[HN Gopher] Recover Apple Keychain
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       Recover Apple Keychain
        
       Author : speckx
       Score  : 40 points
       Date   : 2026-03-30 17:21 UTC (5 hours ago)
        
 (HTM) web link (arkoinad.com)
 (TXT) w3m dump (arkoinad.com)
        
       | xd1936 wrote:
       | It Just Works(tm)... until you don't want to take the default
       | option. I'm sure your average user would just be SoL if going
       | through this same experience.
        
         | jshier wrote:
         | Keychain is one of the worst APIs on Apple platforms, with
         | parts that date all the way back to MacOS 9. It's not
         | surprising there are various breaking bugs from decades of low
         | maintenance.
        
       | zapkyeskrill wrote:
       | Good information to have. I was surprised by step 2 though (rm
       | login.keychain-db). How can you be absolutely sure it doesn't
       | contain anything important and you won't need it later?
       | 
       | I'd probably opt for a more defensive action here and just rename
       | it (like the original reset did).
        
         | joshstrange wrote:
         | I'm hoping that was just the blog version of what they did
         | (since more succinct) but yes, I have so many "-CURRENTDATE-
         | EXPLAINATION.ext" files for any flat-file databases I interact
         | with (keychain, sqlite, db4, etc). It's saved me more times
         | than I can count.
         | 
         | Going in to fix a service that uses sqlite and seeing 5 other
         | times I recovered data or was making a change is always fun.
        
       | nabbed wrote:
       | Based on this description, it sounds like someone walking past
       | your unattended desk and bent on disrupting your day but not
       | stealing your data, could enter in a garbage password into the
       | lock screen a few times and lock you out of your own laptop.
       | 
       | I guess the same also works for cloud accounts as well. I
       | remember, back in the mid-2000s, trying to log into my hotmail
       | account (never having failed to log in before) and getting a
       | "locked out due to too many bad passwords". So someone, only
       | knowing my user account name (which was the same as my email
       | address), locked me out of my own account. The problem was, I
       | couldn't remember what my recovery accounts were (I eventually
       | figured it out).
        
         | varispeed wrote:
         | Remember entering password to one service I subscribed to. It
         | was Friday evening. I typed it wrong 5 times and my account was
         | locked out with a message to contact customer service. Customer
         | service was open from Monday to Friday 9am to 5pm. So I was
         | unable to use it for a couple of days. It was painful
         | experience. I found an alternative though and on Monday
         | cancelled it.
        
         | duskwuff wrote:
         | The description is misleading. What made the OS create a new
         | keychain was resetting their login password, not the failed
         | password attempts.
         | 
         | (The login keychain is encrypted using the user's password, so
         | it's reasonable to create a new one when the password is
         | changed - otherwise, you end up in a situation where
         | applications constantly pop up prompts for a password the user
         | doesn't know every time they try to access the keychain, e.g.
         | to load saved passwords in Safari. I've seen this happen on
         | older versions of macOS and it's positively infuriating.)
        
         | crazygringo wrote:
         | Heck, once I cycled for half an hour with my iPhone in my
         | pocket, and somehow the phone against my leg was in just the
         | right position that it kept interpreting my leg movements as
         | trying to enter a passcode.
         | 
         | Got home, pulled out my phone, and it had a message that it was
         | locked for several hours due to so many failed passcode
         | attempts. Incredibly annoying.
         | 
         | Still, only happened once in well over a decade of owning an
         | iPhone.
         | 
         | I was mostly frustrated that there wasn't some alternate way of
         | regaining access, like via my Mac or iPad logged in with the
         | same Apple ID. Or that the failed passcode attempts didn't
         | start eventually playing a loud alert sound or something on
         | each failure.
        
       | dpark wrote:
       | Is there really no supported model for this scenario? Surely the
       | point of an iCloud backup is that you can restore from the cloud
       | rather than do a local hack to try to regain access to locked
       | keychain db.
       | 
       | What happens if you just set up the device as a new machine and
       | login to your iCloud like normal?
        
         | vessenes wrote:
         | there are some different options depending on settings - apple
         | will encrypt to an internally (apple held) key that your iCloud
         | login will unlock under most circumstances. This can be turned
         | off by consumers, and I would expect by IT departments at well.
        
       | fastaguy88 wrote:
       | Apple Keychain has a number of old bugs that have caused me to
       | have to resort to this strategy several times. The most common
       | problem is having a secure note that you can open, but then
       | immediately disappears (closes). Copying over an older keychain
       | database can sometimes solve the problem.
        
       | bigiain wrote:
       | > Still, I had assumed there might be some kind of master key
       | that would handle this automatically during a password reset.
       | 
       | This assumption, by a clearly technical person, is a fundamental
       | problem that keeps "the rest of the world" locked in to
       | centralised services where that is true, and where that master
       | key can be used against them by law enforcement, fascist regimes,
       | and surveillance capitalists.
        
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       (page generated 2026-03-30 23:00 UTC)