[HN Gopher] A Serious Man: On Bruno Latour
       ___________________________________________________________________
        
       A Serious Man: On Bruno Latour
        
       Author : Thevet
       Score  : 50 points
       Date   : 2024-10-30 18:06 UTC (3 days ago)
        
 (HTM) web link (www.jhiblog.org)
 (TXT) w3m dump (www.jhiblog.org)
        
       | ciconia wrote:
       | > The wine of Burgundy was a network of agents, only
       | conventionally sorted into the human-artificial and the non-human
       | natural, but so too was the landscape of Burgundy, and so too was
       | any countryside.
       | 
       | I like to think we humans are also part of nature, therefore our
       | work, and our creations, cannot be so clearly separated from
       | nature. In the same manner, the work of bees and ants can also be
       | called artificial, in the sense that they practice a craft and
       | manipulate the natural world around them. For me it's all on the
       | same spectrum.
        
         | sdbrown wrote:
         | Wasn't this part of the base thesis of "We Have Never Been
         | Modern"?
        
       | smokel wrote:
       | _> Much of his writing resists analysis while encouraging
       | repetition and undeformed travel._
       | 
       | Sums it up pretty nicely. I have no clue what "undeformed travel"
       | means, which is a nice reference to how his writing resists
       | analysis. His writing does seem to encourage repetition in a lot
       | of people who are _not_ into logic or proper reasoning.
       | 
       | If you say a lot, keep things extremely vague, and change
       | definitions as you go, you attract a lot of people who think,
       | "Hey, this is exactly what I was pondering about," but you also
       | oppose those who think, "Hey, you are not making any sense." I
       | tried to find a middle ground because the subject matter Latour
       | talked about seems very important to our society, but until now,
       | I have consistently failed to like his way of philosophizing.
        
         | currymj wrote:
         | I think "undeformed travel" means that when people quote it or
         | refer to it, they tend not to change his original words.
        
           | dmvdoug wrote:
           | Yup, I agree. Shaping is commenting there about Latour being
           | memorably aphoristic.
        
         | dmvdoug wrote:
         | Latour's not so hard to grok, certainly much easier than the
         | Deleuzes and Derridas of the world. Approach his work as more
         | or less philosophical anthropology rather than, like, pure
         | philosophy. Indeed, humans a situated in overlapping spaces and
         | how we make meaning in those spaces is at the heart of his
         | work, from Lab Life through Actor Network Theory. What makes
         | him easier to grok, and set him a little bit apart, is that he
         | steadfastly refused to deny that there was a reality other than
         | the socially constructed ones we make/negotiate. So you have to
         | really pay attention to particular contexts and study it very
         | carefully in order to understand what's happening in that
         | space. It's not just social constructivism all the way down.
         | 
         | (He was famous for _Lab Life_ , of course, but he did the exact
         | same sort of detailed anthropological-philosophical analysis of
         | French courts too.)
        
           | bananamerica wrote:
           | Deleuze is a fairly traditional philosopher once you get to
           | know him. Derrida kinda wants to burn the very things he
           | needs to convey ideas, so understanding Derrida feels like
           | something Derrida wouldn't approve.
        
             | dmvdoug wrote:
             | Honestly, the only thing I really remember from reading
             | Deleuze was giving up on trying to get what "the Fold" was.
        
             | beezlebroxxxxxx wrote:
             | Derrida is not even particularly difficult to understand
             | (compared to later era Wittgenstein, he's downright
             | straightforward) --- if you read him in french he's
             | actually really funny (the man loved puns).
             | 
             | There's this idea in popular culture that he only wrote
             | incomprehensible nonsense, which is just not true, and he's
             | become a punching bag for some people who cannot handle the
             | (somewhat made-up) "continental v. analytic" divide.
        
               | bananamerica wrote:
               | I actually read Derrida in my time with the literature
               | department so there was no analytics vs continentals
               | struggle going on at all.
        
