[HN Gopher] The Accountability Problem
       ___________________________________________________________________
        
       The Accountability Problem
        
       Author : FrancoisBosun
       Score  : 127 points
       Date   : 2025-10-19 02:22 UTC (20 hours ago)
        
 (HTM) web link (www.jamesshore.com)
 (TXT) w3m dump (www.jamesshore.com)
        
       | gsf_emergency_4 wrote:
       | > _To do so, we have to take accountability, rather than [just]
       | allowing it to be forced upon us._
       | 
       | Ah, one should think of accountability as a 2-way pipe rather
       | than a sink!
        
       | skybrian wrote:
       | >But, thanks to my CPO and CEO's support, I can say that we are
       | building software using product bets. We identified a handful to
       | take to the leadership team earlier this year. They estimated the
       | value, then chose a specific set of bets for us to pursue based
       | on our capacity. It's definitely elevated our conversation around
       | product strategy, and I can see it getting even better as we gain
       | familiarity with the approach.
       | 
       | > What we haven't done yet is finish any bets. We just started
       | our first formal bets this year. So I can't yet tell you how it
       | will turn out.
       | 
       | Sounds good, let's check back in a year!
        
         | julik wrote:
         | ...by the passing of which the name of the game will be to find
         | another vehicle for occluding reality and creating optics.
         | Something to replace "bets" with "shaping" and "appetite", for
         | example.
         | 
         | Connecting effort and outcome is hard as orgs get bigger, and a
         | lot (a LOT) of those strategies have to do with optics and the
         | "sponsors" being "on the wave" at the moment (trusted by
         | owners/board). While it is not realistic to say "we do the work
         | until it works and costs be damned" some tools for this are
         | required, and I would say putting out a "bet horizon" of a year
         | or a quarter is setting up some nice political battles in the
         | future.
        
       | zkmon wrote:
       | Let's say we got someone to be accountable for something. And
       | that something has failed horribly. Now what?
       | 
       | Infact, the first problem would be to identify whether something
       | is a success or failure. This is tough, as anything can be
       | dressed up as success, attributing any negatives to the external
       | factors. Any determination (success or not) would mostly go by
       | perceptions people have on other people, but not really by what
       | happened on the ground, unless it is so glaring or media made a
       | fuss about it.
       | 
       | Assuming it was somehow classified as a failure, the next bigger
       | issue to identify whom to blame. At this point, it would fizzle
       | out with a circular to everyone stating a new policy or general
       | guidance, without naming anyone.
       | 
       | Let's say we have a rare instance where a person was named as
       | accountable for the failure. Mostly likely it will be shown as
       | team decisions and team work that resulted in failure. Can the
       | entire team be fired? No way. Infact the team would be rewarded
       | for going through such crisis situation that got high visibility.
       | 
       | Most preachings about accountability and responsibility do not go
       | into how to actually use them in the aftermath of a failure or
       | success.
        
         | phoe-krk wrote:
         | _> Assuming it was somehow classified as a failure, the next
         | bigger issue to identify whom to blame._
         | 
         | Accountability is to gain introspection about the past and
         | intermediate states of an (interpersonal) system to figure out
         | what decisions were made by whom, when, how, and in which
         | context, so that they be analyzed and similar failures or whole
         | failure mores can be avoided in the future.
         | 
         | It isn't the ability to properly find a scapegoat. You don't
         | make people accountable to be able to fire them. You can fire
         | them regardless. You make them accountable so that they have
         | the _ability_ to produce an _account_ of what, how, and why
         | happened at a given time.
        
           | zkmon wrote:
           | >> You make them accountable so that they have the ability to
           | produce an account of what, how, and why happened at a given
           | time.
           | 
           | The very first line in the Wikipeda article on Accountability
           | states that "accountability is equated with answerability,
           | culpability, liability".
           | 
           | Are you saying a person who is accountable may not be held
           | responsible for the outcomes?
        
