[HN Gopher] FBI couldn't get into WaPo reporter's iPhone because...
___________________________________________________________________
FBI couldn't get into WaPo reporter's iPhone because Lockdown Mode
enabled
Author : robin_reala
Score : 527 points
Date : 2026-02-04 14:31 UTC (8 hours ago)
(HTM) web link (www.404media.co)
(TXT) w3m dump (www.404media.co)
| mandeepj wrote:
| For now! They'll get something from open market like the last
| time when Apple refused to decrypt (or unlock?) a phone for them.
| PlatoIsADisease wrote:
| Yeah this is low stakes stuff, Pegasus historically breaks
| Apple phones easy. Bezos's nudes and Khashoggi knows. (not
| really Khashoggi is dead)
| macintux wrote:
| > Natanson said she does not use biometrics for her devices, but
| after investigators told her to try, "when she applied her index
| finger to the fingerprint reader, the laptop unlocked."
|
| Curious.
| QuantumNomad_ wrote:
| Probably enabled it at some point and forgot. Perhaps even
| during setup when the computer was new.
| NewsaHackO wrote:
| I want to say that is generous of her, but one thing that is
| weird is if I didn't want someone to go into my laptop and
| they tried to force me to use my fingerprint to unlock it, I
| definitely wouldn't use the finger I use to unlock it on the
| first try. Hopefully, Apple locks it out and forces a
| password if you use the wrong finger "accidentally" a couple
| of times.
| altairprime wrote:
| Correct. That's why my Touch ID isn't configured to use the
| obvious finger.
| intrasight wrote:
| My recollection is the computers do by default ask the user
| to set up biometrics
| b112 wrote:
| Very much so, because the question is... did she set it up in
| the past?
|
| How did it know the print even?
| dyauspitr wrote:
| She has to have set it up before. There is no way to divine a
| fingerprint any other way. I guess the only other way would be
| a faulty fingerprint sensor but that should default to a non-
| entry.
| giraffe_lady wrote:
| Could be a parallel construction type thing. They already
| have access but they need to document a legal action by which
| they could have acquired it so it doesn't get thrown out of
| court.
|
| I think this is pretty unlikely here but it's within the
| realm of possibility.
| tsol wrote:
| Seems like it would be hard to fake. The was she tells it
| she put her finger on the pad and the OS unlocked the
| account. Sounds very difficult to do
| operator-name wrote:
| I think they mean if they already have her fingerprint
| from somewhere else, and a secret backdoor into the
| laptop. Then they could login, setup biometrics and
| pretend they had first access when she unlocked it. All
| without revealing their backdoor.
| quesera wrote:
| > _faulty fingerprint sensor_
|
| The fingerprint sensor does not make access control
| decisions, so the fault would have to be somewhere else (e.g.
| the software code branch structure that decides what to do
| with the response from the secure enclave).
| d1sxeyes wrote:
| If you're interested in this in more detail, check this
| out:
|
| https://blackwinghq.com/blog/posts/a-touch-of-pwn-part-i/
| ezfe wrote:
| Why is this curious?
| macintux wrote:
| There appear to be a relatively few possibilities.
|
| * The reporter lied.
|
| * The reporter forgot.
|
| * Apple devices share fingerprint matching details and
| another device had her details (this is supposed to be
| impossible, and I have no reason to believe it isn't).
|
| * The government hacked the computer such that it would
| unlock this way (probably impossible as well).
|
| * The fingerprint security is much worse than years of
| evidence suggests.
|
| Mainly it was buried at the very end of the article, and I
| thought it worth mentioning here in case people missed it.
| ezfe wrote:
| The reporter lying or forgetting seems to be the clear
| answer, there's really no reason to believe it's not one of
| those. And the distinction between the two isn't really
| important from a technical perspective.
|
| Fingerprint security being poor is also unlikely, because
| that would only apply if a different finger had been
| registered.
| orwin wrote:
| My opinion is that she set it up, it didn't work at first,
| she didn't use it, forgot that it existed, and here we are.
|
| > Apple devices share fingerprint matching details and
| another device had her details
|
| I looked into it quite seriously for windows thinkpads,
| unless Apple do it differently, you cannot share
| fingerprint, they're in a local chip and never move.
| fragmede wrote:
| So how does TouchID on an external keyboard work without
| having to re-set up fingerprints?
| piperswe wrote:
| Presumably the fingerprint data is stored in the Mac's
| Secure Enclave, and the external keyboard is just a
| reader
| throwmeaway820 wrote:
| It seems unfortunate that enhanced protection against physically
| attached devices requires enabling a mode that is much broader,
| and sounds like it has a noticeable impact on device
| functionality.
|
| I never attach my iPhone to anything that's not a power source. I
| would totally enable an "enhanced protection for external
| accessories" mode. But I'm not going to enable a general
| "Lockdown mode" that Apple tells me means my "device won't
| function like it typically does"
| UltraSane wrote:
| Computer security is generally inversely proportional to
| convenience. Best opsec is generally to have multiple devices.
| ur-whale wrote:
| > I never attach my iPhone to anything that's not a power
| source.
|
| It's "attached" to the wifi and to the cell network. Pretty
| much the same thing.
| H8crilA wrote:
| GrapheneOS does this by default - only power delivery when
| locked. Also it's a hardware block, not software. Seems to be
| completely immune to these USB exploit tools.
| aaronmdjones wrote:
| It also has various options to adjust the behaviour, from no
| blocks at all, to not even being able to charge the phone (or
| use the phone to charge something else) -- even when
| unlocked. Changing the mode of operation requires the device
| PIN, just as changing the device PIN does.
