[HN Gopher] Opus 4.6 uncovers 500 zero-day flaws in open-source ...
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Opus 4.6 uncovers 500 zero-day flaws in open-source code
Author : speckx
Score : 166 points
Date : 2026-02-05 18:25 UTC (4 hours ago)
(HTM) web link (www.axios.com)
(TXT) w3m dump (www.axios.com)
| garbawarb wrote:
| Have they been verified?
| emp17344 wrote:
| Sounds like this is just a claim Anthropic is making with no
| evidence to support it. This is an ad.
| input_sh wrote:
| How can you not believe them!? Anthropic stopped Chinese
| hackers from using Claude to conduct a large-scale cyber
| espionage attack just months ago!
| littlestymaar wrote:
| Poe's law strikes again: I had to check your profile to be
| sure this was sarcasm.
| input_sh wrote:
| You checked yourself!? Don't let your boss know, you
| could've saved some time by orchestrating a team of Claude
| agents to do that for you!
| andai wrote:
| Yeah, it's pretty funny to me saying "it's way safer than
| previous models" and "also way better at finding exploits" in
| the context of that event. Chinese hackers just said to
| Claude "no, its totally fine to hack this target trust me bro
| I work there!"
| xiphias2 wrote:
| Just 100 from the 500 is from OpenClaw created by Opus 4.5
| falcor84 wrote:
| Well, even then, that's enormous economic value, given
| OpenClaw's massive adoption.
| wiseowise wrote:
| Not sure if trolling or serious.
| IhateAI_2 wrote:
| These people are serious, and delusional. Openclaw hasn't
| contributed anything to the economy other than burning
| electricity and probably more interest on delusional folks
| credit card bills.
| falcor84 wrote:
| Yes, serious. Even if openclaw is entirely useless (which I
| didn't think it is), it's still a good idea to harden it
| and make people's computers safer from attack, no? I don't
| see anyone objecting to fixing vulnerabilities in Angry
| Birds.
| esseph wrote:
| Security Advisory: OpenClaw is spilling over to enterprise
| networks
|
| https://www.reddit.com/r/cybersecurity/s/fZLuBlG8ET
| gambiting wrote:
| I've literally never heard of OpenClaw until this thread. Had
| to google what it is.
| Sharlin wrote:
| In other news: tobacco's enormous economic value, given
| massive adoption of cigarette smoking.
| falcor84 wrote:
| Sorry if it was unclear - I was talking about the economic
| value of finding the vulnerabilities, not the economic
| value of openclaw itself.
| Sharlin wrote:
| Ah, makes sense :)
| Uehreka wrote:
| OpenClaw uses Opus 4.5, but was written by Codex. Pete
| Steinberger has been pretty a pretty hardcore Codex fan since
| he switched off Claude Code back in September-ish. I think he
| just felt Claude would make a better basis for an assistant
| even if he doesn't like working with it on code.
| ains wrote:
| https://archive.is/N6In9
| siva7 wrote:
| Wasn't this Opus thing released like 30 minutes ago?
| jjice wrote:
| A bunch of companies get early access.
| input_sh wrote:
| Yes, you just need to be a Claude++ plan!
| Topfi wrote:
| I understand the confusion, this was done by Anthropics
| internal Red team as part of model testing prior to release.
| tintor wrote:
| Singularity
| blinding-streak wrote:
| Opus 4.6 uses time travel.
| acedTrex wrote:
| Create the problem, sell the solution remains an undefeated
| business strategy.
| _tk_ wrote:
| The system card unfortunately only refers to this [0] blog post
| and doesn't go into any more detail. In the blog post Anthropic
| researchers claim: "So far, we've found and validated more than
| 500 high-severity vulnerabilities".
|
| The three examples given include two Buffer Overflows which could
| very well be cherrypicked. It's hard to evaluate if these vulns
| are actually "hard to find". I'd be interested to see the full
| list of CVEs and CVSS ratings to actually get an idea how good
| these findings are.
|
| Given the bogus claims [1] around GenAI and security, we should
| be very skeptical around these news.
|
| [0] https://red.anthropic.com/2026/zero-days/
|
| [1] https://doublepulsar.com/cyberslop-meet-the-new-threat-
| actor...
