[HN Gopher] How much do I need to change my face to avoid facial...
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How much do I need to change my face to avoid facial recognition?
Author : pseudolus
Score : 84 points
Date : 2024-12-08 14:38 UTC (8 hours ago)
(HTM) web link (gizmodo.com)
(TXT) w3m dump (gizmodo.com)
| mdorazio wrote:
| I wonder if adding stickers, tattoos, or makeup that look like
| eyes above or below your real eyes would do it.
| derefr wrote:
| There's even a make-up trend of "enlarging" the eyes by
| painting the waterline of the lower eyelid white, that could be
| used as a justification for walking around like this even in a
| totalitarian police state.
| dylan604 wrote:
| In the current state of policing, this would just be probable
| cause or fits the description of type of things. Sure, you
| might not be identifiable by facial rec, but you'd be
| recognizable by every flatfoot out there, or even the see
| something say something crowd.
|
| Might as well just wear a face mask and sunglasses. If your
| FaceID can't recognize you, neither can the other systems.
| buran77 wrote:
| > If your FaceID can't recognize you, neither can the other
| systems.
|
| FaceID can't recognize me if I tilt my head a bit too much
| to one side.
| bsenftner wrote:
| That is, for now, 100% effective. I'm a former lead software
| scientist for one of the leading FR companies in the world.
| Pretty much all FR systems trying to operate at real time use a
| tiered approach to facial recognition. First detect for generic
| faces in an image, which collects various things that are not
| human faces but do collect every human face in an image. That's
| tier 1 image / video frame analysis, and the list of potential
| faces is passed on for further processing. This tier 1 analysis
| is the weakest part, if you can make your face fail the generic
| face test, it is as if you are invisible to the FR system. The
| easiest way to fail that generic face test is to not show your
| face, or to show a face that is "not human" such as has too
| many eyes, two noses, or a mouth above your eyes in place of
| any eyebrows. Sure, you'll stand out like a freak to other
| humans, but to the FR system you'll be invisible.
| moffkalast wrote:
| Juggalo makeup is supposedly extremely effective.
|
| Just make sure you don't how how magnets work for plausible
| deniability.
| thefaux wrote:
| I don't even have to pretend!
| dathinab wrote:
| Wrt. cameras with depth sensors like face unlock this isn't
| supper likely to work.
|
| Wrt. public cameras which don't have such features and are much
| further away and aren't supper high resolution either it maybe
| could even somewhat work.
| iterateoften wrote:
| I had a similar thought last time I was in an airport for an
| international flight and instead of scanning my boarding pass and
| looking at my passport they just let everyone walk through and as
| you passed the door it would tell you your seat number.
|
| When I was in Mexico I filed a report with the airport after an
| employee selling timeshares was overly aggressive and grabbed my
| arm and try to block me from leaving. Quickly they showed me a
| video of my entire time with all my movements at the airport so
| they could pinpoint the employee.
|
| Like the article says I think it is just a matter of time until
| such systems are everywhere. We are already getting normalized to
| it at public transportation hubs with almost 0 objections. Soon
| most municipalities or even private businesses will implement it
| and no one will care because it already happens to them at the
| airport, so why make a fuss about it at the grocery store or on a
| public sidewalk.
| Zigurd wrote:
| This reminds me of the early days of applying speech
| recognition. Some use cases were surprisingly good, like non-
| pretrained company directory name recognition. Shockingly good
| _and_ it fails soft because there are a small number of
| possible alternative matches.
|
| Other cases, like games where the user's voice changes due to
| excitement/stress, were incredibly bad.
| dylan604 wrote:
| > Quickly they showed me a video of my entire time with all my
| movements at the airport so they could pinpoint the employee.
|
| This is just as interesting as it is creepy, but that's the
| world we live and this is hacker news. So, how quickly was was
| quickly. You made your report, they get the proper people
| involved, and then they show you the video. How much time
| passed before you were viewing the video?