             | firesteelrain wrote:
             | The person you are replying to describes something akin to
             | retrospective but even in Agile we still have people who
             | need to be accountable and that includes the engineers too.
        
             | DrewADesign wrote:
             | Assuming you're earnestly not seeing how this works rather
             | than seeking an argument:
             | 
             | I work in an industry where accountability is the norm.
             | Individual people perform well-known, but difficult-to-
             | execute steps of various processes; strict metrics define
             | success and failure; close calls are not ideal; and the
             | distance between success and failure is usually not
             | revealed without precisely calibrated equipment. The ways
             | to measure the outcomes are legally codified. Everything
             | can be checked and double-checked, and people can, and
             | often do, check those checks. Even then, sometimes the
             | person that determined the metrics got them wrong.
             | Sometimes it was measured wrong. Sometimes the person that
             | said it was wrong turns out to be wrong. My primary
             | professional function is to determine adherence to those
             | standards. Potentially thousands of lives are at stake if
             | we get the wrong thing wrong enough.
             | 
             | With a sane commit history and code reviews, this is a lot
             | easier in software than it is in most realms. It's
             | definitely easier than mine.
             | 
             | Accountability isn't just about failure-- it's about owning
             | outcomes and giving an account of what you did to
             | contribute to that outcome, good or bad.
             | 
             | > answerability, culpability, liability
             | 
             | You left off the end of the sentence.
             | 
             | > equated with answerability, culpability, liability, and
             | the expectation of account-giving.
             | 
             | Account-giving is the key, here.
             | 
             | Since we're focusing on problems: mistakes have different
             | causes: being careless, having outdated knowledge, having
             | the wrong requirements, physical or mental problems,
             | equipment malfunctioning, bad processes... to identify the
             | root problem, you need an account of what happened. To get
             | that, you need to identify the person or people involved,
             | and figure out what went wrong. That's the only way you're
             | going to mature enough organizationally to have any
             | semblance of quality. As the saying goes: if everybody's
             | responsible for something, then nobody's responsible for
             | it. The distinction is accountability.
             | 
             | So you don't need to fire someone to hold them
             | accountable-- even being 'in trouble' every time someone
             | does something wrong is counterproductive if it makes
             | people hide or shirk responsibility for their mistakes. If
             | someone fucks up badly or frequently enough, then maybe
             | they are in trouble, and maybe they do get fired? But
             | there's a whole hell of a lot accountability that happens
             | before that.
             | 
             | People make mistakes, and any organization that does not
             | tolerate mistakes is run by people without the emotional
             | maturity required to properly run an organization. The same
             | is true of people unwilling to identify those mistakes and
             | figure out either how they can be avoided in the future, or
             | if they can't be reliably avoided, mitigate their effects.
             | Some of the leadership's primary responsibilities involve
             | defining the desired outcome, measuring the difference
             | between it and the actual outcome, determining if/how it
             | matters, and figuring out why it's different. Those that
             | refuse to address, or even acknowledge problems (and again,
             | it doesn't have to be punitive,) are masking their own
             | laziness or incompetence.
        
             | phoe-krk wrote:
             | _> Are you saying a person who is accountable may not be
             | held responsible for the outcomes?_
             | 
             | No, please re-read what I said. I said that it's not about
             | finding a scapegoat to fire, but about understanding what,
             | where, and why happened. If you don't have an _account_ of
             | a problem, then you don 't know where the problem is
             | located; even if it should be solved by firing someone,
             | then you don't have the tools to figure out who and why
             | needs to be fired.
        
       | lencastre wrote:
       | thanks so sharing
        
       | aryehof wrote:
       | This seems to assume that any endeavor in software is something
       | entirely established from scratch. There are no patterns,
       | experiences or reusable parts that can be relied on. A hack at it
       | until it works methodology.
       | 
       | Accordingly, it seems to imply that we as developers can't be
       | accountable for anything but effort. It's a sad condemnation of
       | our industry, and at odds with any (normal) commercial
       | undertaking that has limited resources that must be allocated
       | among competing alternatives.
       | 
       | Any real manager knows the basics of calculating the best choice
       | amongst competing alternatives by establishing projected
       | cashflows and calculating the PV (present value) of each. But not
       | for software - we're too special.
       | 
       | (normal) - one that can sustain itself on a commercial basis,
       | rather than just on injected capital or borrowed funds.
        
