some things from the nonexistence of some things, (3) of the existence of some things from the existence of others. In all these cases inference is possible only when the two are known to be connected with each other (_prasiddhipûrvakatvât apades’asya_) [Footnote

ref 1]. When such a connection does not exist or is doubtful, we have anapades’a (fallacious middle) and sandigdha (doubtful middle); thus, it is a horse because it has a horn, or it is a cow because it has a horn are examples of fallacious reason. The inference of soul from the cognition produced by the contact of soul, senses and objects is not fallacious in the above way. The inference of the existence of the soul in others may be made in a similar way in which the existence of one’s own soul is inferred [Footnote ref 2], i.e.

by virtue of the existence of movement and cessation of movement. In the second chapter it is said that the fact that there is cognition only when there is contact between the self, the senses and the objects proves that there is manas (mind), and this manas is a substance

591

and eternal, and this can be proved because there is no simultaneity of production of efforts and various kinds of cognition; it may also be inferred that this manas is one (with each person).

The soul may be inferred from inhalation, exhalation, twinkling of the eye, life, the movement of the mind, the sense-affections pleasure, pain, will, antipathy, and effort. That it is a substance and eternal can be proved after the manner of vâyu. An objector is supposed to say that since when I see a man I do not see his soul, the inference of the soul is of the type of sâmânyatod@r@s@ta inference, i.e., from the perceived signs of pleasure, pain, cognition to infer an unknown entity to which they belong, but that this was the self could not be affirmed. So the existence of soul has to be admitted on the strength of the scriptures. But the Vais’e@sika reply is that since there is nothing else but self to which the expression “I” may be applied, there is no need of falling back on the scriptures for the existence of the soul. But

are perceived by all the senses (just as colour, taste, smell, touch, and sound are perceived by one sense, cognition, pleasure, pain, etc. by the manas and number etc. by the visual and the tactile sense) [Footnote ref 1].

In the second chapter of the fourth book it is said that the earth, etc. exist in three forms, body, sense, and objects. There cannot be any compounding of the five elements or even of the three, but the atoms of different elements may combine when one of them acts as the central radicle (_upa@s@tambhaka_). Bodies are of two kinds, those produced from ovaries and those which are otherwise produced by the combination of the atoms in accordance with special kinds of dharma. All combinations of atoms are due to special kinds of dharmas. Such super-mundane bodies are to be admitted for explaining the fact that things must have been given names by beings having such super-mundane bodies, and also on account of the authority of the Vedas.

595

In the first chapter of the fifth book action (_karma_) is discussed.

Taking the example of threshing the corn, it is said that the movement of the hand is due to its contact with the soul in a state of effort, and the movement of the flail is due to its contact with the hand. But in the case of the uprising of the flail in the threshing pot due to impact the movement is not due to contact with the hands, and so the uplifting of the hand in touch with the flail is not due to its contact with the soul; for it is due to the impact of the flail. On account of heaviness (_gurutva_) the flail will fall when not held by the hand.

Things may have an upward or side motion by specially directed motions (_nodanavis’e@sa_) which are generated by special kinds of efforts. Even without effort the body may move during sleep.

The movement of needles towards magnets is due to an unknown cause (_adr@s@takâranaka_). The arrow first acquires motion by specially directed movement, and then on account of its inertia (_vegasamskâra_) keeps on moving and when that ceases it falls down through heaviness.

The second chapter abounds with extremely crude explanations

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: This portion has been taken from the Upaskâra of S’ankara

596

Mis’ra on the Vais’e@sika sûtras of Ka@nâda. It must be noted here that the notion of number according to Vais’e@sika is due to mental relativity or oscillation (_apeksabuddhijanya_). But this mental relativity can only start when the thing having number is either seen or touched; and it is in this sense that notion of number is said to depend on the visual or the tactual sense.]

292

of certain physical phenomena which have no philosophical importance. All the special phenomena of nature are explained as being due to unknown cause (_ad@r@s@takâritam_) and no explanation is given as to the nature of this unknown (_ad@r@s@ta_).

It is however said that with the absence of ad@r@s@ta there is no contact of body with soul, and thus there is no rebirth, and therefore mok@sa (salvation); pleasure and pain are due to contact of the self, manas, senses and objects. Yoga is that in which the mind is in contact with the self alone, by which the former becomes steady and there is no pain in the body. Time, space, âkâs’a are regarded as inactive.

The whole of the sixth book is devoted to showing that gifts are made to proper persons not through sympathy but on account of the injunction of the scriptures, the enumeration of certain Vedic performances, which brings in ad@r@s@ta, purification and impurities

597

of things, how passions are often generated by ad@r@s@ta, how dharma and adharma lead to birth and death and how mok@sa takes place as a result of the work of the soul.

