[HN Gopher] Questioning the Criteria for Evaluating Non-Cryptogr...
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Questioning the Criteria for Evaluating Non-Cryptographic Hash
Functions
Author : fanf2
Score : 6 points
Date : 2024-09-21 20:35 UTC (2 hours ago)
(HTM) web link (queue.acm.org)
(TXT) w3m dump (queue.acm.org)
| PeterWhittaker wrote:
| I've read the first several paragraphs and skimmed the article a
| few times, and the motivation still eludes me: given the
| existence of cryptographic hash functions that are well designed
| and thoroughly tested, why spend so much time on non-
| cryptographic hash functions?
|
| What benefits do they provide that are not provided by their
| secure "brethren"?
| twiss wrote:
| Better performance. For a hash table, a cryptographic hash
| function is overkill (i.e. spends a lot of time to provide
| security properties that are not needed).
| bsder wrote:
| > For a hash table, a cryptographic hash function is overkill
| (i.e. spends a lot of time to provide security properties
| that are not needed).
|
| Except, as we quickly find out, attackers can often exploit a
| non-cryptographic hash to create a denial of service attack.
|
| The problem is that if my hash function is really a
| performance bottleneck, I'm probably better off using a
| really shitty hash function that exploits some feature of the
| data being stored that is "good enough" but super fast. In
| that case, even a non-crypto hash function won't be fast
| enough.
|
| Finally, hash tables result in "random-ish" memory access
| patterns. On a modern processor, random memory access is so
| horrifically slow that you may get superior performance by
| changing data structures to something with a much more linear
| access pattern and dumping the idea of hash tables
| altogether.
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