[HN Gopher] The Derelict (2015)
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       The Derelict (2015)
        
       Author : EndXA
       Score  : 38 points
       Date   : 2025-01-17 12:46 UTC (2 days ago)
        
 (HTM) web link (www.damninteresting.com)
 (TXT) w3m dump (www.damninteresting.com)
        
       | bell-cot wrote:
       | From Wikipedia's account -
       | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SS_Morro_Castle_(1930)#Causes - the
       | cause of the fire could be (in effect) an overheated storage
       | locker full of oily rags.
        
         | gwern wrote:
         | I think OP makes a good case that the cause of the fire was
         | probably the shortsighted poisoner, child rapist, human/dog
         | murderer, embezzler, thief, and bomber who apparently had
         | grudges against the captain who mysteriously died shortly
         | before the fire mysteriously started at the worst time & place
         | possible.
        
           | bell-cot wrote:
           | At least from Wikipedia's description - of the ship as a
           | disastrously ill-designed firetrap, with lackluster officers
           | and crew - there were an extremely large number of "worst
           | times & places" for a fire to start.
           | 
           | (BTW, you forgot to implicate the story's villain in the
           | ship's poor design, weak cadre of officers, and the departed
           | captain's slipshod safety training:)
        
             | gwern wrote:
             | That is the type of thinking I was criticizing. Your
             | standard swiss-cheese complex-failure model doesn't apply
             | when you are in an adversarial security setting.
             | 
             | When you do a post-mortem on a complex failure, the outcome
             | proves the accusation: "obviously the fire suppression was
             | inadequate, because it didn't suppress the fire; QED". This
             | sort of hindsight is fine for a regular failure, because
             | the steps in the failure happening at all show that they
             | had large probability of happening - if the fire
             | suppression system let the whole ship burn down from a
             | minor accidental fire in the writing room, it _was_
             | obviously inadequate. (And so on for the other flaws.) But
             | it doesn 't apply if you have an adversary, like a
             | psychopath like Rogers. In security, you can have a failure
             | which will happen once in the lifetime of the universe with
             | random events - and which happens 100% of the time when
             | there is an attack.
             | 
             | Perhaps in reality the fire suppression method _was_ well-
             | designed and adequate to the task... except that the
             | attacker used an incendiary with its own oxidizer (the
             | acid+powder) which _couldn 't_ be put out. Perhaps the
             | 'poor design' wasn't so poor, and the attacker simply found
             | the weak point. Perhaps the departed captain wasn't so bad,
             | and it was the careful choice of poisoning him at the end
             | of the shift to replace him with an officer near-delirious
             | from sleep, so conked out he's asking if he's dreaming, and
             | who couldn't even order an SOS until well after he
             | should've. Perhaps the lack of fire alarm coverage in that
             | one room wasn't a damning fault, because the attacker
             | would've simply cut the wire before starting the fire if it
             | had had coverage. (A random accidental fire cannot choose
             | to ensure it goes undetected by cutting the alarm wire
             | first. An intelligent attacker can.) And so on.
             | 
             | When you are dealing with a technically sophisticated,
             | patient, psychopathic attacker with zero remorse or concern
             | for human life, who is an insider, and who has been casing
             | the joint for months or years, and who will carefully wait
             | for and arrange the worst possible circumstances, it may
             | simply not be possible to harden the system against such an
             | APT at acceptable cost and performance, particularly when
             | the attacker is willing to put himself at mortal risk for
             | hardly any apparent gain. (Notice that you aren't going on
             | about all of the failures which let Rogers go through his
             | whole life of crime - only about the ship. Why is the ship
             | poorly designed but not society?) Most of society is like
             | this: we cannot ensure zero crime or error or fault. There
             | is no way to stop someone from, say, taking a kitchen knife
             | and going out and stabbing people until the police shoot
             | him, or from renting a truck and driving through a crowd of
             | pedestrians before killing himself.
             | 
             | So, the existence and likely culpability of Rogers
             | completely changes the meaning of the post-mortem claims,
             | and renders them a lot less credible given their naive view
             | of all events as accidental and due to incompetence or bad
             | design, rather than this extreme level of irrational,
             | spiteful, self-destructive evil.
             | 
             | > At least from Wikipedia's description
             | 
             | The description which mentions barely anything about
             | Rogers?
        
               | bell-cot wrote:
               | The article says that Rogers was a newcomer, who the
               | captain had immediately made Chief Radio Operator. When
               | normal practice would have been to make Rogers the
               | Assistant to the longer-serving Alagna. On what are you
               | basing your statement "[Rogers] apparently had grudges
               | against the captain..."? The article is clear about
               | _Alagna 's_ ongoing public disputes with the captain.
               | 
               | I'll agree that Rogers' mental and moral fitness were
               | dubious at best. But I see no mention of him being
               | depressed, nor remotely suicidal. And especially in the
               | 1930's, you'd need to be suicidal to set fire to the ship
               | you were on, at sea, in 40-knot winds. What motive would
               | Rogers have had to do that? His later behavior is
               | obviously self-serving.
               | 
               | I agree that things are very different when you're
               | targeted by an A List adversary. But even _if_ such an
               | adversary is present, the normal laws of physics are not
               | suspended by Plot Fiat. Experienced marine engineer
               | William McFee noted that the ship 's funnels were
               | directly behind the locker where the fire started.
               | Funnels clad in flammable materials, which would
               | dangerously overheat if the boiler maintenance had been
               | neglected. In an area with no fire detecting system. Then
               | serious fire-fighting efforts were badly delayed, because
               | nobody knew how to get the fire hose working. And
               | Wikipedia notes that the ship was a fire-trap - with
               | features such as broad wooden bypasses for the "fire
               | doors", hidden above the wooden ceilings.
               | 
               | If there's a closet full of oily rags in an old box
               | factory, where the drunkard night watchman has passed out
               | yet again, then no criminal mastermind is needed for the
               | place to burn down. Though "criminal mastermind" does
               | make a far more salable story.
        
       | TomMasz wrote:
       | This took an interesting turn. A sprinkler system might have
       | helped but it's not mentioned as part of the changes in maritime
       | regulations following the incident.
        
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       (page generated 2025-01-19 23:01 UTC)