|
| Note that it behaves subtly differently to how you described
| in case it was connected to something before being locked. In
| that case data access will remain -- even though the phone is
| now locked -- until the device is disconnected.
| jonpalmisc wrote:
| There is a setting as of iOS 26 under "Privacy & Security >
| Wired Accessories" in which you can make data connections
| always prompt for access. Not that there haven't been bypasses
| for this before, but perhaps still of interest to you.
| pkteison wrote:
| It isn't. Settings > Privacy & Security > Wired Accessories
|
| Set to ask for new accessories or always ask.
| sodality2 wrote:
| I have to warn you, it does get annoying when you plug in
| your power-only cable and it still nags you with the
| question. But it does work as intended!
| neilalexander wrote:
| You might want to check that charger. I have the same
| option set to ask every time and it never appears for
| chargers.
| Terretta wrote:
| > _I would totally enable an "enhanced protection for external
| accessories" mode._
|
| Anyone can do this for over a decade now, and it's fairly
| straightforward:
|
| - 2014: https://www.zdziarski.com/blog/?p=2589
|
| - recent: https://reincubate.com/support/how-to/pair-lock-
| supervise-ip...
|
| This goes beyond the "wired accessories" toggle.
| mrandish wrote:
| > it has a noticeable impact on device functionality.
|
| The lack of optional granularity on security settings is super
| frustrating because it leads to many users just opting out of
| any heightened security.
| UltraSane wrote:
| Samsung phones have the Secure Folder which can have a different,
| more secure password and be encrypted when the phone is on.
| delichon wrote:
| I use the Cryptomator app for this, it works as advertised. I
| keep ~60 GiB of personal files in there that would be an easy
| button to steal my identity and savings. I'm just hoping it
| doesn't include an NSA back door.
| vorticalbox wrote:
| you can check the github https://github.com/cryptomator/ios
| delichon wrote:
| Even if I had the skills to confirm the code is secure, how
| could I know that this is the code running on my phone,
| without also having the skills to build and deploy it from
| source?
| warkdarrior wrote:
| Also, you need to make sure that the installation process
| does not insert a backdoor into the code you built from
| source.
| fragmede wrote:
| Or the compilation process!
|
| https://www.cs.cmu.edu/~rdriley/487/papers/Thompson_1984_
| Ref...
| piperswe wrote:
| The NSA definitely has easier ways to steal your identity and
| savings if they wanted to anyways
| Itoldmyselfso wrote:
| Secure folder uses or is in the process of starting to use
| Android native feature private space, which is available on all
| Android 15 phones.
| dec0dedab0de wrote:
| Every time something like this happens I assume it is a covert
| marketing campaign.
|
| If the government wants to get in they're going to get in. They
| can also hold you in contempt until you do.
|
| Don't get me wrong, it's a good thing that law enforcement cant
| easily access this on their own. Just feels like the government
| is working with Apple here to help move some phones.
| pc86 wrote:
| "Government propaganda to help one of the richest companies in
| the history of the world sell 0.000000001% more phones this
| quarter" is quite frankly just idiotic.
|
| You only said half the sentence anyway. The full sentence is:
| "If the government wants to get in they're going to get in,
| unless they want to utilize the courts in any way, in which
| case they have to do things the right way."
|
| If this reporter was a terrorist in Yemen they would have just
| hacked her phone and/or blown up her apartment. Or even if they
| simply wanted to knock off her source they probably could have
| hacked it or gotten the information in some other illicit
| fashion. But that's not what is happening here.
| Cthulhu_ wrote:
| Better to be held in contempt than to give up constitutional
| rights under pressure - most functioning democracies have and
| defend the right to free press, protecting said press sources,
| and can't make you incriminate yourself.
|
| Anyway, it's a good thing to be skeptical about claims that
| iphones can't be hacked by government agencies, as long as it
| doesn't mean you're driven to dodgier parties (as those are
| guaranteed honeypots).
| mrexcess wrote:
| I trust 404 media more than most sources, but I can't help but
| reflexively read every story prominently showcasing the FBI's
| supposed surveillance gaps as attempted watering hole attacks.
| The NSA almost certainly has hardware backdoors in Apple silicon,
| as disclosed a couple of years ago by the excellent researchers
| at Kaspersky. That being the case, Lockdown Mode is not even in
| play.
| chuckadams wrote:
| The NSA is not going to tip its hand about any backdoors it had
| built into the hardware for something as small as this.
| ddtaylor wrote:
| It depends on if parallel reconstruction can be used to
| provide deniability.
| chuckadams wrote:
| Even a parallel construction has limited uses, since you
| can't use the same excuse every time. The NSA probably
| doesn't trust the FBI to come up with something plausible.
| bwoah wrote:
| https://archive.is/1ILVS
| boring-human wrote:
| Can a hacked phone (such as one that was not in Lockdown Mode at
| one point in time) persist in a hacked state?
|
| Obviously, the theoretical answer is yes, given an advanced-
| enough exploit. But let's say Apple is unaware of a specific
| rootkit. If each OS update is a wave, is the installed exploit
| more like a rowboat or a frigate? Will it likely be defeated
| accidentally by minor OS changes, or is it likely to endure?
|
| This answer is actionable. If exploits are rowboats, installing
| developer OS betas might be security-enhancing: the exploit might
| break before the exploiters have a chance to update it.
| digiown wrote:
| Secure boot and verified system partition is supposed to help
| with that. It's for the same reason jailbreaks don't persist
| across reboots these days.
| quenix wrote:
| Forget OS updates. The biggest obstacle to exploit persistence:
| a good old hard system reboot.
