[HN Gopher] A judge gave the FBI permission to attempt to bypass...
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A judge gave the FBI permission to attempt to bypass biometrics
https://archive.is/NEjHU
Author : qingcharles
Score : 104 points
Date : 2026-01-30 19:38 UTC (3 hours ago)
(HTM) web link (theintercept.com)
(TXT) w3m dump (theintercept.com)
| badc0ffee wrote:
| Something that could come in handy: You can put iPhones into
| passcode mode by holding down a volume button + the lock button
| (the poweroff/emergency mode sequence), and then cancelling.
| sturges wrote:
| Five presses of the power button works too.
| doubletwoyou wrote:
| just tested it and it seems to be a bit finicky
|
| if i dont click those 5 presses fast enough it instead opens
| apple cash or whatever it's called
|
| i'm assuming that in a stressful situation it'd be much more
| consistent to hold down power and volume rather than clicking
| quickly
| aftbit wrote:
| 5 clicks on power button is auto-911 on my Graphene/Android
| device
| michaelmior wrote:
| For Android, you can hold down the power button and press the
| Lockdown option that appears. (I think this may need to be
| enabled in settings.)
| ranger_danger wrote:
| Probably a much better idea to just go ahead and hit shutdown
| if you're on that screen anyway, since many phones are more
| susceptible to gear like Greykey or Cellebrite if they have
| ever been unlocked since the last power-on.
| rimunroe wrote:
| My understanding is that this and similar techniques don't get
| you back into the before first unlock (BFU) state. To do that
| as far as I know you have to shut down the device. Otherwise--
| even if locked--your phone will be in the after first unlock
| (AFU) state. I believe that in the AFU state considerably more
| of the system is decrypted and accessible than in the much more
| limited BFU state.
|
| Maybe someone with more knowledge can chime in here.
| fragmede wrote:
| You used to be able to ask Siri "who am I", and it would lock
| out biometrics, but they removed that feature and I don't
| know why.
| retsl wrote:
| This is true but there's automatic restart which will
| automatically restart the phone to get it back into BFU
| state:
|
| > Automatic Restart is a security mechanism in iOS 18.1
| iPadOS 18.1 and or later that leverages the Secure Enclave to
| monitor device unlock events. If a device remains locked for
| a prolonged period, it automatically restarts, transitioning
| from an After First Unlock state to a Before First Unlock
| state. During the restart, the device purges sensitive
| security keys and transient data from memory.
|
| https://help.apple.com/pdf/security/en_US/apple-platform-
| sec...
|
| > [...] inactivity reboot triggers exactly after 3 days (72
| hours). [...]
|
| https://naehrdine.blogspot.com/2024/11/reverse-
| engineering-i...
|
| GrapheneOS also has this
| (https://grapheneos.org/features#auto-reboot) with a default
| of 18 hours.
|
| Maybe one could try to force restart
| (https://support.apple.com/en-
| gb/guide/iphone/iph8903c3ee6/io...) to quickly get to BFU.
| But I could imagine that it'd be hard to remember and then
| execute the right steps in a stressful situation.
| gurjeet wrote:
| On iPhone SE (and I'm guessing any iPhones with a home button)
| just a long-press of the power button is sufficient to trigger
| the passcode input.
| Aaargh20318 wrote:
| I wish phones supported continuous re-authentication. Like an
| in-screen fingerprint reader that authenticates every single
| touch (even better if you could also use it to assign different
| actions to different fingers), or to have FaceID immediately
| lock the phone if someone other than the owner is using it.
| rolph wrote:
| dont just turn it off, physically disable it so the hardware
| aspect is unusable.
| digiown wrote:
| GrapheneOS has a nice feature where you can use both the
| fingerprint and a short passcode to avoid having to type out your
| longer/more valuable password all the time. Seems like a good
| solution to the problem.
|
| Also, iirc iphones have this feature where if you appear to be
| under duress, it will refuse to unlock and disable face id. Is
| this true?
| mcherm wrote:
| Nice solution! Google, can we get that on Android by default to
| reach the masses? Apple... you too: you built a reputation for
| protecting privacy.
| digiown wrote:
| It's not quite settled whether the FBI is able to demand you
| to decrypt data for now. If this becomes widespread enough,
| they might try to get SCOTUS to decide this, which may or may
| not end privacy once and for all.
| fragmede wrote:
| I thought it was. I thought passcodes can't be demanded but
| biometrics could.
| drnick1 wrote:
| If you want privacy, Google and Apple are not the answer. And
| Apple's claims about privacy are mostly unverifiable and
| should not be trusted.