|
| For someone that plays with quickly assembling an edited video
| from a library of video content using a database full of
| cuepoints, this is a very interesting problem to solve. What
| did the final video look like? Was it an assembled video with
| cuts like in a spy movie with the best angles selected in
| sequence? Was it each of the cameras in a multi-cam like view
| just starting from the time they ID'd the flight you arrived
| on? Did they draw the boxes around you to show the system
| "knew" you?
|
| I'm really curious how dystopian we actually are with the
| facial recognition systems like this.
| eschneider wrote:
| Those sorts of systems run in realtime. They neither know (or
| care) who you are. They work by identifying people and
| pulling out appearance characteristics (like blue coat/red
| hair/beard/etc) and hashing them in a database. After that,
| it's straightforward to track similar looking people via
| connected cameras, with a bit of human assistance.
| Animats wrote:
| Here's a marketing video for a multi-camera tracking system
| which does just that.[1]
|
| [1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=07inDETl3LQ
| CalRobert wrote:
| Making it opt-out instead of opt-in means that that vast
| majority of people won't care, or have better things to do.
|
| You don't have to have your photo taken to enter the US if
| you're a citizen, but who wants to deal with the hassle? And on
| and on it goes.
| onetokeoverthe wrote:
| wrong. photo taken at sfo inbound customs.
|
| go ahead and decline while the cop is holding your passport.
| dessimus wrote:
| > holding your passport.
|
| When my spouse and I crossed through US customs this past
| spring, they called us by our names and waved us on before
| even getting our passports out to hand to the customs
| officer. This was at BWI, fwiw.
| jamiek88 wrote:
| Customs or immigration?
| dessimus wrote:
| CBP. We are citizens, and were returning from a trip.
| jamiek88 wrote:
| Customs or immigration?
| CalRobert wrote:
| For whatever reason most Americans use the word "customs"
| when they are, in fact, referring to immigration, when
| traveling internationally.
| Cyph0n wrote:
| Because entry is handled by CBP - Customs and Border
| Protection.
|
| Immigration - which is the process of becoming a US
| permanent resident and/or citizen - is handled (mostly)
| by USCIS.
|
| Other visas are handled by the State Department (foreign
| ministry).
|
| Not an expert, but this is my understanding.
| CalRobert wrote:
| I fly back to the US pretty often (I am a US citizen living
| abroad) and have declined every time. This is in SFO. They
| are generally fine with it. But most people won't risk it.
|
| It's much, much more annoying in Ireland, where US
| immigration happens in Dublin (an affront to Irish
| sovereignty, but that's another matter) - so being delayed
| can mean missing your flight.
| onetokeoverthe wrote:
| some airports laid back. others like sfo must have an
| ongoing bust quota contest.
| kortilla wrote:
| > (an affront to Irish sovereignty, but that's another
| matter
|
| I'll bite. Why do you think it's an affront to their
| sovereignty? It's entirely voluntary and it's something
| the Dublin airport (and the dozens of other airports in
| Canada) actively seek out to get direct access to the
| domestic side in the US.
|
| The US does not force any airports into these
| arrangements.
| onetokeoverthe wrote:
| a bit after 911 i figured the airport dystopia would eventually
| ooze out. after soaking deep within the nextgen.
|
| rub my jeans sailor. no 3d xrays for me.
| sema4hacker wrote:
| Twenty (!) years ago I got home from a drug store shopping trip
| and realized I had been charged for some expensive items I
| didn't buy. I called, they immediately found me on their
| surveillance recording, saw the items were actually bought by
| the previous person in line, and quickly refunded me. No face
| recognition was involved (they just used the timestamp from my
| receipt), but the experience immediately made me a fan of video
| monitoring.
| WalterBright wrote:
| I was talking with an employee at a grocery store, who told
| me that management one day decided to review the surveillance
| footage, and fired a bunch of employees who were caught
| pilfering.
| kQq9oHeAz6wLLS wrote:
| I had a friend who was a checker at a large local chain,
| and before shift one day he popped into the security office
| (he was friends with the head of security) to say hi, and
| they had every camera in the front of the store trained on
| the employee working the customer service desk.