         | Lionga wrote:
         | 100% bullshit speak from agile coach who has 0 idea how
         | software development actually works, but wants to sell C Level
         | the new shiny idea.
        
         | kcexn wrote:
         | I think this talk speaks to an idea that is true for early
         | stage and small businesses. That is software development is a
         | strategic investment not a tactical one. Maybe I don't need a
         | product database and an API just yet, I could use a
         | spreadsheet. But I choose to do it because software can enable
         | teams to capitalize on opportunities more effectively.
         | 
         | Of course, once software becomes mature there will be tactical
         | decisions in the margins. But greenfield software is usually a
         | strategic decision.
        
         | cjfd wrote:
         | I am not sure this comment it is in any way related to the
         | article it is commentating on. To name one example the comment
         | complains about the absence of PV calculations while the
         | article actually specifically describes this.
        
       | smoody07 wrote:
       | This guy hasn't actually worked in sales or marketing and it
       | shows.
        
       | fmfamaral wrote:
       | I still need those features and a date. Thank you, Sales &
       | Marketing.
        
         | skydhash wrote:
         | That would be fine if Sales & Marketing wants to discuss
         | priority, aka aligning needs with capacity. It's either make
         | them happy and take the blame when the technical debt is
         | unsustainable, or seen as uncooperative. I think it's hard for
         | them to promise the moon if Engineering keeps reminding them
         | about reality.
        
       | csswizardry wrote:
       | Complete side note: I'm on public wifi right now and the domain
       | used to host the images in this article is, for some reason,
       | blocked. But as the author (or whatever tool was used to generate
       | the article) has taken time to write decent `alt` text, I can
       | still get a good idea of what is going on. Kudos.
        
         | jdlshore wrote:
         | Thanks! (Author here.) I wrote the markup by hand, and did
         | spend extra time on the "alt" tags. I'm glad someone noticed.
        
       | zduoduo wrote:
       | ChatGPT Shuo :
       | 
       | I really liked how this post digs into the accountability gap
       | that exists in so many organizations. It's not that people don't
       | care or aren't trying -- it's that no one feels real ownership
       | for outcomes once responsibilities get spread across layers of
       | management. I've seen this happen in agile teams too: endless
       | retros, reports, and syncs, but no one truly driving the result.
       | What resonated most is the idea that accountability shouldn't
       | come from top-down pressure, but from mutual trust and clarity of
       | purpose. When everyone knows why something matters and can see
       | the impact of their work, accountability becomes natural instead
       | of forced.
        
       | akickinthestone wrote:
       | On one company I worked on, in one year tech team shipped 53
       | epics, delivering all the features sales, CS and product needs.
       | By EOY the company grew zero. Literally zero. This was a series A
       | company. CTO got in a meeting with the CEO and said: we delivered
       | everything you asked for, but the company didn't grew. What went
       | wrong? CEO wasn't able to act on this. In the end the company
       | started by laying off the tech team - which delivered what is was
       | asked for (even sometimes knowing that it was not going to work).
       | 
       | The more I think about it, I get a feeling that if your core
       | product depends on software and your CEO doesn't know how to
       | develop software, then your company is doomed to fail. And
       | because all companies depend on software nowadays, more and more
       | are doomed to fail. There's also this new idea of CFOs running
       | the company. But they don't run the company, they run the books.
       | It's hard to grow a product based on the books.
       | 
       | It's confusing and it looks to me that less and less people have
       | the balls to be accountable for their lack of action.
        