| EA-3167 wrote:
| Privacy from what? From a determined government and court
| system? Nothing is going to keep you private from that.
| From your peers and family? Apple and Google keep you
| private in that regard. As for the world of privacy in
| between those extremes: it depends.
| fragmede wrote:
| > From a determined government and court system? Nothing
| is going to keep you private from that
|
| While there's always https://xkcd.com/538/ there are not
| currently quantum computers that can factor 4k RSA keys,
| so the court can order whatever it wants, unless they
| have a way past that (which may involve variations of
| xkcd 538), they ain't getting shit out of a properly
| configured digital safe. (construction of said safe is
| left as an exercise to the reader.)
| digiown wrote:
| xkcd 538 can be defeated by a duress wipe feature like
| the one GrapheneOS has. Your life might be in jeopardy,
| but the data will be safe.
| EA-3167 wrote:
| Most of us (reporters included) aren't protecting
| anything with their life, not just because of a survival
| instinct, but because what we're protecting isn't
| actually worth that much.
|
| For the relative handful who are custodians of that sort
| of data, history suggests a smaller minority than they'd
| like to admit have a readily achievable breaking point.
| The true believers who are left then are a minority
| that's hardly impossible to track and subvert through
| attacks that don't involve decryption on a device.
|
| The point of that XKCD wasn't to be THE SINGULAR EXAMPLE,
| it's sort of a Zen Koan for people who only think in
| terms of technical risks and solutions.
| bornfreddy wrote:
| From advertizers? From power-grabbing BigTech?
| ranger_danger wrote:
| I don't think any rational discussion about privacy can be
| had without first describing exactly what your definition
| of "privacy" is in this specific context, AND you must
| define a threat model. Otherwise we can't know if the
| vendor is even relevant to what they care about.
| drnick1 wrote:
| This. Reporters should NOT be using a phone that isn't running
| GrapheneOS.
|
| The duress password feature is also useful. Entering it will
| completely wipe the phone and reset it to factory.
| digiown wrote:
| Obviously it will work. But it's fairly likely this will get
| you arrested for destroying evidence.
| __MatrixMan__ wrote:
| A better strategy would be to configure multiple profiles
| and when they ask you to unlock your phone you use the pin
| that unlocks the boring one.
|
| We just need a UX which makes it impossible to know how
| many profiles a phone has configured. Not some kind of
| sneaky hidden mode that you can be labeled a terrorist for
| having enabled, just that's how it works--you have to know
| a profile exists in order to log into it.
|
| Of course it's not going to stand up to forensic scrutiny,
| but that's not what the feature is about anyhow.
| digiown wrote:
| For an organization, a better strategy is to never store
| anything of value on the phone, and have a remote server
| in a safe place. The phone acts as a thin client to
| access server. The key in turn is easy to hide in a
| plausibly-deniable way or simply memorized. The server
| can also revoke the key, rendering it useless even if it
| is revealed at a later date.
|
| This is famously used by Uber to protect their systems
| from the French police, for instance.
|
| https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uber_Files#Kill_switch
| 1shooner wrote:
| Graphene also has a kind of workaround to add fingerprint
| duress:
|
| >GrapheneOS improves the security of the fingerprint unlock
| feature by only permitting 5 total attempts rather than
| implementing a 30 second delay between every 5 failed attempts
| with a total of 20 attempts. This doesn't just reduce the
| number of potential attempts but also makes it easy to disable
| fingerprint unlock by intentionally failing to unlock 5 times
| with a different finger.
| digiown wrote:
| > a different finger
|
| Though with all the devices GrapheneOS supports, there are
| only two fingers you can plausibly use with the device: the
| thumb, usually on your dominant hand. It is quite awkward to
| be using anything else.
| j45 wrote:
| There used to be an android app you to unlock the phone
| directly to a different app with different finger(print)s.
|
| All this biometric talk in the world and it's rarely made
| convenient for the user like this.
|
| It was likely almost as fast as a physical keyboard
| smartphone for instant entry into an app.
| raverbashing wrote:
| Yes, very nice
|
| Cut to my phone failing to recognize the fingerprint whenever
| it feels like or maybe because the humidity is 0.5% from the
| ideal value
|
| _sigh_
| burningChrome wrote:
| The first phone I used with Graphene was a Pixel 4XL. It
| didn't come with a fingerprint sensor. If I remember
| correctly, the longest lockout period was still really short,
| like 5 mins or something. It was rather annoying to
| constantly have to put in your unlock code when you wanted to
| use or check something on the phone.
