[HN Gopher] Verifiable science on modified PCR machine
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Verifiable science on modified PCR machine
Author : kotaKat
Score : 28 points
Date : 2025-03-01 14:24 UTC (1 days ago)
(HTM) web link (github.com)
(TXT) w3m dump (github.com)
| therein wrote:
| Good idea. Interests are too aligned in one direction to falsify
| results.
| progbits wrote:
| Really nice project.
|
| I have a few questions if the authors or anyone knowledgeable is
| around.
|
| From the listed features: Cryptographic signing
| of all test results Tamper-evident resin seals on all
| connections and access points Any attempts to open or
| modify the machine result in visible damage to security seals
|
| This sounds like tampering won't break the signing, but only
| leaves evidence. How would this be enforced? Is the idea that a
| third party would regularly inspect the machine, and if evidence
| of tampering is found any results signed since last inspection
| are not to be trusted?
|
| > The system is designed for use in supervised laboratory
| environments where sample chain of custody is maintained. While
| the machine can't prevent sample swapping before testing, it
| ensures that once a sample is tested, the results cannot be
| manipulated.
|
| Two questions here:
|
| - Would an approach where you have to commit to a sample label
| before testing help? Before running the machine you say "ok this
| is sample of experiment X on patient Y", this gets written to a
| third party transparency log, and only then the machine will
| produce a result and sign it together with a reference to the
| log. Later you can't hide such results, or run the samples again.
|
| - Maybe the "supervised laboratory" answers my first question of
| inspecting the machines for tampering, if we assume the
| laboratory itself is to be trusted, and that only researchers
| might falsify results. Is this reasonable assumption? Wouldn't
| the laboratory or the institution be also incentivized to at
| least overlook cheating?
| enopod_ wrote:
| As much as i like the idea--but this project will not prevent any
| fraud. It begins with what you load into the PCR thermocycler.
| Samples, controls, primers are all things that can easily be
| manipulated and not be traced back. Everyone with a little
| knowledge about PCR can make a PCR look exactly the way they want
| it to look. That's why replication is the gold standard in
| science. Will other scientists come to the same results when they
| perform a published experiment in their own lab?
| genewitch wrote:
| > Will other scientists come to the same results when they
| perform a published experiment in their own lab?
|
| Betteridge says "no" - https://www.nature.com/articles/533452a
| for instance...
| mbreese wrote:
| I'm a bit curious about what the purpose of this is... PCR
| machines in and of themselves don't have an output. However, this
| is about a specific real-time PCR machine, which does have a
| digital output. It is a simple mistake, but is an important
| distinction. And it makes me wonder about how much experience the
| authors have in a lab setting. It's important to know how these
| systems are used in real life to know what is really practical.
|
| This looks like a very interesting project in exploring how much
| work would really go into locking down a specific instrument.
| Spoiler -- This is a lot of work! But, now knowing how much
| effort there is here, I don't see how practical it would be.
|
| I'm not convinced that locking down each specific piece of
| equipment is really the answer to the issue (which I agree is a
| problem). There are too many different types of equipment to
| really make a dent in locking down a lab's workflow. What might
| work though is a resource for signing digital assets/output files
| to prove the raw data is unaltered. You couldn't stop someone
| from uploading an altered digital file, but you'd have a digital
| pop trail for when a file was created. That coupled with a lab
| notebook, and you'd have a pretty good audit trail.
|
| I've done a bit of work in this space a long time ago. The
| hardest part was always getting people to actually use the
| system. Now that journals are starting to require copies of all
| raw results used in figures, this type of system would make more
| sense and could make a real impact.
| perching_aix wrote:
| Rather than verifying the science the machine performs, this
| project seems to be about verifying the machine's integrity
| instead. I worry that without heavy disclaimers, this can mislead
| people about the character of the improvement this may provide,
| which is dangerous in its own right. From what I understand,
| verifiable imaging as a whole suffers from this too.
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