In the seventh book it is said that the qualities in eternal things are eternal and in non-eternal things non-eternal. The change of qualities produced by heat in earth has its beginning in the cause (the atoms). Atomic size is invisible while great size is visible. Visibility is due to a thing’s being made up of many causes [Footnote ref 1], but the atom is therefore different from those that have great size. The same thing may be called great and small relatively at the same time. In accordance with a@nutva (atomic) and mahattva (great) there are also the notions of small and big. The eternal size of parima@n@dala (round) belongs to the atoms. Âkâs’a and âtman are called mahân or paramamahân (the supremely great or all-pervasive); since manas is not of the great measure it is of atomic size. Space and time are also considered as being of the measure “supremely great” (paramamahat), Atomic size (parima@n@dala) belonging to the atoms and the mind (manas) and the supremely great size belonging to space, time, soul and ether (âkâs’a) are regarded as eternal.

In the second chapter of the seventh book it is said that unity and separateness are to be admitted as entities distinct from other qualities. There is no number in movement and quality;

598

the appearance of number in them is false. Cause and effect are

_________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: I have differed from the Upaskâra in the interpretation of this sûtra.]

293

neither one, nor have they distinctive separateness (_ekap@rthaktva_).

The notion of unity is the cause of the notion of duality, etc.

Contact may be due to the action of one or two things, or the effect of another contact and so is disjoining. There is neither contact nor disjoining in cause and effect since they do not exist independently (_yutasiddhyabhâvât_). In the eighth book it is said that soul and manas are not perceptible, and that in the apprehension of qualities, action, generality, and particularity perception is due to their contact with the thing. Earth is the cause of perception of smell, and water, fire, and air are the cause of taste, colour and touch[Footnote ref 1]. In the ninth book negation is described; nonexistence (_asat_) is defined as that to which neither action nor quality can be attributed. Even existent things may become nonexistent and that which is existent in one way may be nonexistent in another; but there is another kind of nonexistence which is different from the above kinds of

599

existence and nonexistence [Footnote ref 2]. All negation can be directly perceived through the help of the memory which keeps before the mind the thing to which the negation applies. Allusion is also made in this connection to the special perceptual powers of the yogins (sages attaining mystical powers through Yoga practices).

In the second chapter the nature of hetu (reason) or the middle term is described. It is said that anything connected with any other thing, as effect, cause, as in contact, or as contrary or as inseparably connected, will serve as li@nga (reason).

The main point is the notion “this is associated with this,” or “these two are related as cause and effect,” and since this may also be produced through premisses, there may be a formal syllogism from propositions fulfilling the above condition. Verbal cognition comes without inference. False knowledge (_avidyâ_) is due to the defect of the senses or non-observation and malobservation due to wrong expectant impressions. The opposite of this is true knowledge (_vidyâ_). In the tenth it is said that pleasure and pain are not cognitions, since they are not related to doubt and certainty.

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Upaskâra here explains that it is intended that the senses are produced by those specific elements, but this cannot be found in the

600

sûtras.]

[Footnote 2: In the previous three kinds of nonexistence, prâgabhâva (negation before production), dhvamsâbhâva (negation after destruction),

[Footnote 2: This is a refutation of the doctrines of the Buddhists, who rejected the existence of wholes (avayavî). On this subject a later Buddhist monograph by Pandita As’oka (9th century A.D.), Avayavinirâkara@na in Six Buddhist Nyâya Tracts, may be referred to.]

[Footnote 3: Pûrvodakavis’i@s@tam khalu var@sodakan s’îghrataram srotasâ

bhâ@sya, II. i. 38. The inference that there has been rain up the river is not made merely from seeing the rise of water, but from the rainwater augmenting the previous water of the river and carrying with its current large quantities of foam, fruits, leaves, wood, etc. These characteristics, associated with the rise of water, mark it as a special kind of rise of water, which can only be due to the happening of rain up the river].

298

are quite sufficient and it is needless to accept arthâpatti (implication),

609

aitihya (tradition), sambhava (when a thing is understood in terms of higher measure the lower measure contained in it is also understood—if we know that there is a bushel of corn anywhere we understand that the same contains eight gallons of corn as well) and abhâva (nonexistence) as separate pramâ@nas for the tradition is included in verbal testimony and arthâpatti, sambhava and abhâva are included within inference.

The validity of these as pramâ@nas is recognized, but they are said to be included in the four pramâ@nas mentioned before. The theory of the eternity of sound is then refuted and the non-eternity proved in great detail. The meaning of words is said to refer to class-notions (_jâti_), individuals (_vyakti_), and the specific position of the limbs (_âk@rti_), by which the class notion is manifested.

Class (_jâti_} is defined as that which produces the notion of sameness (_samânaprasavâtmikâ jâti@h_).