|
| Loved Graphene, and the Pixel worked flawlessly, but man,
| that unlock thing drove me nuts more than a few times.
| chasd00 wrote:
| > Also, iirc iphones have this feature where if you appear to
| be under duress, it will refuse to unlock and disable face id.
| Is this true?
|
| heh it would suck to be beaten with a wrench to unlock your
| phone and, finally, to make it stop you relent but then the
| phone is like "nope, sorry. if you're gonna be dumb you gotta
| be tough".
| iamnothere wrote:
| If you're worried about wrench attacks then you're already in
| a situation where encryption won't help you. They may beat
| you anyway if they don't find what they're looking for on the
| phone, or they may just kill you for being a nuisance to
| power.
| dylan604 wrote:
| What if they only did body blows so there was no bloody nose
| or black eyes? Does FaceID notice if your eyelids have been
| taped open?
| koolba wrote:
| Or they beat your loved ones in front of you. No physical
| damage or misremembering passwords due to blunt force
| trauma to the noggin.
| j45 wrote:
| Biometrics should never ever be a username+password. At most a
| username.
| mikestew wrote:
| _Also, iirc iphones have this feature where if you appear to be
| under duress, it will refuse to unlock and disable face id. Is
| this true?_
|
| Sort of: if you hold the buttons on both sides of the phone for
| about three seconds, it will bring up the Power Off/SOS screen.
| You do not need to interact with that screen, just display it.
| Easy-peasy, you can do it with the phone in your pocket. Once
| that screen is displayed, it requires a passcode to unlock the
| phone. The courts have determined that the passcode is
| protected by the 5th Amendment, but biometrics are not.
|
| https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2023/12/suspects-can-ref...
| toomuchtodo wrote:
| It would be useful imho if an option was available for the
| phone to automatically enter this mode if separated for more
| than X seconds from a paired watch or airtag, or with
| sufficient vibration/acceleration (throw or stomp it).
| Similar adversarial defense as the phone rebooting after
| three days [1]. Perhaps part of Advanced Data Protection.
|
| Not legal advice. Having a trusted contact remotely wipe the
| device is also a potential option with appropriate iCloud
| creds and a message passed [2], assuming the device is not
| powered down or kept in a physical location blocking
| internet/cellular channels.
|
| [1] _New Apple security feature reboots iPhones after 3 days,
| researchers confirm_ -
| https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=42143265 - November 2024
| (215 comments)
|
| [2] _Erase a device in Find Devices on iCloud.com_ -
| https://support.apple.com/guide/icloud/erase-a-device-
| mmfc0e...
| mikestew wrote:
| Given that my Apple Watch throws alerts when I leave a
| device behind ("mikestew's iPhone was left behind at
| $PLACE"), it would be just one more step to flip that "no
| biometrics" bit. I'm assuming that those APIs are not
| available to 3rd party devs, so I can't write my own.
| kgwxd wrote:
| without exception, bio metrics should be in-addition-to a
| password, never the only method. just because it's constantly
| sold as a convenience alternative, doesn't make it right.
| robotburrito wrote:
| These phones need a kill expression or finger. If you touch a
| sensor with your left pinky or wink at the camera it nukes the
| phone.
| smashed wrote:
| That would be destruction of evidence.
|
| A solution that can seem like plausible deniability could be
| interesting.
| ranger_danger wrote:
| Unless one has been ordered to preserve evidence already for
| a pending court case... proving that someone knew said
| information was valuable as evidence, and willfully destroyed
| it knowing so, might be extremely difficult.
| NoImmatureAdHom wrote:
| Perhaps a lawyer can chime in here.
|
| My impression is deliberately doing this would be illegal. It
| would have to be convincingly deniable somehow.
|
| Is there a way to do that?
| rolph wrote:
| if something made them decide to force a particular finger
| into a sensor, what happens next is a result of thier own
| actions.
| NoImmatureAdHom wrote:
| Maybe, maybe not. I'm sure there's some legal mechanism for
| punishing you for setting a boobytrap.
|
| You'd also have to rely on this unnamed other to force that
| particular finger, rather than the others...
| ranger_danger wrote:
| There are very specific rules for proving destruction of
| evidence. For a criminal case the burden proof in the US at
| least is "beyond a reasonable doubt", so someone would likely
| have to prove that you knowingly destroyed valuable evidence
| before you'd get in big trouble. And if you haven't already
| been served with something saying you need to preserve
| evidence, they might not have any claim to information they
| had no idea existed beforehand, especially if you don't talk.