               | dmvdoug wrote:
               | Yes, Derrida is fine if you're just in it for wordplay.
               | But it has always struck me that that's about all there
               | is to it. I don't take him/deconstructionism seriously
               | though beyond that. It was a cul-de-sac that was finally
               | escaped.
               | 
               | I say this as someone who loves both Gadamer and Quine,
               | not an erstwhile philosophical culture warrior.
        
               | dmvdoug wrote:
               | By the way, I'd make a similar criticism of, for example,
               | later Heidegger. At some point he collapses into a kind
               | of solipsistic logorrhea. _Sein and Zeit_ and his
               | lectures from the 1920s, though, had real philosophical
               | meat on the bone (this is not an endorsement of his
               | views, by the way; I think he was just wrong about some
               | stuff, like getting the ontological priority of ready-to-
               | hand and present-at-hand exactly backwards---but early
               | Heidegger is philosophically substantive and engaging in
               | ways later Heidegger absolutely isn't).
        
               | beezlebroxxxxxx wrote:
               | I agree with pretty much everything you written here. I
               | think Wittgenstein (PI era) is the only convincing
               | philosopher working in a similar "method" and for similar
               | aims.
        
               | ValentinA23 wrote:
               | Maybe it's precisely wordplay that is at stake here.
               | Heidegger is no less stranger to it than Derrida. In fact
               | a lot of his philosophical complexes are grounded
               | explicitly into etymology and new ways to hear old words.
               | 
               | Concerning Heidegger I stand in the opposite corner of
               | the room: I liked his later writings more and despite
               | having read him profusely, I'm not able to articulate his
               | thoughts like you did by contrasting present-at-hand with
               | ready-at-hand which however pinpoints very well the
               | divide between analytical and continental thought.
               | 
               | You're right to say that he "collapses into a kind of
               | solipsistic logorrhea", and it is pertinent to what we
               | are discussing since in heideggerian terms this should be
               | expressed as "language bringing language to language
               | through language".
               | 
               | An example: the linguistic proximity between explicate vs
               | implicate that is another instance of the ready-to-hand
               | vs present-at-hand dichotomy.
        
           | ttoinou wrote:
           | I read two thirds of "Changer de societe, refaire de la
           | sociologie" and it was a hard read, most of what he wrote
           | didn't make sense or wasn't well illustrated. It didn't seem
           | like he wanted me to understand his points, nor take me on a
           | laborious journey where my way of seeing things would be
           | transformed
        
             | dmvdoug wrote:
             | I feel like that's a fairly dense, technical point of entry
             | for his work, since he's explicitly trying to set up an
             | alternative theoretical framework for his brand of
             | sociological/anthropological philosophy. Did you read _Lab
             | Life_?
        
               | ttoinou wrote:
               | Nope ! It's not on my reading list
        
               | dmvdoug wrote:
               | Fair enough: so little time, so much to read.
               | 
               | I was just wondering if you had found it to be tough
               | sledding, if you had read it.
        
               | ttoinou wrote:
               | I have to admit, I have no idea how I came across this
               | book from Latour, I guess I just liked the title. But the
               | one you quoted looks interesting beyond just the title
        
           | calf wrote:
           | Or Latour and the others really are just pseudo thinkers,
           | maybe they have some things to say but it is muddied and
           | bloated by all the wrong (Not Even Wrong) things they are
           | saying, and history might judge the French postmodernists for
           | taking the wrong path.
           | 
           | I say this as someone who used to be partial toward
           | postmodernist texts, and defended them using arguments
           | similar to yours (they should be understood in this other
           | way!), but I eventually, finally moved on, and I (in my
           | opinion) deem them to be at their worst harmful to critical
           | thinking.
           | 
           | Regarding Latour specifically there is hate-paper on his
           | work, a professor published a paper describing exactly why
           | Latour is problematic bullshit.
        
