[HN Gopher] Secure Domain Name System (DNS) Deployment 2026 Guid...
       ___________________________________________________________________
        
       Secure Domain Name System (DNS) Deployment 2026 Guide [pdf]
        
       Author : XzetaU8
       Score  : 85 points
       Date   : 2026-03-24 12:14 UTC (10 hours ago)
        
 (HTM) web link (nvlpubs.nist.gov)
 (TXT) w3m dump (nvlpubs.nist.gov)
        
       | bob1029 wrote:
       | > ECC algorithms with smaller key sizes would be more vulnerable
       | to a quantum attack, as it would require a currently theoretical
       | quantum computer with fewer qubits than would be required for an
       | RSA key with the same cryptographic strength [25].
       | 
       | This is what keeps me skeptical about ECC. RSA is really chunky,
       | and maybe that's a fundamental advantage from an information
       | theory perspective. Compromising on the crypto scheme because we
       | can't fit inside UDP seems like a cursed path.
       | 
       | [25]: https://arxiv.org/abs/1706.06752
        
         | phicoh wrote:
         | If we are looking at the RSA factoring challenge
         | (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSA_Factoring_Challenge) then
         | 768 bits is done. Breaking RSA 1024 is assumed to be possible
         | but has not been demonstrated in public.
         | 
         | So maybe quantum computers should first complete some of these
         | RSA challenges with less compute resources than done
         | classically before considering any claims about qubits needs as
         | practical.
         | 
         | All of this in the context of DNSSEC or other system using
         | signatures. For encryption the story is different.
        
         | tptacek wrote:
         | A CRQC makes both RSA and ECDLP practically irrelevant. The
         | qubit thresholds between available ECC and RSA-2048 don't look
         | meaningful. If you're worried about QC, get comfortable with
         | lattices.
         | 
         | Of course, this part of the NIST recommendation doesn't matter,
         | because DNSSEC is moribund. If we want post-quantum record
         | authenticity, we should go back to the drawing board and come
         | up with something that doesn't depend on UDP (and that doesn't
         | carry DNSSEC's 1994-vintage offline-signer compromise and all-
         | or-nothing zone signature compromise).
        
           | gumarn_y wrote:
           | Yeah if we will ever see a CRQC...but nevertheless we will
           | migrate to PQC as it will be forced via regulations thx to
           | lobby work by Mosca and friends
        
       | progbits wrote:
       | > 864000 seconds (1 day)
       | 
       | Could use some proofreading.
        
       | antonyh wrote:
       | I do wish these types of document were published as HTML and not
       | just as PDF.
        
         | layer8 wrote:
         | It would be nice if there was an HTML/A standard. Though this
         | document isn't PDF/A either.
        
         | kgwxd wrote:
         | Firefox makes it look like HTML with pdf.js. Wouldn't it be
         | trivial to make something that puts a PDF through that same
         | filter and saves the results to a file? Or do you mean by
         | default so you can just read it in a browser without PDF
         | support?
        
       ___________________________________________________________________
       (page generated 2026-03-24 23:01 UTC)