| 1123581321 wrote:
| Believe this is bad legal advice. They would only need to
| prove you destroyed information with intent to impede an
| investigation/case. They would not need to prove something
| convicting or weighing was destroyed.
| whaleofatw2022 wrote:
| I wonder what the threshold is?
|
| E.x. if one had a "dead man's switch" phone that required
| a passkey every x minutes, and each time you did so it
| set the next threshold...
| happyopossum wrote:
| What you seem to be referring to would be obstruction,
| whereas the entire parent thread was specifically
| discussing _destruction of evidence_. Fair to point out
| that there are other offenses that could be charged, but
| misleading to imply it's the same thing.
| 1123581321 wrote:
| No, I am referring to destruction of evidence. It is
| (very generally) a subset of legal obstruction.
| ranger_danger wrote:
| > They would only need to prove you destroyed information
| with intent to impede an investigation/case
|
| Which requires them to prove they know that device likely
| contains relevant information. Just being party to a
| court case doesn't mean you're forbidden from deleting
| anything ever again... like I said there are very
| specific rules for evidence, and one cannot begin to
| claim something relevant is destroyed if you can't even
| show that you had any idea what might have been destroyed
| in the first place.
| 1123581321 wrote:
| It mostly hinges on your intent, i.e. what they can argue
| is your understanding of the information you destroyed,
| not theirs. It unfortunately can be far-reaching,
| including into the past.
|
| You're right that in normal circumstances you can
| routinely delete records for data hygiene, to save money,
| as part of a phone repair, and so on, unless you've been
| court ordered otherwise.
| jp191919 wrote:
| Anyone in journalism should know not to be using biometrics. I
| use it, but know how to quickly disable it. If using fingerprint,
| you can always offer up the wrong digit, a few fails should make
| it fallback to pin.
| craftkiller wrote:
| So all an adversary/the police need to do is watch you unlock
| your phone once to know which finger to use? Trivial
| considering how often we unlock our phones and how many cameras
| exist.
| NoImmatureAdHom wrote:
| https://archive.is/NEjHU
| neonate wrote:
| How is this different, legally speaking, from forcing someone to
| reveal their password? or at least to type it in?
| rimunroe wrote:
| I don't know about that exactly, but my understanding was that
| this is similar in justification to compelling a person to be
| fingerprinted or give a DNA sample. To me there does seem to be
| a fairly major difference between forcing someone to disclose
| information held in their mind and forcing them to provide a
| biometric. The former seems equivalent to compelling testimony
| against oneself. I have a hard time seeing the latter as
| compelling testimony against oneself, especially if giving
| fingerprints or DNA isn't.
| whaleofatw2022 wrote:
| Part of it is that compelling information can be problematic,
| in that other circumstances can happen where the information
| may not easily be obtainable.
|
| Extreme example, imagine a stroke or head injury causing
| memory loss.
|
| OTOH DNA/Face/Fingerprints, usually can't be 'forgotten'.
| atestu wrote:
| IANAL but I think legally speaking that would be forcing
| speech. Biometrics are not speech.
| qingcharles wrote:
| The constitution has been interpreted to allow the police to
| force your finger onto an inkpad for fingerprints. That
| decision was extended to allow the police to force your finger
| onto a biometric reader.
|
| The 5th Amendment has been (so far) interpreted to only limit
| things that require conscious thought, such as remembering a
| password and speaking it or typing it.
| intrasight wrote:
| What you know (a password) is protected whereas what you have
| (a finger or an eyeball) is not.
| ziml77 wrote:
| It shouldn't be different. But law enforcement wants access and
| everyone who could reign them in seems to also want them to
| have access. Honestly it's surprising at this point they
| haven't argued that people can be compelled to give up their
| password using whatever means necessary.
| ChrisArchitect wrote:
| Orig title was fine: Washington Post Raid Is a Frightening
| Reminder: Turn Off Your Phone's Biometrics
| guelo wrote:
| I've been genuinely depressed about how fast the country is
| descending into strong man rule while half the country cheers it
| on. Which I think is their point, they want their political
| opponents to suffer at all costs.
| gtowey wrote:
| "political opponents to suffer at all costs" is just the
| smokescreen to cover up the real goals which is "oligarchs
| steal everything."
| hollow-moe wrote:
| Could you get charged with destroying evidence if you provided
| the duress password wiping the device when asked for a password ?
| You technically followed orders and didn't even touch the device.
| yxuc77 wrote:
| You can get charged with and convicted of anything, even
| wrongfully. Welcome to life in the human realm.