         | ValentinA23 wrote:
         | I think what bothers you is the poetical aspect of this text
         | (in the sense of Jakobson's function of language, which boils
         | down to, quoting wikipedia, focusing on "the message for its
         | own sake"). This seems to fit what is said elsewhere in the
         | article:
         | 
         | >He protested that religion really has "nothing to do with
         | belief" but "everything to do with Words--the Logos or Spirit
         | that transform the life of those you address."
         | 
         | This feeling may be aggravated by the use of phrases such as
         | "network of agents" which lie somewhere between scientific
         | jargon and poetical language. Since the whole sentence seem to
         | touch about this aspect I'm going to quote it:
         | 
         | >The wine of Burgundy was a network of agents, only
         | conventionally sorted into the human-artificial and the non-
         | human natural, but so too was the landscape of Burgundy, and so
         | too was any countryside
         | 
         | Maybe I could recommend you to read Heidegger's commentaries of
         | Holderlin's hymns ? This is a beautiful text that reaches a
         | zone in language that had never been attained before. It starts
         | with a discussion of what poetry is (neither its form or
         | content) and slowly morphs Holderlin "terminology" into
         | philosophical discourse. Unique.
         | 
         | Some quotes from the book [1]:
         | 
         | >[...] how it is that this poetic, religious people [the
         | Athenians] should also be a philosophical people, this I cannot
         | see. Without poetry, I said, they would never even have been a
         | philosophical people! [...]Poetry, I said, sure of my subject
         | matter, is the beginning and end of such knowledge. Like
         | Minerva from Jupiter's head, it springs from the poetry of an
         | infinite, divine way of beyng. And thus what is irreconcilable
         | in the enigmatic source of poetry in the end comes together in
         | it once again. [...] From mere intellect no philosophy can
         | arise, for philosophy is more than just the limited cognition
         | of what is present before us. From mere reason no philosophy
         | can arise, for philosophy is more than the blind challenge of a
         | never-ending progression in unifying and differentiating a
         | possible subject matter.
         | 
         | Holderlin, as quoted by Heidegger.
         | 
         | >Yet the only way in which we can attain the space of the
         | poetry beyond the poem that lies present before us is the way
         | in which the poet himself becomes master and servant of the
         | poetry, namely, through a struggle. The struggle for the poetry
         | in the poem is the struggle with ourselves, [...]. The struggle
         | with ourselves, however, in no way means inspecting ourselves
         | and dissecting our soul through some form of curiosity; nor
         | does it mean some sort of remorseful 'moral' rebuke; this
         | struggle with ourselves, rather, is a working our way through
         | the poem. For the poem, after all, is not meant to disappear in
         | the sense that we would think up a so-called spiritual content
         | and meaning for the poem, bring it together into some
         | 'abstract' truth, and in so doing cast aside the overarching
         | resonance that oscillates in the word. To the contrary: The
         | more powerfully the poetry comes to power, the more the telling
         | of the word prevails in pressing upon us and tearing us away.
         | And when it does so, the poem is no longer a thing lying
         | present before us that can be read and listened to, as it
         | appears initially whenever we regard language as a means of
         | expression and reaching agreement--something that we have, as
         | it were, in the same way that an automobile has its horn. It is
         | not we who have language; rather, language has us, in a certain
         | way.
         | 
         | Heidegger
         | 
         | [1]https://www.amazon.com/H%C3%B6lderlins-Germania-Studies-
         | Cont...
        
       | BoingBoomTschak wrote:
       | Not again, please let me forget that my country spawned the worst
       | kind of flim-flam nothing-to-say-but-in-a-lot-of-words
       | intellectuals that would disgust any proper philosopher pondering
       | about actually life relevant questions in clear language.
       | 
       | "They muddy the water, to make it seem deep", as some mustachioed
       | German once properly described.
        