|
| Someone got fired that day.
| maccard wrote:
| I worked in a retail/pc repair place about 10 years ago. Boss
| phoned me one day to say X (customer) device is missing have
| I seen it? I immediately knew it had been stolen and who by.
| I was on my own in the shop, 10 minutes before closing and I
| had been busy for the previous hour so the device was in the
| front of the shop instead of stored away securely like they
| normally would be. I was able to find the video within about
| 30 seconds of getting in and pinpoint the guy. I actually
| recognised him and was able to tell the police where I saw
| him somewhat frequently (as I lived nearby too).
|
| Without it, I think all the gingers would have pointed at me
| rather than me being tired and making a mistake.
| 1659447091 wrote:
| > and no one will care because it already happens to them at
| the airport, so why make a fuss about it at the grocery store
| or on a public sidewalk.
|
| You may be overestimating how many unique/different people
| travel through airports, especially more than once or twice to
| notice the tracking. People who travel once or twice total in
| their life by air, (are usually easy to spot), far more
| concerned with getting through a confusing hectic situation
| then noticing or even knowing that using facial recognition is
| new and not simply a special thing (because 9/11). And, the
| majority of Americans have travelled to zero or one country,
| last time I saw numbers on it. That country is usually Mexico
| or Canada where they drive (or walk).
|
| I think once it starts trying to hit close to home where people
| have a routine and are not as stressed by a new situation and
| have the bandwidth to--at a minimum--take a pause, will ask
| questions about what is going on.
| dathinab wrote:
| The thing with you example is that there is a "time and
| location bound context" due to which the false positive rate
| can be _massively_ reduced.
|
| But for nation wide public search the false positive rate is
| just way to high for it to work well.
|
| Once someone managed to leave a "local/time" context (e.g.
| known accident at known location and time) without leaving too
| many traces (in the US easy due to wide use of private cars
| everyone) the false positive rate makes such systems often
| practically hardly helpful.
| gleenn wrote:
| I seriously pisses me off that they make the font so small on
| the opt-out signage and you get told by a uniform to stare at
| the camera like you have no choice. Everything you don't fight
| for ends up getting taken.
| foxglacier wrote:
| I tend to just stop and read the fine print for things that
| might matter or if I have the time, even if I'm holding up a
| queue. I've spent several minutes at the entrance gate to a
| parking building because of the giant poster of T&Cs. I ask
| librarians to find books for me because the catalogue
| computer has a multi-screen T&C that I can't be bothered
| reading. I've turned away a customer from by business because
| their purchasing conditions included an onerous
| indemnification clause which they refused to alter. I
| discovered you don't need ID to travel on local flights
| because the T&C led me to calling the airline who gave me a
| password to use instead. I've also found several mistakes in
| T&Cs that nobody probably notices because nobody reads them.
| jillyboel wrote:
| Thank you for giving us this dystopian future, AI bros
| Zigurd wrote:
| The article correctly points out that the amount of information
| available in a controlled environment. makes it not even that
| same problem. If I have data on your irises and blood vessels and
| cranium shape, good luck evading a match if I get you where I can
| get the same measurements. On the street there are some hacks,
| like measuring gait, that can compensate for less face data, but
| evading a useful match that's not one of a zillion false
| positives is much easier.
| derefr wrote:
| If what you're trying to do is to _publish prepared images of
| yourself_ , that won't be facially recognized as you, then the
| answer is "not very much at all actually" -- see
| https://sandlab.cs.uchicago.edu/fawkes/. Adversarially prepared
| images can still look entirely like you, with all the facial-
| recognition-busting data being encoded at an almost-
| steganographic level vs our regular human perception.
| 1659447091 wrote:
| Do you know if this is still being worked on? The last "News"
| post from the link was 2022. Looks interesting.
| nonrandomstring wrote:
| The thing about biometrics as discussed in more intelligent
| circles, is "compromised once compromised for all time". It's a
| public key or username not a password.