The third book begins with the proofs for the existence of the self or âtman. It is said that each of the senses is associated with its own specific object, but there must exist some other entity in us which gathered together the different sense-cognitions and produced the perception of the total object as distinguished from the separate sense-perceptions. If there were no self then there would be no sin in injuring the bodies of men: again if there were no permanent self, no one would be able to recognize

610

things as having seen them before; the two images produced by the eyes in visual perception could not also have been united together as one visual perception of the things [Footnote ref 1]; moreover if there were no permanent cognizer then by the sight of a sour fruit one could not be reminded of its sour taste. If consciousness belonged to the senses only, then there would be no recognition, for the experience of one could not be recognized by another.

If it is said that the unity of sensations could as well be effected by manas (mind), then the manas would serve the same purpose as self and it would only be a quarrel over a name, for this entity the knower would require some instrument by which it would coordinate the sensations and cognize; unless manas is admitted as a separate instrument of the soul, then though the sense perceptions could be explained as being the work of the

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: According to Vâtsyâyana, in the two eyes we have two different senses. Udyotakara, however, thinks that there is one visual sense which works in both eyes.]

299

senses, yet imagining, thinking, etc., could not be explained.

Another argument for the admission of soul is this, that infants

611

show signs of pleasure and pain in quite early stages of infancy and this could not be due to anything but similar experiences in previous lives. Moreover every creature is born with some desires, and no one is seen to be born without desires. All attachments and desires are due to previous experiences, and therefore it is argued that desires in infants are due to their experience in previous existences.

The body is made up of the k@siti element. The visual sense is material and so also are all other senses [Footnote ref l]. Incidentally the view held by some that the skin is the only organ of sensation is also refuted. The earth possesses four qualities, water three, fire two, air one, and ether one, but the sense of smell, taste, eye, and touch which are made respectively by the four elements of earth, etc., can only grasp the distinctive features of the elements of which they are made. Thus though the organ of smell is made by earth which contains four qualities, it can only grasp the distinctive quality of earth, viz. smell.

Against the Sâ@mkhya distinction of buddhi (cognition) and cit (pure intelligence) it is said that there is no difference between the buddhi and cit. We do not find in our consciousness two elements of a phenomenal and a non-phenomenal consciousness, but only one, by whichever name it may be called. The Sâ@mkhya epistemology that the anta@hkara@na assumes diverse forms in

612

cognitive acts is also denied, and these are explained on the supposition of contacts of manas with the senses, âtman and external objects. The Buddhist objection against the Sâ@mkhya explanation that the anta@hkara@nas catch reflection from the external world just as a crystal does from the coloured objects that may lie near it, that there were really momentary productions of crystals and no permanent crystal catching different reflections at different times is refuted by Nyâya; for it says that it cannot be said that all creations are momentary, but it can only be agreed to in those cases where momentariness was actually experienced.

In the case of the transformation of milk into curd there is no coming in of new qualities and disappearance of old ones, but

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: It is well to remember that Sâ@mkhya did not believe that the senses were constituted of the gross elements. But the Sâ@mkhyaYoga view represented in Âtreyasa@mhitâ (Caraka) regarded the senses as bhautika or constituted of the gross elements.]

300

the old milk is destroyed and the curd originates anew. The contact of manas with soul (_âtman_) takes place within the body and not in that part of âtman which is outside the body; knowledge

613

belongs to the self and not to the senses or the object for even when they are destroyed knowledge remains. New cognitions destroy the old ones. No two recollections can be simultaneous.

Desire and antipathy also belong to the soul. None of these can belong either to the body or to the mind (manas).

Manas cannot be conscious for it is dependent upon self. Again if it was conscious then the actions done by it would have to be borne by the self and one cannot reap the fruits of the actions of another. The causes of recollection on the part of self are given as follows: (1) attention, (2) context, (3) repetition, (4) sign, (5) association, (6) likeness, (7) association of the possessor and the possessed or master and servant, or things which are generally seen to follow each other, (8) separation (as of husband and wife), (9) simpler employment, (10) opposition, (11) excess, (12) that from which anything can be got, (13) cover and covered, (14) pleasure and pain causing memory of that which caused them, (15) fear, (16) entreaty, (17) action such as that of the chariot reminding the charioteer, (18) affection, (19) merit and demerit [Footnote ref 1]. It is said that knowledge does not belong to body, and then the question of the production of the body as due to ad@r@s@ta is described. Salvation (_apavarga_) is effected by the manas being permanently separated from the soul (âtman) through the destruction of karma.

In the fourth book in course of the examination of do@sa

614

(defects), it is said that moha (ignorance), is at the root of all other defects such as râga (attachment) and dve@sa (antipathy).

As against the Buddhist view that a thing could be produced by destruction, it is said that destruction is only a stage in the process of origination. Îs’vara is regarded as the cause of the production of effects of deeds performed by men’s efforts, for man is not always found to attain success according to his efforts.

A reference is made to the doctrine of those who say that all things have come into being by no-cause (_animitta_), for then no-cause would be the cause, which is impossible.

The doctrine of some that all things are eternal is next refuted on the ground that we always see things produced and destroyed.