         | sdbrown wrote:
         | Are you referring to Bruno Latour or the author of the post? If
         | you're referring to Latour, I would strongly urge you to read
         | "Laboratory Life", which is [as] clear and easy to read today
         | as it was when I first encountered it nearly 20 years ago.
        
       | pinewurst wrote:
       | Latour's "Aramis, or The Love of Technology" is one of my
       | favorite books. It's the story, at many levels, of a personal
       | transport system and more.
        
       | idoubtit wrote:
       | I can agree with the "lyrical philosopher" quote, but for anyone
       | with a background in science that think that Bruno Latour was a
       | "serious man", I suggest reading the book that made him famous:
       | "Science in Action". It's so bad that it's funny. Out of his 7
       | rules for studying experimental science, the third one is
       | outstanding:
       | 
       | > Since the settlement of a controversy is the cause of Nature's
       | representation, not its consequence, we can never use this
       | consequence, Nature, to explain how and why a controversy has
       | been settled. (Science in Action)
       | 
       | Bruno Latour was among the selected few that were criticized in
       | Sokal and Bricmont's "Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern
       | Intellectuals' Abuse of Science".
        
         | libraryofbabel wrote:
         | Facile dismissal of a philosopher is easy. Understanding what
         | they are trying to do, especially when it's in a very different
         | intellectual tradition from what you're used to, is the hard
         | thing. I could read Plato, Hegel, Wittgenstein, whoever, and
         | pull the same trick you did by finding some provocative quote
         | that's impossible to put in context without a detailed
         | explanation of what the guy was up to.
         | 
         | For what it's worth, I trained in theoretical physics and also
         | read a fair bit of Latour later on. I don't really like his
         | work all that much, and wish he would be clearer sometimes, but
         | the guy wasn't an idiot, at least start from there.
         | 
         | In philosophy the usual advice when approaching someone's work
         | for the first time is to suspend critique on the first reading
         | and just try and take them seriously and understand what they
         | were doing on their own terms. Then you can go back and apply
         | the critical razor later. It's a useful tool to apply to other
         | areas of life too.
        
           | nradov wrote:
           | Why should anyone care what a philosopher was _trying_ to do
           | if he didn 't actually do it any sort of useful way? Stupid
           | is as stupid does.
        
             | maleno wrote:
             | Why would anyone care what, say, Charles Babbage was trying
             | to do, when he didn't actually do it in any sort of useful
             | way? Surely this is largely how knowledge is produced--over
             | time, with lots of false starts, and language and technique
             | that is not yet adequate to the problem at hand.
        
             | photonthug wrote:
             | Because you risk missing something interesting or important
             | because of your own arrogance, which is tragic, and most
             | likely reinforcing that arrogance, which is even more
             | tragic.
             | 
             | As the parent mentions, engaging with primary sources from
             | a different historical or cultural context with some
             | patience and forbearance is particularly important for
             | understanding philosophical works, but it's not that
             | different for say mathematics or physics. Notation and
             | terminology changes. With your attitude you'd probably
             | assume archimedes, newton and Fibonacci were all stupid.
        
           | calf wrote:
           | This is actually one of those sophisticated bullshit meta
           | arguments used to defend any sort of intellectual garbage.
           | "You have to see things from their context, intentions,
           | history". No, we do not. And there is no authority that says
           | we must save/suspend our skepticism for later. In fact your
           | entire argument is self contradictory in that respect, by
           | positioning the OP as engaging in"facile dismissal" in the
           | first place! Right? This is a precise example of the awful,
           | pernicious mental gymnastics that bad philosophy produces.
           | Someone well-read with advanced formal education should have
           | realized that right away.
        