| majormajor wrote:
| The Ghostscript one is interesting in terms of specific-vs-
| general effectiveness:
|
| ---
|
| > Claude initially went down several dead ends when searching
| for a vulnerability--both attempting to fuzz the code, and,
| after this failed, attempting manual analysis. Neither of these
| methods yielded any significant findings.
|
| ...
|
| > "The commit shows it's adding stack bounds checking - this
| suggests there was a vulnerability before this check was added.
| ... If this commit _adds_ bounds checking, then the code before
| this commit was vulnerable ... So to trigger the vulnerability,
| I would need to test against a version of the code _before_
| this fix was applied. "
|
| ...
|
| > "Let me check if maybe the checks are incomplete or there's
| another code path. Let me look at the other caller in
| gdevpsfx.c ... Aha! This is very interesting! In gdevpsfx.c,
| the call to gs_type1_blend at line 292 does NOT have the bounds
| checking that was added in gstype1.c."
|
| ---
|
| It's attempt to analyze the code failed but when it saw a
| concrete example of "in the history, someone added bounds
| checking" it did a "I wonder if they did it everywhere else for
| this func call" pass.
|
| So after it considered that function based on the commit
| history it found something that it _didn 't_ find from its
| initial fuzzing and code-analysis open-ended search.
|
| As someone who still reads the code that Claude writes, this
| sort of "big picture miss, small picture excellence" is not
| very surprising or new. It's interesting to think about what it
| would take to do that precise digging across a whole codebase;
| especially if it needs some sort of
| modularization/summarization of context vs trying to digest
| tens of million lines at once.
| tptacek wrote:
| I know some of the people involved here, and the general
| chatter around LLM-guided vulnerability discovery, and I am not
| at all skeptical about this.
| malfist wrote:
| [flagged]
| pchristensen wrote:
| Nobody is right about everything, but tptacek's takes on
| software security are a good place to start.
| tptacek wrote:
| I'm interested in whether there's a well-known
| vulnerability researcher/exploit developer beating the
| drum that LLMs are overblown for this application. _All I
| see is the opposite thing_. A year or so ago I arrived at
| the conclusion that if I was going to stay in software
| security, I was going to have to bring myself up to speed
| with LLMs. At the time I thought that was a distinctive
| insight, but, no, if anything, I was 6-9 months behind
| everybody else in my field about it.
|
| There's a lot of vuln researchers out there. Someone's
| gotta be making the case against. Where are they?
|
| From what I can see, vulnerability research combines many
| of the attributes that make problems especially amenable
| to LLM loop solutions: huge corpus of operationalizable
| prior art, heavily pattern dependent, simple closed
| loops, forward progress with dumb stimulus/response
| tooling, lots of search problems.
|
| Of course it works. Why would anybody think otherwise?
|
| You can tell you're in trouble on this thread when
| everybody starts bringing up the curl bug bounty. I don't
| know if this is surprising news for people who don't keep
| up with vuln research, but Daniel Stenberg's curl bug
| bounty has never been where all the action has been at in
| vuln research. What, a public bug bounty attracted an
| overwhelming amount of slop? Quelle surprise! Bug
| bounties have attracted slop for so long before
| mainstream LLMs existed they might well have been the
| inspiration for slop itself.
|
| Also, a very useful component of a mental model about
| vulnerability research that a lot of people seem to lack
| (not just about AI, but in all sorts of other settings):
| _money buys vulnerability research outcomes_. Anthropic
| has eighteen squijillion dollars. Obviously, they have
| serious vuln researchers. Vuln research outcomes are in
| _the model cards_ for OpenAI and Anthropic.
| NitpickLawyer wrote:
| > You can tell you're in trouble on this thread when
| everybody starts bringing up the curl bug bounty. I don't
| know if this is surprising news for people who don't keep
| up with vuln research, but Daniel Stenberg's curl bug
| bounty has never been where all the action has been at in
| vuln research. What, a public bug bounty attracted an
| overwhelming amount of slop? Quelle surprise! Bug
| bounties have attracted slop for so long before
| mainstream LLMs existed they might well have been the
| inspiration for slop itself.
|
| Yeah, that's just media reporting for you. As anyone who
| ever administered a bug bounty programme on regular sites
| (h1, bugcrowd, etc) can tell you, there was an absolute
| deluge of slop for years before LLMs came to the scene.
| It was just manual slop (by manual I mean running wapiti
| and c/p the reports to h1).