|
| Fortunately that's not true of governments. Although your
| government may be presently compromised it is possible, via
| democratic processes, to get it changed back to uncompromised.
|
| Therefore we might say, it's easier to change your government
| than it is to change your face. That's where you should do the
| work.
| dathinab wrote:
| biometrics are also way less unique then people think
|
| basically the moment you apply them to a huge population (e.g.
| all of US) and ignore temporal and/or local context you will
| find collisions
|
| especially when you consider partial samples weather that is
| due to errors of the sensors used or other reasons
|
| Innocent people have gone to prison because of courts ignoring
| reality (of biometric matches always just being a likelyhood of
| matching not ever a guarantee match).
| hammock wrote:
| First order approximation is 10 years' worth of aging, or 5
| years' worth for a child under 16. These are the timelines in
| which you must renew your American passport photo.
|
| Apple Face ID is always learning as well. If your brother opens
| your phone enough times with your passcode, it will eventually
| merge the two faces it recognizes
| sanj wrote:
| citation?
| hammock wrote:
| First hand experience. Try it yourself?
| IncreasePosts wrote:
| Google photos only has pictures of my mom from her 60s
| onwards, but when I put a sepia toned scan of my mom as a 9
| year old, google photos asked me "is this [your mom]?"
| satvikpendem wrote:
| Their conclusion reminds me of this lady in China, Lao Rongzhi,
| who was a serial killer along with her lover, Fa Ziying [0]. They
| both went around the country extorting and killing people, and,
| while Fa was arrested in 1999 via a police standoff, Lao was on
| the run for two decades, having had plastic surgery to change her
| face enough that most humans wouldn't have recognized her.
|
| But in those two decades, the state of facial recognition
| software had rapidly increased and she was recognized by a camera
| at a mall and matched to a national database of known criminals.
| At first police thought it were an error but after taking DNA
| evidence, it was confirmed to be the same person, and she was
| summarily executed.
|
| In this day and age, I don't think anyone can truly hide from
| facial recognition.
|
| [0] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I7D3mOHsVhg
| joe_the_user wrote:
| Hmm, "cameras reported a 97.3% match". I would assume that for
| a random person, the match level would be random. 1/(1 -.973) ~
| 37. IE, 1 in 37 people would be tagged by the cameras. If
| you're talk China, that means matching millions of people in
| millions of malls.
|
| Possibly the actual match level was higher. But still, the way
| facial recognition seems to work even now is that it provides a
| consistent "hash value" for a face but with a limited number of
| digits/information (). This be useful if you know other things
| about the person (IE, if you know someone is a passenger on
| plane X, you can very likely guess which one) but still
| wouldn't scale unless you want a lot of false positives and are
| after specific people.
|
| Authorities seem to like to say DNA and facial recognition
| caught people since it implies an omniscience to these
| authorities (I note above someone throwing out the either wrong
| or meaningless "97.3% value). Certainly, these technologies do
| catch people but they still limited and expensive.
| Epa095 wrote:
| > I would assume that for a random person, the match level
| would be random. 1/(1 -.973) ~ 37.
|
| Why would you assume that?
| ImprobableTruth wrote:
| The "97.3%" match is probably just the confidence value - I
| don't think a frequentist interpretation makes sense for
| this. I'm not an expert in face recognition, but these
| systems are very accurate, typically like >99.5% accuracy
| with most of the errors coming from recall rather than
| precision. They're also not _that_ expensive. Real-time
| detection on embedded devices has been possible for around a
| decade and costs for high quality detection have come down a
| lot in recent years.
|
| Still, you're right that at those scales these systems will
| invariably slip once in a while and it's scary to think that
| this might enough to be considered a criminal, especially
| because people often treat these systems as infallible.
| wslh wrote:
| This could help with the discussion: "Human face identification
| after plastic surgery using SURF, Multi-KNN and BPNN
| techniques"
| <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40747-024-01358-7>
| hyperific wrote:
| CV Dazzle (2010) attempted this to counter the facial recognition
| methods in use at that time.
