[HN Gopher] Does X cause Y? An in-depth evidence review (2021)
       ___________________________________________________________________
        
       Does X cause Y? An in-depth evidence review (2021)
        
       Author : l0b0
       Score  : 218 points
       Date   : 2025-02-14 06:14 UTC (16 hours ago)
        
 (HTM) web link (www.cold-takes.com)
 (TXT) w3m dump (www.cold-takes.com)
        
       | uniqueuid wrote:
       | Oh what fun to discover the horror of causality!
       | 
       | For some areas of research, truly understanding causality is
       | essentially impossible - if well-controlled experiments are
       | impossible and the list of possible colliders and confounders is
       | unknowable.
       | 
       | The key problem is that _any_ causal relation can be an illusion
       | caused by some other, unobserved relation!
       | 
       | This means that in order to show fully valid causal effect
       | estimates, we need to
       | 
       | - measure precisely
       | 
       | - measure all relevant variables
       | 
       | - actively NOT measure all harmful (i.e. falsely correlated)
       | variables
       | 
       | I heartily recommend the book of why [1] by Pearl and Mackenzie
       | for a deeper reading and the "haunted DAG" in McElreath's
       | wonderful Statistical Rethinking.
       | 
       | [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Book_of_Why
        
         | kqr wrote:
         | Pearl's _Causality_ is very high on my  "re-read while making
         | flashcards" list. It is depressing how hard it is to establish
         | causality, but also inspiring how causality can be teased out
         | of observational statistics _provided one dares assume a model
         | on which variables and correlations are meaningful_.
        
           | uniqueuid wrote:
           | "provided one dares assume ..." - that's a great quote which
           | I'll steal in the future if you allow!
           | 
           | Most things we learn about DAGs and causality are
           | frustrating, but _simulating_ a DAG (e.g. with lavaan in R)
           | is a technique that actually helps in understanding when and
           | how those assumptions make sense. That 's (to me) a key part
           | of making causality productive.
        
         | KempyKolibri wrote:
         | I've heard Miguel Hernan's "What If" is also excellent, but not
         | got round to reading it.
        
           | uniqueuid wrote:
           | Yes it's great!
           | 
           | There is also this great book on causality in ML, but it's a
           | much heavier read:
           | 
           | Chernozhukov, V., Hansen, C., Kallus, N., Spindler, M., &
           | Syrgkanis, V. (2025). Causal Inference with ML and AI.
        
           | levocardia wrote:
           | For a lighter introduction to Hernan's ideas check out:
           | 
           | "The C-Word: Scientific Euphemisms Do Not Improve Causal
           | Inference From Observational Data"
           | (https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC5888052/)
           | 
           | "Does water kill? A call for less casual causal inferences"
           | (https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC5207342/)
        
         | alexpetralia wrote:
         | I have reflected on a good definition of causality and would be
         | curious if anyone has thoughts or critiques of it. I am
         | repasting part of my essay below.
         | (https://alexpetralia.com/2023/02/25/statistics-only-gives-
         | co...)
         | 
         | --
         | 
         | Can we nevertheless extract causality from correlation?
         | 
         | I would argue that, theoretically, we cannot. Practically
         | speaking, however, we frequently settle for "very, very
         | convincing correlations" as indicative of causation. A
         | correlation may be persuasively described as causation if three
         | conditions are met:
         | 
         | Completeness: The association itself (R2) is 100%. When we
         | observe X, we always observe Y.
         | 
         | No bias: The association between X and Y is not affected by a
         | third, omitted variable, Z.
         | 
         | Temporality: X temporally precedes Y.
        
           | kqr wrote:
           | I feel like you have this backwards. In the assignment Y:=2X,
           | each unit of Y is caused by half a unit of X. In the game
           | where we flip a coin at fair odds, if you have increased your
           | wealth by 8x in 3 tosses, that was caused by you getting
           | heads every toss. Theoretically establishing causality is
           | trivial.
           | 
           | The problem comes when we try to do so practically, because
           | reality is full of surprising detail.
           | 
           | > No bias: The association between X and Y is not affected by
           | a third, omitted variable, Z.
           | 
           | This is, practically speaking, the difficult condition. I'm
           | not so convinced the others are necessary (practically
           | speaking, anyway) but you should read Pearl if you're into
           | this!
        
           | uniqueuid wrote:
           | You are missing one crucial additional condition:
           | 
           | - No colliders have been included in the analysis, which
           | would _introduce_ appearance of causality that does not exist
        
           | HPsquared wrote:
           | Ruling out all Z is the almost-impossible part. It's hard to
           | prove a negative, especially with incomplete information.
        
           | stonemetal12 wrote:
           | What of the double slit experiment, where observation changes
           | the outcome? Do we call observation the cause of the outcome?
        
             | uniqueuid wrote:
             | In general you assume DAGs, i.e. non-cyclical causality.
             | Cyclical relations must be resolved through distinct
             | temporal steps, i.e. u_t0 causes v_t1 and v_t1 causes u_t2.
             | When your measurement precision only captures simultaneous
             | effects of both u on v _and_ v on u you have a problem.
        
           | dan_mctree wrote:
           | You probably also need at least: - Y does not appear when X
           | does not - We need an overwhelming sample size containing
           | examples of both X and not X - The experiment and data
           | collection and trivially repeatable (so that we don't need to
           | rely on trust) - The experiment, data collection and analysis
           | must be easy to understand and sensible in every way without
           | leaving room for error
           | 
           | And as another commenter already pointed out: You can't
           | really eradicate the existence of an unknown Z
        
         | currymj wrote:
         | even if you hit all the assumptions you need to make
         | Pearl/Rubin causality work, and there is no unobserved factor
         | to cause problems, there is still a philosophical problem.
         | 
         | it all assumes you can divide the world cleanly into variables
         | that can be the nodes of your DAG. The philosopher Nancy
         | Cartwright talks about this a lot, but it's also a practical
         | problem.
        