| tptacek wrote:
| I did some triage work for clients at Latacora and I
| would rather deal with LLM slop than argue with another
| person 10 time zones away trying to convince me that
| something they're doing in the Chrome Inspector
| constitutes a zero-day. At least there's a _possibility_
| that LLM slop might contain some information. You spent
| tokens on it!
| steveklabnik wrote:
| I used to answer security vulnerability emails to Rust.
| We'd regularly get "someone ran an automated tool and
| reports something that's not real." Like, complaints
| about CORS settings on rust-lang.org that would let
| people steal cookies. The website does not use cookies.
|
| I wonder if it's gotten actively worse these days. But
| the newness would be the scale, not the quality itself.
| wrs wrote:
| The new slop can be much harder to recognize and reject
| than the old "I ran XYZ web scanner on your site" slop.
| tptacek wrote:
| POCs are now so cheap that "POC||GTFO" is a perfectly
| reasonable bar to set on a bounty program.
| JumpCrisscross wrote:
| > _I was going to have to bring myself up to speed with
| LLMs_
|
| What did you do beyond playing around with them?
|
| > _Of course it works. Why would anybody think
| otherwise?_
|
| Sam Altman is a liar. The folks pitching AI as an
| investment were previously flinging SPACs and crypto.
| (And can usually speak to anything technical about AI as
| competently as battery chemistry or Merkle trees.)
| Copilot and Siri overpromised and underdelivered. Vibe
| coders are mostly idiots.
|
| The bar for believability in AI is about as high as its
| frontier's actual achievements.
| azakai wrote:
| Plenty of reasons to be skeptical, but also we know that
| LLMs can find security vulnerabilities since at least
| 2024:
|
| https://projectzero.google/2024/10/from-naptime-to-big-
| sleep...
|
| Some followup findings reported in point 1 here from
| 2025:
|
| https://blog.google/innovation-and-ai/technology/safety-
| secu...
|
| So what Anthropic are reporting here is not
| unprecedented. The main thing they are claiming is an
| improvement in the amount of findings. I don't see a
| reason to be overly skeptical.
| jsnell wrote:
| I'm not sure the volume here is particularly different to
| past examples. I think the main difference is that there
| was no custom harness, tooling or fine-tuning. It's just
| the out of the box capabilities for a generally available
| model and a generic agent.
| tptacek wrote:
| I still haven't worked out for myself where my career is
| going with respect to this stuff. I have like 30% of a
| prototype/POC active testing agent (basically, Burp Suite
| but as an agent), but I haven't had time to move it
| forward over the last couple months.
|
| In the intervening time, one of the beliefs I've acquired
| is that the gap between effective use of models and
| marginal use is asking for ambitious enough tasks, and
| that I'm generally hamstrung by knowing just enough about
| anything they'd build to slow everything down. In that
| light, I think doing an agent to automate the kind of
| bugfinding Burp Suite does is probably smallball.
|
| Many years ago, a former collaborator of mine found a
| bunch of video driver vulnerabilities by using QEMU as a
| testing and fault injection harness. That kind of thing
| is more interesting to me now. I once did a project
| evaluating an embedded OS where the modality was "port
| all the interesting code from the kernel into Linux
| userland processes and test them directly". That kind of
| thing seems especially interesting to me now too.
| catoc wrote:
| It does if the person making the statement has a track
| record, proven expertise on the topic - and in this case...
| it actually may mean something to other people
| shimman wrote:
| Yes, as we all know that unsourced unsubstantiated
| statements are the best way to verify claims regarding
| engineering practices. Especially when said person has a
| financial stake in the outcomes of said claims.
|
| No conflict of interest here at all!
| tptacek wrote:
| I have zero financial stake in Anthropic and more broadly
| my career is more threatened by LLM-assisted
| vulnerability research (something I do not personally do
| serious work on) than it is aided by it, but I understand
| that the first principal component of casual skepticism
| on HN is "must be a conflict of interest".
| malfist wrote:
| You still haven't answered why I should care that you, a
| stranger on the internet, believes some unsubstantiated
| hearsay?
| wtallis wrote:
| Take a look at https://news.ycombinator.com/leaders
|
| The user you're suspicious of is pretty well-known in
| this community.
| godelski wrote:
| Someone's credibility cannot be determined by their point
| counts. Holy fuck is that not a way to evaluate someone
| in the slightest. Points don't matter.
