(C) Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty This story was originally published by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and is unaltered. . . . . . . . . . . Iran’s Nuclear Disarmament [1] ['Daniel Ackerman'] Date: 2025-03-14 To ensure that Iran would be permanently and verifiably blocked from acquiring nuclear weapons, a new nuclear agreement with Tehran would need to contain the following obligations designed to eliminate Iran’s nuclear weapons program: Require Iran to Adhere to International Obligations: Permanent adherence to all obligations in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). These include Iran’s NPT Article II commitment “not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons … and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons” and its Article III safeguards obligations. Iran’s obligation to permanently abide by its NPT obligations would need to override the withdrawal provisions of Article X of the NPT. This is particularly important because Iran has periodically threatened to withdraw from the NPT. Restoration of prior UN Iran resolutions and associated trade prohibitions on Iran’s nuclear, missile, and military programs and restoration of relevant expert panels. This would require the so-called “snapback” of UN sanctions and other restrictions imposed on Iran by several UN Security Council resolutions enacted between 2006 and 2010, all of which were suspended by UNSCR 2231. Alternatively, the Security Council could adopt a new resolution achieving the same objective. Compliance with other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) conventions. Iran is in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and must come back into compliance with it. Given Iran’s past chemical weapons use and transfer, as well as its more recent experimentation with pharmaceutical-based agents, this is of great urgency. Eliminate Iran’s Access to Nuclear Fuel: Full, permanent, and verifiable dismantlement, export, or in-place destruction of Iran’s uranium production assets. Such facilities and capabilities enable Iran to produce highly enriched and weapons-grade enriched uranium, key fuels for nuclear weapons. Relevant assets may include but are not limited to converted and enriched uranium stocks; uranium enrichment infrastructure, including gas centrifuge plants; gas centrifuge production parts, components, and materiel, manufacturing plants, and assembly facilities; uranium conversion facilities; and all associated support equipment. Full, permanent, and verifiable dismantlement, export, or in-place destruction of Iran’s plutonium production assets. Such facilities and capabilities enable Iran to produce weapons-grade separated plutonium, a key fuel for nuclear weapons. Relevant assets may include but are not limited to reactors suited to proliferation-relevant plutonium production, plutonium reprocessing plants, associated support equipment, and research efforts. Verified import of reactor fuel to run permitted research reactors and verified export of spent reactor fuel. Iran must be limited to importing reactor fuel and exporting spent fuel for medical isotope production in research reactors only and granted the same allowances to maintain nuclear power reactors for electrical power generation purposes only. Iran must be prohibited from having any ability to produce its own nuclear fuel. Removing Iran’s spent fuel will also reduce both proliferation and environmental risks. Iran has no justifiable need to enrich its own uranium. Uranium enrichment technology is tightly controlled globally due to its dual applications in producing fuel for reactors and nuclear weapons. As such, only some 14 countries currently enrich uranium. Iran can obtain enriched uranium fuel for reactors at market cost from authorized global suppliers, such as the United States, France, or the nuclear fuel consortium Urenco. Moreover, Tehran could obtain fuel from a multinational fuel bank. The multinational low enriched uranium bank, located in Kazakhstan but owned and controlled by the IAEA, is a mechanism of last resort for IAEA member states in case the supply of LEU to a nuclear power plant is disrupted due to exceptional circumstances that prevent securing the fuel from the commercial market or any other supply arrangement. Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC) has suggested that the LEU bank “be expanded to guarantee that any [Persian Gulf] state can fuel its commercial nuclear reactors from an IAEA fuel bank on the condition of forgoing domestic uranium enrichment and reprocessing.” This idea was also reflected in a Senate resolution co-sponsored by Sen. Graham in 2022. Either option — imports from reliable Western suppliers or from the IAEA fuel bank — would help minimize the risk of a remaining civil Iranian nuclear program while addressing Tehran’s proclaimed need for a reliable supply of nuclear fuel for peaceful purposes. Full, permanent, and verifiable dismantlement, export, or in-place destruction of Iran’s heavy water production plant and associated equipment. This will protect against Iran’s ability to use heavy water for covert plutonium-producing reactors. Permanent and verifiable prohibition on Iran’s reconstitution of uranium conversion and enrichment and plutonium production and reprocessing capabilities. Once Iran has dismantled, exported, or permitted the destruction of its uranium and plutonium fuel cycle assets, its commitment not to rebuild