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Nyâya sûtra III. ii. 44.]

301

The doctrine of the nihilistic Buddhists (s’ûnyavâdin Bauddhas) that all things are what they are by virtue of their relations to other things, and that of other Buddhists who hold that there are merely the qualities and parts but no substances or wholes, are then refuted. The fruits of karmas are regarded as being like

615

the fruits of trees which take some time before they can ripen.

Even though there may be pleasures here and there, birth means sorrow for men, for even the man who enjoys pleasure is tormented by many sorrows, and sometimes one mistakes pains for pleasures. As there is no sorrow in the man who is in deep dreamless sleep, so there is no affliction (_kles’a_) in the man who attains apavarga (salvation) [Footnote ref 1]. When once this state is attained all efforts (_prav@rtti_) cease for ever, for though efforts were beginningless with us they were all due to attachment, antipathy, etc. Then there are short discussions regarding the way in which egoism (_aha@mkâra_) ceases with the knowledge of the true causes of defects (_do@sa_); about the nature of whole and parts and about the nature of atoms (_a@nus_) which cannot further be divided. A discussion is then introduced against the doctrine of the Vijñânavâdins that nothing can be regarded as having any reality when separated from thoughts. Incidentally Yoga is mentioned as leading to right knowledge.

The whole of the fifth book which seems to be a later addition is devoted to the enumeration of different kinds of refutations (_nigrahasthâna_) and futilities (_jâti_).

Caraka, Nyâya sûtras and Vais’e@sika sûtras.

616

When we compare the Nyâya sûtras with the Vais’e@sika sûtras we find that in the former two or three differentstreams of purposes have met, whereas the latter is much more homogeneous. The large amount of materials relating to debates treated as a practical art for defeating an opponent would lead one to suppose that it was probably originally compiled from some other existing treatises which were used by Hindus and Buddhists alike for rendering themselves fit to hold their own in debates with their opponents [Footnote ref 2]. This assumption is justified when

we compare the futilities (jâti) quibbles (chala), etc., relating to disputations as found in the Nyâya sûtra with those that are found in the medical work of Caraka (78 A.D.), III. viii. There are no other works in early Sanskrit literature, excepting the Nyâya sûtra and Caraka-sa@mhitâ which have treated of these matters. Caraka’s description of some of the categories (e.g.

d@r@s@tânta, prayojana, pratijñâ and vita@n@dâ) follows very closely the definitions given of those in the Nyâya sûtras. There are others such as the definitions of jalpa, chala, nigrahasthâna, etc., where the definitions of two authorities differ more. There are some other logical categories mentioned in Caraka (e.g. prati@s@thâpanâ, jijñâsâ, vyavasâya, vâkyado@sa, vâkyapras’a@msâ, upalambha, parihâra, abhyanujñâ, etc.) which are not found in the Nyâya sûtra [Footnote ref 1]. Again, the various types of futilities (jâti) and points of opponent’s refutation (nigrahasthâna) mentioned in the Nyâya sûtra are not found in Caraka. There are some terms which are found in slightly variant forms in the two works, e.g. aupamya in Caraka, upamâna in Nyâya sûtra, arthâpatti in Nyâya sûtra and arthaprâpti in Caraka. Caraka does not seem to know anything about the Nyâya work on this subject, and it is plain that the treatment of these terms of disputations in the Caraka is much simpler and less technical than what we find in the Nyâya sûtras.

If we leave out the varieties of jâti and nigrahasthâna of the fifth book, there is on the whole a great agreement between the treatment of Caraka and that of the Nyâya sûtras. It seems therefore

618

in a high degree probable that both Caraka and the Nyâya sûtras were indebted for their treatment of these terms of disputation to some other earlier work. Of these, Caraka’s compilation was earlier, whereas the compilation of the Nyâya sûtras represents a later work when a hotter atmosphere of disputations had necessitated the use of more technical terms which are embodied in this work, but which were not contained in the earlier work.

It does not seem therefore that this part of the work could have been earlier than the second century A.D. Another stream flowing through the Nyâya sûtras is that of a polemic against the doctrines which could be attributed to the Sautrântika Buddhists, the Vijñânavâda Buddhists, the nihilists, the Sâ@mkhya, the Cârvâka, and some other unknown schools of thought to which we find no

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Like Vais’e@sika, Caraka does not know the threefold division of inference (_anumâna_) as pûrvavat, s’e@savat and sâmânyatod@r@s@ta.]

303

further allusion elsewhere. The Vais’e@sika sûtras as we have already seen had argued only against the Mîmâ@msâ, and ultimately agreed with them on most points. The dispute with Mîmâ@msâ in the Nyâya sûtras is the same as in the Vais’e@sika over the question

619

of the doctrine of the eternality of sound. The question of the self-validity of knowledge (_svata@h prâmâ@nyavâda_)and the akhyâti doctrine of illusion of the Mîmâ@msists, which form the two chief points of discussion between later Mîmâ@msâ and later Nyâya, are never alluded to in the Nyâya sûtras. The advocacy of Yoga methods (_Nyâya sûtras_, IV.ii.38-42 and 46) seems also to be an alien element; these are not found in Vais’e@sika and are not in keeping with the general tendency of the Nyâya sûtras, and the Japanese tradition that Mirok added them later on as Mahâmahopâdhyâya Haraprasâda S’astri has pointed out [Footnote ref l] is not improbable.

