[HN Gopher] One Head, Two Brains: The origins of split-brain res...
___________________________________________________________________
One Head, Two Brains: The origins of split-brain research (2015)
Author : shry4ns
Score : 62 points
Date : 2025-02-19 19:22 UTC (3 days ago)
(HTM) web link (www.theatlantic.com)
(TXT) w3m dump (www.theatlantic.com)
| neonate wrote:
| https://web.archive.org/web/20241228215151/https://www.theat...
|
| https://archive.ph/gJ32A
| zonkerdonker wrote:
| The confabulation to justify picking out related images that the
| left brain never observed (chicken and snow shovel in the
| article) reminds me profoundly of the confident slop produced by
| LLMs. Make you wonder if llms might be one half of the "brain" of
| a true AGI
| jjtheblunt wrote:
| along those lines, maybe dreaming is piecing together new
| adventures imagined from snippets of reality.
| encipriano wrote:
| Those videos about ai making up a game after having watched
| countless hours of streaming is fucked up. It looks
| completely how dreams do
| MathMonkeyMan wrote:
| That's a theme in the novel "Neuromancer".
| danielmarkbruce wrote:
| confident slop.
| nuancebydefault wrote:
| I believe most confident statements people make, are
| established the same way. There are some anchor points
| (inputs and vivid memories) and some part of the brain in
| some stochastic way dreams up connections. Then we convince
| ourselves that the connections are correct, just because they
| match some earlier seen pattern or way of reasoning.
| zdragnar wrote:
| The basis of human irrationality is not tied to the basis
| of LLM irrationality.
|
| LLMs don't get to make value judgements, because they don't
| "understand". They predict the subsequent points of a
| pattern given a starting point.
|
| Humans do that, but they also jade their perception with
| emotive ethics, desires, optimism and pessimism.
|
| It is impossible to say that two humans with the exact same
| experience would always come to the same conclusion,
| because two humans will never have the exact same
| experience. Inputs include emotional state triggered by
| hormones, physical or mental stress, and so forth, which
| are often not immediately relevant to any particular
| decision, but carried over from prior states and biological
| processes.
| svachalek wrote:
| Just because humans have additional sources of
| irrationality doesn't mean they don't also have
| irrationality based on the same lack of self-awareness
| that LLMs exhibit.
| nuancebydefault wrote:
| I could understand that argument as follows: LLMs fill in
| the gaps in a creative but predictable way. Humans fill
| in the gaps in creative but unpredictable ways. The
| creativeness level is affected by the ad hoc state of the
| brain.
|
| I understand that you relate judgement, ethics and
| emotions to 'understanding'. I'm not convinced. Emotions
| might as well be an effect of pattern matching. You hear
| a (pattern matched) type of song, you feel a certain way.
| lo_zamoyski wrote:
| Conversely, human beings with varying particular
| experiences can come to the same conclusions, because
| human cognition can abstract from particulars, while LLMs
| are, at best, statistical and imagist. No two of us ever
| experience the same set of triangles, but abstraction
| allows us to form concepts like "triangularity", which
| means we can _understand_ what it means to be a triangle
| per se (something that is not concrete or particular, and
| therefore cannot be visualized), while an LLM can only
| proceed based on the _concrete_ and _particular_ data of
| input triangles and derivations introduced into the
| model. It can never go "beyond" the surface features of
| the training model's images, as it were, and where the
| appearance of having done so occurs, it is not via
| abstraction, but by way of product of human abstraction.
| From the LLM's perspective, there is no triangle, only
| co-occurrence of features, while abstraction goes beyond
| features, stripping them away to obtain the bare,
| unimaginable form.
| Lerc wrote:
| The confidence seems to be an artifact of fine tuning. The
| first instruction trained models were given data sets with
| answers to questions but generally omitted non answers to
| things the model didn't know.
|
| Later research showed that models know that they don't know
| certain pieces of information, but the fine tuning constraint
| of providing answers did not give them the ability to express
| that they didn't know.
|
| Asking the model questions against known information can
| produce a correct/incorrect map detailing a sample of facts
| that the model knows and does not know. Fine tuning a model
| to say "I don't know" in response to the those questions
| where it was incorrect can allow it to generalise the concept
| to its internal concept of unknown.
