[HN Gopher] What is "founder mode"?
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What is "founder mode"?
Author : nqureshi
Score : 60 points
Date : 2024-10-07 21:37 UTC (1 days ago)
(HTM) web link (tomblomfield.com)
(TXT) w3m dump (tomblomfield.com)
| jsifalda wrote:
| Thanks for sharing! Good take.
|
| There is also this checklist I used to use for more "practical
| references" https://www.craftengineer.com/the-founder-mode-used-
| by-brian...
| henning wrote:
| like everything else coming from startup people, none of this
| means anything.
|
| none of the items listed there preclude a CEO from only talking
| to direct reports and viewing the org chart as a set of black
| boxes that their reports are responsible. having "engineering
| and design report to the founder" doesn't mean anything. is
| that saying everyone who does engineering and design has an
| executive as their manager?
|
| nothing in that list talks about hiring or firing practices.
|
| whomever wrote this post would have great success as an object-
| oriented clean code thought leader, where their skills at
| saying nothing would earn them slots at conferences and social
| media followers.
| Aurornis wrote:
| > At Monzo, we experimented with some pretty wacky management
| structures at times. There was a period when our middle managers
| were basically just responsible for "pastoral care" of each
| employee. They were not connected at all with the output that the
| ICs were producing. It was totally insane and overlapped with our
| period of lowest productivity by far.
|
| Funny - I took a manager role where the company was trying this
| approach. I was the manager, but I wasn't empowered to manage the
| team or their work. They had a lot of feel-good ideas about
| empowering employees and reducing the role of managers.
|
| It had the same result. Lowest productivity period of my career,
| for the entire company. It turns out there is some value to
| traditional management structures when implemented properly.
| Nearly all of the companies that experiment with weird management
| structure ideas seem to discover this eventually, and either
| revert to traditional management structures or they get built up
| in the shadows via social standing within the company.
| settsu wrote:
| > Lowest productivity period of my career, for the entire
| company
|
| "Productivity" is a nebulous concept in knowledge work. So
| unless you're referring to a factory with a very concrete,
| measurable output, this isn't particularly meaningful term.
|
| How was the quality and employee satisfaction (as shown by
| solicited feedback or subjective anecdotes, plus
| attrition/turnover, etc.)?
| Aurornis wrote:
| It was low productivity as in we didn't really accomplish
| anything. Teams couldn't figure out what to build because it
| was forbidden for managers to direct them.
|
| Happiness was down too because everyone just wanted to work,
| but we had these obscure rules about who could decide what
| was worked on (not managers) that turned into roadblocks to
| getting anything done across teams.
|
| This wasn't a case where "productivity" was an abstract
| metric that wasn't measuring the right thing. It was just
| gridlock where nothing was getting done because nobody was
| allowed to be empowered to direct things.
| settsu wrote:
| Oof, certainly sounds like a miserable train wreck.
|
| These are the sort of ideas that, at best, seem like they
| should be explored with an isolated R&D approach, or simply
| left to academics.
|
| And, if they are executed realtime with a companies
| mainline workforce and somehow succeed, it should be
| clearly stated and understood that it was--like much
| "success"--by no small amount of sheer luck (or
| happenstance via uncontrolled factors, if you prefer),
| force of will, and patience by the team as a whole, rather
| than the usual narrative which is the inspired actions of
| single prescient individual (who will then go on to write a
| book and give TED Talks about an approach that absolutely
| cannot be applied anywhere else and does not scale.)
| travisjungroth wrote:
| It can be hard or impossible to measure certain things, and
| just as hard to pick the right measures. But, there are
| also cases where you can say all reasonable measures are
| worse in one instance than another. Less new ideas, less
| happiness, less stuff going out the door, less bug fixes.
| Especially possible when it's a time window comparison.
| This sounds like one of those cases.
| serial_dev wrote:
| I got, what feels like, the most productive month of the year
| behind me, because I thought that the data nerd top executives
| flagged me because my GitHub stats were down and they keep an
| eye on me. It turns out I took something as a hint from my
| engineering manager that wasn't directed towards me, and my
| stats were fine.
|
| In the end they got increased productivity out of me because I
| thought I was flagged in some faceless soulless nonsensical
| "insights" dashboard.
|
| And by productive I mean that I feel like I made more impactful
| changes than usually, so I'm not referring to GitHub stats with
| fake cheat PRs and changes.