|
| Instead look at their profile...
|
| Points != creds. Creds == creds.
|
| Don't be fucking lazy and rely on points, especially when
| they link their identity.
| wtallis wrote:
| I wasn't at all saying that points = credibility. I was
| saying that points = _not unknown_. Enough people around
| here know who he is, and if he didn 't have credibility
| on this topic he'd be getting down voted instead of voted
| to the top.
| godelski wrote:
| Is that meaningfully different? If you read malfist's
| point as "tptacek's point isn't valuable because it's
| from some random person on the internet" then the problem
| is "random person on the internet" = "unknown
| credentials". In group, out group, notoriety, points,
| whatever are not the issue.
|
| I'll put it this way, I don't give a shit about Robert
| Downy Jr's opinion on AI technology. His notoriety "means
| nothing to anybody". But instead, I sure do care about
| Hinton's (even if I disagree with him).
|
| malfist asked why they should care. You said points. You
| should have said "tptacek is known to do security work,
| see his profile". Done. Much more direct. _Answers the
| actual question._ Instead you pointed to points, which
| only makes him "not a stranger" at best but still
| doesn't answer the question. Intended or not "you should
| believe tptacek because he has a lot of points" is a
| reasonable interpretation of what you said.
| godelski wrote:
| > but I understand that the first principal component of
| casual skepticism on HN is "must be a conflict of
| interest".
|
| I think the first principle should be "don't trust random
| person on the internet"
|
| (But if you think Tom is random, look at his profile.
| First link, not second)
| catoc wrote:
| A security researcher claiming that they're _not_
| skeptical about LLMs being able to do part of their job -
| where is the financial stake in that?
| dvfjsdhgfv wrote:
| It doesn't mean we have to agree:
|
| https://ludic.mataroa.blog/blog/contra-ptaceks-terrible-
| arti...
| tptacek wrote:
| Here's a fun exercise: go email the author of that blog
| (he's very nice) and ask how much of it he still stands
| by.
| JumpCrisscross wrote:
| > _that means nothing to anybody else_
|
| Someone else here! Ptacek saying anything about security
| means a lot to this nobody.
|
| To the point that I'm now going to take this seriously
| where before I couldn't see through the fluff.
| arduanika wrote:
| It might mean nothing to you, but tptacek's words means at
| least something to many of us here.
|
| Also, he's a friend of someone I know & trust irl. But then
| again, who am I to you, but yet another anon on a web
| forum.
| Uehreka wrote:
| How have you been here 12 years and not noticed where and
| how often the username tptacek comes up?
| aaaalone wrote:
| See it as a signal under many and not as some face value.
|
| After all they need time to fix the cves.
|
| And it doesn't matter to you as long as your investment into
| this is just 20 or 100 bucks per month anyway.
| scotty79 wrote:
| > It's hard to evaluate if these vulns are actually "hard to
| find".
|
| Can we stop doing that?
|
| I know it's not the same but it sounds like "We don't know if
| that job that the woman supposedly successfully finished was
| all that hard." implying that if a woman did something, it
| surely must have been easy.
|
| If you know it's easy, say that it was easy and why. Don't use
| your lack of knowledge or competence to create empty critique
| founded solely on doubt.
| fred_is_fred wrote:
| Is the word zero-day here superfluous? If they were previously
| unknown doesn't that make them zero-day by definition?
| bink wrote:
| Yes. As a security researcher this always annoys me.
| tptacek wrote:
| It's a term of art. In print media, the connotation is
| "vulnerabilities embedded into shipping software", as opposed
| to things like misconfigurations.
| limagnolia wrote:
| I though zero-day meant actively being exploited in the wild
| before a patch is available?
| jfyi wrote:
| I think it's a fairly common trope in communication to explain
| in simple terms any language that the wider part of an audience
| doesn't understand.
| zhengyi13 wrote:
| I feel like Daniel @ curl might have opinions on this.
| Legend2440 wrote:
| You're right, he does:
| https://daniel.haxx.se/blog/2025/10/10/a-new-breed-of-analyz...
|
| Curl fully supports the use of AI tools by legitimate security
| researchers to catch bugs, and they have fixed dozens caught in
| this way. It's just idiots submitting bugs they don't
| understand that's a problem.