|
| https://adam.harvey.studio/cvdazzle
| probably_wrong wrote:
| D-ID (YC S17, [1]) promised that they would do the same. They
| have been quite silent on whether they ever achieved their
| target and nowadays they've pivoted to AI so no idea whether
| they ever actually succeeded.
|
| https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=14849555
| its_bbq wrote:
| Why is makeup considered cheating but surgery not?
| jquave wrote:
| wrong app bro
| jl6 wrote:
| Maybe wearing enough makeup to hide your face would fool an
| algorithm, but be conspicuous enough to get you noticed anyway.
| throe844i wrote:
| I welcome such tracking and surveillance.
|
| It is too easy to get accused of something. And you have no
| evidence to defend yourself. If you keep video recording of your
| surroundings forever, you now have evidence. AI will make
| searching such records practical.
|
| There were all sorts of safe guards to make such recordings
| unnecessary, such as due process. But those were practically
| eliminated. And people no longer have basic decency!
| dingnuts wrote:
| who cares if you're tracked because you have nothing to hide,
| right?
|
| now imagine you're the wrong religion after the regime change.
|
| "I have nothing to hide" is a stupid argument that leads to
| concentration camps
| simplicio wrote:
| Seems like the Nazis managed to do the Concentration Camps
| thing without facial recognition software.
| pavel_lishin wrote:
| But they did have tremendous data processing abilities for
| their time!
| simplicio wrote:
| I don't think keeping the data processing abilities of
| modern gov'ts below that of 1930's Germany is really a
| plausible plan for avoiding concentration camps.
| pessimizer wrote:
| > As the Nazi war machine occupied successive nations of
| Europe, capitulation was followed by a census of the
| population of each subjugated nation, with an eye to the
| identification and isolation of Jews and Romani. These
| census operations were intimately intertwined with
| technology and cards supplied by IBM's German and new
| Polish subsidiaries, which were awarded specific sales
| territories in Poland by decision of the New York office
| following Germany's successful Blitzkrieg invasion. Data
| generated by means of counting and alphabetization
| equipment supplied by IBM through its German and other
| national subsidiaries was instrumental in the efforts of
| the German government to concentrate and ultimately destroy
| ethnic Jewish populations across Europe. Black reports that
| every Nazi concentration camp maintained its own Hollerith-
| Abteilung (Hollerith Department), assigned with keeping
| tabs on inmates through use of IBM's punchcard technology.
| In his book, Black charges that "without IBM's machinery,
| continuing upkeep and service, as well as the supply of
| punch cards, whether located on-site or off-site, Hitler's
| camps could have never managed the numbers they did."
|
| https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IBM_and_the_Holocaust
|
| They would have done a lot better faster with facial
| recognition software, and certainly wouldn't have turned it
| down.
| mixmastamyk wrote:
| But surely it couldn't happen in America, right? Guess
| what, census data _was_ used to facilitate Japanese
| internment.
| whycome wrote:
| America and Canada used facial recognition for their ww2
| concentration camps.
|
| https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internment_of_Japanese_Cana
| d...
| throe844i wrote:
| Data means power and freedom. With access to data you can
| defend yourself from legal persecution! In past people were
| lynched and killed for false accusations! With evidence they
| would have a chance!
|
| Hostile regime will kill you anyway. But there is a long way
| there. And "soft hostile" may throw you into prison for 30
| years, or take your your house and family. Or will not
| enforce punishment on crooks. All fully legally in "proper
| democracy".
|
| And "wrong religion" and "leads to concentration camps"
| really is a stupid argument, given what is happening last
| year. People today are just fine with concentration camps and
| genecide! It is just absurd argument used to defend corrupted
| status quo!
|
| If you have a "wrong religion" change it! People did that all
| the time.
| pavel_lishin wrote:
| > _With access to data_
|
| That's the key problem. Why do you assume you'll have
| access to this data?