         | shadowgovt wrote:
         | And this is even before we get into the philosophical /
         | epistemological questions about "cause."
         | 
         | You can make the argument, from correlative data, that bridges
         | and train tracks cause truck accidents. And more importantly,
         | if you _act like they do_ when designing roadways, you
         | _actually will_ decrease truck accidents. But it 's a common-
         | sense-odd meaning of causality to claim a stationary object is
         | acting upon a mobile object...
        
         | QuantumGood wrote:
         | That colliders and confounders have technical definitions is
         | not known by some:
         | 
         | ------------------ Confounders ------------------
         | 
         | A variable that affects both the exposure and the outcome. It
         | is a common cause of both variables.
         | 
         | Role: Confounders can create a spurious association between the
         | exposure and outcome if not properly controlled for. They are
         | typically addressed by controlling for them in statistical
         | models, such as regression analysis, to reduce bias and
         | estimate the true causal effect.
         | 
         | Example: Age is a common confounder in many studies because it
         | can affect both the exposure (e.g., smoking) and the outcome
         | (e.g., lung cancer).
         | 
         | ------------------ Colliders ------------------
         | 
         | A variable that is causally influenced by two or more other
         | variables. In graphical models, it is represented as a node
         | where the arrowheads from these variables "collide."
         | 
         | Role: Colliders do not inherently create an association between
         | the variables that influence them. However, conditioning on a
         | collider (e.g., through stratification or regression) can
         | introduce a non-causal association between these variables,
         | leading to collider bias.
         | 
         | Example: If both smoking and lung cancer affect quality of
         | life, quality of life is a collider. Conditioning on quality of
         | life could create a biased association between smoking and lung
         | cancer.
         | 
         | ------------------ Differences ------------------
         | 
         | Direction of Causality: Confounders cause both the exposure and
         | the outcome, while colliders are caused by both the exposure
         | and the outcome.
         | 
         | Statistical Handling: Confounders should be controlled for to
         | reduce bias, whereas controlling for colliders can introduce
         | bias.
         | 
         | Graphical Representation: In Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs),
         | confounders have arrows pointing away from them to both the
         | exposure and outcome, while colliders have arrows pointing
         | towards them from both the exposure and outcome.
         | 
         | ------------------ Managing ------------------
         | 
         | Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs): These are useful tools for
         | identifying and distinguishing between confounders and
         | colliders. They help in understanding the causal structure of
         | the variables involved.
         | 
         | Statistical Methods: For confounders, methods like regression
         | analysis are effective for controlling their effects. For
         | colliders, avoiding conditioning on them is crucial to prevent
         | collider bias.
        
           | lenzm wrote:
           | If you have to start with apologies then you know, just stop
           | and don't post.
        
             | QuantumGood wrote:
             | Sure, but someone else did this for me, using AI, I found
             | it useful to scan in the moment. I appreciated it and
             | upvoted it.
             | 
             | Like that experience, this was meant as a scannable
             | introduction to the topic, not an exact reference. Happy to
             | hear altenative views, or downvote to give herding-style
             | feedback.
             | 
             | Had I done a short AI-generated summary, it would have been
             | a bit less helpful, but there wouldn't have been downvotes.
             | 
             | Had I linked instead of posted the same AI explanation,
             | there would have been no or fewer downvotes, because many
             | wouldn't click, and some of those that did would find it
             | helpful.
             | 
             | Had I linked to something else, many would not click and
             | read without a summary, both of which could have been AI-
             | created.
             | 
             | I chose to move on and accept a few downvotes. The votes
             | count less than the helpfulness to me. Votes don't mean it
             | helps or doesn't. Many people accept confusion without
             | seeking clarification, and appreciate a little help.
             | 
             | Although I personally do tend to downvote content-free
             | unhelpful Reddit-style comments, I'm not overly fond of
             | trying to massage things to help people manage their
             | feelings when posts are only information, with no framing
             | or opinion content. I understand that there is value in
             | downvotes as herding-style feedback (as PG has pointed
             | out). Yes, I've read the HN guidelines.
             | 
             | I think beyond herding-style feedback downvotes, AI info
             | has become a bit socially unacceptable--okay to talk about
             | it but not share it. But I find AI particularly useful as
             | an initial look at information about a domain, though not
             | trustworthy as a detailed source. I appreciate the
             | footnotes that Perplexity provides for this kind of usage
             | that let me begin checking for accurate details.
        
         | dan_mctree wrote:
         | And even if you do know there's causality (eg: the input
         | variable X is part of software that provides some output Y),
         | the exact nature of the causality can be too complex to analyze
         | due to emergent and chaotic effects. It's seldom as simple as:
         | an increase in X will result in an increase in Y
        
       | aqueueaqueue wrote:
       | So, Bayesian or Frequentist?
        
         | uniqueuid wrote:
         | Funnily enough that hardly matters here.
         | 
         | Causality is a largely _orthogonal_ problem to frequentist
         | /bayesian - it makes everything harder, not just one of those!
        
           | procaryote wrote:
           | Causality at least correlates with a lot of problems
        
             | uniqueuid wrote:
             | Yeah but in this case it's really a wrong way to think
             | about it.
             | 
             | If you have a DAG based on wrong assumptions, it doesn't
             | matter whether you get a point estimate based on null
             | hypothesis thinking or whether you get a posterior
             | distribution based on some prior. The problem is that the
             | way in which you combine variables is wrong, and bayesian
             | analysis will just be more detailed and precise in being
             | wrong.
        