|
| It is good to keep in mind that the models we have been
| playing with are just the first ones to appear. GPT 3.5 is
| like the Atari 2600. You can get it provide a limited
| experience for what you want and its cool that you can do it
| at all, but it is fundamentally limited and far from an ideal
| solution. I see the current proliferation of models to be
| like the Cambrian explosion of early 8 bit home computers.
| Exciting and interesting technology which can be used for
| real world purposes, but you still have to operate with the
| knowledge of the limitations forefront in your mind and
| tailor tasks to allow them to perform the bits they are good
| at. I have no-idea of the timeframe, but there is plenty more
| to come. There have been a lot of advances revealed in
| papers. A huge number of those advances have not yet
| coalesced into shipping models. When models cost millions to
| train you want to be using a set of enhancements that play
| nicely together. Some features will be mutually exclusive. By
| the time you have analysed the options to find an optimal
| combination, a whole lot of new papers will be suggesting
| more options.
|
| We have not yet got the thing for AI that Unix was for
| computers. We are just now exposing people to the problems
| that drives the need to create such a thing.
| codr7 wrote:
| It certainly looks like what LLMs are doing is one aspect of
| what a brain is doing.
| ggm wrote:
| Key point here is "looks like" I suggest if you want to argue
| this further to invest the time asking Brain Scientists what
| they think. Not AI scientists but people who actually work in
| cognition.
|
| (Not a brain scientist btw)
| Hacker_Yogi wrote:
| I disagree with Steven Pinker's claim that consciousness arises
| from the brain.
|
| This perspective fails to establish that the brain produces
| consciousness, as it relies on the mistaken assumption that
| "mind" and "consciousness" are interchangeable. While brain
| activity may influence the mind, consciousness itself could be a
| more fundamental aspect of reality. Rather than generating
| consciousness, the brain might function like a radio, merely
| receiving and processing information from an all-pervasive field
| of consciousness.
|
| In this view, a split-brain condition would not create two
| separate consciousnesses but instead allow access to two distinct
| streams of an already-existing, universal consciousness.
| actionfromafar wrote:
| Descartes was pretty much on the same page.
| at_a_remove wrote:
| I cannot see how one might perform an experiment to determine
| which concept is correct. As with most things which are
| unfalsifiable, the idea can be amusing for a bit but is
| ultimately not useful to the extent that you can do anything
| about it. You cannot serve tea from Russell's Teapot.
| cognaitiv wrote:
| If the brain is a receiver, information transfer could happen
| non-locally and the tea might be telepathy, precognition, or
| remote viewing. In the split brain example, demonstrating an
| ability to coordinate between hemispheres in ways not
| predicted by neural separation might challenge the physical
| origin of consciousness as with the chicken and shovel
| anecdote.
|
| Experiments demonstrating an external source of consciousness
| would be very interesting.
|
| Not a teapot in this case!
| cognaitiv wrote:
| Or communicate telepathically with dogs.
| at_a_remove wrote:
| Ah, no.
|
| Suppose you do all kinds of studies and not show any
| telepathy, precog, or remote viewing. You could still say
| that the brain was only a receiver. None of that would
| _disprove_ the "brain-as-consciousness-receiver" concept,
| you would just say that, I guess it is one way, no
| telepathy.
|
| It's not disprovable. And so, kind of boring.
| kerblang wrote:
| It's not Steven Pinker's claim alone. Gazzaniga agrees, I
| think, and I know of one other prominent neuroscientist but
| don't remember his name. Pinker is "just" a psychologist.
|
| (Edit: Michael Graziano is who I was trying to remember - he
| uses the words "schematic" and "model")
|
| Your view is called "pan-psychism". It's interesting, but there
| isn't anything that makes it necessary. Everything we're
| finding out is that most or all thinking happens outside of
| consciousness, and the results bubble up into it as perception.
| Consciousness does seem to be universal _within_ the brain,
| though.
|
| I find pan-psychism interesting just because of its popularity
| - people want something spiritual, knowingly or not. I would
| advise not to insist that consciousness==soul, however, as
| neuroscience seems to be rapidly converging on a more mundane
| view of consciousness. It's best to think of one's "true" self
| according to the maxim that there is much more to you than
| meets the mind's eye.
| codr7 wrote:
| Or, people are spiritual, and realize it to different
| degrees. It's very easy to get confused about what we know
| and don't know on these subjects.