             | zamfi wrote:
             | Huh. No one is forcing _you_ to do this. You are 100% free
             | to not give even the slightest mind to Bruno Latour--or any
             | other philosopher's--writing.
             | 
             | The point is only that it's _easy_ to dismiss most
             | philosophy because it's easy to take a common reading,
             | interpret words in ways the author may not have intended,
             | and make them into a contradiction or other ridiculousness
             | --but in contrast it's _hard_ to do the work to understand
             | the context in which the author is writing, what the author
             | is responding to, and what the author actually is trying to
             | say through those words.
             | 
             | It's fine to take the easy road here, it's just not going
             | to teach you anything most of the time--and nor is it going
             | to convince those who've done the hard part of anything.
        
               | smokel wrote:
               | At the time I'm writing this, there are three similar
               | replies that use an argument along the lines of "you can
               | simply ignore Latour if you don't like his work". I'm
               | just replying to the first comment.
               | 
               | Unfortunately this argument is not correct. Many, many,
               | people have read Latour, and he has influenced a lot of
               | thought. Ignoring Latour would imply that you'd have to
               | ignore quite a few other people as well, and that is near
               | impossible.
               | 
               | Ironically, it is Latour who writes about the
               | connectedness of things in his "actor-network theory".
               | 
               | Even more ironically, Latour tried to improve mutual
               | understanding in his "Inquiry Into Modes of Existence"
               | project, but apparently it is not that easy.
               | 
               | It might be interesting to hear out the criticisms
               | against Latour's way of reasoning, instead of dismissing
               | it.
        
             | libraryofbabel wrote:
             | eh, I mean, you do you -- nobody's forcing you to sit down
             | and read French Philosophy or anything. But this is a
             | thread on Bruno Latour, and context, intentions, and
             | history are useful for having a productive discussion about
             | the guy. Some of us do find context, intentions, and
             | history for major thinkers or philosophical movements
             | interesting -- that's what TFA was about, after all.
             | 
             | Make no mistake, "intellectual garbage" does exist. I'm not
             | saying everything is equally valid. Furthermore, life is
             | short and you don't have to engage deeply with everything
             | if it's not your cup of tea. But if you do want to engage
             | in a debate about a major thinker with long career and a
             | serious body of work (which by the way is not comparable to
             | engaging with a random short HN post), then people are more
             | likely to listen to you if you make an effort to understand
             | them.
        
             | beepbooptheory wrote:
             | What is at stake for you here? Where does the resentment
             | come from? Like.. people write books, some people read them
             | and get something out of them, whether something critical
             | or something positive. Reading things you don't agree with
             | can help you understand youself and your commitments
             | better. No one is trying to pull a fast one on you
             | specifically by writing a book.
             | 
             | Like great, you are scientific realist, we get it.
             | Congratulations. That's all it needs to be.
             | 
             | I just don't know how you can even live a peaceful life
             | just getting angry that there is "bad" philosophy out
             | there. Who cares? The line between "good" philosophy and
             | "bad" is fraught and has been talked about since there's
             | been philosophy (in the West). Hence the figure of the
             | sophist for Plato being absolutely essential.
             | 
             | Imagine Socrates with no Thrasymachus. Nietzsche without
             | Hegel. Wittgenstein without Russell. "Bad" philosophy is
             | always only a future gift to a good one. We should be giddy
             | in our tear downs of other thinkers, not angry and bitter.
             | 
             | It just really doesn't make any sense to be like this!
        
         | codeulike wrote:
         | Sokal on Latour:
         | 
         | "The basic trouble with much of Latour's writings--as with
         | those of some other sociologists and philosophers of a "social
         | constructivist" bent--is that these texts are often ambiguous
         | and can be read in at least two distinct ways: a "moderate"
         | reading, which leads to claims that are either worth discussing
         | or else true but trivial; and a "radical" reading, which leads
         | to claims that are surprising but false. Unfortunately, the
         | radical interpretation is often taken not only as the "correct"
         | interpretation of the original text but also as a well-
         | established fact"
         | 
         | From
         | https://physics.nyu.edu/faculty/sokal/comment_on_NYT_latour....
        