|
| Modern iOS has an incredibly tight secure chain-of-trust
| bootloader. If you shut your device to a known-off state (using
| the hardware key sequence), on power on, you can be 99.999%
| certain only Apple-signed code will run all the way from
| secureROM to iOS userland. The exception is if the secureROM is
| somehow compromised and exploited remotely (this requires
| hardware access at boot-time so I don't buy it).
|
| So, on a fresh boot, you are almost definitely running
| authentic Apple code. The easiest path to a form of persistence
| is reusing whatever vector initially pwned you (malicious
| attachment, website, etc) and being clever in placing it
| somewhere iOS will attempt to read it again on boot (and so
| automatically get pwned again).
|
| But honestly, exploiting modern iOS is already difficult enough
| (exploits go for tens millions $USD), persistence is an order
| of magnitude more difficult.
| doublerabbit wrote:
| It's why I keep my old iPhone XR on 15.x for jail breaking
| reasons. I purchased an a new phone specially for the later
| versions and online banking.
|
| Apple bought out all the jail breakers as Denuvo did for the
| game crackers.
| noname120 wrote:
| > Apple bought out all the jail breakers > Denuvo did for
| the game crackers
|
| Do you have sources for these statements?
| doublerabbit wrote:
| Like anything in that field its more NDA, antidotal.
|
| > in 2018, the prominent Denuvo cracker known as "Voksi"
| (of REVOLT) was arrested in Bulgaria following a criminal
| complaint from Denuvo.
|
| https://www.dsogaming.com/news/denuvo-has-sued-revolts-
| found...
|
| That's how you get off such charges. I'll work for you,
| if you drop charges. There was a reddit post I can't find
| when EMPRESS had one of their episodes where she was
| asked if she wanted to work for. It's happened in the
| cracking scene before.
|
| > The jailbreaking community is fractured, with many of
| its former members having joined private security firms
| or Apple itself. The few people still doing it privately
| are able to hold out for big payouts for finding iPhone
| vulnerabilities. And users themselves have stopped
| demanding jailbreaks, because Apple simply took
| jailbreakers' best ideas and implemented them into iOS.
|
| https://www.vice.com/en/article/iphone-jailbreak-life-
| death-...
|
| And from the jail break community discord.
| boring-human wrote:
| Roger that. Here's some thought experiments aligned with your
| points.
|
| (1) Downloaded attachment file exploiting a metadata parsing
| bug, plus privilege escalation.
|
| (2) Malicious media file on website in an open Safari tab,
| auto-reloaded when the tab preview updates (without the user
| even switching to the tab), plus privilege escalation.
|
| Auto-reinfection for (1) is shortly after boot or after the
| user first opens the Files app, for (2) it's when the tabs
| view is first shown or scrolled.
|
| Both of these might be rowboats or frigates. If they're
| rowboats, installing developer betas would defeat (1), but
| would not make a difference with (2).
| nxobject wrote:
| Re: reboots - TFA states that recent iPhones reboot every 3
| days when inactive for the same reasons. Of course, now that we
| know that it's linked to inactivity, black hatters will know
| how to avoid it...
| maldev wrote:
| You should read into IOS internals before commenting stuff like
| this. Your answer is wrong, and rootkits have been dead on most
| OS's for years, but ESPECIALLY IOS. Not every OS is like Linux
| where security is second.
|
| Even a cursory glance would show it's literally impossible on
| IOS with even a basic understanding.
| aquir wrote:
| We need a Lockdown mode for MacBooks as well!
| steve-atx-7600 wrote:
| Looks like it's a feature: https://support.apple.com/en-
| us/105120
| LordGrey wrote:
| To save a click:
|
| * Lockdown Mode needs to be turned on separately for your
| iPhone, iPad, and Mac.
|
| * When you turn on Lockdown Mode for your iPhone, it's
| automatically turned on for your paired Apple Watch.
|
| * When you turn on Lockdown Mode for one of your devices, you
| get prompts to turn it on for your other supported Apple
| devices.
| ChrisArchitect wrote:
| Previously, direct link to the court doc:
|
| _FBI unable to extract data from iPhone 13 in Lockdown Mode in
| high profile case [pdf]_
|
| https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.vaed.58...
|
| (https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46843967)
| nxobject wrote:
| Sadly, they still got to her Signal on her Desktop - her sources
| might still be compromised. It's sadly inherent to desktop
| applications, but I'm sad that a lot more people don't know that
| Signal for Desktop is much, much less secure against adversaries
| with your laptop.
| pbhjpbhj wrote:
| Did she have Bitlocker or FileVault or other disk encryption
| that was breeched? (Or they took the system booted as TLAs seek
| to do?)
| MoonWalk wrote:
| breached
| bmicraft wrote:
| There was a story here the other day, bitlocker keys stored
| in your Microsoft account will be handed over.
| direwolf20 wrote:
| Which windows does by default and makes it hard to turn off
| deltastone wrote:
| This has been known for a while, though I don't know if
| your typical layperson was aware until recently. People
| need to remember that any access a company has to a device,
| so does LE with a warrant. Even moreso once you get into
| federal resources and FISA courts.
| deltastone wrote:
| Bitlocker isn't secure, for several reasons, that I won't get
| into on here.
| stronglikedan wrote:
| If people don't have Signal set to delete sensitive messages
| quickly, then they may as well just be texting.
| AdamN wrote:
| That's a strong statement. Also imho it's important that we
| use Signal for normal stuff like discussing where to get
| coffee tomorrow - no need for disappearing messages there.
| aschobel wrote:
| I'm weird, i even have disappearing messages for my coffee
| chats. It's kind of refreshing not having any history.