The Vais’e@sika sûtras, III.i.18 and III.ii.1, describe perceptional knowledge as produced by the close proximity of the self (âtman), the senses and the objects of sense, and they also adhere to the doctrine, that colour can only be perceived under special conditions of sa@mskâra (conglomeration etc.).

The reason for inferring the existence of manas from the non-simultaneity (_ayaugapadya_) of knowledge and efforts is almost the same with Vais’e@sika as with Nyâya. The Nyâya sûtras give a more technical definition of perception, but do not bring in the questions of sa@mskâra or udbhûtarûpavattva which Vais’e@sika does. On the question of inference Nyâya gives three classifications as pûrvavat, s’e@savat and samânyatod@r@s@ta, but no definition. The Vais’e@sika sûtras do not know of these classifications, and give only particular types or instances of inference

but the technical vyâpti is not known, and the connotation of the term prasiddhipûrvakatva of Vais’e@sika seems to be more loose than the term vyâpti as we know it in the later Nyâya. The Vais’e@sika sûtras do not count scriptures (_s’abda_) as a separate pramâ@na, but they tacitly admit the great validity of the Vedas.

With Nyâya sûtras s’abda as a pramâ@na applies not only to the Vedas, but to the testimony of any trustworthy person, and

621

Vâtsyâyana says that trustworthy persons may be of three kinds @r@si, ârya and mleccha (foreigners). Upamâna which is regarded as a means of right cognition in Nyâya is not even referred to in the Vais’e@sika sûtras. The Nyâya sûtras know of other pramâ@nas, such as arthâpatti, sambhava and aitihya, but include them within the pramâ@nas admitted by them, but the Vais’e@sika sûtras do not seem to know them at all [Footnote ref 1]. The Vais’e@sika sûtras believe in the perception of negation (abhâva) through the perception of the locus to which such negation refers (IX. i.

1-10). The Nyâya sûtras (II. ii. 1, 2, 7-12) consider that abhâva as nonexistence or negation can be perceived; when one asks another to “bring the clothes which are not marked,” he finds that marks are absent in some clothes and brings them; so it is argued that absence or nonexistence can be directly perceived [Footnote ref 2]. Though there is thus an agreement between the Nyâya and the Vais’e@sika sûtras about the acceptance of abhâva as being due to perception, yet their method of handling the matter is different. The Nyâya sûtras say nothing about the categories of dravya, gu@na, karma, vis’e@sa and samavâya which form the main subjects of Vais’e@ska discussions [Footnote ref 3]. The Nyâya sûtras take much pains to prove the materiality of the senses. But this question does not seem to have been important with Vais’e@sika. The slight reference to this question in VIII. ii. 5-6 can hardly be regarded as sufficient.

The Vais’e@sika sûtras do not mention the name of “Îs’vara,” whereas the Nyâya sûtras try to prove his existence on eschatological

622

grounds. The reasons given in support of the existence of self in the Nyâya sûtras are mainly on the ground of the unity of sense-cognitions and the phenomenon of recognition, whereas the

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: The only old authority which knows these pramâ@nas is Caraka.

But he also gives an interpretation of sambhava which is different from Nyâya and calls arthâpatti arthaprâpti (_Caraka_ III. viii.).]

[Footnote 2: The details of this example are taken from Vâtsyâyana’s commentary.]

[Footnote 3: The Nyâya sûtra no doubt incidentally gives a definition of jâti as “_samânaprasavâtmikâ jâti@h_” (II. ii. 71).]

305

Vaisesika lays its main emphasis on self-consciousness as a fact of knowledge. Both the Nyâya and the Vais’e@sika sûtras admit the existence of atoms, but all the details of the doctrine of atomic structure in later Nyâya-Vais’e@sika are absent there. The Vai’se@sika calls salvation ni@hs’reyasa or mok@sa and the Nyâya apavarga. Mok@sa with Vais’e@sika is the permanent cessation of connection with body; the apavarga with Nyâya is cessation of

623

pain [Footnote ref l]. In later times the main points of difference between the Vais’e@sika and Nyâya are said to lie with regard to theory of the notion of number, changes of colour in the molecules by heat, etc.

