This unaltered story [1] was originally published on OpenDemocracy.org.
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Reform in name only: Lukashenka's constitutional referendum is a sham

By:   []

Date: 2022-02 

Popular democracy, Lukashenka-style

In the end, a twofold situation has developed. On the one hand, Lukashenka has been thinking about constitutional reform for a long time. But the topic of the transition of power was of interest to him only in the context of the undetermined ‘distant future’. And he certainly would not want to implement such a complex manoeuvre right now, with the catastrophic election results fresh in people’s memories. As Lukashenka admitted at one meeting: “To be frank, I really don’t need this process.”

On the other hand, the Kremlin continues to push for constitutional reform, and Lukashenka is in no position to quarrel with Russia, his only ally. Therefore, at the end of 2021, he submitted a draft of a new constitution for Belarus.

As expected, the main changes concern the role of the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly. The People’s Assembly is due to receive the constitutional status of “the highest representative body of democracy” in the country and significant powers: the right to impose martial law and a state of emergency; to elect and dismiss judges of the Supreme and Constitutional Courts; and to form the Central Electoral Commission (CEC).

But most importantly, the People’s Assembly will be able to remove the president in the event of a systematic violation of the constitution or treason, as well as consider whether elections are legitimate and give “mandatory instructions to state bodies”.

If Lukashenka decides to leave the presidency, and he moves to head the People’s Assembly, he would still concentrate power in his hands, including the option to remove an objectionable president and to cancel election results, if they are won by “the wrong people”. As a bonus, the former president would receive guarantees of personal immunity from prosecution and life senatorship.

As a democratic carrot, the constitution would reinstate the rule that the president can be elected for no more than two terms. Yet Lukashenka’s own number of terms would be reset to zero: this means he would still reserve the right to be president until 2035.

The transition that won’t happen

The new constitution will give Lukashenka a powerful mechanism for an authoritarian transition of power. The only question is whether he plans to put this mechanism into action in the coming years. Everything indicates that this is not on the cards and the new model of state management will remain on paper only.

Firstly, in the aftermath of 2020, Lukashenka’s regime is in a state of permanent instability. He has lost legitimacy in the eyes of the majority of the population, and the level of rejection of and intolerance towards the authorities in Belarusian society is extremely high. Starting a political transition under these conditions is a huge risk.

Secondly, the January events in Kazakhstan have discredited the very idea of political transition, regardless of its specific circumstances. Kazakhstan’s ‘Bloody January’ has shown that the de jure delegation of power can very quickly lead to the loss of power in reality. And no life-long government posts, such as Nazarbayev held, would change that. Lukashenka can draw only one conclusion from Kazakhstan: power should be kept in one’s own hands for as long as possible.

But if Lukashenka is not going to leave the presidency, then he not only does not need the special powers of the People’s Assembly, but they are dangerous for him. A new centre of power will emerge in the system, which, at least in theory, could limit his own power. To avoid this, the draft constitution spells out the right of Lukashenka (and only him) to simultaneously be both president and chairman of the People’s Assembly. Lukashenka’s deputy head of administration, Olga Chupris, called it “an additional safety net” for the transition period. The circle is closed: in fact, the constitutional reform comes down to the redistribution of powers between the right and left hands of Lukashenka. Nothing will change, either on paper or in reality.
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[1] Url: https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/why-lukashenko-is-changing-belarus-constitution-referendum/
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