| zikduruqe wrote:
| I'm an inbox zero person... I keep even my personal notes
| to disappear after 2 days. For conversations 1 day.
| tptacek wrote:
| Not if you're using Signal for life-and-death secure
| messaging; in that scenario it's table stakes.
| CGMthrowaway wrote:
| Strong and accurate. Considering non-disappearing messages
| the same as texts is not the same thing as saying all
| Signal messages ought to be disappearing or else the app is
| useless.
|
| Telegram allows you to have distinct disappearing settings
| for each chat/group. Not sure how it works on Signal, but a
| solution like this could be possible.
| NewsaHackO wrote:
| Yea, I also would want to question the conclusions in the
| article. Was the issue that they couldn't unlock the iPhone, or
| that they had no reason to pursue the thread? To my
| understanding, the Apple ecosystem means that everything is
| synced together. If they already got into her laptop, wouldn't
| all of the iMessages, call history, and iCloud material already
| be synced there? What would be the gain of going after the
| phone, other than to make the case slightly more watertight?
| NetMageSCW wrote:
| Not if she's smart.
| mrandish wrote:
| I would have thought reporters with confidential sources at
| that level would already exercise basic security hygiene.
| Hopefully, this incident is a wake up call for the rest.
| tadzikpk wrote:
| > I'm sad that a lot more people don't know that Signal for
| Desktop is much, much less secure against adversaries with your
| laptop
|
| Educate us. What makes it less secure?
| digiown wrote:
| The key in the desktop version is not always stored in the
| secure enclave, is my assumption (it definitely supports
| plaintext storage). Theoretically this makes it possible to
| extract the key for the message database. Also a different
| malicious program can read it. But this is moot anyway if the
| FBI can browse through the chats. This isn't what failed
| here.
| anigbrowl wrote:
| Also last time I looked (less than 1 year ago) files sent
| over Signal are stored in plain, just with obfuscated
| filenames. So even without access to Signal it's easy to
| see what message attachments a person has received, and
| copy any interesting ones.
| armadyl wrote:
| In addition to what the other person who replied said,
| ignoring that iOS/Android/iPadOS is far more secure than
| macOS, laptops have significantly less hardware-based
| protections than Pixel/Samsung/Apple mobile devices do. So
| really the only way a laptop in this situation would be truly
| secure from LEO is if its fully powered off when it's seized.
| KKKKkkkk1 wrote:
| What is she investigated for?
| buckle8017 wrote:
| They're not actually investigating her, they're investigating a
| source that leaked her classified materials.
| jimt1234 wrote:
| Did the individual store the classified material in the
| bathroom at his beach-side resort?
| zozbot234 wrote:
| If they're not investigating her she doesn't have any 5th-
| amendment protection and can be compelled to testify on
| anything relevant, including how to unlock her devices.
| deltastone wrote:
| This here is true. 5th amendment protections only protect
| you from SELF-incrimination, and in some ways, your spouse.
| It does not apply to protecting others. Though some have
| tried arguing that they are protecting themselves, which
| then requires some form of admittance of them having been
| committing ANOTHER crime, which doesn't look good to a
| jury.
| PlatoIsADisease wrote:
| Little too late for 1000 people hacked by pegasus.
| PunchyHamster wrote:
| They just need to ask apple to unlock it. And they can't really
| refuse under US law
| quesera wrote:
| They can refuse, and they have refused. See San Bernardino and
| the concept of "compelled work".
| direwolf20 wrote:
| That was the old US law, not the one where Tim Cook delivered
| gold bars to Trump
| kittikitti wrote:
| It sounds like almost all of our devices have security by
| annoyance as default. Where are the promises of E2E encryption
| and all the privacy measures? When I turned on lockdown mode on
| my iPhone, there were a few notifications where the random spam
| calls I get were attempting a FaceTime exploit. How come we have
| to wait until someone can prove ICE can't get into our devices?
| nova22033 wrote:
| Remember...they can make you use touch id...they can't make you
| give them your password.
|
| https://x.com/runasand/status/2017659019251343763?s=20
|
| The FBI was able to access Washington Post reporter Hannah
| Natanson's Signal messages because she used Signal on her work
| laptop. The laptop accepted Touch ID for authentication, meaning
| the agents were allowed to require her to unlock it.
| wackget wrote:
| Link which doesn't directly support website owned by
| unscrupulous trillionaire:
| https://xcancel.com/runasand/status/2017659019251343763?s=20
| throwawayfour wrote:
| Good reminder to also set up something that does this
| automatically for you:
|
| https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46526010
| JimA wrote:
| I generally avoid extensions that can read all sites (even
| if technically necessary), so use the suggestion found here
| [1] instead.
|
| A few bookmarklets:
|
| javascript:(function(){if (location.host.endsWith('x.com'))
| location.host='xcancel.com';})()
|
| javascript:(function(){if
| (location.host.endsWith('youtube.com'))
| location.host='inv.nadeko.net';})()
|
| javascript:(function(){if
| (location.hostname.endsWith('instagram.com'))
| {location.replace('https://imginn.com' +
| location.pathname);}})()
|
| [1] https://www.reddit.com/r/uBlockOrigin/comments/1cc0uon/
| addin...
| forgotTheLast wrote:
| I actually think it is fitting to read about a government
| agency weaponized by an unscrupulous billionaire going after
| journalists working for an unscrupulous billionaire on an
| unscrupulous trillionaire owned platform.
| patrickmay wrote:
| Is the knowledge of which finger to use protected as much as a
| passcode? Law enforcement might have the authority to
| physically hold the owner's finger to the device, but it seems
| that the owner has the right to refuse to disclose which finger
| is the right one. If law enforcement doesn't guess correctly in
| a few tries, the device could lock itself and require the
| passcode.
