[HN Gopher] AI-Generated Voice Evidence Poses Dangers in Court
___________________________________________________________________
AI-Generated Voice Evidence Poses Dangers in Court
Author : hn_acker
Score : 109 points
Date : 2025-03-11 15:32 UTC (7 hours ago)
(HTM) web link (www.lawfaremedia.org)
(TXT) w3m dump (www.lawfaremedia.org)
| fhd2 wrote:
| Sounds like reasonable changes.
|
| Generally speaking, I think evidence tampering is not a new
| problem, and even though it's easy in some cases, I don't think
| it's _that_ widespread. Just like it's possible to lie on the
| stand, but people usually think twice before they do it, because
| _if_ they are found to have lied, they're in trouble.
|
| My main concern is rather that legit evidence can now easily be
| called into question. That seems to me like a much higher risk
| than fake evidence, considering the overall dynamics.
|
| But ultimately: Humanity has coped without photo, audio or video
| evidence for most of its existence. I suppose it will cope again.
| mitthrowaway2 wrote:
| I agree. The article didn't touch on this aspect, but we're now
| at the point where even authentic recordings could be plausibly
| denied and claimed to be fake. So the entire usage of
| recordings as evidence will suffer a hit. We may essentially be
| knocked back to an 18th century level of reliance on eyewitness
| testimony. One wonders what the consequences for justice will
| be.
| Ukv wrote:
| I wouldn't say we'd be quite back to pre-photo evidence days.
| I feel a lot if not most of the value in a video/audio
| recording is not just that the medium has traditionally been
| difficult to edit, but that it's attesting to a lot of
| details with high specificity. There's a lot to potentially
| get caught out on with not a lot of wiggle room when
| inconsistencies are spotted (compared to recalling from
| memory). Document scans and static images are still useful
| despite having long been trivial to edit, for instance.
| datadrivenangel wrote:
| Digital forensics will continue to be an in-demand skill!
| nine_k wrote:
| I can easily imagine a future where video evidence is only
| acceptable in the form of chemically developed analog film,
| at resolutions that are prohibitively expensive to model, and
| audio recordings of any kind are not admissible as evidence
| at all. Signatures on paper, faxes, etc are, of course,
| inadmissible, too.
| thereddaikon wrote:
| There's already a process for this, its called chain of
| custody. If you cant prove the evidence has a solid chain of
| custody then it was potentially tampered with and isn't
| reliable.
| mrandish wrote:
| Yep, "chain of custody." Came here hoping to see that
| concept discussed since it's how the system already deals
| with cases of potential evidence tampering. If the evidence
| is of material importance and there's no sufficiently
| credible chain of custody, then its validity can be
| questioned. The concept started around purely physical
| evidence but applies to image, audio and video. The good
| thing about the ubiquity of deepfake memes on social media
| is that it familiarizes judges and juries with how easy it
| now is to create plausible fake media.
| AnthonyMouse wrote:
| The usual chain of custody goes something like: The store
| has a video surveillance system which the police collect
| the footage from, so the chain of custody goes through the
| store and the police which implies that nobody other than
| those two have tampered with it.
|
| But then you have an inside job where the perpetrators work
| for the store and have doctored the footage before the
| police come to pick it up, or a corrupt cop who wants to
| convict someone without proving their case or is accepting
| bribes to convict the wrong person and now has easy access
| to forgeries. Chain of custody can't help you in either of
| these cases, and both of those things definitely happen in
| real life, so how do you determine when they happen or
| don't?
| iamacyborg wrote:
| Surely chain of custody applies if the accused has access
| to the evidence? Perhaps I'm missing your point or I'm
| overly optimistic about the legal system.
| AnthonyMouse wrote:
| Suppose the store manager is having a dispute with a kid
| who keeps skateboarding in the parking lot, so the store
| manager decides to commit insurance fraud by robbing the
| store herself and then submits forged video of the kid
| doing it to the police.
|
| The store manager is in the chain of custody but isn't a
| suspect, the accused is the kid. The kid doesn't even
| know who actually committed the crime. How is the kid
| supposed to prove this?
| condiment wrote:
| In this case, chain of custody needs to extend to the
| capture device itself, and to any software that exists in
| the supply chain for the video content.
|
| There are some experimental specifications that exist to
| provide attestation as to the authenticity of media. But
| most of what I've seen so far is a "perjury based"
| approach that just requires a human to say that something
| is authentic.