         | ronbenton wrote:
         | Why does the CEO knowing how to develop software matter? This
         | sounds more like the company was unable to sell the software,
         | either because of product/market fit or some other reason
        
           | array_key_first wrote:
           | Because the CEO needs to understand their product deeply to
           | know what is achievable, what isn't, and how easy it is. Many
           | (most?) software products leave simple "duh" type features on
           | the table, while they pursue incredibly difficult and brittle
           | things instead. This can be prevented.
           | 
           | Just like how, IMO, a car company CEO needs to know how a car
           | works very well. They should know enough to gauge that a dual
           | clutch transmission on a 30,000 dollar car is risky and will
           | blow up.
           | 
           | Again, we see this same sort of problem with cars. Cars will
           | have all these incredibly complex bells and whistles. But
           | then the basics, like the engine and transmission, suck ass
           | and break down. And that's why Honda and Toyota eats their
           | lunch.
        
         | dan-robertson wrote:
         | It does seem that something went wrong in your story, but I
         | don't think it's the CEO not knowing how to develop software.
         | Maybe I misunderstand what you mean by that phrase.
        
         | firesteelrain wrote:
         | In all of these types of stories, it is always the CEO or CTOs
         | fault the way it is framed. There is never any accountability
         | on the engineers part.
         | 
         | CEO/CTO sets the vision. They are not the ones developing the
         | UI or developing the API or writing documentation etc
         | 
         | CEO determined there was a market fit or vision for a product,
         | convinced an investor or shareholder to invest based on
         | multiple reviews of this vision then hired a set of people to
         | execute on this vision.
         | 
         | Yes, there are plenty of bullshit artists out there. But, the
         | product itself is developed by people below the CEO.
        
           | skydhash wrote:
           | > _it is always the CEO or CTOs fault the way it is framed.
           | There is never any accountability on the engineers part._
           | 
           | If we're going with the military analogy in TFA, it's always
           | the general fault for loosing a war. Especially if the
           | soldiers did all they were told to do. He's the one in
           | control making all the major decision.
           | 
           | > _CEO /CTO sets the vision. They are not the ones developing
           | the UI or developing the API or writing documentation etc_
           | 
           | That's why you need a feedback loop. If a general only stays
           | in a bunker, deciding things based on map and single line
           | reports, then it's a poor general. You have to also have a
           | clear sense of what the product is (dogfooding it if it's
           | necessary) so that you can adjust its course. Vision is all
           | bell and whistle. People wants to pay for solutions, not nice
           | ideas. They may even be willing to invest in such solutions.
           | But you have to deliver it.
        
             | pessimizer wrote:
             | > If a general only stays in a bunker, deciding things
             | based on map and single line reports, then it's a poor
             | general.
             | 
             | This is a bit of an exaggeration: if he can pull the signal
             | out of the maps and single-line reports and deliver
             | results, then he is a good general. The point is he can't
             | blame his failure on the fact that he didn't know what was
             | happening, because his job is to understand enough to make
             | money. If he failed because didn't understand, then he
             | should have been prioritizing his information pipeline
             | (whether that's personal knowledge or it's finding the
             | right people to deliver the correct information to him
             | intelligibly.)
             | 
             | Otherwise, it's like saying you weren't responsible for the
             | car accident because you were drunk.
        
           | marcosdumay wrote:
           | Unless a single person decided to go completely against what
           | they are told and did something bad all on their own, then
           | yes, it's always the CEO/CTO fault.
           | 
           | That shouldn't be an alien concept.
        
       | shevy-java wrote:
       | "And like medieval scholars drawing elephants they've never seen,
       | we make those interpretations through the lens of our own
       | biases."
       | 
       | Those images are quite amusing. They drew an elephant like a boar
       | but with odd tusks. So the tusks were probably described
       | correctly (semi-correctly) for the most part, but the size is
       | totally wrong, which is weird. It's like ... "hey, I saw a thing
       | with huge tusks but it was not bigger than a boar."
       | 
       | Or perhaps the one who drew this just imagined a strange boar,
       | and never heard of the tusks. It's strange.
        