         | kayo_20211030 wrote:
         | > Since the settlement of a controversy is the cause of
         | Nature's representation, not its consequence, we can never use
         | this consequence, Nature, to explain how and why a controversy
         | has been settled.
         | 
         | I don't understand why you find this so objectionable.
         | 
         | If I grasp Latour's point, the settlement of a controversy
         | fixes an understanding of nature at a particular point (the
         | causal effect). It seems sensible then to forbid that
         | understanding of nature to be used as an explanation for why
         | the controversy was settled. Doing that would affix an
         | absoluteness to the understanding that's unjustified, given the
         | empirical approach. At some point in the future some new
         | anomaly in the understanding (Nature) will be discovered,
         | leading to a controversy, empirical science will resolve it,
         | and a new understanding will be synthesized; handing us a
         | representation. It's probably better than the earlier
         | representation, but it's still not all of Nature.
         | 
         | I think Latour's view is a humble view.
        
         | _notreallyme_ wrote:
         | I've had him as a sociology teacher in the early 2000s,
         | specifically on this subject (controversies).
         | 
         | It was apparently his first time in this school, and he was not
         | prepared for the controversy that happened due to his
         | (controversial) stance on the scientific method. He ended up
         | calling us names, and privileged kids (that part was 97% true,
         | but not entirely true...).
         | 
         | It's only after his death that many articles praising him
         | appeared. I guess people capitalize on its notoriety rather
         | than on whatever bullshit he wrote...
        
           | Animats wrote:
           | > (controversial) stance on the scientific method.
           | 
           | That stance is well-covered here.[1]
           | 
           | Some of the problems in science come from experiments too
           | close to the noise threshold. This is most of social science
           | and psychology. The hard-line position is Rutherford's "If
           | your experiment needs statistics, you ought to have done a
           | better experiment." Related to this is Hoyle's "Science is
           | prediction, not explanation." For phenomena that led to
           | useful engineering, repeatability and predictability are very
           | good. Otherwise the products won't work.
           | 
           | People tend to forget this, because controversial research
           | topics are often close to the noise threshold. It something
           | turns out to be real, and you can get it to happen further
           | from the threshold, it becomes routine engineering. It's then
           | no longer controversial. Your result gets a few lines in the
           | _Handbook of Chemistry and Physics._ This sort of science
           | makes the world go.
           | 
           | Philip K. Dick's "Reality is that which, when you stop
           | believing in it, doesn't go away" remains useful.
           | 
           | Taking this hard-line position is useful, because humans are
           | evolved and wired to see patterns near the noise threshold.
           | This is a useful survival strategy for detecting predators in
           | the brush, even with a high false-alarm rate. Once past
           | survival level, it's less useful.
           | 
           | [1] https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/25/magazine/bruno-latour-
           | pos...
        
       | libraryofbabel wrote:
       | The article, by Stephen Shapin (another famous figure in the
       | history of science / STS) is actually mostly about Latour's
       | Catholicism -- something nobody in the field remembers. (I had to
       | read a lot of Latour back in the day, and I'd always assumed he
       | was non religious like most late 20th century intellectuals.)
       | According to Shapin, the Catholicism, together with the climate
       | emergency, is at the heart of his "seriousness", although
       | apparently he didn't really do "belief" per se:
       | 
       | > in his own words, religion was not to do with "belief." God was
       | not an entity you believed in: God did not exist outside of the
       | practices--what Bruno called "the processions and rituals" that
       | make Him present. That is, God is made manifest in an actor-
       | network of religiosity.
       | 
       | The other interesting things you learn here is that Latour was
       | from the famous Latour wine family, he was a youngest son so his
       | family kind of expected him to enter the church, and they were
       | apparently unimpressed and uninterested in his academic career.
        
       | Animats wrote:
       | > "Much of his writing resists analysis while encouraging
       | repetition and undeformed travel. It is often hard to understand
       | but easier to chant."
       | 
       | Now, who does that make you think of?
        
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