| _DeadFred_ wrote:
| Chain of custody isn't real as long as the judiciary
| gives the government a 'good faith' pass when chain of
| custody isn't maintained/documentable in court. Go into
| Lexus Nexus and look up 'good faith' related to 'chain of
| custody'. Any 'protections' that can be waived away at
| the judges whim when the standard isn't met by the
| government are not actually real but pure theater to lend
| legitimacy to the American judicial system that it
| doesn't deserve.
| LPisGood wrote:
| This is unironically a usecase for blockchain.
| adiabatichottub wrote:
| Who needs a whole blockchain? Just basic public-key
| cryptography would do the job.
|
| Imagine if you will, that the NVR (recording system) has
| a unique private key flashed in during manufacturing,
| with the corresponding public key printed on it's
| nameplate. The device can sign a video clip and its
| related meta-data before exporting. Now, any decent
| hacker could see possible holes in this system, but it
| could be made tamper-resistant enough that any non-expert
| wouldn't be able to fabricate a signed video. Then the
| evidence becomes the signed video and the NVR's serial
| number and public key. Not perfect, but probably good
| enough.
| _DeadFred_ wrote:
| This is such BS. The government is ALWAYS deferred to when
| the chain of custody is broken because 'good faith' is
| applied. As long as 'good faith' is rountely dispensed
| 'chain of custody' is nothing but propaganda for the
| justice system not an actual tool used for justice.
|
| As long as chain of custody ca be discarded because 'good
| faith' whenever it becomes inconvenient it is not a real
| thing.
| AyyEye wrote:
| > we're now at the point where even authentic recordings
| could be plausibly denied and claimed to be fake.
|
| We've been there for at least two years.
|
| https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2023/04/judge-slams-
| tesl...
| dghlsakjg wrote:
| How is AI voice faking any different than any other type of
| faking? How is it different than a manipulated recording, or a
| recording where someone is imitating another?
|
| It is just as easy to fake many paper documents, and we have
| accepted documents as evidence for centuries.
|
| Photos can be faked, video can be edited or faked, witnesses lie
| or misremember.
|
| Is this just about telling lawyers that unvetted audio recordings
| can be unreliable? Because that shouldn't be news.
|
| Edit: this is a good faith question. I'm legitimately just
| curious. Splicing and editing have been around since recording
| was invented, I was legitimately curious why voice recordings
| would have been given extra evidential weight when manipulating
| recordings is a known possibility.
| gdulli wrote:
| "We've had projectile murder for centuries with arrows, how are
| these machine guns and missiles any different?"
| rout39574 wrote:
| Presuming good faith here, faking recordings has been harder to
| do, easier to detect, and less equivocal in the past than it is
| now.
|
| If it takes an FX house to generate a plausible recording of me
| saying something I didn't say, that's a risky enterprise with a
| lot of witnesses.
|
| If my enemy can do it in their basement with an hour of
| research, the exposure risk goes way down, and consequently the
| expectation you'll see it in real life goes way up.
| ceejayoz wrote:
| Nuclear weapons require nation-state levels of resources. Now
| imagine you can build one in your basement for $10k. Does that
| change things at all?
| dghlsakjg wrote:
| I understand what you are saying, but my point is that I
| could make plausible sounding recordings that did not reflect
| reality by, for example, cutting recordings up with freeware
| like Audacity, or even using a consumer level double tapedeck
| before that. It wasn't Manhattan project levels of effort
| before this.
|
| This seems more like people losing their minds over 3d
| printed guns, when hobbyists with a drill press have been
| making guns in the garage for decades.
|
| Yeah, its easier now to fake voice, but its not as if what
| this article warns against wasn't possible before the latest
| AI hype cycle. And it is also worth noting that voice
| cloning/changing technology is not particularly new either
| (I've been able to sound like Morgan Freeman using a phone
| app for at least half a decade).
|
| I agree that courts should be cautious around accepting voice
| recording evidence, I just don't think that the ability to do
| this is new.
| ceejayoz wrote:
| > I could make plausible sounding recordings that did not
| reflect reality by, for example, cutting recordings up with
| freeware like Audacity, or even using a consumer level
| double tapedeck before that.
|
| Sure, and https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Hahn managed
| to get quite a bit of nuclear material.
|
| Being able to do it at scale, convincingly, in real-time,
| for any arbitrary text, with just 30s or so of someone's
| voice as a sample, changes the calculus a lot.
