(C) Daily Kos This story was originally published by Daily Kos and is unaltered. . . . . . . . . . . What if the Money were removed from Truth API? [1] ['Greg Dworkin', 'Dan K', 'Bill In Portland Maine'] Date: 2026-08-19 What if Trump didn’t charge for the early access postings and continued delaying his posts to the public. No charge, but only for a list of preferred people or entities, granting them access to market changing information thirty minutes prior? There is an important legal difference between selling early access to presidential information and simply giving selected people early access for free. Removing the payment may eliminate much of the argument that the President is personally profiting from government information. It does not necessarily eliminate the legal problem. If a President deliberately gives selected people access to material, nonpublic information before the general public receives it — particularly information capable of moving financial markets — the issue begins to look much more like an insider-trading or securities-law problem. Consider a Thirty-Minute Head Start Imagine the President knows at 10:00 a.m. that he is about to announce something capable of materially affecting the price of stocks, bonds, commodities, currencies, or other securities. That announcement might involve: new tariffs sanctions cancellation or approval of a major federal contract pharmaceutical policy banking regulation defense procurement energy policy government action affecting a particular company or industry Instead of announcing the decision immediately to everyone, the President gives a preferred group the information at 10:00. The public does not receive it until 10:30. For those thirty minutes, the favored recipients possess something extremely valuable: material information that the market does not yet have. That changes the legal analysis considerably. The STOCK Act Specifically Includes the President The STOCK Act is particularly important because Congress expressly included the President within its rules concerning government officials and material nonpublic information. The statute establishes that the President owes a duty of trust and confidence to the United States and its citizens concerning material, nonpublic information obtained through his official position. That matters because insider-trading law often turns on the existence of a duty concerning confidential information. For the President, Congress has already addressed that question. The relevant primary source is the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act of 2012 — the STOCK Act. Receiving Early Information Can Create a Trading Advantage Federal securities law generally prohibits securities trading based upon material nonpublic information when the necessary duty and other elements of insider trading are present. A thirty-minute advance warning could be enormously valuable. Suppose, for example, the President privately tells selected people that substantial tariffs on an industry will be announced in thirty minutes. A recipient might: sell shares in companies expected to suffer; purchase shares in companies expected to benefit; trade options based upon the expected price movement; move money into commodities or currencies affected by the announcement. When the President finally makes the information public, the market moves. The favored recipient has already taken a position. The fact that the President did not charge for the information would not necessarily make that arrangement harmless. Free Information Can Still Be a “Tip” Insider-trading law also recognizes what is commonly called tipping. Someone possessing material nonpublic information can potentially violate securities law by improperly providing that information to another person who then trades on it. Importantly, a tip does not necessarily have to be sold for cash. Supreme Court insider-trading cases have recognized circumstances in which providing valuable confidential information as a gift to a friend or relative can satisfy the personal-benefit element required in traditional tipping cases. That makes the identity of the favored recipients extremely important. Not Every Advance Disclosure Is Improper Government routinely provides people with information before the general public receives it. There can be entirely legitimate reasons for doing so. Cabinet officials may need advance knowledge to implement a policy. Government agencies may need advance notice to coordinate operations. Reporters sometimes receive embargoed material so they have time to understand complicated announcements before publication. Those situations have identifiable governmental purposes. The troubling hypothetical is different. Imagine that the favored list contains: major political donors hedge-fund managers investors business associates friends relatives executives political allies people known to actively trade financial markets Now the central question becomes much harder to explain: Why were these particular people permitted to know something capable of moving markets before everyone else? The Thirty-Minute Delay Becomes Evidence A deliberate thirty-minute delay would also create something investigators rarely receive so neatly: a defined trading window. Investigators could compare: Before disclosure: Who received the information? During the thirty-minute window: What securities did those people buy, sell, short, or place options on? After public disclosure: How did the affected markets move? Repeated correlations would be particularly significant. Suppose favored recipients repeatedly made profitable trades shortly before Presidential announcements concerning tariffs, sanctions, contracts, mergers, regulations, or particular industries. The timing could become extremely important evidence. Regulation FD Illustrates the Underlying Concern Another securities rule helps illustrate why selective disclosure is considered dangerous, although it would not automatically apply directly to Presidential communications. The Securities and Exchange Commission’s Regulation FD — Fair Disclosure — was created to prevent publicly traded companies from selectively providing material information to favored analysts or investors before providing it to the market generally. The President is not simply a corporate issuer, so Regulation FD should not be treated as a direct prohibition on Presidential selective disclosure. But the principle behind the rule is highly relevant. A select group should not receive market-moving information merely because it occupies a privileged position while everyone else trades without that knowledge. Removing the Price Does Not Necessarily Solve the Problem At first glance, giving the information away rather than selling it might appear safer. In some circumstances, however, it could actually make the legal issue more recognizable. Selling broad access to a data feed raises questions about monetizing Presidential information. Privately giving valuable information to selected individuals who can trade on it raises questions about tipping, insider trading, misuse of nonpublic government information, and favoritism. The important facts would therefore be: Who received the information? Why were they selected? Was the information material and nonpublic? Did recipients trade during the advance-access period? Did the President know or expect that the information could be used for financial advantage? And perhaps most revealing: Did the same people repeatedly profit during those thirty-minute windows? If that pattern existed, the absence of a subscription fee would hardly end the inquiry. It might simply change what investigators would be investigating. Primary Legal Sources STOCK Act of 2012 — Establishes duties concerning material nonpublic information obtained through government service and expressly encompasses the President. Securities Exchange Act § 10(b) — Principal federal statutory prohibition underlying insider-trading enforcement. SEC Rule 10b-5 — Prohibits fraud and deceptive practices in connection with securities transactions. SEC Rule 10b5-1 — Addresses trading while aware of material nonpublic information. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983) — Major Supreme Court decision concerning insider-trading tips and breaches of duty. Salman v. United States, 580 U.S. 39 (2016) — Supreme Court decision confirming that gifting confidential information to a trading relative or friend can satisfy the personal-benefit requirement. SEC Regulation FD — Although generally applicable to securities issuers rather than the President, it provides useful context for why selective disclosure of material information to favored market participants is considered problematic. Thanks for reading Glenn Hefley [END] --- [1] Url: https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2026/8/19/800086522/community/what-if-the-money-were-removed-from-truth-api/ Published and (C) by Daily Kos Content appears here under this condition or license: Site content may be used for any purpose without permission unless otherwise specified. via Magical.Fish Gopher News Feeds: gopher://magical.fish/1/feeds/news/dailykos/