| ChrisArchitect wrote:
| Earlier source: https://red.anthropic.com/2026/zero-days/
| (https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46902374)
| mrkeen wrote:
| Daniel Stenberg has been vocal the last few months on Mastodon
| about being overwhelmed by false security issues submitted to the
| curl project.
|
| So much so that he had to eventually close the bug bounty
| program.
|
| https://daniel.haxx.se/blog/2026/01/26/the-end-of-the-curl-b...
| tptacek wrote:
| We're discussing a project led by actual vulnerability
| researchers, not random people in Indonesia hoping to score $50
| by cajoling maintainers about atyle nits.
| malfist wrote:
| Vulnerability researches with a vested interest in making
| LLMs valuable. The difference isn't meaningful
| tptacek wrote:
| I don't even understand how that claim makes sense.
| judemelancon wrote:
| The first three authors, who are asterisked for "equal
| contribution", appear to work for Anthropic. That would
| imply an interest in making Anthropic's LLM products
| valuable.
|
| What is the confusion here?
| tptacek wrote:
| The notion that a vulnerability researcher employed by
| one of the highly-valued companies in the hemisphere,
| publishing in the open literature with their name signed
| to it, is on a par with a teenager in a developing nation
| running script-kid tools hoping for bounty payoffs.
| delusional wrote:
| You don't see how thats even directionally similar?
|
| I guess I'll spell it out. One is a guy with an abundance
| of technology, that he doesn't know how to use, that he
| knows can make him money and fame, if only he can
| convince you that his lies are truth. The other is a
| bangladeshi teenager.
| tptacek wrote:
| I don't even understand how that claim makes sense.
| judemelancon wrote:
| To preemptively clarify, I'm not saying anything about
| these particular researchers.
|
| Having established that, are you saying that you can't
| even conceptualize a conflict of interest potentially
| clouding someone's judgement any more if the amount of
| money and the person's perceived status and skill level
| all get increased?
|
| Disagreeing about the significance of the conflict of
| interest is one thing, but claiming not to understand how
| it could make sense is a drastically stronger claim.
| tptacek wrote:
| I'm responding to "the difference isn't meaningful".
| Obviously, the difference is extremely meaningful.
| mpyne wrote:
| > Having established that, are you saying that you can't
| even conceptualize a conflict of interest potentially
| clouding someone's judgement any more if the amount of
| money and the person's perceived status and skill level
| all get increased.
|
| If I used AI to make a Super Nintendo soundtrack, no one
| would treat it as equivalent to Nobuo Uematsu or Koji
| Kondo or Dave Wise using AI to do the same and making the
| claim that the AI was managing to make creatively
| impressive work. Even if those famous composers worked
| for Anthropic.
|
| Yes there would be relevant biases but there could not be
| a comparison of my using AI to make music slop vs. their
| expert supervision of AI to make something much more
| impressive.
|
| Just because AI is involved in two different things
| doesn't make them similar things.
| drekipus wrote:
| You have to be doing this willfully. This is obtuse
| PunchyHamster wrote:
| I'm not sure the gap between the two is all that wide
| tptacek wrote:
| Then you're telling on yourself.
| pityJuke wrote:
| Daniel is a smart man. He's been frustrated by slop, but he has
| equally accepted [0] AI-derived bug submissions from people who
| know what they are doing.
|
| I would imagine Anthropic are the latter type of individual.
|
| [0]: https://mastodon.social/@bagder/115241241075258997
| catwell wrote:
| Not only that, he's very enthusiastic about AI analyzers such
| as ZeroPath and AISLE.
|
| He's written about it here:
| https://daniel.haxx.se/blog/2025/10/10/a-new-breed-of-
| analyz... and talked about it in his keynote at FOSDEM -
| which I attended - last Sunday
| (https://fosdem.org/2026/schedule/event/B7YKQ7-oss-in-
| spite-o...).
| Topfi wrote:
| The official release by Anthropic is very light on concrete
| information [0], only contains a select and very brief number of
| examples and lacks history, context, etc. making it very hard to
| gleam any reliably information from this. I hope they'll release
| a proper report on this experiment, as it stands it is impossible
| to say how much of this are actual, tangible flaws versus the
| unfortunately ever growing misguided bug reports and pull
| requests many larger FOSS projects are suffering from at an
| alarming rate.