| antonkar wrote:
| Yep, some unfinished philosophy if you're into it: you can
| imagine that our universe at a moment of time has is just a
| giant geometric shape, then at the next moment the universe
| somehow changes into the this new shape. How does this change
| happen? Some believe it's a computation according to a rule/s,
| some that it's not a discrete change but a continuous equation
| that changed the shape of the universe from one to another.
| Basically you can imagine the whole universe as a long-exposure
| photography in 3d and then there is some process that "forgets"
| almost all of it leaving only slim slices of geometry and
| changing from one slice into another. This forgetting of the
| current slice and "recalling" the next, is consciousness, the
| time-like process. And it looks like the Big Bang was like
| matter converted to energy (or "space converted to time")
| process. The final falling into a giant black hole will be the
| reverse: energy converted to matter (or "time converted to
| space"). Some say electrons are like small black holes, so we
| potentially experience the infinitesimal qualia of coming into
| existence and coming out of existence, because we are
| sufficiently "time-like" and not too much "space-like". I'll
| soon write a blog post ;)
| jstanley wrote:
| If consciousness doesn't arise from the brain, it seems to be
| _suspiciously_ well correlated with the brain.
|
| I think consciousness arises from the brain.
| MailleQuiMaille wrote:
| "If the music I dance to doesn't arise from the radio, it
| seems to be suspiciously well correlated with the radio.
|
| I think the music I dance arises from the radio."
| dbtc wrote:
| Well, it must all come from a singularity some time before
| the Big Bang.
|
| Yet, when I turn the radio on, music really does seem to
| come out of it.
|
| And when I turn the radio off, the music stops (for me, but
| not for you).
|
| Without the radio there is no sound, but the radio needs a
| signal.
|
| Does the radio make the music? Quite an interesting
| metaphor.
| MailleQuiMaille wrote:
| Yes ! I like it even more when you consider the
| brainwaves that deal with...frequency...hmm...
| kulahan wrote:
| Note that in this scenario, we've never even heard of radio
| stations or radio waves before.
| yencabulator wrote:
| And despite looking for them intensely, we have never
| found any evidence of the existence of radio waves, or
| been able to send a signal to a radio ourselves.
| jstanley wrote:
| Postulate 1: The music is created by the radio in the form
| of sound waves, the end.
|
| Postulate 2: The music was played by a band in the form of
| sound waves, some time in the past. The band recorded their
| music on to some storage medium so that it could be
| transmitted to the future. In the present, the storage
| medium is connected up to a piece of equipment that turns
| the recorded signal into some invisible power transmission
| that spreads throughout space in a way you can't experience
| directly with any of your natural senses. The radio however
| can sense these invisible power transmissions and can turn
| them back into audio that sounds like what the band played
| in the past. So we're saying that it is possible to create
| music in the form of sound waves (that's what the band
| did), and it is possible for the radio to output sound
| waves that sound like music (that's what the radio does),
| but the radio is curiously not the thing that is producing
| music and instead we have an enormous system of technology
| transmitting the music across space and time.
|
| You'd need an awful lot of evidence to convince me that
| postulate 2 is true and postulate 1 is false.
|
| On the one hand you have "consciousness can be created, and
| it is created by the brain". On the other hand you have
| "consciousness can be created, and it is created somewhere,
| but it's not created by the brain, instead it is created
| somewhere else and there is a system of consciousness
| transmission that gets it into the brain".
|
| There's just no reason to prefer the second explanation. It
| is a more complicated story.
| selcuka wrote:
| > I think consciousness arises from the brain.
|
| I tend to agree, but it doesn't fully explain Benj Hellie's
| vertiginous question [1]. Everyone seems to have brains, but
| for some reason only _I_ am me.
|
| If we were able to make an atom-by-atom accurate replica of
| your brain (and optionally your body, too), with all the
| memories intact, would you suddenly start seeing the world
| from two different pair of eyes at the same time? If no, why?
| What would make you (the original) different from your
| replica?
|
| [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vertiginous_question
| spiderfarmer wrote:
| New commits.
| trescenzi wrote:
| I don't understand how this refutes physicalism. Only my
| eyes are hooked up to my brain. If you duplicate the whole
| system there would be a duplicate that would begin
| experiencing its own version of reality.