         | thwave wrote:
         | they could have seen tusks themselves, and relied on verbal
         | descriptions for the rest of the animal.
        
         | gus_massa wrote:
         | The ears are also extrange, but quite incorrect in shape and
         | size, but they are not horse ears. Is it possible that they saw
         | some tusks IRL, but no elephant ear?
         | 
         | About the size, one elephant is smaller than a horse but has 4
         | small guys standing on it. Is it possible that it was a
         | standard convention to get everyone in the drawing, instead of
         | tying to make a photorealistic image.
        
         | afandian wrote:
         | If you're interested, Uli Westphal has made a serious study of
         | elephant drawings and the chains of influence.
         | 
         | https://www.uliwestphal.de/elephas-anthropogenus/
        
       | alphazard wrote:
       | Everyone who has worked in tech should reflect on the fact that
       | it would be shocking to see a product manager produce a spec for
       | the behavior of a feature, or a spreadsheet with discounted value
       | analysis as in TFA. Those are both artifacts that aid in decision
       | making, and especially aid in making the kind of decisions that
       | product orgs have taken from other more qualified people at a
       | company. Unfortunately, product management has become an
       | _imposter role_ , a side door into tech companies for people who
       | can't contribute to the sales, financial, or technical parts of
       | the business. They would just be bloat if that was where it
       | stopped, but these imposter roles task themselves with making
       | important decisions, at the company's expense.
       | 
       | Like the author, I've found some success in forcing
       | accountability, to the point that imposters hand off decisions to
       | someone who can legitimately navigate to a solution. A lingering
       | problem is that business decision making isn't about one-time
       | decisions, it's about decision making rate. As long as poor
       | decision makers can retain their position in the critical loop,
       | they will impede the ability of the business to function. The
       | solution is building the organization around accountability and
       | consequences for misallocating the company's resources: setting
       | up a system where the organization tends towards competent
       | decision makers gaining influence, and incompetent decision
       | makers losing influence or leaving.
        
         | MrDarcy wrote:
         | I've struggled for a decade to pin down my frustration with
         | most product owners and it's this at the root. They are often
         | true imposters. At a startup they are shielded by CEO founders
         | who beat the imposter syndrome drum, giving legitimacy to their
         | incompetence.
        
           | amelius wrote:
           | But somehow nobody is calling them out for it.
           | 
           | I suppose they quickly choose the side of the user, saying
           | "you don't have to convince me, I'm just playing the user
           | role here".
        
             | alphazard wrote:
             | I've also heard this quite a lot. If they've never actually
             | had to use the product or similar products in a
             | professional setting, where their results mattered, then
             | they aren't qualified to play the part of the user.
             | 
             | If the product has _actual_ users, it 's always better to
             | talk to them directly, than to trust the opinions of
             | someone who doesn't use the product to generate value every
             | day.
        
           | alphazard wrote:
           | A whole generation has come up thinking that it's normal for
           | the direction of the product to be guided by the dumbest,
           | least competent people in the room. Pretty much every tech
           | company has, or aspires to have a product org.
           | 
           | The best intuition pump I have for product managers is the
           | analogy of hedge fund managers. There exist people who can
           | predict the market, just like there exist people who can
           | predict how a product or feature is received by the market.
           | Most people claiming to can't. The people who can are
           | expensive. You can't reliably train white collar workers to
           | be hedge fund managers, and you can't reliably train white
           | collar workers to lead product development.
           | 
           | That mostly encapsulates all of the "but this guy at Apple"
           | objections that get thrown around by people defending product
           | orgs, as if they were a business insight that most of us
           | don't yet understand.
        