           | GuB-42 wrote:
           | Does frequentist/bayesian matters to anything but quasi-
           | religious beliefs?
           | 
           | I mean, that's maths, either approach has to give the same
           | results, as they come from the same theory. The Bayes theorem
           | is just a theorem, use it explicitly or not, the numbers will
           | be the same because the axioms are the same.
        
             | uniqueuid wrote:
             | No, they are linked to beliefs (like anything else), but
             | the canonical forms do differ a lot. Most importantly:
             | 
             | - bayesian methods give you posterior distributions rather
             | than point estimates and SEs
             | 
             | - bayesian methods natively offer prior and posterior
             | predictive checks
             | 
             | - with bayesian methods, it's evidently easier to combine
             | knowledge from multiple sources, which null-hypothesis
             | testing struggles with (best way is probably still meta-
             | analyses)
        
       | Temporary_31337 wrote:
       | And don't even get me started on A leading to B
        
         | aqueueaqueue wrote:
         | The old headline: B happens as A happens.
         | 
         | Baby boom as solar panels sales skyrocket.
        
       | skirge wrote:
       | Most important factor on results of research are personal
       | beliefs, especially in "economics".
        
       | laurentlb wrote:
       | On a similar note, I enjoyed watching the video:
       | https://youtu.be/mQ56uOkjccg?si=1hpwGqv2dQqLQ-ME (by Nutrition
       | Made Simple!)
       | 
       | It takes a specific topic (here, health effects of red meat) and
       | explains how each type of study can provide information, without
       | proving anything. It helped me a lot understand the science
       | related to nutrition, where you never have perfect studies.
        
       | KempyKolibri wrote:
       | Dismissing all observational study designs out of hand because
       | they can be difficult and easy to perform poorly seems like quite
       | the take.
       | 
       | I see this all the time in people's interpretation of nutrition
       | research, and they do exactly as this article suggests and fall
       | back to the "intuitive option", and go onto some woo diet that
       | they eventually give up because they start feeling awful.
       | 
       | I would disagree that observational study designs should be
       | thrown out the window or that it makes sense to, as this article
       | seems to do, lump cross-sectional ecological data in with
       | prospective cohort studies.
       | 
       | Things often "make intuitive sense" only because of these study
       | designs. We used to get kids to smoke pipes to stave off chest
       | infections because it made "intuitive sense" and it's only
       | because of observational studies that we now believe smoking
       | causes lung cancer.
       | 
       | The direction of evidence from prospective cohort studies to RCTs
       | in the field of nutrition science on intake vs intake shows a 92%
       | agreement. If we take RCTs to be the "gold standard" of evidence
       | that best tracks with reality, it seems a little odd that these
       | deeply flawed observational studies that we should apparently
       | disregard seem to do such a good job coming to the correct
       | conclusions.
       | 
       | https://bmcmedicine.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s1291...
        
         | mistercow wrote:
         | > We used to get kids to smoke pipes to stave off chest
         | infections because it made "intuitive sense" and it's only
         | because of observational studies that we now believe smoking
         | causes lung cancer.
         | 
         | This is an interesting example, because I don't know of any
         | studies (although there probably are some, if only old ones)
         | specifically about whether smoking pipes staves off lung
         | infections, but the "intuitive sense" answer has changed
         | because of adjacent evidence. And in this case, it's not the
         | lung cancer evidence that makes it intuitively unlikely that
         | pipe smoking would be helpful, but a broader understanding of
         | what causes lung infections, and what tobacco smoke contains
         | and doesn't contain.
        
           | KempyKolibri wrote:
           | I think that's a fair critique! Probably would have been
           | better to say that the intuitive position was that smoking
           | was unrelated to lung cancer.
        
         | derbOac wrote:
         | It's important to be thoughtful about research interpretation,
         | but I'm kind of tired of kneejerk dismissal of observational
         | studies for a couple of reasons.
         | 
         | First, experiments have their own varieties of horrors. Many
         | are small N, with selective data reporting, and lack external
         | validity -- that is, the thing you really want to randomize is
         | difficult or impossible to randomize, so researchers randomize
         | something else as a proxy that's not at all the same. Other
         | times there's complex effects that distort the interpretation
         | of the casual pathway implied by the experiment.
         | 
         | Second, sometimes it's important to show that any association
         | exists. There are cases where it's pretty clear an association
         | is non-existent, based on observational data and covariate
         | analysis. You just don't hear about those because people stop
         | talking about them because of the null effects. So there's a
         | kind of survivorship bias in the way results are discussed,
         | especially in the popular literature.
         | 
         | It's easy to handwave about limitations of studies, it's much
         | harder to create studies that provide evidence, for logical,
         | practical, and ethical reasons. Why you'd want _less_
         | information about an important phenomenon isn 't clear to me.
        
         | not_kurt_godel wrote:
         | It is quite the take indeed; one that I posit resonates most
         | strongly with people whose societal views tend to conflict with
         | the available evidence.
        
       | mnky9800n wrote:
       | In my own research we are investigating how fluids cause changes
       | in rocks that allow for mineralization of CO2 and have such
       | problems of confounding variables (not terribly unique I
       | suppose). One thing we note is that, well, fluid comes from the
       | sky and goes into the ground. Thus, the deeper you go, the less
       | fluid there is since the pathways from the sky to deep into the
       | ground become more sparse as well as needing higher pressures to
       | enter these regions to either overcome capillary pressures in
       | existing fracture zones or to literally break the rock (which is
       | highly unlikely using naturally occuring pressures from fluids
       | from the sky). And so, literally everything in all the data sets
       | correlates with depth in some way. But in what way? well this has
       | many dependencies as well, did the rock that absorbed some of the
       | fluids grow in volume because of a chemical change? are the fluid
       | pathways currently connected? What kind of rock is absorbing the
       | fluids? Are microbes in the fluid absorbing contents from the
       | fluid that would otherwise be used for rock changes? and so you
       | are left with this giant pile of data (tens of terabytes) without
       | a clear connection between fluid and rock interactions except
       | that there is less fluids from the sky the deeper you go into the
       | rock. This is obvious, however it is also rather unhelpful when
       | trying to understand the other processes that exist. Of course
       | you might say, have you tried detrending your data? And the
       | answer is yes and to no effect. The simple truth is that this
       | depth dependency interacts in different ways with different
       | systems and there is no easy way to figure out how it does for
       | each sub-system such as the fluid rock chemistry interactions,
       | the rock fracture mechanics, the subsequent methane and hydrogen
       | that is produced and likely consumed by microbes, etc.
        