| debit-freak wrote:
| To equity-holders, it's code for the obsession that makes
| founders work extra-hard to please the financiers. To employees,
| it's code for being an abusive asshole.
|
| FWIW, I would never describe any of the (successful, with exits
| and now-successful brands) founders I worked for this way. It's
| disgusting.
|
| It's been a long, long time since pg had to answer to employees.
| He clearly no longer understands the current labor market, nor
| what it implies about actual workplace conditions.
|
| EDIT: To be clear, "obsessive" attention to detail is still what
| makes products work coherently. It's the rhetoric that an
| individual, even a "founder" taking on mountains of potential
| value, should (or even can) shoulder and internalize this,
| without breaking, that is inherently wrong.
| notahacker wrote:
| I think the most damning comment of all on "founder mode" came
| not from the critics but from a LinkedIn post giving Brian
| Chesky apparently sincere praise for purportedly examplifying
| it. Apparently AirBNB had completely screwed up customer
| support responses to a fellow founder to the extent they'd
| blocked her, but _as she was a member of the YC alumni network_
| , a quick message and Brian resolved her in a few minutes, at
| the weekend. Who needs process or executive decision making at
| lower levels when you have "founder mode"?!
|
| Customer support mistakes are unavoidable in large companies
| and AirBNB definitely isn't the worst offender in that regard,
| but I can't really imagine a bigger example of dysfunction in a
| B2C business than customer support resolution being the CEO
| needing to respond to personal messages of customers well
| connected enough to reach him via private channels. But now
| customer support failure is actually something to aspire to,
| provided it involves the important virtue of CEOs being busy at
| weekends.
| debit-freak wrote:
| The behavior you've described seems deeply dysfunctional but
| for reasons that are entirely separate from how the term
| "founder mode" has gained a life of its own. "Founder mode"
| is being weaponized to critique people for entering a market
| much more competitive and dry of opportunity than it was
| thirty years ago Without acknowledging any change in the
| market the article at hand seems to be just a person belching
| complaints without anything to say.
| notahacker wrote:
| Comparisons with the big internet successes of 25-30 years
| ago are pretty wild anyway, on the basis that Google is
| pretty much the poster child for tech founders letting a
| professional manager install a hierarchy to do the running-
| big-company stuff, and Pierre Omidyar not only left day to
| day management as soon as eBay floated but also made a
| point of moving out the Valley and portraying himself as a
| philanthropist rather than a business leader.
|
| The original essay felt more like scrabbling around for a
| reason why founders felt their companies were less
| effective with more levels of hierarchy whilst somehow
| missing the essential truth that managing a team of 1000 is
| harder than managing a team of 15 no matter how you do it.
| I'm just here for all the wild takes on founder greatness
| and founder obligation that came with it!
| moomoo11 wrote:
| Replace managers with AI
| matthewsinclair wrote:
| Someone should at least do the experiment and see what happens.
| I can see it now: ChatCEO.
| danielmarkbruce wrote:
| I have some sense that it would work better than most CEOs. It
| would require someone reasonably smart to build the system and
| keep it fed with the right data etc, but the amount of decision
| making and additional context as to why decisions are made etc
| would be valuable, especially where CEOs are a bottle neck
| (which is... a lot of places)
| swyx wrote:
| something jeff bezos always warned against was the "narrative
| fallacy" - for one to believe so strongly in a compelling story
| that they dont stop for data.
|
| here's the stock charts of the founder of founder mode vs a
| professional manager mode guy :)
|
| https://x.com/ericnewcomer/status/1830998969490526423
|
| just a fun reminder not to take everything as gospel.
|
| to engage more substantively with TFA:
|
| > I think the general pattern that Brian was identifying was the
| following. A young, inexperienced founder with limited management
| experience is running a rapidly scaling company. Famous VCs
| invest a lot of money and join the board. Headcount passes 100
| and quickly grows beyond 1000. The VCs (who often have never run
| anything themselves) encourage the founder to hire "executives"
| with "scaling experience". > > The founder is told to "empower"
| these executives, who typically then implement techniques that
| worked for them at previous companies. But, too often, these
| techniques fail in the new company.
|
| yes, i have worked at a company where this happened -- sans the
| "quickly grows beyond 1000" - we never got there before our hired
| gun execs made enough political moves to effectively kill the
| company momentum. i dont know if our founder couldve righted the
| ship by himself since he had his own issues to overcome, but i'm
| 100% sure he would have been better off just having the hired
| guns be advisors rather than management layers.