|
| Personally, while I get that 500 sounds more impressive to
| investors and the market, I'd be far more impressed in a
| detailed, reviewed paper that showcases five to ten concrete
| examples, detailed with the full process and response by the team
| that is behind the potentially affected code.
|
| It is far to early for me to make any definitive statement, but
| the most early testing does not indicate any major jump between
| Opus 4.5 and Opus 4.6 that would warrant such an improvement, but
| I'd love nothing more than to be proven wrong on this front and
| will of course continue testing.
|
| [0] https://red.anthropic.com/2026/zero-days/
| ChrisMarshallNY wrote:
| When I read stuff like this, I have to assume that the blackhats
| have already been doing this, for some time.
| kibibu wrote:
| Not with Opus 4.6 they haven't
| ChrisMarshallNY wrote:
| Good point. I suspect that they'll be addressing that,
| quickly...
| bastard_op wrote:
| It's not really worth much when it doesn't work most of the time
| though:
|
| https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/18866
| https://updog.ai/status/anthropic
| tptacek wrote:
| It's a machine that spits out sev:hi vulnerabilities by the
| dozen and the complaint is the uptime isn't consistent enough?
| bastard_op wrote:
| If I'm attempting to use it as a service to do continuous
| checks on things and it fails 50% of the time, I'd say yes,
| wouldn't you?
| tptacek wrote:
| If you had a machine with a lever, and 7 times out of 10
| when you pulled that lever nothing happened, and the other
| 3 times it spat a $5 bill at you, would your immediate next
| step be:
|
| (1) throw the machine away
|
| (2) put it aside and call a service rep to come find out
| what's wrong with it
|
| (3) pull the lever incessantly
|
| I only have one undergrad psych credit (it's one of my two
| college credits), but it had something to say about this
| particular thought experiment.
| candiddevmike wrote:
| You're leaving out how much it costs to pull the lever,
| both in time and money.
| jsnell wrote:
| But it's not failing 50% of the time. Their status page[0]
| shows about 99.6% availability for both the API and Claude
| Code. And specifically for the vulnerability finding use
| case that the article was about and you're dismissing as
| "not worth much", why in the world would you need
| continuous checks to produce value?
|
| [0] https://status.claude.com/
| anhner wrote:
| updog? what's updog?
| bxguff wrote:
| In so far as model use cases I don't mind them throwing their
| heads against the wall in sandboxes to find vulnerabilities but
| why would it do that without specific prompting? Is anthropic
| fine with claude setting it's own agendas in red-teaming? That's
| like the complete opposite of sanitizing inputs.
| assaddayinh wrote:
| How weird the new attack vector for secret services must be..
| like "please train into your models to push this exploit in code
| as a highly weighted trained on pattern".. Not Saying All answers
| are Corrupted In Attitude, but some "always come uppers" sure are
| absolutly right..
| almosthere wrote:
| I've mentioned previously somewhere that the languages we choose
| to write in will matter less for many arguments. When it comes to
| insecure C vs Rust, LLMs will eventually level out the playing
| field.
|
| I'm not arguing we all go back to C - but companies that have
| large codebases in it, the guys screaming "RUST REWRITE" can be
| quieted and instead of making that large investment, the C
| codebase may continue. Not saying this is a GOOD thing, but just
| a thing that may happen.
| somalihoaxes wrote:
| No shit! ("OpeEn SoUrCe CaN bE eAsIlY ReViEwEd By EvErYOnE")
| HAL3000 wrote:
| I honestly wonder how many of these are written by LLMs. Without
| code review, Opus would have introduced multiple zero day
| vulnerabilities into our codebases. The funniest one: it was
| meant to rate-limit brute-force attempts, but on a failed check
| it returned early and triggered a rollback. That rollback also
| undid the increment of the attempt counter so attackers
| effectively got unlimited attempts.
| moribvndvs wrote:
| My dependabot queue is going to explode the next few days.
| ravebv wrote:
| Cox Enterprises owns Axios as well as Cox Automotive. Cox
| Automotive has a tight collaboration with Anthropic.
|
| This is a placed advertisement. If known security researchers
| participated in the claim:
|
| Many people have burned their credibility for the AI mammon.
| kylecazar wrote:
| This seems like quite a stretch. Axios is run independently of
| Cox, but even if it wasn't -- I don't see why they would go to
| this length for an AI company whose models they use to give the
| world the Kelley blue book.
| maxclark wrote:
| Did they submit 500 patches?
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