|
| Another reason to use my dog's nose instead of a fingerprint.
| parl_match wrote:
| I really wish Apple would offer a pin option on macos. For
| this reason, precisely. Either that, or an option to
| automatically disable touchid after a short amount of time
| (eg an hour or if my phone doesn't connect to the laptop)
| fpoling wrote:
| You can setup a separated account with a long password on
| MacOS and remove your user account from accounts that can
| unlock FileVault. Then you can change your account to use a
| short password. You can also change various settings
| regarding how long Mac has to sleep before requiring to
| unlock FileVault.
| AnonHP wrote:
| I didn't understand how a user that cannot unlock
| FileVault helps. Can you please elaborate on this setup?
| Thanks.
| fpoling wrote:
| With that setup on boot or after a long sleep one first
| must log in into an account with longer password. Then
| one logs out of that and switches to the primary account
| with a short password.
| xoa wrote:
| As another alternative, rather than using Touch ID you can
| setup a Yubikey or similar hardware key for login to macOS.
| Then your login does indeed become a PIN with 3 tries
| before lockout. That plus a complex password is pretty
| convenient but not biometric. It's what I've done for a
| long time on my desktop devices.
| Wistar wrote:
| On my Macbook Pro, I usually need to use both touch and a
| password but that might be only when some hours have passed
| between log ins.
| NetMageSCW wrote:
| You can script a time out if desired.
| redeeman wrote:
| uhm, are you saying its not possible to require an actual
| password to unlock osx?
| djhn wrote:
| Wait, wasn't touch id phased out together with the intel
| touch bar macbooks? I've never used anything but a long
| password to unlock.
| thecapybara wrote:
| There's only ten possible guesses, and most people use their
| thumb and/or index finger, leaving four much likelier
| guesses.
|
| Also, IANAL, but I'm pretty sure that if law enforcement has
| a warrant to seize property from you, they're not obligated
| to do so immediately the instant they see you - they could
| have someone follow you and watch to see how you unlock your
| phone before seizing it.
| z3phyr wrote:
| 0.1 in itself is a very good odd, and 0.1 * n tries is even
| more laughable. Also most people have two fingers touchID,
| which makes this number close to half in reality.
| mbil wrote:
| Reminder that you can press the iPhone power button five times
| to require passcode for the next unlock.
| kstrauser wrote:
| Or squeeze the power and volume buttons for a couple of
| seconds. It's good to practice both these gestures so that
| they become reflex, rather than trying to remember them when
| they're needed.
| pkulak wrote:
| Oh wow, just going into the "should I shutdown" menu also
| goes into pre-boot lock state? I didn't know that.
| duskwuff wrote:
| It doesn't reenter a BFU state, but it requires a
| passcode for the next unlock.
| snuxoll wrote:
| It's close enough, because (most of) the encryption keys
| are wiped from memory every time the device is locked,
| and this action makes the secure enclave require PIN
| authentication to release them again.
| overfeed wrote:
| > It's close enough
|
| Not really, because tools like Cellbrite are more limited
| with BFU, hence the manual informing LEO to keep (locked)
| devices charged, amd the countermeasures being iOS
| forcefully rebooting devices that have been locked for
| too long.
| CGMthrowaway wrote:
| There is a way now to force BFU from a phone that is
| turned on, I can't remember the sequence
| duskwuff wrote:
| Eh? BFU ("before first unlock") is, by definition, the
| state that a phone is in when it is turned on. There's no
| need to "force" it.
|
| If you mean forcing an iOS device _out_ of BFU, that 's
| impossible. The device's storage is encrypted using a key
| derived from the user's passcode. That key is only
| available once the user has unlocked the device once,
| using their passcode.
| kccqzy wrote:
| It's called restarting the phone.
| regenschutz wrote:
| Sad, neither of those works on Android. Pressing the power
| button activates the emergency call screen with a countdown
| to call emergency services, and power + volume either just
| takes a screenshot or enables vibrations/haptics depending
| on which volume button you press.
| thallium205 wrote:
| On Pixel phones, Power + Volume Up retrieves a menu where
| you can select "Lockdown".
| rationalist wrote:
| Not on my Pixel phone, that just sets it to vibrate
| instead of ring. Holding down the power button retrieves
| a menu where you can select "Lockdown".
| zerocrates wrote:
| On my 9 you get a setting to choose if holding Power gets
| you the power menu or activates the assistant (I think it
| defaulted to assistant? I have it set to the power menu
| because I don't really ever use the assistant.)
| rationalist wrote:
| Yes, that was the default for me, but I changed it in
| settings.
| silisili wrote:
| Did you check your phone settings? Mine has an option to
| add it to the power menu, so you get to it by whichever
| method you use to do that (which itself is sad that
| phones are starting to differ in what the power key
| does).
| paulsmith wrote:
| Alternately, hold the power button and either volume button
| together for a few seconds.
| tosapple wrote:
| This is the third person advocating button squeezing, as a
| reminder: IF a gun is on you the jig is up, you can be shot
| for resisting or reaching for a potential weapon. Wireless
| detonators do exist, don't f around please.
| fogzen wrote:
| In case anyone is wondering: In newer versions of MacOS, the
| user must log out to require a password. Locking screen no
| longer requires password if Touch ID is enabled.
| jen729w wrote:
| Shift+Option+Command+Q is your fastest route there, but
| unsaved work will block.
| alistairSH wrote:
| Is that actually true? I'm fairly confident my work Mac
| requires a password if it's idle more than a few days
| (typically over the weekend).