| dvt wrote:
| > here's the stock charts of the founder of founder mode vs a
| professional manager mode guy :)
|
| I've always told myself if I start a company that ever reaches,
| say, 250+ employees, I'd step down. First, playing a management
| game doesn't interest me (it's sort of like Risk vs Monopoly;
| the former is fun, the latter I find boring). And second, I
| just like _building_ things. I wish the meme /essay would be
| about "builder mode" because I do think that's more of a thing
| than "founder mode."
|
| I also think, uncontroversially I'd wager, that the skillset is
| just different. Building an MVP, finding product market fit,
| pivoting, trying new things, failing, and doing it all over
| (and over, and over) again is just absolutely fundamentally
| different than running a large corporation, trying to maneuver
| around market sentiment, dealing with politics, and so on.
| octopoc wrote:
| Wow this really hits home for me. I can do long stints at a
| job but when I do I inevitably start building all kinds of
| things on the side because that's what I love doing.
| rgbrgb wrote:
| I understand the sentiment but you may be overlooking how you
| and your interests can change as the company scales. The
| version of you running the 200 person company probably looks
| different from the seed stage version and won't want to quit
| at 250. That said, if you don't want to have a bunch of
| people working for you, it seems kind of unlikely that you'll
| find yourself in that position.
| causal wrote:
| This seemed like an obvious blindspot in the pg essay - if you
| take the 0.1% most successful founders and put them in a room
| together (which is the context of his essay) then of course
| you're going to come away looking for that special ingredient
| which makes these people so special.
|
| It could just be luck. But you're not likely to learn much
| without also talking to all the people who were just as
| talented and still failed.
| carabiner wrote:
| Bezos also said, "When the anecdotes disagree with the data,
| it's usually the anecdotes that are right"
| robenkleene wrote:
| The end of that quote is "there is something wrong with the
| way that you are measuring your data". Which changes the
| meaning of the quote (without it, it's "value anecdotes over
| data", with it, it's "use inconsistencies with anecdotes to
| identify problems with data".
| debit-freak wrote:
| Putting aside the inherent irrationality of stock charts for
| measuring anything other than the markets' (wildly inaccurate)
| interpretations of a topic, I agree with you. Rhetoric is a
| rich-mans' stand-in for actual argumentation with evidence and
| response to criticism.
| concerndc1tizen wrote:
| The two charts are basically identical except for Uber's last 6
| months...
| pdntspa wrote:
| I am glad he is calling out the C-levels for their propensity to
| lie and 'manage up'. This is a character trait that needs to be
| annihilated. We should not be filtering for what is effectively
| psychopathy.
|
| I have watched so many amazing and sustainable products die
| because someone let the MBAs in. After sitting through so much of
| this crap dogma in my own business school classes, I would say
| the vast majority of what they/we are taught is actively harmful
| to most businesses.
| BurningFrog wrote:
| I don't like it more than you do, but it exists because it
| works in practical reality.
|
| To replace it you must come up with something that works even
| better.
| pdntspa wrote:
| I disagree with this blocking tactic of "if you want to
| complain about it you must come up with something better"
|
| Like, yes, let me completely redo my entire life path so I
| can redo one stupid argument.... I would love to, but I
| wasn't born with a silver spoon in my mouth that gives me the
| sapce to explore these things, and I have more practical
| matters to attend to. Until then, we're going to be
| complaining to anyone that would listen.
|
| This is why we elect representatives to handle our
| complaints. Except in the business world there are no
| representatives and the regulatory bodies are actively made
| toothless (by business interests), so the only prevailing
| doctrine is the one that allows the people at the top to
| steal ("capture") the most value from the process. Everyone
| else can just go fuck themselves, amiright? This is a system
| that needs to be destroyed.
| codingwagie wrote:
| Its forcing employees to create value, when they really just want
| to collect compensation
| blitzar wrote:
| Its a grindset.
| extr wrote:
| Feels like I am taking crazy pills when I read about this stuff.
| Like 1500 words that boil down to "make sure you're paying
| attention to whether or not people are doing a good job".