| selcuka wrote:
| > I don't understand how this refutes physicalism.
|
| Maybe it doesn't and there is a plausible explanation,
| that's why it has been an unanswered question. But it's
| definitely an astonishing question.
|
| You instincitively say that even if you duplicate the
| whole system "you" would remain as "you" (or "I", from
| your point of view), and the replica would be someone
| else. In this context you claim that there is a new
| consciousness now, but there was supposed to be one,
| because our initial assumption was consciousness ==
| brain.
|
| You are right if you define consciousness as being able
| to think, but when you define it as what makes you "you",
| then it becomes harder to explain who the replica is. It
| has everything (all the neurons) that makes you "you",
| but it is still not "you".
|
| The above may not make sense as it is difficult for a
| layman such as me to explain the vertiginous question to
| someone else. I suggest you to read the relevant
| literature.
| trescenzi wrote:
| Oh yes if the question is if the duplicate is also _me_
| then I understand the concern. That's a much more
| complicated question. But when it comes to perspective
| it's easy to answer. Which I guess is literally what the
| wiki page says it makes more sense as you state it
| though.
|
| Thanks for the additional explanation. I have read a good
| deal from Nagel to Chalmers and somehow missed this
| particular question.
| selcuka wrote:
| > I have read a good deal from Nagel to Chalmers and
| somehow missed this particular question.
|
| Chalmers' "Hard Problem" is very similar, although not
| exactly the same. My understanding is that it asks "why
| is there something called consciousness at all", as in, a
| robot doesn't have the notion of "I", but for some reason
| we do. The question is hard because it is hard to explain
| it only by our brains being more complex than a robot's
| CPU. Hellie's question is "why am I me and not someone
| else".
| ssfrr wrote:
| Say I walk into a machine, and then I walk out, and also
| an exact duplicate walks out of a nearby chamber. My
| assumption is that we'd both feel like "me". One of us
| would have the experience of walking into the machine and
| walking out again, and the other would have the
| experience of walking into the machine and being
| teleported into the other chamber.
|
| Im probably lacking in imagination, or the relevant
| background, but I'm having trouble thinking of an
| alternative.
| selcuka wrote:
| > My assumption is that we'd both feel like "me".
|
| You assume that both would feel like you, but there is no
| way you can prove it. The other can be a philosophical
| zombie [1] for all you know.
|
| Would the "current you" feel any different after the
| duplication? Most people, including me, would find this
| counterintuitive. What happens if the other you travels
| to the other end of the world? What would you see? The
| question is not how the replica would think and act from
| an outside observer's perspective, but would it have the
| same consciousness as you. Would you call the replica
| "I"?
|
| Or to make it more complex, what would happen if you save
| your current state to a hard disk, and an exact duplicate
| gets manufactured 100 years after you die, using the
| stored information?
|
| [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie
| kristiandupont wrote:
| Like GP, I feel that I might be imagining imagination
| here, but I really don't follow what this is supposed to
| reveal.
|
| >Would you call the replica "I"?
|
| The two would start out identical and immediately start
| to diverge like twins. They would share memories and
| personality but not experience? What am I missing here?
| polishdude20 wrote:
| I too don't get what's being missed.
| maksimur wrote:
| I understand what the author means, though I struggle to
| express it as well. The best I can come up with is this:
| What defines I? Is it separated from "I" and if so how?
| Or does I merely appears that way because our perspective
| is informed by our limited being?
| jstanley wrote:
| > Would you call the replica "I"?
|
| Both of the replicas would refer to themselves as "I",
| but neither would refer to the other as "I".
| peterlada wrote:
| It would be a fork. Identical experience until that point
| but bifurcated from the point of fork since it no longer
| occupies the same physical space
| jstanley wrote:
| I feel like this is just a totally stupid question.
|
| The brain has inputs, internal processing, and outputs. The
| conscious experience happens within the internal
| processing.
|
| If you make a second copy, then that second copy will also
| have conscious experience, but it won't share any inputs or
| outputs or internal state with the first copy.
|
| If you were to duplicate your computer, would the second
| computer share a filesystem with the first one? No. It
| would have a copy of a snapshot-in-time of the first
| computer's filesystem, but henceforth they are different
| computers, each with their own internal state.