         | whatshisface wrote:
         | Have you tried checking to see if the depth dependency is
         | different in different large-scale geological regions?
        
       | epidemiology wrote:
       | In introductory epidemiology courses you'll usually get the
       | Bradford Hill criteria in the first week or two, which gives a
       | good foundation of determining public health causality. After
       | digging deeper, the entire field of causal inference is revealed.
       | 
       | A healthy respect for the difficulties of determining causality
       | is beneficial. Irrational skepticism ignoring the evidence of
       | strong observational research simply replaces it with... what
       | exactly? That's how we ended up with an 71 year old anti-vaccine
       | conspiracist as the health secretary.
        
       | jtrn wrote:
       | As a clinical psychologist, I find it increasingly frustrating to
       | sift through research studies that fail to meet even the most
       | basic standards of scientific rigor. The sheer volume of studies
       | that claim "X is linked to Y" without properly addressing the
       | correlation-versus-causation fallacy is staggering. It's not just
       | an oversight--it's a fundamental flaw that undermines the
       | credibility and utility of psychological research.
       | 
       | If a study is publicly funded, there should be a minimum
       | requirement: it must include at least two research arms--one with
       | an experimentally manipulated variable and a proper control
       | condition. Furthermore, no study should be considered conclusive
       | until its findings have been successfully replicated,
       | demonstrating a consistent predictive effect. This isn't an
       | unreasonable demand; it's the foundation of real science. Yet, in
       | clinical psychology, spineless researchers and overly cautious
       | annd/or power crazed ethics committees have effectively neutered
       | most studies into passive, observational, and ultimately useless
       | exercises in statistical storytelling.
       | 
       | And for the love of all that is scientific, we need to stop the
       | obsession with p-values. Statistical significance is meaningless
       | if it doesn't translate into real-world impact. Instead of
       | reporting p-values as if they prove anything on their own,
       | researchers should prioritize effect sizes that demonstrate
       | meaningful clinical relevance. Otherwise, we're left with a field
       | drowning in "statistically significant" noise--impressive on
       | paper but useless in practice.
        
         | gloomyday wrote:
         | Obsessing with p-values while at the same time shunning
         | replication studies and studies with negative results is a
         | catastrophe. It causes everyone to be confidently wrong way
         | more often than one would think at first.
         | 
         | What worth is a result with p<0.01 when the 10 previous
         | articles with negative results were never actually written?
        
           | parpfish wrote:
           | another contributing factor is that in psychology (and
           | possibly other fields), it's very hard to make a career doing
           | rigorous, incremental science that results in confident
           | outcomes because each step along the way, people just way
           | "yeah, sounds about right".
           | 
           | to make a career, you need to discovering quirky
           | counterintuitive findings that can be turned into ted talks
           | and 'one weird trick' clickbait. you become a big deal once
           | you start providing fodder for the annoying "well,
           | actually..." guy to drop on people at a dinner party/reddit
           | comment section.
        
       | zkmon wrote:
       | There is no causality, what so ever. The perceived causality is
       | built backwards, only to make something appear sensible. Every
       | event in this universe contributes as a cause to every other
       | event in the universe. It's like fluid flow. Every molecule of
       | the fluid affects the movement of every other molecule. The world
       | evolves in a fluid motion, not through isolated causal chains.
        
         | adrian_b wrote:
         | Tell that to one who gives you a punch in the face, that there
         | is no causal relationship between his desire to punch you and
         | your bloody nose :-)
        
           | zkmon wrote:
           | They just get a couple of harder punch back. But you missed
           | the point in your rush to make a dramatic comment. It's not
           | about how someone would interpret the causality or how they
           | react. It is about about how a set of events can't be
           | considered as an isolated system of chain of causally related
           | things, disconnected from other things. If you like to think
           | about it in terms of punches, I think you would get lots of
           | them.
        
         | bowsamic wrote:
         | The Scottish man still speaks it seems
        
         | Matumio wrote:
         | If you read the mathematical theory of causality (e.g. Pearl),
         | you'll learn that you must have the ability to make
         | interventions "from outside" (at least in theory) before you
         | can talk about causality. You have to define what is "inside"
         | the system you study.
         | 
         | If you define everything to be "inside", then causality
         | disappears because intervention disappears.
        
       | Kaotique wrote:
       | I think a lot of these kinds of studies are not really about
       | objectively studying a phenomenon but trying to prove a
       | predetermined point. The study is designed and adjusted until it
       | proves what it should prove. Then it's wrapped in a nice news
       | headline which goes away with all the details and subtleties and
       | used for political or economic gain. Reproducing the results is
       | not interesting and not funded. Other studies are then using
       | these results as sources to stack the house of cards even higher.
       | I think this does a lot of harm to science as a whole because a
       | lot of people disregard all scientific results as a result.
        