| alphakappa wrote:
| It's also crazy that people are buying into the idea of
| 'Founder Mode' when Airbnb is one of the companies that is very
| much riding on the moat it created a while back while not doing
| anything much that can even remotely be called customer-
| obsessive (which is the lesson they could really learn from
| Steve Jobs)
| lotsofpulp wrote:
| Airbnb being customer obsessive would involve much higher
| labor expenses and liability, which would be counter to the
| goal of its investors (especially investors from pre-IPO
| days).
|
| The goal is to make a business out of the higher margin parts
| that scale easily, and leave the lower margin customer-
| obsessive parts to others.
| _puk wrote:
| Anecdotally, in my friendship group, Airbnb in Europe seems
| to be losing ground quite rapidly, especially from a mind
| share perspective.
|
| Prices are similar to hotels.com, with silly house rules,
| cleaning fees and hassle vs just turning up and leaving.
|
| I've used Airbnb for years, and it was truly revolutionary
| back in the day.
| nonameiguess wrote:
| I would argue that, when you get to the scale of an Airbnb,
| or Amazon, which is where I think the "customer-obsessive"
| terminology comes from, you need to move beyond focusing
| solely on your customers. Your business is having a social
| impact. The house next door to me right now has had
| contractors going in and out of it for the past three weeks
| to remove and replace the entire interior because of damage
| done by a short-term renter. Construction has absolutely
| boomed around me but nearly all of the new units are becoming
| short-term rentals. The neighborhood is either empty most of
| the time, or full of drunken idiots making a bunch of noise,
| getting the police called on them at 3 AM, and leaving the
| streets and sidewalks full of trash and broken bottles.
|
| Airbnb may very well be making its customers happy, but when
| so many of those customers are 21 year-olds looking for party
| houses they can trash and fundamentally changing the
| character and safety of entire neighborhoods, is that really
| the most important thing? Even as the founder or executive or
| both of a business, you're still part of a human community
| and you have a duty to that community not to worsen the lives
| of countless bystanders in order to delight the few who
| happen to pay you. Make products that are valuable in
| general, to everybody, not products that are valuable only to
| your customers at everyone else's expense.
| tptacek wrote:
| A lot of people, including people in attendance, do too. I
| think the reason is that people read Paul Graham posts about
| startup management as if they were written on stone tablets.
| Sometimes I think he intends for them to be taken that way (and
| in some cases, I think I get why), but this was not one of
| those cases, and the discourse ran away with it.
|
| That said: there's a real phenomenon Graham and Chesky were
| grappling with, and if you've done startups for awhile ---
| startups, in particular, because they give you the vantage
| point of seeing a company's management processes develop from
| zero --- you've almost certainly seen it yourself. Not enough
| has been written about it! The point Graham was trying to make
| isn't banal (or wrong).
|
| It's just not fully formed, and is being taken that way.
| extr wrote:
| I've worked in startups a long time myself. Personally I've
| never seen this problem, feels like it's advice literally
| specifically for Chesky or maybe a founders at a couple dozen
| other unicorns. In my experience it's a way more common
| problem in the other direction. Founder can't let go of the
| details and is mucking about in everyone's work. Or have
| literally just become bored with the company and can't even
| be bothered to hire the professional executives that are
| supposedly such a problem. Perhaps a hot take, but IME most
| professional executives/managers/MBA types are actually
| pretty solid people to work with and do a good job.
| tptacek wrote:
| Both things are true: there are founders who lose Github
| merge privileges and start meddling because they haven't
| defined a long-term job for themselves, and there are most
| definitely pasteurized processed business units that get
| hired and run the exact same performative playbook at
| startup after startup. It's not an either-or thing.
| extr wrote:
| I'm not saying that both don't exist, I'm just saying
| PG's advice is so narrowly applicable as to be
| effectively "bad advice" for most people reading it.
| tptacek wrote:
| As this article points out: Graham's article has probably
| been misconstrued, and is best read as "this is something
| you should consider and pay attention to", and not a
| directive for everyone to go "be in founder mode". But to
| be clear: I also don't think Graham's post is especially
| good, though I think the issue he's engaging with is
| important and widely slept on.
| danielmarkbruce wrote:
| There is an implicit assumption that the founder will make
| good decisions. If someone is "mucking about" in everyone's
| work, presumably it's phrased that way because they are
| making a bunch of stupid decisions? Not much (there are
| counter examples) will fix a ceo making dumb decision after
| dumb decision.