| pavel_lishin wrote:
| > _It is too easy to get accused of something. And you have no
| evidence to defend yourself. If you keep video recording of
| your surroundings forever, you now have evidence._
|
| This assumes that you have _access_ to those recordings. If you
| 're live-logging your life via something you're wearing all day
| every day, maybe - but if the government decides to prosecute
| you for something, what are the odds that you'll be able to
| pull exonerating evidence out of the very system that's trying
| to fuck you?
|
| Even if a system doesn't _care_ , it's still a hassle. Case in
| point:
| https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/michigan-s...
|
| > _An African American man who was wrongly convicted of a fatal
| shooting in Michiganin 2011 is suing a car rental company for
| taking seven-years to turn over the receipt that proved his
| innocence, claiming that they treated him like "a poor black
| guy wasn't worth their time"._
|
| I found this article while looking for another story that's
| virtually identical; I believe in that one it was a gas station
| receipt that was the key in his case, and he ended up spending
| very minimal time in jail.
|
| How many people are in jail now because they weren't able to
| pull this data?
| trgn wrote:
| i recently tried one of those cashierless amazon stores. it was
| an odd jolt, this feeling to be trusted, by default. It was
| vaguely reminiscent off one in my childhood, when, after my
| parents had sent me on an errand to the local grocer, I'd
| forgotten the money and the clerk/owner let me just walk out
| since they knew me. Presumably they and my mom would take care
| of the balance later.
|
| I live now in a city where small exchanges are based on a
| default of of mistrust (e.g. locking up the tide-pods behind a
| glass case - it's not a meme). The only super market near (not
| even _in_) my food desert started random bag checks.
|
| The modern police state requires surveillance technology, but
| abusive authority has flourished in any technological
| environment. the mafia had no problem to terrorize entire
| neighborhoods into omerta for example, without high technology.
| i'm sure there's other examples.
|
| i don't know the right answer, but considering the extent to
| which anti-social and criminal attitudes are seemingly allowed
| to fester, while everybody else is expected to relinquish their
| dignity, essentially _anonymize_ themselves, it makes me less
| and less have a kneejerk response to the expansion of
| technologically supported individualization.
| shae wrote:
| What about you infrared LEDs on my face?
| gehwartzen wrote:
| https://www.reddit.com/r/techsupportmacgyver/comments/mej7j7...
| deadbabe wrote:
| It's trivial to also implement gait analysis to help visually
| identify someone if a face isn't available. Then when you do get
| a glimpse of the face you can link the gait and the face
| identity.
| SoftTalker wrote:
| I was traveling internationally earlier this year and I have
| grown a heavy beard since my passport photo was taken. None of
| the automated immigration checkpoints had any trouble identifying
| me.
| mixmastamyk wrote:
| Believe they focus on the eyes/nose shape and spacing.
| dathinab wrote:
| yes, they mainly focus on bone structure especially around
| eye nose area
|
| beards are to easy to change, and masks had been very common
| for some time and cover more then beards
| darepublic wrote:
| Need emp charges like in metal gear. A bunch of metallic confetti
| fills the air while you dash past the security cameras big and
| small
| Scotrix wrote:
| "Asking our governments to create laws to protect us is much
| easier than..."
|
| A bit naive that, it's too late since data is already mostly
| available and it just takes a different government to make this
| protection obsolete.
|
| That's why we Germans/Europeans have tried to fight data
| collections and for protections for so long and quite hard (and
| probably have one of the most sophisticated policies and
| regulations in place) but over time it just becomes an
| impossibility to keep data collections as low as possible (first
| small exceptions for in itself very valid reasons, then more and
| more participants and normalization until there is no protection
| left...)
| wizzwizz4 wrote:
| It's not too late. Maybe it is _for us_ : but in 100 years, who
| will really care about a database of uncomfortably-personal
| details about their dead ancestors? (Sure, DNA will still be an
| issue, but give that 1000 years and we'll probably have a new
| MRCA.) If we put a stop to things _now_ (or soon), we can nip
| this in the bud.