         | nkoren wrote:
         | Yeah, sadly, I think it's worth having "ulterior motives" on
         | the list.
         | 
         | One of the first time I got interested in reading medical
         | studies was when I saw a bunch of headlines announcing that a
         | randomized controlled trial had proved that echinacea was
         | ineffective for treating respiratory problems. This surprised
         | me, because I'd always been a dogmatic drinker of echinacea tea
         | whenever I had a cold, and had thought that it helped. But then
         | again, I come from a culture of damn dirty hippies, so I was
         | open to being wrong about it. Rather than rely on the
         | headlines, I decided to dig up the study itself.
         | 
         | Here's what the study actually found: that rubbing an
         | echinacea-infused ointment on your wrists has no effect on
         | respiratory health.
         | 
         | Er... yeah, no shit, Sherlock. Literally nobody uses echinacea
         | that way. You've just falsified a total straw-man of a
         | hypothesis, and based on the number of headlines generated off
         | the back of this, I think it's reasonable to presume there was
         | some kind of funded apparatus for disseminating that bogus
         | result.
         | 
         | Ever since then, I've learned not to trust the headlines when
         | it comes to trials, reserving judgment until I've looked at the
         | methodology. When I do, a lot come up short.
        
           | kridsdale1 wrote:
           | I've gotten in the habit of sending study pdf files to
           | Claude, having it write its own Abstract and headline from
           | the rest of the content, then comparing those to the
           | "organic" Abstract and headline.
        
         | Xcelerate wrote:
         | This is exactly what's going on in many situations. For any
         | proposed study, you can ask the question "Is there a possible
         | outcome of this study that would have a strong emotional effect
         | on someone?" If the answer is "yes", then I'd say it's more
         | likely than not that the study's results are already
         | compromised in some subtle way.
        
         | HPsquared wrote:
         | Like a lot of other noble pursuits, scientific enquiry can be
         | corrupted by money.
        
       | daoboy wrote:
       | It's layers of abstraction all the way down the light cone.
       | 
       | The causality is always present, we just don't have the
       | processing power to ensure with 100% certainty that all relevant
       | factors are accounted for and all spurious factors dismissed.
        
         | winternewt wrote:
         | This is what I miss for important subjects: an actual
         | ambitious, reductionist approach where in-depth cause-effect
         | analysis is performed for each individual sample.
        
       | Cappor wrote:
       | The question of whether X can cause Y remains open and requires
       | further research. The article highlights the importance of
       | thoroughly checking sources and methodology to draw clear
       | conclusions. This is an important step towards a deeper
       | understanding of such relationships.
        
       | gns24 wrote:
       | "A study using a complex mathematical technique claiming to
       | cleanly isolate the effect of X and Y. I can't really follow what
       | it's doing..."
       | 
       | This is a frustrating type of issue. Dismissing something with "I
       | don't understand this, but I don't believe it" isn't the sort of
       | thing I want to be doing. However, I don't have any desire to
       | waste time trying to understand what someone has done (and did
       | they really understand what they were doing themselves?) when
       | it's clear that the effect isn't cleanly isolated in the data and
       | no amount of mathematics is going to change that.
        
       | sujumayas wrote:
       | Am I the only one thinking through the reading of this: "Wait a
       | minute... isn't this article some kind of weak X then Y also?
       | Observation of many cases, with generalized causality concludes
       | that he just feels like x should cause Y? hahaha. Love the
       | article btw.
        
       | spacebanana7 wrote:
       | I disagree strongly with this mathematised notion of causality.
       | Two things can be perfectly correlated at all observed points in
       | history without necessarily being causal. There can always be
       | some unknown variable driving change in both.
        
         | ekianjo wrote:
         | Or they can also not be related at all and just happen by pure
         | coincidence.
        
         | ibeff wrote:
         | That's what the author deals with in the first part of the
         | article on observational studies. Randomized studies don't have
         | that problem.
        
       | talkingtab wrote:
       | I am slowly becoming convinced that studies are in fact cargo-
       | cultism. And there are many, many studies that confirm this.
       | 
       | But about causality. Long ago (old cars) I had a friend who told
       | me that most mornings his car would not start until he opened the
       | hood and wrapped some wires with tape (off with the old tape on
       | with the new). Then the car would start. Every now and then it
       | would take two wraps. Hmmm.
       | 
       | After he demonstrated this, I decided to try to help. I followed
       | the wires that were wrapped. Two of them. To my surprise they
       | were not connected at either end. This was insane, and yet his
       | study - and my own observation - demonstrated that wrapping these
       | two wires which were completely disconnected caused his car to
       | start. Now there is causality for you.
       | 
       | Except that if you have a more complex model of cars, there is a
       | sane explanation. Again this is an old car with a carburetor. In
       | case you don't know this is a little bowl of gas it that provides
       | a combustible mix of air and gas. If there is too much gas then
       | your car won't work. The mix is controlled by a little float that
       | controls the level of gas in the little bowl. Toilet bowls work
       | on the same principle.
       | 
       | If your float is bad (or other issues) your car engine would get
       | too much gas - be "flooded" and you have to wait until much of it
       | evaporates. So if you flood your car engine, go and wrap some
       | wires, it may be that your car will start right up.
       | 
       | So I rebuilt the carburetor and my friend never had that problem
       | again.
       | 
       | The moral of the story is that I had better "model" of how cars
       | work. But in the back of my mind I am aware that my model may be
       | or have been just as deficient. Did you know that we are
       | bombarded from space by an unknown type of neutrino that stops
       | electricity from working unless there is a little pool of some
       | liquid nearby or it is Thursday. I am going to do a study of
       | this.
       | 
       | There are very good reasons to understand how frail our ability
       | to understand causality is. And we are talking simple things
       | here. The scientific method is about EXPERIMENTS. Yes, I did that
       | in bold. Doing things. We have deeply complex situations we need
       | to understand and in my opinion, studies do not help.
        