Thus the former admitted a special procedure of the mind by which cognitions of number arose in the mind (e.g. at the first moment there is the sense contact with an object, then the notion of oneness, then from a sense of relativeness—apek@sâbuddhi—notion of two, then a notion of twoness, and then the notion of two things); again, the doctrine of pilupâka (changes of qualities by heat are produced in atoms and not in molecules as Nyâya held) was held by Vais’e@sika, which the Naiyâyikas did not admit [Footnote ref 2]. But as the Nyâya sûtras are silent on these points, it is not possible to say that such were really the differences between early Nyâya and early Vaise@sika. These differences may be said to hold between the later interpreters of Vais’e@sika and the later interpreters of Nyâya. The Vais’e@sika as we find it in the commentary of Pras’astapâda (probably sixth century A.D.), and the Nyâya from the time of Udyotakara have come to be treated as almost the same system with slight variations only. I have therefore preferred to treat them together. The main presentation of the Nyâya-Vais’e@sika philosophy in this chapter is that which is found from the sixth century onwards.

The Vais’e@sika and Nyâya Literature.

624

It is difficult to ascertain definitely the date of the Vais’e@sika sûtras by Ka@nâda, also called Aulûkya the son of Ulûka, though there is every reason to suppose it to be pre-Buddhistic. It

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Professor Vanamâlî Vedântatîrtha quotes a passage from Sa@mk@sepas’a@nkarajaya, XVI. 68-69 in J.A.S.B., 1905, and another passage from a Nyâya writer Bhâsarvajña, pp. 39-41, in J.A.S.B., 1914, to show that the old Naiyâyikas considered that there was an element of happiness (_sukha_) in the state of mukti (salvation) which the Vais’e@sikas denied. No evidence in support of this opinion is found in the Nyâya or the Vais’e@sika sûtras, unless the cessation of pain with Nyâya is interpreted as meaning the resence of some sort of bliss or happiness.]

[Footnote 2: See Mâdhava’s Sarvadars’anasa@mgraha-Aulûkyadars’ana.]

306

appears from the Vâyu purâna that he was born in Prabhâsa near Dvârakâ, and was the disciple of Somas’armâ. The time of Pras’astapâda who wrote a bhâ@sya (commentary) of the Vais’e@sika sûtras cannot also unfortunately be ascertained. The peculiarity

625

of Pras’astapâda’s bhâ@sya is this that unlike other bhâ@syas (which first give brief explanations of the text of the sûtras and then continue to elaborate independent explanations by explaining the first brief comments), it does not follow the sûtras but is an independent dissertation based on their main contents [Footnote ref 1]. There were two other bhâ@syas on the Vais’e@sika sûtras, namely Râva@na-bhâ@sya and Bharâdvâja-v@rtti, but these are now probably lost. References to the former are found in Kira@nâvalîbhâskara of Padmanâbha Mis’ra and also in Ratnaprabhâ 2. 2. II. Four commentaries were written on this bhâ@sya, namely Vyomavatî by Vyomas’ekharâcârya, Nyâyakandalî by S’ridhara, Kira@nâvalî by Udayana (984 A.D.) and Lîlâvatî S’rîvatsâcârya.

In addition to these Jagadîs’a Bha@t@tâcârya of Navadvîpa and S’a@nkara Mis’ra wrote two other commentaries on the Pras’astapâda-bhâsya, namely Bhâsyasûkti and Ka@nâda-rahasya. S’a@nkara Mis’ra (1425

A.D.) also wrote a commentary on the Vais’e@sika sûtras called the Upaskâra. Of these Nyâyakandalî of S’rîdhara on account of its simplicity of style and elaborate nature of exposition is probably the best for a modern student of Vais’e@sika. Its author was a native of the village of Bhûris@r@s@ti in Bengal (Râ@dha). His father’s name was Baladeva and mother’s name was Acchokâ and he wrote his work in 913 S’aka era (990 A.D.) as he himself writes at the end of his work.

The Nyâya sûtra was written by Ak@sapâda or Gautama, and

626

the earliest commentary on it written by Vâtsyâyana is known as the Vâtsyâyana-bhâ@sya. The date of Vâtsyâyana has not

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: The bhâ@sya of Pras’astapâda can hardly he called a bhâ@sya (elaborate commentary). He himself makes no such claim and calls his work a compendium of the properties of the categories (_Padârthadharmasa@mgraha_). He takes the categories of dravya, gu@na, karma, sâmânya, vis’e@sa and samavâya in order and without raising any discussions plainly narrates what he has got to say on them. Some of the doctrines which are important in later Nyâya-Vais’e@sika discussions, such as the doctrine of creation and dissolution, doctrine of number, the theory that the number of atoms contributes to the atomic measure of the molecules, the doctrine of pilupâka in connection with the transformation of colours by heat occur in his narration for the first time as the Vais’e@sika sûtras are silent on these points. It is difficult to ascertain his date definitely; he is the earliest writer on Vais’e@sika available to us after Ka@nâda and it is not improbable that he lived in the 5th or 6th century A.D.]