them, either overtly or covertly, must be permanent and verifiable. Permanent IAEA monitoring of Iran’s uranium mines, mills, and ore processing facilities and activities. This obligation, which is supplementary to IAEA enhanced safeguards, will protect against diversion to military nuclear efforts or illicit/non-approved exports. Require Iran’s Complete Disclosure of Past and Current Nuclear Weaponization Work: Iran must provide a correct and complete description of past Iranian nuclear activities, including what the IAEA refers to as “possible military dimensions.” Critical parts of Iran’s nuclear program are not fully understood by the international community. Thus, Iran must be required to provide a baseline of information about sites, equipment, material, persons, and activities sufficient to make Iran’s nuclear program transparent. Until Iran correctly and completely answers previous questions from the IAEA about such activities and explains who was involved, what actions were taken, and where they took place, there can be no international confidence that the development of nuclear weapons capabilities has ceased. It is vital that the agreement’s data declaration provisions capture past Iranian activities in sufficient detail to provide a baseline understanding of how far Iran may be along the path to nuclear weapons. Iran must, immediately upon entry into force of the agreement, provide a correct and complete data declaration of its current nuclear sites, activities, material, and equipment. This will provide a baseline for accountancy and function as the equivalent of a tax return or internal audit. Declarations are compliance tools that help test Iran’s willingness to be transparent. Declarations also help establish those areas where Iranian nuclear equipment, material, and activities are located and that should therefore be subjected to persistent inspection and monitoring. Require Unimpeded Access to Suspect Sites and Ensure Verification: Ratification of and permanent adherence to the IAEA Additional Protocol and implementation of standard safeguards obligation Modified Code 3.1. Iran’s parliament must immediately ratify the AP. The AP, supplementary to Iran’s comprehensive IAEA safeguards obligations stemming from the NPT, permits short-notice IAEA inspections of sites that may have possible relation to undeclared nuclear activities. The AP would require Iran to permit IAEA access to any site the agency suspects may be engaged in such illicit activities. The AP would also require Iran to report to the IAEA additional information about various nuclear-related activities, including its nuclear imports and exports. One hundred forty-one countries, plus the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) with its 27 member states, have entered into AP agreements with the IAEA. Iran must also implement Modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements Part to Iran’s Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA. Modified Code 3.1 requires Iran to provide early notification and design information to the IAEA about the construction of new nuclear facilities as soon as the decision to construct, or to authorize construction of, a new facility has been taken, whichever is earlier. The code is a legally binding commitment of IAEA safeguards that Iran has persistently violated. Intensive IAEA investigation and reporting on Iran’s past and ongoing nuclear weapons program. The IAEA’s goal must be to determine an absence of undeclared nuclear material and nuclear weapons research and activities in Iran, or a “Broader Conclusion Plus,” and direct IAEA follow-up investigations as needed. No sanitization, dismantlement, destruction, or relocation by Iran — without IAEA participation — of nuclear program documentation, equipment, and sites. In the past, Iran has engaged in such concealment activities prior to IAEA inspections or visits. Facilitate full and timely IAEA access, by inspectors of the IAEA’s choosing, to current and former nuclear program personnel, documentation, equipment, and sites, including military sites. The agreement, and potentially an accompanying UN Security Council resolution, should specifically require Iran to permanently provide the IAEA with “access without delay to all sites, equipment, persons, and documents requested by the IAEA,” as UNSCR 1929 previously required. Quarterly IAEA reporting on activities taken toward the dismantlement of Iran’s non-civil nuclear program and the status of IAEA investigation, as well as the status of any remaining approved civil nuclear activities and facilities. Such IAEA reporting will allow member states to independently review implementation of the deal. Establishment of a designated committee for oversight of the dismantlement of relevant Iranian nuclear facilities and activities. Such a committee would comprise the United States and any other Western countries that are parties to the deal. It would liaise with the IAEA and provide guidance and interpretations to the agency on the deal’s implementation. This committee would provide public, quarterly reports on its activities and Iran’s compliance with the provisions. Terminate Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Research and Development: Declaration of and verified permanent closure or reorientation of civilian and military research institutions and personnel that engage in nuclear weapons-related research. All relevant institutions and personnel must verifiably and