         | gwern wrote:
         | > After he demonstrated this, I decided to try to help. I
         | followed the wires that were wrapped. Two of them. To my
         | surprise they were not connected at either end. This was
         | insane, and yet his study - and my own observation -
         | demonstrated that wrapping these two wires which were
         | completely disconnected caused his car to start. Now there is
         | causality for you.
         | 
         | You didn't show causality, though. You never randomized
         | anything. His study and your observation was purely
         | observational. At no point did you open the hood, get ready to
         | wrap the wires, and flip a coin to decide whether to wrap the
         | wires or do a placebo wrapping somewhere else.
         | 
         | Had you done that, you would have found, per your ultimate
         | explanation, that the wrapping made no causal difference: you
         | did the procedure, and either way, the car turned on. Hence,
         | there is no causality for you.
        
           | bwfan123 wrote:
           | imo, The idea of a cause is a logical concept of containment
           | when used in theories. A causes B means the phenomena
           | represented by A implies the phenomena represented by B. So,
           | causation is a device of our symbolization and understanding
           | of the world rather than anything fundamentally out there.
           | this is of course a controversial view.
           | 
           | Causality eventually demands a "theory" for full explanatory
           | power and understanding. Theories have premises, involve
           | inference, and have predictions. Otherwise, we get ad-hoc
           | models of phenomena via observations which is a great start,
           | but ends up as an oversimplification. X causes Y but, what
           | caused X or why did X cause Y and not Z ? models represent
           | phenomena while theories explain them. we start with models,
           | and then our curiosity eventually leads to a theory. refer
           | [1] for a great read from a physicist turned quant.
           | 
           | [1] https://www.amazon.com/Models-Behaving-Badly-Confusing-
           | Illus...
        
           | yccs27 wrote:
           | If I understand it correctly, they randomly decided to try
           | starting the car immediately or to go wrap the wires first.
           | This absolutely demonstrates a causality, they just didn't
           | cleanly separate the different factors which changed.
           | 
           | Your comparison to placebo is very apt: Giving medication to
           | a patient (vs not giving anything) _causes_ them to get
           | better, but it might be the  "giving a pill" part instead of
           | the "ingesting medication" part that matters.
        
         | Retric wrote:
         | > The scientific method is about EXPERIMENTS
         | 
         | IMO the model of that story is the S at the end of experiments
         | is more than just repeating the same things. Fixing the
         | carburetor was the second and vastly more informative
         | experiment, but your friend could have tried various
         | alternatives to doing exactly what he was doing which would
         | then uncover the time component.
         | 
         | Science digs into problems, so the most important part of meta
         | analysis, which is often ignored, is asking if the question
         | even makes sense in a generic context. Just as crucial is
         | narrowing down the effect size which may be dwarfed by random
         | noise in some experiments etc.
        
         | ramon156 wrote:
         | Doesn't this heavily apply to building software as well? e.g.
         | instead of spray and pray development we should get a better
         | understanding of the model we're working with.
         | 
         | If my parser gets null's when it should be non-null then I
         | first need to find where they could potentially even come from,
         | aka get a better understanding of the model I'm working with.
        
         | schneems wrote:
         | I liken this to the experience of playing an old school
         | fighting game in the era before the internet. You would be
         | mashing buttons when suddenly your character would do a power
         | move. Then spend the rest of the day trying to figure out how
         | to reproduce it.
         | 
         | If you could reproduce it, it would usually be intermittent.
         | Eventually you would learn "when I X then my character will Y,
         | but only sometimes.
         | 
         | This is due to the real command being a subset or being a
         | slight variation of what you thought was correct that you
         | accidentally do sometimes.
         | 
         | Even when it's ephemeral and seemingly random I still find
         | these things valuable. It's better to be able to reproduce it
         | sometime instead of never. Answering the question "is doing
         | this better than random?" (P95) can help you throw away a bad
         | hypothesis. Most people don't realize that when they are
         | providing evidence for causality they are competing with
         | random. If they had instead done jumping jacks or said a prayer
         | to the engine gods X times, then the correlation between the
         | wires and the engine might suddenly seem much weaker.
         | 
         | Once you have one hypothesis you can test it against others and
         | I believe that's powerful. Provided it's done systemically and
         | with at least a mild understanding of probability and error.
         | Also a hypothesis without a theory first scientific. Why did
         | your friend wrap the wires to begin with?
         | 
         | It's okay to act in random until we find some effect, but then
         | we also need to take the time to roll back (as you did) to ask
         | "WHY did this happen?" In which case you can begin the process
         | with a fresh hypothesis.
         | 
         | I feel when we are taught the scientific method in elementary
         | school it doesn't stick for most of us, even engineers.
         | Especially non-engineer folks. It seems at first blush like
         | some truisms strung together, but that simplicity hides very
         | powerful capabilities and subtle edge cases.
        
         | shadowgovt wrote:
         | I think the most fascinating thing about the practice of
         | science (and this is one of those things I wish I'd realized
         | sooner when learning physics) is that experimental evidence
         | often outstrips theory.
         | 
         | There are all manner of observable, reproducible behaviors in
         | nature that we barely have an explanation of. Those things
         | remain observable and reproducible whether we can tell a tidy
         | story about why they happen.
         | 
         | In a very meaningful sense, the local healer applying poultices
         | formulated from generations of experimentation is using science
         | much as the medical doctor is (assuming, of course, they're
         | taking notes, passing on the discoveries, and the results are
         | reproducible). The doctor having tied their results to the
         | "germ theory of medicine" vs. the local healer having tied
         | theirs to "the Earth Mother's energies impregnate the wound" is
         | an irrelevant distinction until (and unless) a need comes along
         | to unify the theory to some other observable outcomes.
        
           | atombender wrote:
           | That's true for simple things. You don't need to know what
           | the pharmacological mechanism of COX inhibitors is in order
           | to prescribe Advil for a headache. But if you're a scientist
           | trying to make a better Advil you probably need to know how
           | it works.
           | 
           | Doctors routinely prescribe medications that have no
           | randomized clinical trials supporting their use. In those
           | cases, clinical experience replaces trial data; they "know"
           | the drugs work because all the patients have effectively been
           | trial subject over a span of decades.
        
