Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Path: utzoo!utgpu!watserv1!watdragon!violet!cpshelley
From: cpshelley@violet.uwaterloo.ca (cameron shelley)
Subject: Re: What does intentionality have that AI doesn't.....
Message-ID: <1991Mar15.023632.28135@watdragon.waterloo.edu>
Sender: daemon@watdragon.waterloo.edu (Owner of Many System Processes)
Organization: University of Waterloo
References: <13503@ccncsu.ColoState.EDU> <1991Mar14.150044.12197@watdragon.waterloo.edu> <1991Mar14.191814.26802@psych.toronto.edu>
Date: Fri, 15 Mar 1991 02:36:32 GMT
Lines: 45

In article <1991Mar14.191814.26802@psych.toronto.edu> christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher Green) writes:
[...]
>I really don't like the tone of what I'm about to say but you've got this
>entirely wrong. IntenTionality, in philosophy, indicates the capacity of 
>some entity to point to or refer to something else. Thoughts (inasmuch
>as they're propositional attitudes) refer in this way. So do sentences
>and, sometimes, pictures, although their intentionality seems to be 
>derived from ours -- we use them that way.  Intent, as the term is used
>colloquially (e.g., "I intend to go to the movies") is not at issue. It
>is only a species of the tehcnical form of IntenTionality and not priveledged
>in any particular way.
>
>IntenSion is an entirely different matter. To put things crudely, the 
>IntenSion of a mental act (Brentano's term) is its representation (or
>'mental picture', sometimes) 'in your head'. This is to be contrasted
>with the extension of the act, the thing in the world which is being
>represented. There has long been a debate in philosophy over which
>(the intension or the extension) is the MEANING. Hilary Putnam is
>particularly notable for having argued the latter. Jerry Fodor has
>severely criticized Putnam's position.
>

I'll admit I was using entirely the "wrong" vocabulary, hoping to circumvent
the philosphical dispute you mention.  Particularly, I wished to avoid
priveledging philosophy (to borrow your phrasing) since we are not 
necessarily talking about "artificial philosophy" when "artificial
intelligence" is the subject.  At any rate, the philosophical notions
regarding intension/extension are notoriosly static, and thus ill-suited
to talk of how useful they are for implemenation (which is how I had
interpreted the thread to that point).  Also, I've just been reading
over work in text planning in which intenTion is represented as plan
goals, so perhaps I am mixing myself up ...

>I hate to be so blunt and I hope this won't be construed as a flame but
>it is important to get these terms straight before engaging in any further
>debate on this topic. 

No problem here.  I promise to take my philosophy more seriously in
future.

--
      Cameron Shelley        | "Belladonna, n.  In Italian a beautiful lady;
cpshelley@violet.waterloo.edu|  in English a deadly poison.  A striking example
    Davis Centre Rm 2136     |  of the essential identity of the two tongues."
 Phone (519) 885-1211 x3390  |				Ambrose Bierce
