[HN Gopher] The Business of Betting on Catastrophe
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       The Business of Betting on Catastrophe
        
       Author : anarbadalov
       Score  : 57 points
       Date   : 2025-06-23 13:04 UTC (3 days ago)
        
 (HTM) web link (thereader.mitpress.mit.edu)
 (TXT) w3m dump (thereader.mitpress.mit.edu)
        
       | MarkusQ wrote:
       | This reminds me of the predator hierarchy (for example, see
       | Colinvaux's "Why Big Fierce Animals are Rare"): the reinsurers
       | spread the risk from various insurers and for various
       | catastrophes around among a pool of meta-insurers. But this pool
       | is necessarily smaller than that of primary insurers, and their
       | risks more likely to be correlated (catastrophes can cause other
       | catastrophes, and multiply primary insurers can be affected by
       | the same catastrophe).
       | 
       | For that matter, I'm also reminded of credit default swaps, and
       | Lehrer's "We Will All Go Together When We Go."
        
         | falseprofit wrote:
         | One aspect worth pointing out is that ILS are transferring
         | insurance risk outside of the insurance industry. Appetite has
         | gone up and down but e.g. hedge funds would normally not be
         | available to assume insurance risk otherwise.
        
         | kqr wrote:
         | Reinsurance does not only spread risk by pooling multiple
         | insurers, but also smears out the impact of catastrophes
         | geographically and temporally: big events in one year, in one
         | part of the world result in more expensive reinsurance all over
         | the globe for a few years forward, as reinsurers collectively
         | stock up on capital again.
         | 
         | So while locally catastrophes can cause other catastrophes, for
         | the most part earthquakes in Thailand does not trigger
         | wildfires in Texas. Nor does a hurricane in Florida one year
         | cause more hurricanes in Florida the next year.
        
         | simicd wrote:
         | It's correct that the number of reinsurers is smaller than that
         | of primary insurers. But the risk born by reinsurers is less
         | correlated, not more. Any given primary insurer has risk
         | clusters (domestic market, line of business, etc.). If a large
         | catastrophe happens in their domestic market they might go bust
         | but what are the chances that it happens simultaneously to all
         | markets globally?
         | 
         | Say you're a primary home insurer in the US. If a hurricane
         | hits you might not have enough capital to rebuild all the
         | homes. A reinsurer which is also covering Europe, Asia, LatAm,
         | etc. is less likely to go bankrupt. The reinsurer can cross-
         | subsidize and use the insurance premiums from other regions to
         | pay out the claims from the US market. All that matters is that
         | on average the loss probabilities and severities are estimated
         | correctly.
         | 
         | And this is just using one line of business as example,
         | reinsurers are covering property, casualty, life and health
         | which add extra layers of diversification.
        
       | Onavo wrote:
       | Not sure what the controversy here is. Catastrophe risk is the
       | bread and butter of property insurance.
        
         | falseprofit wrote:
         | Felt like the article ended before a thesis statement.
        
           | gwern wrote:
           | > She is the author of "Investable! When Pandemic Risk Meets
           | Speculative Finance - A Cautionary Tale," from which this
           | article is adapted.
           | 
           | So I think structurally, the conclusion here is that 'cat
           | bonds are an example of how insurers can work with abstract
           | risks, and so any risk (such as global pandemic) could be
           | worked with this way', and the rest of the book then examines
           | how people are trying to actually do so with pandemic risk.
        
         | PaulHoule wrote:
         | But as traditional insurance, not cat bonds.
        
       | munificent wrote:
       | _> New "efficiency features" regularly get introduced in ILS and
       | written into contracts. One of the most transformative has been
       | the use of parametrics. Unlike traditional insurance, which
       | calculates payouts based on actual losses (what's called
       | indemnity), parametric insurance uses preset triggers to
       | determine whether money gets released. During an interview, a
       | London-based parametric expert gave me this example of a
       | parametric scenario: If, during a hurricane, wind speeds off the
       | Florida coast hit a predetermined trigger speed -- say 175 mph --
       | at a trigger distance of two miles offshore within a preset
       | longitude and latitude grid, the payout is, in theory, immediate.
       | No actual damage need occur; the trigger measures just need to be
       | met._
       | 
       | Wow, that is absolutely _begging_ for exploitation.
       | 
       | Whoever controls the authority reporting these figures now
       | controls whether these bonds pay out. That in turn means that
       | whoever holds those bonds has a huge financial incentive to
       | manipulate what that authority says.
       | 
       | Put another way, if you're holding a bond that will cost you $100
       | million if a hurricane windspeed hits 175 MPH, then you have $99
       | million bucks that are worth spending trying to get the NOAA to
       | say anything but that.
        
         | gruez wrote:
         | The same incentive exists for economic figures (inflation
         | linked bonds) and market prices (cash settled derivatives), and
         | it's seemingly not an issue, and those are far easier to game
         | than physical measurements like wind speed or whatever.
        
           | jallmann wrote:
           | Manipulation of reported economic numbers has been an issue
           | in the past, see LIBOR.
        