| Majromax wrote:
| > I could make plausible sounding recordings that did not
| reflect reality by, for example, cutting recordings up with
| freeware like Audacity,
|
| Cutting up _what_ recordings, exactly? If you 're mixing-
| and-matching, you need a pretty broad corpus of source
| material with fairly consistent recording quality
| (background noise, etc), and even still you're limited to
| reproducing words that are already present. You can't cut-
| and-splice together a recording of me saying 'Yes,
| dghlsakjg, I embezzled $1 million and blew it on the
| ponies' because there will be no recording of me saying
| your username, 'embezzled', or 'ponies.'
|
| The problem comes with the voice-cloning technology that
| can construct entirely new sentences based on relatively
| short voice profile samples.
|
| > I've been able to sound like Morgan Freeman using a phone
| app for at least half a decade
|
| You've been able to sound like Morgan Freeman because of
| specific, hard tuning work put into the voice changer. Now,
| you can sound like your boss, or your neighbour, or your
| ex.
| gus_massa wrote:
| I agree.
|
| I edited the audio of a few math videos to upload to
| YouTube and I had to fix "typos" like " _then one plus
| zero is zero_ ". The problem is that there are no spaces
| in the voice, so it sounds like "
| _thenonepluszeroiszero._ "
|
| So I had to look for a " _one_ " that is in a similar
| context, after an "s" and before a ".", or at least a
| similar one. And hope the speed matches, and adjust the
| volume.
|
| They were free videos, so it was not necesary to get it
| perfect, but at least reduce the distraction caused by
| mistakes.
| carra wrote:
| Wait some more time and photos or even video recordings will be
| deemed just as dangerous. And then what? Even if there is real
| evidence, it will have to be discarded unless it can't be
| sufficiently validated. It will get very hard to prove anything.
| paulnpace wrote:
| If it goes that direction, one silver lining could be that they
| also realize video conference tools used for court proceedings
| should also go away.
| bluGill wrote:
| Or perhaps camera manufactures will start putting traces in.
| Anyone who makes surveillance systems (like stores use) should
| put some end to end things in so they can say "this camera took
| that recording and we can see that it wasn't tampered with
| by...". (if anyone works for a surveillance company please run
| with this!) With encryption we can verify a lot of things, but
| it sets the bar higher than someone took a picture.
|
| Of course in a darkroom someone skilled could always make a
| fake photo - but the bar is a lot lower with AI.
| AnthonyMouse wrote:
| Cryptography doesn't really fix it. There are a zillion
| camera makers and all it takes is one of them to have poor
| security and leak the keys. Then the forger uses any of the
| cameras with extractable keys to sign their forgery.
|
| Or they just point a camera at a high resolution playback of
| a forged video.
|
| This also assumes you can trust all the camera makers,
| because by doing this you're implicitly giving them each
| authorization to produce forged videos. Recall that many of
| these companies are based in China.
| bluGill wrote:
| The point is the camera maker certifies in court under
| perjury penalty that their cameras are not compromised and
| that is their image. "Other camera systems are compromised,
| but ours is not...".
| AnthonyMouse wrote:
| Cameras are an IoT device. The S is for security. What
| good is having the company certify something that isn't
| true?
|
| It seems like it would just be a mechanism to lend
| undeserved credibility to something that still isn't
| trustworthy.
| gs17 wrote:
| > Or they just point a camera at a high resolution playback
| of a forged video.
|
| Exactly, it's just like DRM or cheating in video games.
| Even if everything in software is blocked, there's always
| the analogue hole.
| Lanolderen wrote:
| The smart encryption people will fix it. At some point it had
| to be fixed anyway since LLMs have only made it less effort.
| nottorp wrote:
| So... those talking head "influencers" who leave multiple hours
| of voice and video samples on social networking for anyone to
| download and clone are the most at risk for an attack like this?
| treetalker wrote:
| I question the wisdom of setting the judge up as a superjury /
| gatekeeper for this kind of situation. This seems like a
| reliability / weight of the evidence scenario, not a reliability
| / qualification of the witness scenario (as with an expert
| witness).
|
| Why would the judge be better qualified to determine whether the
| voice was authentic, as opposed to the witness? And why should
| the judge effectively determine the witness's credibility or
| ability to discern, when that's what juries are for?
|
| All that said, emulated voices do pose big problems for
| litigation.
| bluGill wrote:
| I don't know what the latest is, but often judges are supposed
| to not allow "expert testimony" without checking that the
| person is an expert. However this is a really complex area.