             | pols45 wrote:
             | Competence is not magic.
             | 
             | There are unpredictable and complex problems that
             | competence can't solve - see The Theory of Bounded
             | Rationality.
             | 
             | So what happens when the "competent" can't solve what falls
             | in their lap given constraints like resources/time/team
             | etc?
             | 
             | They will either say we can't do it (someone else like
             | Trump will put up his hand immediately and say but I can, I
             | can do anything, Hilary is just a clown choose me). Or they
             | will say we need to buy more time/resources/team etc.
             | 
             | The point here is - if they can't fend of the Opportunists
             | and if they can't buy more time/resources etc by themselves
             | but end up being reliant on some one that can easily be
             | framed as incompetence and will be framed as such by
             | Opportunists.
             | 
             | So you want to change the game, be honest about what
             | "competent" people do when faced with unpredictability and
             | complexity ie understand their limits. They generally exit
             | the space. And others fill the space.
        
               | alphazard wrote:
               | I think we are just using the word _competence_
               | differently. It 's not an innate quality. It's an
               | observed quality. I would define it as the ability to
               | perform a task well.
               | 
               | Flipping a coin has no skill component, it's all chance.
               | It's impossible to be competent at flipping a coin. Poker
               | has a skill component. A single hand is mostly luck, but
               | repeated hands tend to result in the same few players
               | having more at the end. That is observable evidence that
               | poker has a skill component, and it make sense to call
               | people with that skill "competent at poker".
               | 
               | If a problem is complex or unpredictable, then there will
               | be a luck component, but chain enough of those together
               | (like over the course of a few quarters at a company),
               | and the luck washes out leaving a skill signal.
               | 
               | The short-term noise actually helps those in _imposter
               | roles_ hide their lack of competence. It 's like a poker
               | player that never bets, and decays their bankroll slowly
               | enough that no one really notices. Then through politics
               | they are able to get a refill, and stay at the table to
               | let it slowly decay again.
        
         | drooby wrote:
         | I was spoiled at my first company out of college. My director
         | cared deeply about product specs, acceptance criteria, and
         | making sure engineers actually understood product and business
         | decisions. It was so nice.
         | 
         | Oh, how sweet and naive I was to the world... hahah.
         | 
         | It still blows my mind that product isn't treated like a soft
         | engineering discipline in its own right. When product doesn't
         | do its own thinking, the cognitive load shifts to engineering.
         | Suddenly, engineers are doing parts of product's job. The
         | result is predictable: engineering gets stretched thin, and
         | both Product and Engineering fail to fully document or even
         | understand what they've built.
         | 
         | The project falls apart because Product drops the ball, but
         | Engineering is the team at the end of the funnel, so the blame
         | naturally tends to land on them. Product's output is often
         | hidden, and it's easy for them to say, "Well, we did our part.
         | Engineering just didn't deliver."
        
           | master_crab wrote:
           | Any product person who hasn't had years of engineering or
           | sales needs to be taken out back and treated like Old Yeller
           | (metaphorically of course). If you can't deeply associate
           | with the customer or comprehend the engineering of systems,
           | you are not fit to be in the flow from keyboard to customer.
        
           | Seattle3503 wrote:
           | > The project falls apart because Product drops the ball, but
           | Engineering is the team at the end of the funnel, so the
           | blame naturally tends to land on them. Product's output is
           | often hidden, and it's easy for them to say, "Well, we did
           | our part. Engineering just didn't deliver."
           | 
           | I've seen this get worse with LLMs. I've had specs that were
           | wholly or in significant part generated by ChatGPT, but they
           | look detailed so the are plausible workslop. I've been given
           | a spreadsheet with nonsense items "Implement adaptive intent-
           | driven workflows across user touchpoints" (I generated this
           | example with GPT).
           | 
           | When I asked what any of it meant I was met with silence.
           | Later through the grapevine I hear the requirements were
           | generated by ChatGPT and the guy responsible for them doesn't
           | understand the system at all. But guess who is responsible
           | for delivery?
        
         | nerdponx wrote:
         | When somebody incompetent is hired to do a job, do you blame
         | the incompetent person, or the person who hired the incompetent
         | person?
        