| raw_anon_1111 wrote:
| Settings -> lock screen -> "Require password after screen
| saver begins or display is turned off"
| rawgabbit wrote:
| Serious question. If I am re-entering the US after traveling
| abroad, can customs legally ask me to turn the phone back on
| and/or seize my phone? I am a US citizen.
|
| Out of habit, I keep my phone off during the flight and turn
| it on after clearing customs.
| Analemma_ wrote:
| If you are a US citizen, you legally cannot be denied re-
| entry into the country for any reason, including not
| unlocking your phone. They can make it really annoying and
| detain you for a while, though.
| monocasa wrote:
| They can also practically keep your phone indefinitely.
| verall wrote:
| my understanding is that they can hold you for a couple
| days without charges for your insubordination but as a
| citizen they have to let you back into the country or
| officially arrest you, try to get an actual warrant, etc.
| direwolf20 wrote:
| they can just break the law
| thecapybara wrote:
| Did you know that on most models of iPhone, saying "Hey Siri,
| who's iPhone is this?" will disable biometric authentication
| until the passcode is entered?
| rconti wrote:
| hm. didn't work on my 17 pro :( might be due to a setting i
| have.
| fragmede wrote:
| They disabled that in like iOS 18.
| teejmya wrote:
| I previously commented a solution to another problem, but it
| assists here too:
|
| https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=44746992
|
| This command will make your MacBook hibernate when lid is
| closed or the laptop sleeps, so RAM is written to disk and the
| system powers down. The downside is that it does increase the
| amount of time it takes to resume.
|
| A nice side benefit though, is that fingerprint is not accepted
| on first unlock, I believe secrets are still encrypted at this
| stage similar to cold boot. A fingerprint still unlocks from
| screensaver normally, as long as the system does not sleep (and
| therefore hibernate)
| jakobdabo wrote:
| > I believe secrets are still encrypted at this stage similar
| to cold boot.
|
| Does this mean that the Signal desktop application doesn't
| lock/unlock its (presumably encrypted) database with a secret
| when locking/unlocking the laptop?
| goda90 wrote:
| Remember that our rights aren't laws of nature. They have to be
| fought for to be respected by the government.
| b8 wrote:
| They can hold you in contempt for 18 months for not giving your
| password, https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2020/02/man-who-
| refused-....
| ElevenLathe wrote:
| Being held in contempt at least means you got a day in court
| first. A judge telling me to give up my password is different
| than a dozen armed, masked secret police telling me to.
| C6JEsQeQa5fCjE wrote:
| > A judge telling me to give up my password is different
| than a dozen armed, masked secret police telling me to.
|
| Yes, a judge is unlikely to order your execution if you
| refuse. Based on recent pattern of their behavior, masked
| secret police who are living their wildest authoritarian
| dreams are likely to execute you if you anger them (for
| example by refusing to comply with their desires).
| noident wrote:
| That's a very unusual and narrow exception involving
| "foregone conclusion doctrine", an important fact missed by
| Ars Technica but elaborated on by AP:
| https://apnews.com/general-
| news-49da3a1e71f74e1c98012611aedc...
| OGWhales wrote:
| > Authorities, citing a "foregone conclusion exception" to
| the Fifth Amendment, argued that Rawls could not invoke his
| right to self-incrimination because police already had
| evidence of a crime. The 3rd Circuit panel agreed,
| upholding a lower court decision.
|
| I do not follow the logic here, what does that even mean?
| It seems very dubious. And what happens if one legitimately
| forgets? They just get to keep you there forever?
| seanw444 wrote:
| You're delusional. When ICE starts executing people on
| the spot for not giving up iPhone passwords, I'll eat my
| words.
| OGWhales wrote:
| ???
| direwolf20 wrote:
| And why do they need to unlock your phone if they already
| proved you did the crime?
| p0w3n3d wrote:
| Allowed to require - very mildly constructed sentence, which
| could include torture or force abuse...
|
| https://xkcd.com/538/
| raw_anon_1111 wrote:
| As if the government is not above breaking the law and using
| rubber hose decryption. The current administration's justice
| department has been caught lying left and right
| direwolf20 wrote:
| Plausible deniability still works. You enter your duress code
| and your system boots to a secondary partition with Facebook
| and Snapchat. No such OS exists.
| neves wrote:
| I just searched the case. I'm appalled. It looks like USA
| doesn't have legal protection for reporter sources. Or better,
| Biden created some, but it was revoked by the current
| administration.
|
| The real news here isn't privacy control in a consumer OS ir
| the right to privacy, but USA, the leader of the free world,
| becoming an autocracy.
| joecool1029 wrote:
| > they can't make you give them your password.
|
| Except when they can:
| https://harvardlawreview.org/print/vol-134/state-v-andrews/
| notyourwork wrote:
| I don't get why I can be forced to use my biometrics to unlock
| but I cannot be forced to give a pin. Doesn't jive in my brain.
| wan23 wrote:
| The fifth amendment gives you the right to be silent, but
| they didn't write in anything about biometrics.
| deltastone wrote:
| It's something you know vs. something you have. That's how
| the legal system sees it. You might not tell someone the pin
| to your safe, but if police find the key to it, or hire a
| locksmith to drill out your safe, it's theirs with a warrant.
|
| It's interesting in the case of social media companies.
| Technically the data held is the companies data (Google,
| Meta, etc.) however courts have ruled that a person still has
| an expectation of privacy and therefore police need a
| warrant.
| direwolf20 wrote:
| When they arrest you, they have physical control of your
| body. You're in handcuffs. They can put your fingers against
| the unlock button. You can make a fist, but they can have
| more strength and leverage to unfist your fist.