permanently halt weaponization-related work, including work that the committee and IAEA assess have possible weaponization applications. Declaration and verified permanent dismantlement, destruction, or export of all components, equipment, computer programs and models, weapons designs, research, and facilities relevant to the manufacture of nuclear weapons, including archived assets. Iran must eliminate all such assets that the committee and IAEA assess have possible weaponization applications. Permanent verifiable ban on weaponization-related research and activities. Iran must commit to a permanent ban of such research and activities and verification that it has not reconstituted such research. End Iran’s Illicit Imports and Exports: End to non-approved imports for Iran’s nuclear and missile programs and end to any non-approved exports from these programs. This provision must include facilities and commodities covered by Nuclear Suppliers Group Part I and II lists and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Category I and II items. These import and export restrictions would limit Iran’s ability to covertly reconstitute illicit nuclear facilities and activities or to proliferate key assets abroad. Reporting by Iran and by supplier states of proposed nuclear- and missile-related imports by Iran, including those with dual civil and military uses, to the committee for approval or denial. The committee must be informed of such procurements and empowered to approve or deny them on a case-by-case basis. Iran must permit the IAEA to conduct checks of Iran’s ultimate use of the commodity to verify Iran’s stated use. The JCPOA created, and UNSCR 2231 endorsed, the creation of a Procurement Channel to review proposals by states seeking to participate in or permit particular transfers of nuclear or dual-use goods, technology, and/or related services to Iran. But the Procurement Channel did not fulfill its potential. While the Procurement Channel was theoretically still functioning as of December 2024, submissions to it have petered out. Reporting by states to the committee of any suspicious or illicit Iranian nuclear- and missile-related imports or exports, including dual-use. Countries must formally report such instances to the committee so it can proactively address Iranian noncompliance. Iran’s establishment of a fully transparent strategic trade control system to oversee and monitor any permitted nuclear- and missile-related procurements and exports. Such a system must be separate from Iran’s military, which co-opts civilian institutions for cover to covertly import or export illicit nuclear and missile commodities and deceive suppliers about, for example, the end user, end use, or destination. Require Iran to Terminate WMD Delivery Vehicle Efforts and Abide by Arms Embargoes: Full declaration to the committee of Iran’s ballistic missile, cruise missile, and drone arsenals and plans for their elimination. Iran must declare those missiles that exceed MTCR Category 1 thresholds, commit to cease their production, and develop a plan and timetable to dismantle, export, or destroy these capabilities in-place. This should also include disclosing Iran’s domestic supply chain and other facilities involved in the production of these projectiles. Termination of all tests of surface-to-surface missiles (SSM) and space launch vehicles (SLVs) as well as any space-related activities that can be used to develop medium-range, intermediate-range, and intercontinental ballistic missiles. Flight-testing offers the Islamic Republic a more ready and reliable missile force, and its space program is a way to grow its long-range strike capabilities while it claims to adhere to a self-imposed 2,000-kilometer ban. Adherence to other UN Security Council resolutions containing arms embargoes. Tehran should commit to abiding by all applicable existing UN arms embargoes, including those relating to jurisdictions where it has partners, including Yemen (UNSCR 2216), Lebanon (UNSCR 1701), and North Korea (UNSCRs 1718 and 2270). Terminate Iran’s Nuclear, Missile, and Arms Cooperation With Russia, China, North Korea, and Other States: Termination of Iranian military and technical assistance to the Russian Federation, including but not limited to support for weapons, material, and training for drones, ballistic missiles, or other platforms. Iran’s transfer of missiles and drones to Russia is not covered by an active UN Security Council resolution and represents the first-ever large-scale Iranian export of these systems to the European continent. Iran must detail its past, and any ongoing, nuclear and missile cooperation with North Korea, China, Russia, and other states. It will be far easier to deter, detect, and interdict future nuclear assistance to Iran if it has to make a declaration of its past nuclear cooperation with any outside actors. This will guard against the significant risk that Iran could circumvent restrictions on nuclear weapons activities on its own territory by acquiring fissile material from a foreign country such as North Korea or having such a country conduct nuclear or nuclear-related tests for it. [END] --- [1] Url: https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2025/03/14/irans-nuclear-disarmament/ Published and (C) by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Content appears here under this condition or license: By permission of RFE/RL. via Magical.Fish Gopher News Feeds: gopher://magical.fish/1/feeds/news/rferl/