lived some time in the beginning of the fourth century A.D. Jacobi places him in 300 A.D. Udyotakara (about 635 A.D.) wrote a Vârttika on Vâtsyâyana’s bhâ@sya to establish the Nyâya views and to refute the criticisms of the Buddhist logician Di@nnâga (about 500 A.D.) in his Pramâ@nasamuccaya. Vâcaspatimis’ra (840 A.D.) wrote a sub-commentary on the Nyâyavârttika of Udyotakara called Nyâyavârttikatâtparya@tîkâ in order to make clear the right meanings of Udyotakara’s Vârttika which was sinking in the mud as it were through numerous other bad writings (_dustarakunibandhapa@nkamagnânâm_). Udayana (984 A.D.) wrote a sub-commentary on the Tâtparya@tîkâ called Tâtparya@tîkâparis’uddhi. Varddhamâna (1225 A.D.) wrote a sub-commentary on that called the Nyâyanibandhaprakâs’a. Padmanâbha wrote a sub-commentary on that called Varddhamânendu and S’a@nkara Mis’ra (1425 A.D.) wrote a sub-commentary on that called the Nyâyatâtparyama@n@dana. In the seventeenth century Vis’vanâtha wrote an independent short commentary known as Vis’vanâthav@rtti, on the Nyâya sûtra, and Râdhâmohana wrote a separate commentary on the Nyâya sûtras known as Nyâyasûtravivara@na.

In addition to these works on the Nyâya sûtras many other independent works of great philosophical value have been written on the Nyâya system. The most important of these in medieval times is the Nyâyamañjari of Jayanta (880 A.D.), who flourished shortly after Vâcaspatimis’ra. Jayanta chooses some of the Nyâya sûtras for interpretation, but he discusses the Nyâya views quite

628

independently, and criticizes the views of other systems of Indian thought of his time. It is far more comprehensive than Vâcaspati’s Tâtparya@tîkâ, and its style is most delightfully lucid. Another important work is Udayana’s Kusumâñjali in which he tries to prove the existence of Îs’vara (God). This work ought to be read with its commentary Prakâs’a by Varddhamâna (1225 A.D.) and its sub-commentary Makaranda by Rucidatta (1275 A.D.). Udayana’s Âtmatattvaviveka is a polemical work against the Buddhists, in which he tries to establish the Nyâya doctrine of soul. In addition to these we have a number of useful works on Nyâya in later times. Of these the following deserve special mention in connection with the present work. Bhâ@sâpariccheda by Vis’vanâtha with its commentaries Muktâvalî, Dinakarî and Râmarudrî, Tarkasamgraha with Nyâyanir@naya, Tarkabkâ@sâ of Kes’ava Mis’ra with

the commentary Nyâyapradîpa, Saptapadârthî of S’ivâditya, Târkikarak@sâ of Varadarâja with the commentary Ni@ska@n@taka of Mallinâtha, Nyâyasâra of Mâdhava Deva of the city of Dhâra and Nyâyasiddhântamañjarî of Jânakinâtha Bha@t@tâcarya with the Nyâyamanjarisara by Yâdavâcârya, and Nyâyasiddhântadîpa of S’a@sadhara with Prabhâ by S’e@sânantâcârya.

The new school of Nyâya philosophy known as Navya-Nyâya

629

began with Ga@nges’a Upâdhyâya of Mithilâ, about 1200 A.D. Ga@nges’a wrote only on the four pramâ@nas admitted by the Nyâya, viz. pratyak@sa, anumâna, upamâna, and s’abda, and not on any of the topics of Nyâya metaphysics. But it so happened that his discussions on anumâna (inference) attracted unusually great attention in Navadvîpa (Bengal), and large numbers of commentaries and commentaries of commentaries were written on the anumâna portion of his work Tattvacintâma@ni, and many independent treatises on sabda and anumâna were also written by the scholars of Bengal, which became thenceforth for some centuries the home of Nyâya studies. The commentaries of Raghunâtha S’iroma@ni (1500 A.D.), Mathurâ Bha@t@tâcârya (1580 A.D.), Gadâdhara Bha@t@tâcârya

(1650 A.D.) and Jagadîsa Bha@t@tâcârya (1590 A.D.), commentaries on S’iroma@ni’s commentary on Tattvacintâmani, had been very widely read in Bengal. The new school of Nyâya became the most important study in Navadvîpa and there appeared a series of thinkers who produced an extensive literature on the subject [Footnote ref l].The contribution was not in the direction of metaphysics, theology, ethics, or religion, but consisted mainly in developing a system of linguistic notations to specify accurately and precisely any concept or its relation with other concepts [Footnote ref 2]. Thus for example when they wished to define precisely the nature of the concomitance of one concept with another (e.g. smoke and fire), they would so specify the relation that the exact nature of the concomitance should be clearly expressed, and that there

630

should be no confusion or ambiguity. Close subtle analytic thinking and the development of a system of highly technical

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: From the latter half of the twelfth century to the third quarter of the sixteenth century the new school of Nyâya was started in Mithilâ (Behar); but from the fifteenth to the seventeenth century Bengal became pre-eminently the home of Nyâya studies. See Mr Cakravarttî’s paper, J. A.S.B. 1915. I am indebted to it for some of the dates mentioned in this section.]