       | daft_pink wrote:
       | After reading this article, it would be really interesting to
       | have a study on whether they can do research to indicate when
       | correlation == causation and when correlation != causation for
       | any given study and what the factors and a tool so we can have a
       | simple risk assessment on whether there is a link or not.
        
       | BugsJustFindMe wrote:
       | > _Now, a lot of these studies try to "control for" the problem I
       | just stated - they say things like "We examined the effect of X
       | and Y, while controlling for Z [e.g., how wealthy or educated the
       | people/countries/whatever are]." How do they do this? The short
       | answer is, well, hm, jeez._
       | 
       | You mean they don't cluster the data into sets of overlapping
       | bins where the controlled attribute has approximately the same
       | value and then look for the presence of an XY relationship within
       | the bins instead of across them?
        
         | Sniffnoy wrote:
         | No. What they actually do is that they do a regression with
         | both X and Z among the independent variables, and then look
         | solely at the coefficients coming from X. (As mentioned in the
         | article.) Including Z as a dependent variable alongside X
         | "controls for" it in that now the coefficients for X are
         | supposed to not include any effect from Z (since any Z effect
         | should go in the Z coefficients). How well this works is
         | something I don't know enough to answer.
         | 
         | I don't actually know how the method you suggest compares in
         | the limit of finer bins. It's possible it might only achieve
         | similar results?
        
           | KempyKolibri wrote:
           | The smaller bins approach is adjustment via stratification.
           | 
           | Good primer on both here:
           | https://www.mynutritionscience.com/p/statistical-adjustment
        
       | einpoklum wrote:
       | > _I have to say, this all was simultaneously more fascinating
       | and less informative than I expected it would be going in._
       | 
       | Direct quote from the author of this post and I couldn't agree
       | more, particulartly about the post itself.
        
       | thenoblesunfish wrote:
       | As with many things, just understand what you are trying to do.
       | 
       | If you want to _predict_ Y and you know X, you can use data that
       | tell you when they happen together.
       | 
       | If you are trying to _cause_ (or prevent) Y, it 's harder. If you
       | can't do experiments (e.g. macroeconomics), it's borderline
       | impossible.
        
       | m3kw9 wrote:
       | so if we have a scenario where we have data points where when X
       | ball moves white ball also moves, but we're missing some direct
       | evidence where they actually hit each other or not. But they
       | correlate from the limited sample. I think this is what most
       | correlations are like, we do not see the direct atoms causing the
       | causation, only a probability
        
       | Chance-Device wrote:
       | Well, of course the conclusion is that you don't know, Mr.
       | Author. Because the very thing that triggered your interest in
       | the subject of X and Y was that there was no clear cut consensus
       | on the subject. If there were, you wouldn't have needed to do
       | research at any level of depth at all, because those findings
       | would be well known, and you'd have found them easily through a
       | simple web search.
       | 
       | Instead you were drawn to a topic which seemed ambiguous, which
       | had multiple possible interpretations, multiple plausible angles,
       | and on which nobody could agree. You didn't explicitly know these
       | things starting out, but they were embedded in the very
       | circumstances which caused you to investigate the subject
       | further.
       | 
       | Yes, determining causation is sometimes hard, is it also
       | sometimes very easy. However, very easy answers are not
       | interesting ones, and so we find ourselves here.
        
         | HPsquared wrote:
         | Nice hypothesis, but how do we prove it?
        
       | levocardia wrote:
       | Seems very dismissive and unaware of recent advances in causal
       | inference (cf other comments on Pearl). Putting "throw the
       | kitchen sink at it" regression a la early 2000s nutritional
       | research (which is indeed garbage in garbage out) in the same
       | category as mendelian randomization, DAGs, IP weighting, and
       | G-methods is misleading. I do worry that some of these EA types
       | dive head-first into a random smattering of google scholar
       | searches with no subject matter expertise, find a mess of
       | studies, then conclude "ah well, better just trust my super
       | rational bayesian priors!" instead of talking with a current
       | subject matter expert. Research -- even observational research --
       | has changed a lot since the days of "one-week observational study
       | on a few dozen preschoolers."
       | 
       | A more general observation: If your conclusion after reading a
       | bunch of studies is "wow I really don't understand the fancy math
       | they're doing here" then _usually_ you should do the work to
       | understand that math before you conclude that it 's all a load of
       | crap. Not always, of course, but usually.
        
         | Recursing wrote:
         | > I do worry that some of these EA types dive head-first into a
         | random smattering of google scholar searches with no subject
         | matter expertise, find a mess of studies, then conclude "ah
         | well, better just trust my super rational bayesian priors!"
         | instead of talking with a current subject matter expert.
         | Research -- even observational research -- has changed a lot
         | since the days of "one-week observational study on a few dozen
         | preschoolers."
         | 
         | EA types spend a lot of time talking with subject matter
         | experts, see e.g.
         | https://www.givewell.org/international/technical/programs/vi...
        
         | t_mann wrote:
         | We don't even need to go into the 2000's. The author openly
         | dismisses Generalized Method of Moments (published in 1982 by
         | Lars Hansen [0]) as a 'complex mathematical technique' that
         | he's 'guessing there are a lot of weird assumptions baked into'
         | it, the main evidence being that he 'can't really follow what
         | it's doing'. He also admits that he has no idea what control
         | variables are or how to explain linear regression. It's
         | completely pointless trying to discuss the subtleties of how
         | certain statistical techniques try to address some of his exact
         | concerns, it's clear that he has no interest in listening,
         | won't understand and just take that as further evidence that
         | it's all just BS. This post is a rant best described as
         | Dunning-Kruger on steroids, I have no idea how this got 200
         | points on HN and can just advise anyone who reads here first to
         | spare themselves the read.
         | 
         | [0] edit: Hansen was awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in
         | Economics in 2013 for GMM, not that that means it can't fail,
         | but clearly a lot of people have found it useful.
        