           | krisoft wrote:
           | > and those are far easier to game than physical measurements
           | like wind speed or whatever.
           | 
           | I'm not so sure about that. I bet that we could tamper with
           | an anemometer somewhere out in a field. Easiest is to put
           | brushless motor with a propeller next to it and blow propwash
           | on it. More technically difficult is to tamper with the
           | signal between the sensor and the station, or MitM the
           | station.
           | 
           | If you are careful and only modifying the measurments when
           | the weather is already crummy they might not even suspect.
        
             | singleshot_ wrote:
             | Replace the anemometer cups with slightly larger ones.
        
           | 56544562 wrote:
           | > and it's seemingly not an issue
           | 
           | Sounds like you do see an issue after all. Is it obfuscated?
           | Hidden in complexity? Is it artificial to appear as one thing
           | while indirectly, as a side effect, leading to another?
        
           | jowea wrote:
           | There have some governments outside of the developed world
           | accused of manipulating inflation numbers.
        
         | kqr wrote:
         | Sure. Getting reliable data all parties can agree on is one of
         | the biggest challenges to parametric insurance. The data
         | sources I hear about most often are US governmental agencies -
         | and this is a problem, since the US political system is not
         | stable enough to finance its governmental agencies reliably.
         | (Most recently I recall concerns around budget and staffing
         | cuts for NOAA and USGS.)
         | 
         | That said, sane practice for parametric insurance is to have
         | redundancy in data sources, and an agreed procedure for
         | settling differences in conclusions resulting from relying on
         | either of them alone.
        
         | soulofmischief wrote:
         | Goodhart's law continues to ring true.
        
         | dylan604 wrote:
         | Taking your point of view now makes sense on why to defund
         | NOAA, fire everyone that's not going to toe the line, and then
         | have those that will parrot the necessary info to keep from
         | paying out. Make Weather Great Again, just doesn't lend itself
         | to a hat though
        
         | the_pwner224 wrote:
         | People have already done this with NWS weather equipment for
         | federal farm drought insurance:
         | https://coloradosun.com/2024/09/08/patrich-esch-ed-dean-jage...
        
         | bgnn wrote:
         | In Turkey the mandatory earthquake insurance for homeowners is
         | owned by the government. It triggers parametrically (> 7
         | magnitude). In one case at least [1] the government office
         | responsible for announcing the magnitude, AFAD, declared it
         | lower than this threshold although other countries and Turkish
         | research institues measured it as 7.0 . At the end the
         | insurance payout was so much more limited even for people who
         | kist their house and loved ones.
         | 
         | As wiki page mentions in notes section AFAD declared this a 6.6
         | magnitude earthquake although it was 7.0 . [1]
         | https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/2020_Aegean_Sea_earthquake
        
       | paxys wrote:
       | As if pandemics weren't already political enough. Let's get large
       | corporations, investment funds and billionaires involved and give
       | them direct stake in declaring what is or isn't a pandemic, how
       | many deaths have happened in a certain area, what was the cause
       | of death etc. That should end well.
        
       | leemelone wrote:
       | This is the dumbest idea I've read about in a long time.
        
       | danielfoster wrote:
       | I like to think I'm somewhat intelligent, but there's something I
       | don't understand here. The article cites an example of pandemic
       | bond holders receiving a return of 40% over 3 years and these
       | bonds being a useful way for the issuer to secure needed funds in
       | the event of a pandemic. Unless a pandemic happens every ~8
       | years, isn't this a ridiculous and unsustainable risk premium to
       | pay?
        
         | HillRat wrote:
         | The class B bonds paid roughly 11% over LIBOR, so about 40%
         | over three years, against the risk of a viral outbreak for five
         | different families, defined as At least two countries
         | experiencing at least 250 fatal cases increasing over twelve
         | weeks, so the trigger did not have to be as globally-
         | significant as COVID-19 turned out to be. That's a pretty
         | aggressive coupon, but the chance of a regional outbreak was
         | also pretty high.
        
           | danielfoster wrote:
           | Makes sense now, thank you! I feel like the author should
           | have mentioned this.
        
           | dmurray wrote:
           | Based on that description it would have been triggered by
           | COVID-19, swine flu in 2009, and I think just missed out
           | (depending on the fine print) on SARS in 2002. That's two or
           | three in 18 years, so losing your money once every eight
           | years is not far off the recent performance of this kind of
           | bond.
        
       | 21secondstogo wrote:
       | CTO at an ILS fund. Cat bonds are essentially securitised
       | versions of fully collateralised reinsurance contracts where the
       | premium is the coupon plus the return on collateral. A benefit
       | being that you can trade them. They're not usually used for
       | speculation as stated in the article - investors are typically
       | pension funds looking for investments that are uncorrelated to
       | traditional financial market risk. e.g. on a US hurricane exposed
       | cat bond you may only lose money if a huge hurricane blows
       | through Florida, no matter what credit and equities are doing.
       | It's true that a lot of the deal sourcing is relationship-driven,
       | but there is a good amount of data-driven tech involved in
       | overlaying the insured's past claims and underwriting data on top
       | of simulated catastrophe model output, applying your own view of
       | climate, vendor model adjustments, hurricane activity etc.
        
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       (page generated 2025-06-26 23:00 UTC)