| Judges don't want to be the one deciding a case, but not
| allowing some "expert" is in a way deciding the case.
| hiatus wrote:
| Isn't it up to the opposing party, and not the judge, to
| impeach an expert?
| ARandumGuy wrote:
| If it was solely up to the opposing party, then they'd
| strike down every single expert. The judge still is the
| ultimate decider on what evidence (including expert
| testimony) is admissible.
| zusammen wrote:
| There's a built-in design paradox. How does a judge assess an
| expert in a field where he is not one? There's probably some
| improvement that comes from experience but it's not perfect.
| NoMoreNicksLeft wrote:
| Excluding fake evidence is very much a responsibility of the
| judge. In the age of Fox News, letting the jury decide for
| themselves whether or not made-up bullshit is actual evidence
| seems like a recipe for disaster, and not necessarily one that
| errs on the side of caution.
| treetalker wrote:
| To the contrary, in US courts the jury determines whether
| evidence (documentary, testimonial) is credible or not, and
| what weight (if any) to assign it. (Experts, a la _Daubert_
| etc., are a different matter because they give expert
| opinions, not factual evidence based on personal witnessing
| of the events in the case, so the judge does perform a
| gatekeeping function, essentially to ensure the underlying
| field /science is reliable.)
|
| While certainly Fox News headlines would not reach the jury
| in most instances, that is on account of hearsay, lack of
| qualification, materiality, relevance, and similar rules. It
| is not a prior credibility or weight determination by the
| judge, as I understand TFA to be advocating. So: did the
| witness hear a voice that he believed to be the one in
| question? If so, jury gets to decide (unless unfairly
| prejudicial or some other overriding rule comes into play).
| pharrington wrote:
| IANAL, and I am assuming you are a lawyer - I interpreted
| @NoMoreNicksLeft as saying that it's a judge's
| responsibility to determine whether or not evidence is
| admissible - before it gets to a jury. And that's also what
| the article is talking about - "The examples should
| illustrate circumstances that may satisfy the
| authentication requirement while still leaving judges
| discretion to exclude an item of evidence if there is other
| proof that it is a fake. "
| NoMoreNicksLeft wrote:
| >While certainly Fox News headlines would not reach the
| jury in most instances, that is on account of hearsay,
|
| Nor should obviously fake evidence reach the jury. They can
| judge for themselves whether testimony is credible, but
| this is far different than admitting faked evidence. And if
| you can't see the difference, I'm not sure I'm qualified to
| explain it to you.
| whywhywhywhy wrote:
| Gell-Mann Amnesia effect comes to mind.
| _DeadFred_ wrote:
| You mean like expert witness polygraphers that were treated as
| fact by the courts for years and still used to re-incarcerate
| people on parole/probation?
|
| Or gun matching (ballistics) that are no longer considered
| conclusive but subjective?
| https://www.mdcourts.gov/data/opinions/coa/2023/10a22.pdf
|
| Hair and Fiber expert analysis that was wrong?
| https://innocenceproject.org/fbi-agents-gave-erroneous-testi...
|
| Or do you mean bite mark analysis that was again wrong?
|
| Many of these forensic methods were used for decades and
| presented/treated as conclusive evidence before being
| challenged leading to wrongful convictions. But yes, let's have
| 'certified' voice experts whose living is based on being hired
| by the government and giving testimony to convict people.
| Surely this time it will be altruistic and scientific.
| klipklop wrote:
| What always worried me is that nobody ever challenged these
| methods. We just accepted it as fact. Endless crime tv shows
| reenforce that these methods are infallible. People that
| watch these shows then become jurors. Scary.
| exe34 wrote:
| On a related note, why oh why does Lloyds Bank insist on grabbing
| my voice for login every time I call them? I have to keep saying
| "no, fcuk off!" a dozen times until it gives up.
| Lammy wrote:
| In the future this stuff will get so good that the public will
| beg to be surveilled at all times because it will be the only way
| to prove what you didn't do. You will learn to love Total
| Information Awareness. Consent status: manufactured :)
| nostrademons wrote:
| It could easily go the other way, where the public doesn't care
| what people think they did or didn't do and just does whatever
| they want, because they don't respect the state and believe the
| social contract has been broken. "Fuck justice, talk to my
| AR-15."
|
| There's ample evidence that this is already happening, eg.
| recent headlines about kids being radicalized at increasingly
| younger ages, groups like No Lives Matter that embrace violent
| nihilism, increased domestic terrorism, record high gun
| ownership across both sides of the political spectrum,
| authority figures that just do whatever they want and ignore
| any form of law or accountability, etc.