| nerdsniper wrote:
| Yes, that would be "spoliation of evidence" and probably
| "obstruction of justice". Also, I believe duress passwords are
| only a "thing" on GrapheneOS, not iOS or stock Android.
| cyberax wrote:
| Nope. It's not your duty as an accused to care about evidence
| in a criminal case.
|
| And unlike a witness, you can legally lie and mislead
| officers.
| refurb wrote:
| You may not think it's your duty but the courts do and will
| happy lock you for it.
| 15155 wrote:
| Federal ones, no:
| https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/1001
| buckle8017 wrote:
| Can the author even read?
|
| > The warrant included a few stipulations limiting law
| enforcement personnel. Investigators were not authorized to ask
| Natanson details about what kind of biometric authentication she
| may have used on her devices.
|
| The warrant said they couldn't demand she do those things, not
| that they couldn't ask.
|
| Makes me question the rest of the reporting.
| majorchord wrote:
| > Can the author even read?
|
| Why do you think it's appropriate to talk to people like this?
| duskwuff wrote:
| Functionally there's very little distinction - a question asked
| by a law enforcement officer during a search and seizure will
| inevitably be understood as a demand, no matter how it's
| worded. (And doubly so when it's in the context of e.g.
| choosing which of the person's fingers to grab and press to
| their phone.) I'm surprised that the warrant even acknowledged
| the possibility of a "voluntary" disclosure.
| fortranfiend wrote:
| Don't use biometrics a pin has been shown to have more 5th
| amendment protections. Have your phone automatically reboot at a
| regular time every day. When your phone reboots a lot of the
| exploits that can get into your phone are locked out because they
| rely on reading the active memory.
| 1vuio0pswjnm7 wrote:
| I have always thought biometrics on phones is just another way
| so-called "tech" companies perform data collection ultimately to
| be used for commercial purposes or any purposes deemed
| appropriate by the companies or their business partners
|
| The companies are secretive so who knows what they are up to that
| we dont know about. What we do know is that these companies do
| not tell the whole truth when explaining their publicly visible
| conduct, including their data collection practices
|
| For example, a so-called "tech" company might claim they need a
| user's phone number for "security" purposes while the data
| actually serves other purposes for the company that the user
| might find objectionable if they knew about them (This actually
| happened)
|
| The mobile phone has become a computer that the user cannot truly
| control. Companies can remotely install and run code on these
| computers at any time for any reason.^1 If the user stores data
| on the phone, the company tries to get the user to sync it to the
| company's computers
|
| If there are promises, e.g., about "privacy", made by the
| companies, then these promises are unlikely to be enforceable.
| It's rather difficult if not impossible to verify such promises
| are kept, or to discover they have been breached. Unfortunately,
| when the promises are broken then there is no adequate remedy.
| It's too late
|
| 1. This unfettered access can be blocked but there's been a
| culture that has emerged around actively doing the opposite. That
| the so-called "tech" companies are the primary beneficiaries is
| surely a fortuitous coincidence
| Nevermark wrote:
| The only secure data is secure data.
|
| Anything else is insecure in principle, and getting less and
| less secure in practice, as acquisition, collation, sharing,
| and leveraging unpermissioned information use becomes cheaper,
| easier, and more profitable by the day.
|
| Cryptography provides a long menu of ways entities can exchange
| information and interact, without sharing information that is
| not functionally relevant.
|
| Making those capabilities the basis for digital inter-entity
| trade is the only way we will get real privacy and avoid the
| massive predatory surveillance-manipulation-for-hire economy
| from continuing to metastasize. With AI driving the value and
| opportunity of its leverage against us ever upward.
|
| Strict laws might have been a practical solution a couple
| decades ago when information based services began hyperscaling
| the surveillance-manipulation economy. It wouldn't be a bad
| thing now. But those laws seem unlikely, so the technical
| solution is the only path forward.
|
| I don't think people really absorb how much of the value of the
| economy is parasitically skimmed off by the 2-sided centralized
| S-M business model. From consumers and ad buyers/producers. The
| colossal revenues of Google and Facebook to start. And how
| effectively that is incentivizing and funding continued growth
| in addictive, manipulative and dominant (through pervasiveness)
| "personalized" content, that will make things much worse.
| 15155 wrote:
| Face ID doesn't work with eyes closed, the warrant wasn't clear
| whether or not _A Clockwork Orange_ -style setup would be
| allowed.
| UltraSane wrote:
| Samsung phones have the Secure Folder where you can use a
| different, more secure password. If you have the data encrypted
| it is very secure as the actual encryption key is stored in a
| secure element.
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