[HN Gopher] How Did the CIA Lose a Nuclear Device in the Himalayas?
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       How Did the CIA Lose a Nuclear Device in the Himalayas?
        
       Author : Anon84
       Score  : 21 points
       Date   : 2025-12-14 14:02 UTC (5 hours ago)
        
 (HTM) web link (www.nytimes.com)
 (TXT) w3m dump (www.nytimes.com)
        
       | manarth wrote:
       | https://archive.is/eTdkQ
        
       | manarth wrote:
       | For additional context, the "Nuclear Device" in question is a
       | SNAP-19C, an RTG (Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator), which
       | generates electricity via radioactivity decay (approx 30W for
       | this model).
        
       | ViktorRay wrote:
       | Interesting to see this level of cooperation between the United
       | States and India in 1965. Especially between the American and
       | Indian intelligence agencies.
       | 
       | Historians of this time period usually describe India as having a
       | more frigid relationship with America by the mid 1960's with
       | India moving closer to the Soviet Union and the United States
       | moving closer to Pakistan. But articles like this demonstrate
       | that the situation may have been more complex than that.
       | 
       | Of course geopolitics can sometimes change quickly. The
       | leadership in the US and in India did change between 1965, the
       | early 1970's and the late 1970's so that was a factor as well.
        
         | jhbadger wrote:
         | As the article mentions, this was about their shared worry of
         | Mao's China and their nuclear advances. India then as now has a
         | strong connection to the USSR/Russia -- they flew, and still
         | fly, MiG planes, for example.
        
         | alephnerd wrote:
         | It was mutual.
         | 
         | The US shifted to becoming de facto allied with China in the
         | early 1970s as a bulwark against the Soviet Union, and Pakistan
         | helped with the initial backdoor diplomacy [0][1] that lead to
         | US-Chinese normalization in the 1970s.
         | 
         | India, having fought a war against both Pakistan and China in
         | the 1960s, pivoted to the Soviet Union as a result, who were
         | also miffed at China because of the Sino-Soviet split and were
         | looking for a bulwark.
         | 
         | > Historians of this time period usually describe India as
         | having a more frigid relationship with America by the mid
         | 1960's with India moving closer to the Soviet Union and the
         | United States moving closer to Pakistan
         | 
         | A major reason was Brzezinski - LBJ and later Carter's foreign
         | policy czar.
         | 
         | He was a "realist" whose primary goal was boxing in the USSR
         | (he spent his early childhood in Moscow during the Stalinist
         | purge and Poland before the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact). As such,
         | he pivoted the US away from India in favor of Pakistan and
         | China.
         | 
         | The is why the US went from building IITs and allowing it's
         | tech companies like Burroughs and IBM building joint ventures
         | in 1960s India to de facto sanctions in the 1970s.
         | 
         | Kissinger followed a similar policy as Brzezinski, and IMO a
         | major reason was that both grew up in pre-War Europe and their
         | past experiences colored their views as a result.
         | 
         | [0] - https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2015/10/pakistan-
         | and-ch...
         | 
         | [1] - https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/papers/pakistan-china-
         | relations-...
        
         | hermitcrab wrote:
         | There is an interesting video by Sarah Paine on Youtube
         | discussing the geopolitics of this. (Paraphrasing from memory)
         | she says that the US tried to be friends with both but, because
         | the scars of partition were so painful, this wasn't possible
         | and they just ended up pissing off both. Apparently Pakistan
         | was very strategic due to the presence of US listening posts
         | and U2 bases.
        
           | alephnerd wrote:
           | China played a role as well. The US pivoted to China from the
           | 1970s to 1990s due to the rivalry with the USSR.
        
             | hermitcrab wrote:
             | Sarah Paine is an expert on China and covers this (and lots
             | more besides). If you are at all interested in geopolitics,
             | then I recommend watching some of her videos.
        
               | Analemma_ wrote:
               | Is she actually considered an expert, by other experts? I
               | watched a couple clips of her which were recommended to
               | me on YouTube, and she just came across as a self-
               | congratulatory booster for the inevitable triumph of
               | Western liberal democracy, the sort of end-of-history
               | talk we all now mock when it comes from e.g. Fukuyama.
        
               | hermitcrab wrote:
               | >she just came across as a self-congratulatory booster
               | for the inevitable triumph of Western liberal democracy
               | 
               | I've watched 2 or 3 hours of videos and that isn't what I
               | took away. She does argue that a rules based
               | international order, free trade, democracy and liberalism
               | is a superior system to authoritarianism, but I don't
               | think too many people (in the West, at least) would
               | disagree with that.
        
               | alephnerd wrote:
               | As someone who was adjacent to China studies back in it's
               | early days in the late 2000s/early 2010s (it was not
               | mainstream back then - everyone was concentrating on
               | Russia and the MidEast during that era and those of us
               | who warned about China's potential were ignored), I think
               | she is decent, but I wouldn't really call her a China
               | expert (she is absolutely a Naval strategy expert
               | though). To become a policy expert in a region, you need
               | to understand it's institutional and organizational
               | mores.
               | 
               | I'd recommend following academics affiliated with the
               | FSI@Stanford or the Fairbanks Center@Harvard instead.
               | They tend to be the ones most in touch with policymakers
               | on both sides of the Pacific, and are often a conduit for
               | Track 1.5 and Track 2 dialogues.
               | 
               | There has been a deluge of academics in the US entering
               | "China studies" in the same way you saw "Mid East
               | experts" proliferate in the 2000s and "Kremlinologists"
               | in the 1980s-90s.
        