|
| There's no known technique to force you to input a password.
| sejje wrote:
| Are we not talking about a legal difference? That was my
| reading.
| direwolf20 wrote:
| The law follows practicality in this instance.
| sejje wrote:
| "technicality" or "loophole" is probably the word.
|
| I fully agree, forced biometrics is bullshit.
|
| I say the same about forced blood removal for BAC testing.
| They can get a warrant for your blood, that's crazy to me.
| deltastone wrote:
| Also, using biometrics on a device, and your biometrics unlock
| said device, do wonders for proving to a jury that you owned
| and operated that device. So you're double screwed in that
| regard.
| direwolf20 wrote:
| Remember, this isn't how it works in every country.
| rustyhancock wrote:
| As far as I know lockdown mode and BFU prevent touch ID
| unlocking.
|
| At least a password and pin you choose to give over.
| TheDong wrote:
| I find it so frustrating that Lockdown Mode is so all-or-nothing.
|
| I want some of the lockdown stuff (No facetime and message
| attachments from strangers, no link previews, no device
| connections), but like half of the other ones I don't want.
|
| Why can't I just toggle an iMessage setting for "no link preview,
| no attachments", or a general setting for "no automatic device
| connection to untrusted computers while locked"? Why can't I turn
| off "random dickpicks from strangers on iMessage" without also
| turning off my browser's javascript JIT and a bunch of other
| random crap?
|
| Sure, leave the "Lockdown mode" toggle so people who just want
| "give me all the security" can get it, but split out individual
| options too.
|
| Just to go through the features I don't want:
|
| * Lockdown Mode disables javascript JIT in the browser - I want
| fast javascript, I use some websites and apps that cannot
| function without it, and non-JIT js drains battery more
|
| * Shared photo albums - I'm okay viewing shared photo albums from
| friends, but lockdown mode prevents you from even viewing them
|
| * Configuration profiles - I need this to install custom fonts
|
| Apple's refusal to split out more granular options here hurts my
| security.
| Terretta wrote:
| The profiles language may be confusing -- what you can't do is
| _change_ them while in Lockdown mode.
| ectospheno wrote:
| Family albums work with lockdown mode. You can also disable web
| restrictions per app and website.
| everdrive wrote:
| >* Lockdown Mode disables javascript JIT in the browser - I
| want fast javascript, I use some websites and apps that cannot
| function without it, and non-JIT js drains battery more
|
| This feature has the benefit of teaching users (correctly) that
| browsing the internet on a phone has always been a terrible
| idea.
| jgwil2 wrote:
| I think that ship has sailed.
| rantingdemon wrote:
| I'll bite. Why is it so terrible? I'm browsing this site
| right now on my phone and don't see the horror.
| mghackerlady wrote:
| Phone networks by design track you more precisely than
| possible over a conventional internet connection to
| facilitate the automatic connection to the nearest
| available network. Also, for similar reasons it requires
| the phone network to know that it is your phone
| LoganDark wrote:
| You don't need to connect to the internet for that. It
| has nothing to do with web browsing at all.
| quizzical8432 wrote:
| I'm with you on the shared photo albums. I'd been using
| lockdown mode for quite a while before I discovered this
| limitation, though. For me, this is one I'd like to be able to
| selectively enable (like the per-website/app settings). In my
| case, it was a one-off need, so I disabled lockdown mode,
| shared photos, then enabled it again.
|
| The other feature I miss is screen time requests. This one is
| kinda weird - I'm sure there's a reason they're blocked, but
| it's a message from Apple (or, directly from a trusted family
| member? I'm not 100% sure how they work). I still _recieve_ the
| notification, but it's not actionable.
|
| While I share with your frustration, though, I do understand
| why Apple might want to have it as "all-or-nothing". If they
| allow users to enable even one "dangerous" setting, that
| ultimately compromises the entire security model. An attacker
| doesn't care which way they can compromise your device. If
| there's _one_ way in, that's all they need.
|
| Ultimately, for me the biggest PiTA with lockdown mode is not
| knowing if it's to blame for a problem I'm having. I couldn't
| tell you how many times I've disabled and re-enabled it just to
| test something that should work, or if it's the reason a
| feature/setting is not showing up. To be fair, most of the time
| it's not the issue, but sometimes I just need to rule it out.
| mmooss wrote:
| Don't be idiots. The FBI may say that whether or not they can get
| in:
|
| 1. If they can get in, now people - including high-value targets
| like journalists - will use bad security.
|
| 2. If the FBI (or another agency) has an unknown capability, the
| FBI must say they can't get in or reveal their capabilities to
| all adversaries, including to even higher-profile targets such as
| counter-intelligence targets. Saying nothing also risks revealing
| the capability.
|
| 3. Similarly if Apple helped them, Apple might insist that is not
| revealed. The same applies to any third party with the
| capability. (Also, less significantly, saying they can't get in
| puts more pressure on Apple and on creating backdoors, even if HN
| readers will see it the other way.)
|
| Also, the target might think they are safe, which could be a
| tactical advantage. It also may exclude recovered data from rules
| of handling evidence, even if it's unusable in court. And at best
| they haven't got in yet - there may be an exploit to this OS
| version someday, and the FBI can try again then.
| coppsilgold wrote:
| I would not recommend that one trust a secure enclave with full
| disk encryption (FDE). This is what you are doing when your
| password/PIN/fingerprint can't contain sufficient entropy to
| derive a secure encryption key.
|
| The problem with low entropy security measures arises due to
| the fact that this low entropy is used to instruct the secure
| enclave (TEE) to release/use the actual high entropy key. So
| the key must be stored physically (eg. as voltage levels)
| somewhere in the device.