| bilbo0s wrote:
| I don't know man?
|
| We're already at a place where most people don't care what
| other _people_ think of them.
|
| Issue is, as long as the government has the big guns, what
| the government thinks of you will still matter in a major
| way.
|
| In such an environment, most people are going to choose to
| have some kind of way to prove to the government what they
| did and what they didn't do. Not because they care what other
| people think as you're implying, but rather because they very
| much care that the government not get the wrong idea about
| them. Because the government getting the wrong idea about you
| can be fatal.
| nostrademons wrote:
| Government is based on the _threat_ of the use of force,
| not the _actual_ use of force. If you 're a government that
| is regularly using force against a significant proportion
| of your citizens, you have problems, and probably will not
| remain the government for long.
|
| I suspect that we're saying the same thing but with
| reversed causality. Both of us agree that non-deterministic
| enforcement breaks down the incentives needed for pro-
| social behavior. You're saying that this will cause people
| to demand ways to improve the governments enforcement
| abilities. I'm saying that this will cause people to adapt
| their behavior to the new, lessened enforcement abilities.
| In defense of my point, I'd point out that changes to
| government are a coordination problem while adaptation of
| behavior is an individual-only response, and it is _much_
| easier to effect changes to your own behavior than it is to
| convince 300 million people to agree on a solution and
| implement it, particularly when the root problem is a lack
| of enforcement ability.
| bilbo0s wrote:
| Keep in mind that being able to demonstrate your
| innocence to the government is also just an individual
| change in behavior. A person might not necessarily care
| if _you_ use the tracking technologies or submit yourself
| to all the cameras in society. But they 'll choose to do
| it themselves just so that there's that record out there.
|
| The government coming up with one way to track everyone
| is not really necessary to get people to submit to
| tracking. In fact, most of the law enforcement "watcher"
| types wouldn't want that anyway. Not only is having a
| myriad number of ways to track and surveil people is far
| preferable to law enforcement, but it also allows people
| to individually choose to set up all the Ring doorbells
| and security cameras and GPS trackers and smart glasses
| based body cams etc etc all on their own.
|
| And they'll happily choose to buy all that stuff
| voluntarily and without regard to what everyone else is
| doing.
| nostrademons wrote:
| I think the issue demonstrated by this article is that
| technology is getting such that demonstrating your
| innocence to the government is _not_ an individual change
| of behavior, and that there are ways to abuse the
| demonstration mechanisms that effectively feed false
| information to the government.
|
| Imagine that the populace supports widespread
| surveillance techniques, and so cameras are setup
| everywhere. Some hacker group figures out how to hack
| into the cameras and insert deepfakes in them. Now
| members of that hacker group have a government-proof
| alibi whenever they want it, and can commit crimes at
| will, and get it blamed on others. Justice goes out the
| window.
| tgv wrote:
| I'll say it again, even though it is rather unpopular here: there
| has never been a need to develop these tools, nor one to make
| them easy to deploy, nor one to make them easy to use. Yet all
| this has happened, and now it may occur that someone is acquitted
| because AI generated media is so good, the evidence might be
| artificial. If that happens, and the suspect commits another
| crime, it's on the conscience of the people that contributed to
| this. You cannot create something and pretend its use has nothing
| to do with you.
|
| The tools aren't perfect yet, so it's not too late to stop. Stop
| the ridiculous image and audio generation tools before it's too
| late. Nothing of value is lost when these models are made private
| again, and research is simply halted.
| cootsnuck wrote:
| It actually is too late for that. For anyone unaware, the open
| source models are already more than sufficient enough for
| imitations and deepfakes. For better or worse there's no going
| back.
|
| Personally, I'd rather we all know this tech is out there and
| develop defense mechanisms rather than thinking hiding it away
| will prevent harm.
|
| The cyber security industry exists because of all the privacy
| and security issues posed by all the tech we already have had
| for the past several decades.
|
| I'm confident the same will happen for AI simply because it is
| a business opportunity and other businesses and institutions
| are already talking about these issues.
| bdangubic wrote:
| _You cannot create something and pretend its use has nothing to
| do with you._
|
| has always worked with guns so it'll always work with anything
| else :) and guns will kill more people that AI-generated shit
| for foreseeable future
| qwertox wrote:
| I do want a computer which talks to me like a person, with that
| agility. I am used to listening to voice.