               | hermitcrab wrote:
               | >I wouldn't really call her a China expert
               | 
               | That was my take. I don't know that she calls herself
               | that. She certainly seems very knowledgeable about China
               | (and Japan and Russia).
               | 
               | From Wikipedia:
               | 
               | "She spent ten years on her doctoral research in Russian
               | and Chinese history at Columbia University, which
               | included five years of research and language study in
               | China, Taiwan, Russia, Japan, and Australia.'
        
               | alephnerd wrote:
               | I'd disagree with her bio on Wikipedia.
               | 
               | Most of her early research on China was with regards to
               | Imperial Russia and Imperial China's rivalry in East and
               | North Asia (ended up being published into a book back in
               | the 1980s [0]), but was largely superficial and done in
               | the context of US-China normalization in the 70s as a
               | check against the USSR. Her limited Putonghua fluency is
               | a major issue as well for someone who is a supposed China
               | scholar.
               | 
               | Much of her work about that time period has been
               | superseded by Yuhua Wang [1] and other younger and more
               | quantitative scholars who took more of an
               | institutionalist approach.
               | 
               | Even during my time, she was not viewed as a significant
               | academic in the space - that remains to be students of
               | John Fairbanks, Kenneth Lieberthal, Mary Gallagher,
               | Rodrick MacFarquhar, and Yasheng Huang because a large
               | portion of Chinese decisionmakers today either studied
               | under them or under faculty who were advised by them in
               | the 1980s-2000s period.
               | 
               | Furthermore, she has a history of media self promotion,
               | and the loudest academics (especially on YouTube) tend to
               | be the least regarded, because media engagements are such
               | a time sink that it means you aren't really participating
               | in policymaking adjacent work like Track Diplomacy.
               | 
               | This is why I take a dim view of her - she started off in
               | the 70s as a Latin America researcher who pivoted to
               | Russian history in the 80s, Japanese history in the 90s,
               | Naval policy in the 2000s, and China recently in the
               | 2010s. These aren't the hallmarks of a domain expert and
               | I say this as someone who studied under a couple of
               | those.
               | 
               | Heck, she's started trying to pivot/shoehorn India
               | studies the same way as the others becuase there is a
               | vacuum in the field now that the most relevant
               | contemporary India academics in the US (Raghuram Rajan,
               | Aravind Subramanian, Karthik Subramanian, Ashutosh
               | Varshney, Karthik Muralidharan, and Nirupam Bajpai) have
               | taken steps back from US academia because they are all
               | either transitioning or transitioned into Indian
               | policymaking roles.
               | 
               | [0] - https://www.routledge.com/Imperial-Rivals-China-
               | Russia-and-T...
               | 
               | [1] - https://yuhuawang.scholars.harvard.edu/
        
       | alephnerd wrote:
       | The US also pivoted to de facto allying with China by the 1970s.
       | 
       | In the eyes of contemporary NatSec leadership like Kissinger
       | (Nixon, Ford) and Brzezinski (LBJ, Carter), leveraging the Sino-
       | Soviet split to box in the Soviets was the ideal option.
       | 
       | As such, from 1972-1992 the US posted soldiers in Xinjiang
       | monitoring the USSR [0], sponsored govenrnent led tech transfers
       | and scientific collaboration [1], provided support for Chinese
       | military modernization [2][3], and expanded economic cooperation
       | [4].
       | 
       | This _also_ played a role as to why US intel in the 2000s assumed
       | Xi Jinping would be pro-American [5], as he started his career
       | working on the US supported modernization of the PLA as a junior
       | secretary to Geng Biao [6] - who was the primary reason the
       | Maoist regime was overthrown in the 1970s.
       | 
       | By the 1970s, the _primary_ NatSec goal was blocking the USSR,
       | and as a result realism became the primary foreign policy
       | strategy used by the US. As such, you ended up seeing policies
       | like ditching India and Taiwan in favor of Pakistan and China,
       | supporting communist Somalia over not-really-communist Dergist
       | Ethiopia during the Ogaden War, and swaying then Soviet-aligned
       | Egypt in favor of the US by cultivating Anwar Sadat and
       | culminating in the Camp David Accords.
       | 
       | [0] - https://www.nytimes.com/1981/06/18/world/us-and-peking-
       | join-...
       | 
       | [1] -
       | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S.%E2%80%93China_Agreement_o...
       | 
       | [2] - https://www.nytimes.com/1981/06/17/world/us-decides-to-
       | sell-...
       | 
       | [3] - https://www.nytimes.com/1979/10/04/archives/study-urges-
       | us-a...
       | 
       | [4] - https://www.nytimes.com/1983/05/26/business/us-china-
       | investm...
       | 
       | [5] - https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09BEIJING3128_a.html
       | 
       | [6] - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geng_Biao
        
       | iJohnDoe wrote:
       | I thought we've been led to believe that the US has sensitive
       | radiation monitoring capabilities that could be capable of
       | somewhat pinpointing the location of the device or at least
       | detect it's still there or has spread? Satellite detection?
        
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       (page generated 2025-12-14 20:01 UTC)