|
| It's probably not too late for us, either. Facial recognition
| by skull shape is still a concern, but only if the bad guys get
| _up-to-date_ video of us. Otherwise, all they can do is
| investigate our _historical_ activity. Other types of data have
| greater caveats preventing them from being useful long-term,
| provided we not participate in the illusion that it 's
| "impossible to put the genie back in the bottle".
| imron wrote:
| > If you wore sunglasses and then did something to your face
| (maybe wear a mask or crazy dramatic makeup) then it would be
| harder to detect your face, but that's cheating on the question--
| that's not changing your face, that's just hiding it!
|
| So sunglasses and a mask then. Who cares if it's 'cheating'.
| dathinab wrote:
| What often is fully ignored in such articles is the false
| positive rate.
|
| Like e.g. where I live they tested some state of the art facial
| recognition system on a widely used train station and applauded
| themself how grate it was given that the test targets where even
| recognized when they wore masks and capes, hats etc.
|
| But what was not told was that the false positive rate while
| percentage wise small (I think <1%) with the amount of expected
| non-match samples was still making it hardly usable.
|
| E.g. one of the train stations where I live has ~250.000 people
| passing through it every day, even just a false positive rate of
| 0.1% would be 250 wrong alarms, for one train station every
| single day. This is for a single train station. If you scale your
| search to more wider area you now have way higher numbers (and
| lets not just look at population size but also that many people
| might be falsely recognized many times during a single travel).
|
| AFIK the claimed false positive rate is often in the range of
| 0.01%-0.1% BUT when this system are independently tested in real
| world context the found false positive rate is often more like
| 1%-10%.
|
| So what does that mean?
|
| It means that if you have a fixed set of video to check (e.g.
| close to where a accident happened around +- idk. 2h of a
| incident) you can use such systems to pre-filter video and then
| post process the results over a duration of many hours.
|
| But if you try find a person in a nation of >300 Million who
| doesn't want to be found and missed the initial time frame where
| you can rely on them to be close by the a known location then you
| will be flooded by such a amount of false positives that it
| becomes practically not very useful.
|
| I mean you still can have a lucky hit.
| Eisenstein wrote:
| What does 'false positive' mean? That it thinks it is someone
| else, or that it thinks it is a target of an investigation?
| TuringNYC wrote:
| When the actual is negative but the inference is positive,
| rate of that.
|
| This is a very handy guide:
| https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Confusion_matrix
| _DeadFred_ wrote:
| This has been answered since the 80s. This much:
|
| https://i.imgur.com/7cuDqPI.jpg
| _heimdall wrote:
| I'm of two minds when it comes to surveillance. I don't like that
| businesses, airports, etc do it but it is their property. I don't
| like that they can run video feeds through software, either in
| real time or after the fact, to so easily find and track my every
| move. But again, its their property.
|
| Where the line is always drawn for me, at a minimum, is what they
| do with the video and who has access to it.
|
| Video should always be deleted when it is no longer reasonably
| needed. That timeline would be different for airports vs
| convenience stores, but I'd always expect the scale of days or
| weeks rather than months or years (or indefinitely).
|
| Maybe more importantly, surveillance video should never be shared
| without a lawful warrant, including clear descriptions of the
| limits to what is needed and why it is requested.
| gehwartzen wrote:
| Kidding. (But maybe not?...)
|
| https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Groucho_glasses
| costco wrote:
| The face ID feature on Bryan Johnson's phone no longer recognized
| him after many months of his intense health regimen:
| https://twitter.com/bryan_johnson/status/1777789375193231778
| sandbach wrote:
| At Tianfu Airport in Chengdu, there are large screens with
| cameras attached that recognize your face and tell you which gate
| to go to. Convenient but scary, like many things in China.
| aprilthird2021 wrote:
| It feels increasingly like the only way to avoid such facial
| recognition is to suddenly grow a religious conviction that your
| face should not be seen by strangers
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