| IAmGraydon wrote:
| It's actually worse than that. It's 1500 words that boil down
| to "the hierarchical structure that powers the most powerful
| companies, organizations and governments in the world and has
| for hundreds of years is all bullshit. Believe me I am very
| smart."
|
| It's a complete clown show, but people love to believe stories
| about people bucking the system, so they eat it up.
| intelVISA wrote:
| well the oft reality: I Made Lots of Money Exploiting H1Bs
| You Can Trust Me Bro needs some artistic license before you
| can sell yourself as a thought leader
|
| pg gets a pass for building outsized value (YC pre 2020), but
| the rest should probably not flex their luck and confuse it
| with success and spare us their 'wisdom'
| fakedang wrote:
| > I Made Lots of Money Exploiting H1Bs You Can Trust Me Bro
|
| Who dat?
| nine_zeros wrote:
| > Instead, I believe that great leaders have to be able to dig
| into the details, have an incredibly high bar for quality, and
| ultimately do great IC work themselves. Great managers have to
| manage the work - they should primarily be responsible for
| quality and speed of output. Managing people must be secondary to
| managing the product.
|
| If you are ever confused about founder-mode vs manager-mode, this
| is the one single insight that you need to internalize.
|
| Put in other words, the org needs leaders who drive from the
| front. Not managers who build empires and run performance reviews
| from the back.
|
| Driving from the front involves looking at external-facing data -
| customer happiness, features that land better, maintenance of
| services - things that make the customers life better - whether
| internal customer of external customer. They need to spend a lot
| of time collaborating with peer leaders, distant leaders,
| diagonal leaders, different departments regardless of anyone's
| position in the org chart.
|
| However, most large tech companies are filled with dogshit
| management that tries to micromanage number of commits, meetings,
| standups, Jira points, velocity, performance calibrations, stack
| ranking, PIPs - aka inward looking things that are mostly set up
| to catch their own people doing something. Also called politics -
| personal gain triumphs all.
|
| Even a 5th grader can tell you - practice makes perfect. And if
| your leaders are practicing inward politics as opposed to outward
| exploration and collaboration, you are getting exactly what they
| are practicing - inward politics.
| __loam wrote:
| Most of us are confused by founder mode because Paul Graham
| invented the term like a month ago.
| cynicalpeace wrote:
| Programmers love to name things, and then argue about the name.
|
| For me, "founder mode" just means being extremely motivated to go
| "harder, better, faster, stronger" (ala Daft Punk and Kanye).
|
| You don't need to be a founder to be motivated and just because
| you're a founder doesn't mean you're motivated. But the two
| nicely line up.
|
| Calling it founder mode has obviously been a great way to get
| nerds to argue about it, so good on pg.
| tempodox wrote:
| Yep, the nerd sniping worked, and besides there's no such thing
| as bad publicity.
| intelVISA wrote:
| Founder mode = drop out of Berkeley and copy paste open source
| code?
|
| I wonder if 'founder mode' is the antithesis to Agile as getting
| shit done is against the manifesto (in practice).
| fakedang wrote:
| Somehow I feel that Paul Graham has contaminated the startup
| discourse with his "Founder Mode" essay.
|
| Not to mention, PG is taking the dangerous route and only looking
| at a few data points (let's be honest, just one - Brian Chesky,
| not even Joe or Nate) and trying to extrapolate that over the
| rest of the domain.
|
| According to PG, Sam was one of his favorite founder types a
| decade earlier. How did that founder mode work out, except for a
| failed startup, then having to kick him out of YC, and now
| heading a startup where all the core team members left for
| greener pastures? If Loopt did pan out, I'm sure PG would be
| raving over Sam instead.
|
| At this point, it's about time PG steps out of his inner circle
| shell and actually meet some successful founders in the YC
| community on the regular.
| trunnell wrote:
| Unlike PG's half-baked founder mode essay, this article is more
| complete in describing what behaviors are successful during
| scaling. It also matches my experience when Netflix was scaling
| up the streaming business in the 2010-2016 era.
|
| > how do good leaders stay in the detail and run great companies
| at scale?
|
| It's a relevant question not just for founders but for leaders at
| every level.
|
| IMO, one test for a "good leader" is whether they are capable of
| doing the work 1 to 2 levels down into their teams. The more
| familiarity they have, the more they are able to hire, fire, and
| evaluate those people. After all, it's pretty hard to evaluate
| work in an unfamiliar domain. Paradoxically, though, good leaders
| do not contribute to that work directly. So how do they maintain
| their skills if they don't do the work?