[Footnote 2: Îs’varânumâna of Raghunatha as well as his Padârthatattvanirûpa@na are, however, notable exceptions.]

309

expressions mark the development of this literature. The technical expressions invented by this school were thus generally accepted even by other systems of thought, wherever the need of accurate and subtle thinking was felt. But from the time that Sanskrit ceased to be the vehicle of philosophical thinking in India the importance of this literature has gradually lost ground, and it can hardly be hoped that it will ever regain its old position by attracting enthusiastic students in large numbers.

631

I cannot close this chapter without mentioning the fact that so far as the logical portion of the Nyâya system is concerned, though Ak@sapâda was the first to write a comprehensive account of it, the Jains and Buddhists in medieval times had independently worked at this subject and had criticized the Nyâya account of logic and made valuable contributions. In Jaina logic Das’avaikâlikaniryukti of Bhadrabâhu (357 B.C.), Umâsvâti’s Tattvârthâdhigama sûtra, Nyâyâvatâra of Siddhasena Divâkara (533 A.D.) Mâ@nikya Nandi’s (800 A.D.) Parîk@sâmukha sûtra, and Pramâ@nanayatattvâlokâla@mkâra of Deva Sûri (1159 A.D.) and Prameyakamalamârta@n@da of Prabhâcandra deserve special notice.

Pramâ@nasamuccaya and Nyâyapraves’a of Di@nnâga (500 A.D.), Pramâ@nayârttika kârikâ and Nyâyabindu of Dharmakîrtti (650 A.D.) with the commentary of Dharmottara are the most interesting of the Buddhist works on systematic logic [Footnote ref l].

The diverse points of difference between the Hindu, Jain and Buddhist logic require to be dealt with in a separate work on Indian logic and can hardly be treated within the compass of the present volume.

It is interesting to notice that between the Vâtsyâyana bhâ@sya and the Udyotakara’s Vârttika no Hindu work on logic of importance seems to have been written: it appears that the science of logic in this period was in the hands of the Jains and

632

the Buddhists; and it was Di@nnâga’s criticism of Hindu Nyâya that roused Udyotakara to write the Vârttika. The Buddhist and the Jain method of treating logic separately from metaphysics as an independent study was not accepted by the Hindus till we come to Ga@nges’a, and there is probably only one Hindu work of importance on Nyâya in the Buddhist style namely Nyâyasâra of Bhâsarvajña. Other older Hindu works generally treated of

The other gu@nas such as buddhi(knowledge),_sukha_ (happiness), du@hkha (sorrow), icchâ (will), dve@sa (antipathy or hatred) and yatna (effort) can occur only with reference to soul.

The characteristic of gurutva (heaviness) is that by virtue of which things fall to the ground. The gu@na of sneha (oiliness) belongs to water. The gu@na of sa@mskâra is of three kinds, (i) vega

In spite of all diversity in all objects around us, they are all perceived as sat or existing. This sat or existence is thus a sameness, which is found to exist in all the three things, dravya, gu@na, and karma. This sameness is called sâmânya or jâti, and it is regarded as a separate thing which rests on dravya, gu@na, or karma. This highest genus sattâ (being) is called parajâti (highest universal), the other intermediate jâtis are called aparajâti (lower universals), such as the genus of dravya, of karma, or of gu@na, or still more intermediate jâtis such as gotvâjâti (the genus cow), nîlatvajâti (the genus blue). The intermediate jâtis or genera sometimes appear to have a special aspect as a species, such as pas’utva (animal jâti) and gotva (the cow jâti); here however gotva appears as a species, yet it is in reality nothing but a jâti.

The aspect as species has no separate existence. It is jâti which from one aspect appears as genus and from another as species.

649

318

This jâti or sâmânya thus must be regarded as having a separate independent reality though it is existent in dravya, gu@na and karma. The Buddhists denied the existence of any independent reality of sâmânya, but said that the sameness as cow was really but the negation of all non-cows (_apoha_). The perception of cow realizes the negation of all non-cows and this is represented in consciousness as the sameness as cow. He who should regard this sameness to be a separate and independent reality perceived in experience might also discover two horns on his own head [Footnote ref 1]. The Nyâya-Vais’e@sika said that negation of non-cows is a negative perception, whereas the sameness perceived as cow is a positive perception, which cannot be explained by the aforesaid negation theory of the Buddhists. Sâmânya has thus to be admitted to have a separate reality. All perception as sameness of a thing is due to the presence of this thing in that object [Footnote ref l]. This jâti is eternal or non-destructible, for even with the destruction of individuals comprehended within the jâti, the latter is not destroyed [Footnote ref 2].