           | MichaelDickens wrote:
           | I think you are significantly misrepresenting what the author
           | said. He didn't say he has no idea what control variables
           | are. What he said is:
           | 
           | > The "controlling for" thing relies on a lot of subtle
           | assumptions and can break in all kinds of weird ways.
           | Here's[1] a technical explanation of some of the pitfalls;
           | here's[2] a set of deconstructions of regressions that break
           | in weird ways.
           | 
           | [1] https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/jour
           | nal...
           | 
           | [2] https://www.cold-takes.com/phil-birnbaums-regression-
           | analysi...
           | 
           | To me this seems to demonstrate a stronger understanding of
           | regression analysis than 90+% of scientists who use the
           | technique.
        
             | groby_b wrote:
             | > He didn't say he has no idea what control variables are
             | 
             | He did say exactly that.
             | 
             | > They use a technique called regression analysis that, as
             | far as I can determine, cannot be explained in a simple,
             | intuitive way (especially not in terms of how it "controls
             | for" confounders).
             | 
             | That's about as /noideadog as you can get.
        
           | roenxi wrote:
           | That is unfair, he says...
           | 
           | > "generalized method of moments" approaches to cross-country
           | analysis (of e.g. the effectiveness of aid)
           | 
           | Which is an entirely reasonable criticism. GMM is a complex
           | mathematical process, wiki suggests [0] that it assumes data
           | generated by a weakly stationary ergodic stochastic process
           | of multivariate normal variables. There are a lot of ways
           | that a real world data for aid distribution might be
           | nonergodic, unstationary, generally distributed or even
           | deterministic!
           | 
           | Verifying that a paper has used a parameter estimation
           | technique like that properly is not a trivial task even for
           | someone who understands GMM quite well. A reader can't be
           | expected to follow what the implications are from reading a
           | study; there is a strong element of trust.
           | 
           | [0]
           | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Generalized_method_of_moments
        
         | hn_throwaway_99 wrote:
         | Yeah, I found this article to be annoying AF, because it seemed
         | to fall into the same traps that he's accusing these study
         | authors of making in the first place. It seemed by the end of
         | it he was just trying to yell "correlation is not causation!"
         | but in an _even smarter_ "I am very smart" sort of way.
         | 
         | E.g. I certainly found myself agreeing with his points about
         | observational studies, and there are plenty of real-world
         | examples you can point to where experts have been lead astray
         | by these kinds of studies (e.g. alcohol consumption
         | recommendations, egg/cholesterol recommendations, etc.)
         | 
         | But when he talked about his reservations re "the wheat"
         | studies, they seemed really weak to me and semi-bizarre:
         | 
         | 1. Regarding "The paper doesn't make it easy to replicate its
         | analysis." I mean, no shit Sherlock? The whole point is that it
         | would be prohibitively expensive or unethical to carry out
         | these real experiments, so we rely on these "natural"
         | experiments to reach better conclusions.
         | 
         | 2. "There was other weird stuff going on (e.g., changes in
         | census data collection methods), during the strange historical
         | event, so it's a little hard to generalize." First, this seems
         | kind of hand-wavy (not all natural experiments have this
         | issue), but second and more importantly, of course it's hard to
         | "generalize" these kinds of experiments because their value in
         | the first place is that they're trying to tease out one
         | specific variable at a specific point in time.
         | 
         | 3. The third bullet point just seemed like it could be
         | summarized as "news flash, academics like to endlessly argue
         | about shit."
         | 
         | I think the fundamental problem when looking for "does X cause
         | Y", is that in the real world these are complex systems: _lots_
         | of other things cause Y too (or can reduce its chances), so you
         | 're only ever able to make some statistical statement, e.g. X
         | makes Y Z% more likely, on average. But even then, suppose
         | there is some thing that could make Y Z% more likely among some
         | specific sub-population, but make it some percent _less_ likely
         | in another sub-population (not an exact analogy but my
         | understanding is that most people don 't really need to worry
         | about cholesterol in eggs, but a sub-population of people is
         | very reactive to dietary cholesterol).
         | 
         | Basically, it feels like the author is looking for some
         | definitive, unambiguous "does X cause Y", but that's not really
         | how complex systems work.
        
       | fritzo wrote:
       | I like this writing style with unbound variables. Reminds me of
       | Maya Binyam's novel "Hangman", or Kafka's novels.
        
       | dang wrote:
       | Related. Others?
       | 
       |  _Does X cause Y? An in-depth evidence review_ -
       | https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30613882 - March 2022 (3
       | comments)
        
       | groby_b wrote:
       | "a technique called regression analysis that, as far as I can
       | determine, cannot be explained in a simple, intuitive way
       | (especially not in terms of how it "controls for" confounders)"
       | 
       | That sounds very much like a skills issue. Because it can. You
       | call out what you consider might be confounders as independent
       | variables (covariates). You can then use regression analysis to
       | estimate the individual contributions from each confounder, and
       | control for them by essentially filtering out that contribution.
       | 
       | Is reality harder than that? Yes. Much. The world of science
       | isn't 9th grade math, sorry. You are not entitled to understand
       | everything deeply with 5 minutes of mediocre effort.
        
       | stickfigure wrote:
       | I can't believe nobody has posted the obvious XKCD of relevance
       | yet:
       | 
       | https://xkcd.com/552/
        
       | skyde wrote:
       | is it only me or this completely miss all the recent research on
       | causal inference using causal graphical model ?
        
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