           | marcosdumay wrote:
           | On this case, probably the person that decided to split the
           | job that way or the person that decided that somebody must be
           | hired.
        
         | gubicle wrote:
         | The (relatively big and successful) tech company I work at, has
         | gradually seen ~all high level decision-making positions filled
         | with PMs, while senior engineers who have been at the company
         | for years are being pushed out and/or leaving. Most of these
         | PMs have very little understanding of the tech, the market, or
         | how software engineering works, yet they now make ~all of the
         | product decisions at the company. I haven't worked on anything
         | remotely useful, or bottom-line impactful in 2 years. I was
         | originally very optimistic about the company and elected to get
         | paid in as much stock (vs cash) as possible... which I now
         | realize was a big mistake.
        
       | ozim wrote:
       | I liked the article, it is really in depth.
       | 
       | Thing is I am taking the opposite approach because author has
       | different goals.
       | 
       | Author gets to be VP of engineering on company that has multiple
       | product teams and he gets to sit at "the table".
       | 
       | I am engineering lead for a company that has one dev team, I can
       | give my opinions and run stuff however I want but I don't get a
       | sit at the table.
       | 
       | The way I see it if I would like to take authors approach I would
       | be like Scotty trying to go over commanders head - going with the
       | analogy as software engineer I run the ship I am not making
       | decision or being responsible about where the ship goes.
       | 
       | So my approach is that I minimize responsibility of the
       | engineering team and I use scrum to do so. We are accountable for
       | running the ship on time, every sprint gets delivered, every
       | release is delivered like a clockwork. Business gets their input
       | and output - if they have clear requirements that are small
       | enough for the sprint going in, they will get change on
       | production after 6 to 8 weeks.
       | 
       | We cannot promise something will be there in 6 months or a year,
       | we can work on figuring out requirements with business and find
       | out what we can promise to be there in 8 weeks on production.
       | 
       | We guard the process so we have predictable schedule on finished
       | tasks and releases - what is finished or almost finished goes to
       | the release candidate and we promise RC will be in 2 weeks on
       | production and most of the time it works.
       | 
       | Yes we can do an emergency bypass and get someone to work on
       | something ASAP - but it really has to be important, not something
       | "a person" thinks is important.
       | 
       | Prediction is state A of the application + 2 weeks that is fully
       | possible for reasonably well written requirements. If someone
       | wants to hold me accountable for their grand vision I say no, he
       | has to deliver requirements that I can help him with -
       | 
       | so just developers should not let themselves to be pushed around
       | to be responsible for more than they actually should.
       | 
       | Just like captain in Star Trek has no say about how the ship has
       | to be run I don't want business guys coming over and making me do
       | stuff their way.
        
       | Esophagus4 wrote:
       | A bit rambling and meandering, but some decent points in there I
       | guess. Lost me on the elephants.
       | 
       | Setting goals on estimated value vs measured value is the
       | difference between a process goal and an outcome goal.
       | 
       | I guess the idea is you can't control outcomes, but you can
       | control your process inputs.
       | 
       | In baseball, for example, if you want to be a good hitter, don't
       | set a goal to hit .300, set a goal to do the things that will
       | make you a .300 hitter. "I want to take 50 swings in batting
       | practice per day. I want to workout once per day. I want to spend
       | 30 minutes watching films of the next pitcher I'll face..." etc.
       | 
       | In reality, it's probably a little of both. For example, Sales
       | teams are often compensated on revenue generated (outcome), but
       | what if you did a good job (process) but didn't hit your numbers
       | because the market was just really bad in your vertical? A good
       | leader will recognize this and still compensate you (i.e. hold
       | you accountable) appropriately rather than punishing you for the
       | outcome.
       | 
       | If one leader hits their targets in an easy environment, and
       | another misses but comes close in a really challenging
       | environment by being really creative and scrappy and clever, the
       | second leader should be the one with the big reward.
       | 
       | You should be judged on how well you play your hands, not solely
       | whether you win the game.
        