|
| Consider the case of a front-line engineering manager with IC
| engineer reports. A good one will know their team's codebase,
| know where it could be easily extended and have good intuition
| for the time required for any given feature idea. They know the
| difference between good and bad code. But they NEVER submit PRs,
| mostly because the maker schedule/manager schedule problem [1]
| forces a choice of doing only one type of work well. (Every new
| manager I've seen who wants to "spend 10-30% of their time
| writing code" will either fail to support that code or fail to
| support their team as a manager, when in a fast growing team or
| company.)
|
| The solution for eng. managers is to have the codebase on their
| machine, be able to build and run it, and occasionally implement
| their own experiments or POCs. These things NEVER go to
| production. It's meant purely to maintain the manager's
| familiarity with the codebase and staying current with their
| team's output. (Hat tip to CW).
|
| Note that we still don't have good labels for these behaviors.
| "Hands on" and "hands off" confuses the issue-- is the example
| above "hands on" or "hands off?" It's both and neither, because
| those aren't useful labels.
|
| There are other solutions for leaders higher up the org chart.
| The article mentions _skip level 1:1s_ and _niche area deep
| dives_ both with the purpose of _evaluating leadership
| effectiveness._ When I did these, I 'd always start with setting
| the same context: _I have two goals for this meeting and one non-
| goal. I want to hear about what you 're working on, what's going
| well and where the challenges are. I also want to answer any
| questions you have about what's going on elsewhere in the
| company. My non-goal is giving you specific direction, since
| that's always between you and your manager. I'm just here to
| gather and share information._
|
| The role of a leader is to set goals, share context and ensure
| the right team is in place, hiring and firing as needed. They
| need to know what's going on from top to bottom in the teams they
| lead, and in order to hire effectively, they need to be capable
| of doing the work 1-2 levels below them. But they never actually
| contribute 1-2 levels down, because that would severely undermine
| the people they've delegated to.
|
| I think this is why so many had a knee-jerk reaction to in PG's
| founder mode essay, where he implied that founders have a special
| ability to bypass management layers _and contribute directly_ (in
| the Steve Jobs example). I 've seen it happen, and it failed 100%
| of the time. 100%. After establishing some amount of managerial
| structure -- wild guess would be after 50+ total employees --
| contributing directly several layers down into your team is a
| recipe for disaster. The puzzle is how to lead effectively
| without making that mistake.
|
| [1] maker schedule/manager schedule
| https://www.paulgraham.com/makersschedule.html * Bonus behavior:
| good managers are sensitive to booking meetings with any of their
| team members who are on the maker schedule.
| renewiltord wrote:
| Founder mode is funny. There's definitely some companies that
| benefit and there's others that don't, and it's not clear which
| is which. But the term "founder mode" is so funny that we now use
| it in my group of friends (of which the majority have started
| software companies worth $xxx million) as an analogue for "going
| ham".
|
| On the basketball court, when someone's got a hot hand: Damn,
| he's going founder mode.
|
| At dinner, when someone devours a meal: I went founder mode on
| that shit dude.
| lol768 wrote:
| An interesting read. I've been a Monzo customer ever since the
| sign-up process was "come to the office and we'll give you your
| card and help you get the Beta version of the app installed" and
| it's been interesting, exciting (and sad, in some ways) to see it
| grow and morph into what it is today.
|
| Back then, you were more likely than not to get an engineer
| dealing with your customer support queries. There was a Slack
| community, a forum community and it felt very much like a scrappy
| little start-up that was truly making a difference in what - in
| the UK - had been an industry dominated by companies that didn't
| really care about user experience or modern technology (I'd had
| the misfortune of doing work for some of those banks). They even
| had an API which customers could use to get their own data!
|
| The pace of progress was rapid, too. I remember asking Tom if
| he'd ever consider offering business current accounts, since the
| competition was pretty dire at the time - the answer back then
| was a "no, we're focussing on retail" - but I'm happy to use my
| Monzo business account daily now!
|
| I had the opportunity to work on a proposal and sit down with
| some folks from one of Monzo's partnerships team a few weeks back
| for a potential collaboration which ultimately didn't end up
| going forwards. The staff were lovely, but it didn't feel like
| _quite_ the same company I 'd visited in-person years ago to
| collect my pre-paid card from. I guess that's something that
| inevitably happens as companies scale up.
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