|
| You could argue that there are ways to do it which make it
| unclear which is the "original" computer and which is the
| "copy". That's fine, that doesn't matter. They both have
| the same history up to the branching point, and then they
| diverge. I don't see the problem.
| selcuka wrote:
| When you replace "I" with "it" (as in your example with
| computers) the question becomes meaningless and stupid.
| As an outside observer both computers are the same, as
| they act exactly the same way, therefore there is no
| question. That is actually the "egalitarian" view in Benj
| Hellie's paper [1]:
|
| > The 'god's eye' point of view taken in setting up the
| egalitarian metaphysics does not correspond to my
| 'embedded' point of view 'from here', staring out at a
| certain computer screen.
|
| The vertiginous question (or Nagel's Hard Problem [2] to
| a degree: Why does physical brain activity produce a
| first-person perspective at all?) is about the
| subjectivity of consciousness. I see the world through my
| eyes, therefore there is only one "I" while there are
| infinitely many others.
|
| The duplication example was something I made up to
| explain the concept, but to reiterate, if I could make a
| perfect copy of me, why would I still see the world from
| the first copy's eyes and not the second, if the physical
| structure of the brain defines "me"? What stops my
| consciousness from migrating from the first body to the
| second, or both bodies from having the same
| consciousness? Again, this question is meaningless when
| we are talking about others. It is a "why am I me"
| question and cannot be rephrased as "why person X is not
| person Y".
|
| Obviously we don't have the capacity to replicate
| ourselves, but I, as a conscious being, instinctively
| know (or think) that I am always unique, regardless of
| how many exact copies I make.
|
| As I mentioned in another comment, I don't have a formal
| education on philosophy, so I am probably doing a
| terrible job trying to explain it. This question really
| makes sense when it clicks, so I suggest you to read it
| from a more qualified person's explanation.
|
| [1] http://individual.utoronto.ca/benj/ae.pdf
|
| [2] https://consc.net/papers/facing.pdf
| jstanley wrote:
| > Why does physical brain activity produce a first-person
| perspective at all?
|
| I agree that this question is mysterious and fascinating,
| I just don't think the question of forking your
| consciousness bears on it at all.
|
| The fact that first-person perspective exists is probably
| the fact that I am most grateful for out of all the facts
| that have ever been facts.
|
| But I don't have any difficulty imagining forking myself
| into 2 copies that have a shared past and different
| futures.
| card_zero wrote:
| Right, yes: _Why does physical brain activity produce a
| first-person perspective?_
|
| We might ask "what else do we expect it to do?" A
| _second_ person perspective makes even less sense. And
| since the brain 's activity entails first-person-
| perspective-like processing, the next most obvious
| answer, no perspective at all, isn't plausible either.
| It's _reasonable_ that the brain would produce a first
| person perspective as it thinks about its situation. (And
| you don 't have extend this to objects that _don 't_
| think, by the way, if you were thinking of doing that.)
|
| But I'm still left with the impression that there's an
| unanswered question which this one was only standing in
| for. The question is probably "what is thinking,
| anyway?".
|
| Or, something quite different: "Why don't I have the
| outside observer point of view?". It's somehow difficult
| to accept that when there are many points of view
| scattered across space (and time), you have a specific
| one, and don't have all of them: "why am I not
| omniscient?". It's egotistical to expect _not_ to have a
| specific viewpoint, and yet it seems arbitrary (and thus
| inexplicable) that you _do_ have one. But again, the real
| question is not "why is this so?" but "why does this
| seem like a problem?".
| card_zero wrote:
| Yes, the two of you would see through two pairs of eyes,
| independently.
|
| Both of you would be you, and you two would function
| separately, occupy separate spaces, and diverge slightly in
| ways that would only rarely make a difference to your
| personality.
|
| But that's not the vertiginous question, which is "why am I
| me". I've wondered that before. However, it _is_ nonsense.
| Naturally a person is that person, not some other person
| (and a tree is a tree, not some other tree). There 's
| nothing strange about this. Why would it be otherwise? So
| the urge to ask the question really reveals some deep-
| seated misconception, or some other question that actually
| makes sense, and I wonder what _that_ is.