         | jeremyjh wrote:
         | This just pushes the responsibility for outcomes farther from
         | the people doing the work. The CEO is going to answer to the
         | board based on outcomes. If the sales leader knows they can't
         | penetrate a market or engineering leader knows the feature will
         | flop and they don't change the company's strategy then they are
         | failing.
        
           | Esophagus4 wrote:
           | That's... a strange dismissal of my point, and not based in
           | reality. And despite yourself, you're agreeing with me. The
           | smart sales leader will find creative ways to pivot. And even
           | if they don't hit their numbers for factors outside their
           | control, if they played their hand well, that's what you
           | reward.
           | 
           | If you're solely graded on outcomes, you end up with very
           | bizarre behavior as people game the system.
           | 
           | See: surgeons avoiding high risk patients because they don't
           | want to ding their outcome scores. And see Wells Fargo
           | employees fraudulently creating accounts for people to boost
           | their numbers.
           | 
           | You want to have an org that encourages (calculated) risk
           | taking and rewards those who persevere though difficult
           | situations.
        
       | pessimizer wrote:
       | I really like this idea, and he seems to have gotten a good way
       | into trying to formalize it.
       | 
       | I think there should be a lot more gambling carefully designed
       | and introduced into processes and institutions, and that the
       | reason we don't do it is because of an almost religious reverence
       | for markets, and the idea that they are natural. There is nothing
       | natural about a market; what they are is _useful_. They are
       | artificial, intentional situations that converge to a particular
       | desirable outcome, and an effort is made to remove all fluff and
       | friction that doesn 't encourage that outcome. A price auction is
       | a game, and it's designed by the people who certify and enforce
       | the sale.
       | 
       | Having different departments estimate potential gains and
       | quantify what they're willing to risk for those gains, and having
       | developers decide whether they can get something like that done
       | for that amount, and using the success of those wagers for
       | accounting purposes seems like it has a lot of potential. Your
       | product manager might just be a full time bookie, looking at
       | every step in the process and trying to figure out whether bets
       | that have been made by different departments will pay off, and
       | trying to match bets against each other to come out even. His job
       | would be to give everyone credit to bet with (and to "cut off"
       | bad bettors.)
        
       | alganet wrote:
       | > They called them "stories," and "epics," and recorded them in
       | Jira, but they were more like technical tasks.
       | 
       | Yep. Mostly title-only technical tasks that will end up as a
       | point in a graph, and an excuse to put tools over people instead
       | of people over tools. A true perversion of the agile core
       | principles. Jira-oriented product development killed agile.
        
       | marcosdumay wrote:
       | It's not really a criticism because the author is very clear this
       | is about early stage startups. At least, it's not a criticism of
       | the author, it will be if random people start to adopt the
       | idea...
       | 
       | But yet another software administration policy that is against
       | maintenance.
        
       | dzonga wrote:
       | ever wondered why the most successful software orgs never have
       | Product Managers ?
       | 
       | there goes your answer.
        
       | Pannoniae wrote:
       | Amazing presentation, the real gold is buried somewhere in the
       | middle:
       | 
       | "To paraphrase Kent Beck, professional software development is
       | about...
       | 
       | Communication and collaboration between large numbers of people
       | with different perspectives."
       | 
       | This is why large organisations suffer, communication;)
       | 
       | People say it a lot that the code isn't most of the value but the
       | auxiliary stuff is, which is true - but the conclusion from that
       | shouldn't be that the work itself isn't that important, it's just
       | that you'll see way less of it in a large organisation.
       | 
       | This is also why a well-aimed startup can easily blow the socks
       | off companies with thousands of employees - the communication
       | overhead is high, accountability is very diffused and everything
       | is codified.
       | 
       | In an ideal world, you'd spend 100% of your time with either the
       | work or something adjacent (like research), but of course, that's
       | completely unrealistic. But if you aren't doing work but
       | something else, it's probably a good idea to ask yourself, does
       | this matter? Does it help my goals?
        
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