|
| It's a similar story when the device is locked, on most
| computers the RAM isn't even encrypted so a locked computer is
| no major obstacle to an adversary. On devices where RAM is
| encrypted the encryption key is also stored somewhere - if only
| while the device is powered on.
| pregnenolone wrote:
| RAM encryption doesn't prevent DMA attacks and perofming a
| DMA attack is quite trivial as long as the machine is
| running. Secure enclaves do prevent those and they're a good
| solution. If implemented correctly, they have no downsides.
| I'm not referring to TPMs due to their inherent flaws; I'm
| talking about SoC crypto engines like those found in Apple's
| M series or Intel's latest Panther Lake lineup. They prevent
| DMA attacks and side-channel vulnerabilities. True, I
| wouldn't trust any secure enclave never to be breached -
| that's an impossible promise to make even though it would
| require a nation-state level attack - but even this concern
| can be easily addressed by making the final encryption key
| depend on both software key derivation and the secret stored
| within the enclave.
| davidfekke wrote:
| I guess they got a 404
| 827a wrote:
| Is there an implication here that they _could_ get into an iPhone
| with lower security settings enabled? There 's Advanced Data
| Protection, which E2EEs more of your data in iCloud. There's the
| FaceID unlock state, which US law enforcement can compel you to
| unlock; but penta-click the power button and you go into PIN
| unlock state, which they cannot compel you to unlock.
|
| My understanding of Lockdown Mode was that it babyifies the
| device to reduce the attack surface against unknown zero-days.
| Does the government saying that Lockdown Mode barred them from
| entering imply that they've got an unknown zero-day that would
| work in the PIN-unlock state, but not Lockdown Mode?
| zymhan wrote:
| Yes
| kingnothing wrote:
| It's relatively well know that the NSO Group / Pegasus is what
| governments use to access locked phones.
| 827a wrote:
| This was known, in the past, but if its relying on zero-days
| Apple & Google are, adversarially, attempting to keep up with
| and patch, my assumption would _not_ be that pegasus is, at
| any time, always able to breach a fully-updated iPhone.
| Rather, its a situation where maybe there are periods of a
| few months at a time where they have a working exploit, until
| Apple discovers it and patches it, repeat indefinitely.
| direwolf20 wrote:
| How does Apple discover their exploits? I'm sure they keep
| some around for extremely high value targets.
| kingnothing wrote:
| It's always a game of cat and mouse, but NSO had a quarter
| billion USD in annual revenue in 2020. They are clearly
| providing highly effective spyware to governments around
| the world. It wouldn't surprise me if they have that many
| zero day, zero click exploits that they can always get in
| to a phone. We're talking nation state espionage here...
| they probably have insiders at Apple and Google who
| introduce subtle unnoticeable bugs in core OS stacks.
| ramuel wrote:
| Can't they just use Pegasus or Cellebrite???
| aw1621107 wrote:
| It's unlikely that Pegasus would work since Apple patched the
| exploit it used.
|
| I think it's unclear whether Cellebrite can or cannot get
| around Lockdown Mode as it would depend very heavily on whether
| the technique(s)/exploit(s) Cellebrite uses are suitable for
| whatever bugs/vulnerabilities remain exposed in Lockdown Mode.
| 1vuio0pswjnm7 wrote:
| "Lockdown Mode is a sometimes overlooked feature of Apple devices
| that broadly make[sic] them harder to hack."
|
| Funny to see disabling "features" itself described as "feature"
|
| Why not call it a "setting"
|
| Most iPhone users do not change default settings. That's why
| Google pays Apple billions of dollars for a default setting that
| sends data about users to Google
|
| "Lockdown Mode" is not a default setting
|
| The phrase "sometimes overlooked" is an understatement. It's not
| a default setting and almost no one uses it
|
| If it is true Lockdown Mode makes iPhones "harder to hack", as
| the journalist contends, then it is also true that Apple's
| default settings make iPhones "easier to hack"
| rick_dalton wrote:
| The intention behind lockdown mode is protection for a select
| few groups of people such as journalists, that are at risk of
| having software like Pegasus used against them. It's to reduce
| the attack surface. The average user wouldn't want most of it
| as a default setting, for example: almost no message
| attachments allowed, no FaceTime calls from people you haven't
| called and safari is kneecapped. Making this a default setting
| for most people is unrealistic and also probably won't help
| their cybersecurity as they wouldn't be targeted anyway.
| 1vuio0pswjnm7 wrote:
| A "reduced attack surface" can also be a reduced surface for
| telemetry, data collection, surveillance and advertising
| services, thereby directly or indirectly causing a reduction in
| Apple revenues
|
| Perhaps this could be a factor in why it's not a default
| setting
| cdrnsf wrote:
| Given Cook's willing displays of fealty to Trump this time around
| I wouldn't be shocked if they were to remove lockdown mode in a
| future release.
| niemandhier wrote:
| Depending on your jurisdiction faceid is safer than fingerprint,
| because faceid won't unlock while your eyes are closed.
|
| In many European countries forcing your finger on a scanner would
| be permissible under certain circumstances, forcing your eyes
| open so far has been deemed unacceptable.
| Melatonic wrote:
| Good to know. You sure about this though ? I swear I've seen
| people use Face ID on someone who's sleeping
| eth0up wrote:
| Every time I see these articles about iphones posing trouble for
| authorities, I always think of it as free (and fraudulent)
| advertisement.
|
| I could be naive, but just don't think they'd really have any
| difficulty getting what they needed. Not that I give a fuck, but
| I guess I've seen one too many free ads.
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