| jodrellblank wrote:
| I wonder if the origin of the question is the religious
| idea of a separate immortal soul which popped into _this_
| body and not into some other body - but in some way
| _could have_. This concept is in popular discourse like
| "what if I had been born in Italy in 1420?!" as if that
| were a thing thats plausible - an "I" separate from this
| body /place/time/life
| experiences/memories/language/family/etc but somehow
| still 'me'.
|
| Boring materialism view is that a brain with genetics
| mixed from my parents and raised in the way I was raised,
| with the experiences I had here and in this time, is what
| makes "me" and I couldn't be anywhere or anyone else.
|
| Or another way, we are all everyone else - what it would
| be like if I was born to your parents and raised like you
| is ... you. What you would be like here is... me.
| card_zero wrote:
| Well, if I were you, I wouldn't worry about it.
| layer8 wrote:
| > What would make you (the original) different from your
| replica?
|
| You'd be in two different locations, have independent
| experiences, and your world lines would quickly diverge.
| Both of you would remember a common past.
|
| How do you know when you wake up in the morning that you
| are the same "I" as you remember from the previous day? Who
| isn't to say that the universe didn't multiply while you
| were asleep, and now there are two or more of you waking
| up?
|
| (You don't actually need to go to sleep to do this:
| https://cheapuniverses.com/)
| detourdog wrote:
| I think this is what severance is about.
| financetechbro wrote:
| The idea that the brain functions as a sort of radio capturing
| a consciousness field makes the most sense to me and also feel
| comforting in some way
| morkalork wrote:
| This is dualism, no.
| Barrin92 wrote:
| It's not a dualism at all. What the OP is proposing is
| similar to Spinoza (probably the most hardcore monist to ever
| exist), where mind is a fundamental property of the universe
| (in fact, there's only one mind) and each individual person
| is a 'mode' of it.
|
| It's effectively akin to talking about mass. Despite the fact
| that mass is observable as a distinct phenomenon in any
| object, it's obviously not accurate to say that you "produce
| mass" or that it's "your mass" in some private, ontologically
| separated way, it just appears that way, by definition if we
| look at particular manifestations of it.
| EMM_386 wrote:
| I've had numberous LLMs tell me that humans are conscious
| because we are like radio receivers, picking up a single
| consciousness field of the universe itself.
|
| So that's very interesting that you mention that.
| layer8 wrote:
| This would imply that the behavior of elementary particles in
| the brain (which ultimately cause our observable behavior via
| nerve signals and muscle movements, including the texts we are
| typing or dictating here) differs from the one predicted by the
| known physical laws. That's difficult to reconcile with the
| well-confirmed fundamental physical theories, and one has to
| wonder why nobody tries to experimentally demonstrate such
| known-physical-laws-contradicting behavior. It would be worth
| at least one Nobel Prize.
|
| Secondly, it wouldn't really explain anything. The
| "consciousness field" would presumably obey _some_ kind of
| natural laws like the known fields do, but the subjective
| experience of consciousness would remain as mysterious as
| before (for those who do find it mysterious).
| teddyh wrote:
| Related: _You Are Two_ by GCP Grey:
| <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wfYbgdo8e-8>
| 0x1ceb00da wrote:
| Looks like this was one of the inspirations behind severance.
| nuancebydefault wrote:
| The fact that the explaining part of the brain fills in any
| blanks in a creative manner (you need the shovel to clean the
| chicken shed), reminds me to some replies of LLMs.
|
| I once provided an LLM the riddle of the goat, cabbage and wolf,
| and changed the rules a bit. I prompted that the wolf was
| allergic to goats (and hence would not eat them). Still the llm
| insisted on not leaving them together on the same river bank,
| because the wolf would otherwise sneeze and scare the goat away.
|
| My conclusion was that the llm solved the riddle using prior
| knowledge plus creativity, instead of clever reasoning.
| drupe wrote:
| If one is interested in hemisphere theory, including
| psychological and philosophical implications, make sure to check
| out the work of Ian McGilchrist:
|
| https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3V3_Y_FuMYk
| GonzoBytes wrote:
| All of this is way above my paygrade, however.. There exists this
| work by Julian Jaynes called The Origin of Consciousness in the
| Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind:
| https://ia802907.us.archive.org/32/items/The_Origin_Of_Consc...
|
| Seems pertinent, and now I will try to read it again. Perhaps it
| will be useful for reference by others.
___________________________________________________________________
(page generated 2025-02-22 23:00 UTC)