|
| I am tired of reading so much stuff which could well be spoken
| to me. Like this comment here, which you now need to read.
|
| It's only very recently that living beings on this world have
| learned to read and write, it's not normal. It's normal to
| communicate through sound.
| krainboltgreene wrote:
| What an incredible line to end on. "It's not normal to
| read/write".
| qwertox wrote:
| I'm not aware of any other species which is capable of
| reading and writing. But many can certainly hear and make
| sounds.
| MichaelDickens wrote:
| I'm not aware of any other species with a >10,000 word
| vocabulary, either.
| educasean wrote:
| Fatalities due to automobile accidents are a major drag. We
| should've stuck with horses
| a2128 wrote:
| There is some use to bringing deepfakes to mass adoption. The
| thing is that since the tech exists, powerful actors with lots
| of resources will develop these tools for their own use either
| way. The question is whether they'll be able to fool the masses
| who are unaware that such realistic deepfakes can exist, or
| whether they will have no effect as everyone and their mom have
| already seen similar AI slop on their Facebook feed
| recursive wrote:
| Here's my plan.
|
| 1. Cryptographically hash each piece of media when it's recorded.
|
| 2. Submit the hash to a "trusted" authority.
|
| 3. It will add a timestamp and sign the result.
|
| 4. Now, as long as you keep the original, without re-compressing,
| and you trust the authority, you have some evidence that the
| media existed at a timestamp. On or before.
|
| This doesn't prove authenticity, but in many cases, establishing
| a timestamp would be enough. Forgeries probably wouldn't be
| created until later, after the shit hit the fan.
|
| Or maybe this doesn't work at all.
| AnthonyMouse wrote:
| Thieves are planning an inside job. They forge the surveillance
| video ahead of time, do the theft and submit the forgery to be
| timestamped while it's happening.
|
| Also, a lot of surveillance systems are purposely kept offline
| to prevent them from being compromised, but your system doesn't
| allow that because they would need external connectivity to get
| signatures.
| lolc wrote:
| Sure when you're controlling the source, you can fake it. But
| requiring the fakes be prepared ahead of time locks the faker
| into one story that may be contradicted by other evidence.
| AnthonyMouse wrote:
| That's pretty much what happens anyway. The police are
| going to come collect the footage as soon as the crime is
| reported and you can't change it after they do.
| tiahura wrote:
| Why can't objecting party ask to voir dire the witness and find
| out if they can distinguish between AI and real recordings?
| gortok wrote:
| What shocks (and irritates!) me is that Charles Schwab keeps
| wanting me to set up voice ID. Why would I want to set up a voice
| ID for something that is now trivially spoofed?
| alamortsubite wrote:
| When was the last time you encountered this? I remember getting
| nags up until around the end of last year, but not lately. I
| like to think they dropped the program because I expressed
| concerns about it to so many reps, but more likely I've just
| been dialing in on a different number.
| MichaelDickens wrote:
| Schwab used to have an 8 character maximum on passwords
| (although at least they changed that). They have never been a
| paragon of good security practices.
| belter wrote:
| To avoid the scenarios like the one described in the court case,
| setup a family password or keyword. The bot will not know it.
| TeeMassive wrote:
| I think we're going to see C2PA (https://c2pa.org/) being
| mandatory for cellphones. At least when there's at least one
| implementation and that all digital cameras has an integrated
| TPM.
| TriangleEdge wrote:
| AI threatens all digital perceptions, not just voice. Images,
| videos, recordings, ... I think soon enough proving things in
| court beyond a reasonable doubt when the evidence is digital
| media will be difficult/impossible.
| PolieBotics wrote:
| I've developed a novel approach to creating tamper-evident video
| via cryptographic feedback loops between projectors and cameras.
| The process works as follows:
|
| 1. A projector displays a challenge pattern (derived from a
| Perlin noise function of a hash) 2. A camera captures this
| projection 3. The system hashes the captured image and uses it to
| derive the next projection 4. This chain demonstrates true
| temporal sequentiality that's difficult to forge
|
| By incorporating random noise derived from Byzantine Fault
| Tolerant networks and using these networks as timestamping
| servers, the proofs inherit the network's decentralization
| properties. ML then confirms that the feature distributions in
| projection-photograph pairs match expected patterns from the
| training dataset.
|
| Demo video and GitHub repo available here:
| https://www.reddit.com/r/PoliePals/comments/1j8qm2j/truth_be...
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