(C) Daily Kos This story was originally published by Daily Kos and is unaltered. . . . . . . . . . . Attritting Russian weapons [1] ['This Content Is Not Subject To Review Daily Kos Staff Prior To Publication.'] Date: 2024-11-11 The Ukrainian Military publishes a daily report of Russian losses with cumulation; Euromaidan reprints it. and annieli reprints that for us. Most of the reprints include percentage of original active and reserve equipment. I’ve been looking at these reports and asking other questions about them. I’ll go through tanks carefully and then put in the numbers for Armored Personnel Vehicles and artillery. The current reports say that 68% of the original tanks have been destroyed. The last day that the report said 67% was 2 Nov., and they reported that 9,170 tanks had been destroyed then. Well, 9,170 is 67% of 13,686. So, the Russians started off with something like — almost certainly, something under — 13,686 tanks. On Nov. 9, they reported 9,238 tanks destroyed, which would mean about 4,448 tanks left. The previous 30 days had 293 tanks reported destroyed. At 293 tanks a month, 4.448 tanks would be used up in 15.2 months. That would be Feb. 15, 2026. They are not going to lose 293 tanks a month, of course. to protect the remaining ones, they will use fewer in combat, and as their numbers decrease, they will have fewer tanks that they can use in combat. This reduction in use, though, will reduce their military effectiveness. The corresponding numbers for APV are 65% = 18,538 on Nov. 4. That gives something under 28,520 to start. Losses of 18,697 by Nov. 9 would mean something less than 9,823 left. losses of 922 over the previous 30 days gives 10.7 months. Think Nov. 1. 2025. (Again, RU is not going to use — and, thus, lose — APVs at the same rate next year.) APV % active at the start of the current invasion were much higher than tanks and artillery percentages. While an army needs tanks and artillery roughly in proportion to the size of its adversary, it needs APVs roughly in proportion to the size of its active infantry. For both those reasons, Russia is already feeling the shortage of APVs. They are trying to replace the protection of armor with the protection of speed — putting attacking troops on motorcycles and “Chinese golf carts.” The attempt has resulted in limited success. OTOH, the ATV is less central to Russian military planning than either tanks or artillery. The corresponding numbers for artillery systems are 78% = 20,076 on Nov. 2. That gives something under 25,738 guns at the beginning of the current invasion. Losses of 20,249 through Nov. 9 would mean less than 5,489 left. Losses of 986 over the 30 days leading up to Nov. 9 gives something like 5.7 months. Think May 1, 2025. (Again, RU is not going to use — and, thus, lose — guns at the same rate next year.) Tube artillery is central to Russian military thought. OTOH, they have rockets, drones, and glide bombs to perform somewhat similar tasks. Then too, artillery losses of an enemy are more difficult to ascertain. The Russians seemed to be making an effort to acquire more artillery ammunition, which raises questions of whether they expected to face a scarcity of guns to use that ammunition. On the other side, barrels wear out, and they may have been cannibalized from the remaining reserve guns. Reported losses of guns over the last three 30-day periods was 562, 840, and 986. With the steady increase in losses, they don’t seem to be cutting back in their usage yet. OTOH, they may be forced to use pieces that are less able to “shoot and scoot,” increasing the losses without increasing the pieces at the front. Reported losses in tanks over the same periods was 193, 205, and 293. That might represent increased RU assaults or increased availability of ammo to Ukrainian forces. Reported losses in APVs was 562, 840, and 922. OTOH, reported losses in men was 36,870, 37,410, and 42,340. = * = Other reports tell us that RU gained just over 1,500 square kilometers in the months of September and October in Ukraine and Kursk. (Note that these calendar months are not quite the 30-day periods that I used above). Now, Russia has long been notorious for its willingness to trade blood — and materiel — for soil. I’m not claiming any special insight into Ukrainian military plans when I say that they are more willing to make that trade when they are giving up Russian soil than when they are giving up Ukrainian soil. Nevertheless, a lot of Ukrainian soil is included in that figure. OTOH, Ukraine’s area is just under 400 times those gains; since Russia occupies less than ¼ of Ukraine, it decreased Ukrainian holdings by less than one part in 300. Compare those figures with the timelines listed above. In 2 years, at the rate of 1 part in 300 over 2 months, Russia will increase its holding of Ukrainian territory by 4% of Ukrainian-held territory while losing all the rest of its tanks, APV, and artillery — together with about a million (Russian and North Korean) troops. (Short term, the lowest number reported for the N. Korean contingent was 12,000. As recent Russian deaths and serious injuries have been reported at 1,400 per day, some have said, “Tat’s less than 9 days.” Since Russia seems able to sign 1,000 men a day to contracts, they have a deficit of 400 men a day. All figures are quite approximate. The Korean contribution may be only 9 days of losses, but it’s a full month of deficit.) 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