[HN Gopher] Resilient Anonymous Communication for Everyone (RACE)
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Resilient Anonymous Communication for Everyone (RACE)
Author : keepamovin
Score : 84 points
Date : 2024-08-30 14:51 UTC (8 hours ago)
(HTM) web link (www.darpa.mil)
(TXT) w3m dump (www.darpa.mil)
| ZunarJ5 wrote:
| Matrix or Briar? Wouldn't P2P/self hosting always be better?
| upon_drumhead wrote:
| p2p leaks the 'metadata' of the network connections. It makes
| it trivial for someone to know that these two nodes are talking
| to each other. A goal of this, and other similar protocols,
| attempt to prevent that sort of metadata analysis.
| thisconnect wrote:
| Have a look at simplex.chat
| ZunarJ5 wrote:
| Interesting, thanks for the reply.
| Rhapso wrote:
| That only happens if the fact nodes are peering provides
| information relevant to security.
|
| If the peer selection protocol is something like a dht, or a
| random-k network like bitcoin, it doesn't leak anything.
|
| but in practice nothing works better than all-to-all messages
| via epidemic routing. https://www.miasma.space/anon-dhts/
| mapt wrote:
| Apparently, Signal is already used heavily by the US military,
| and Telegram by the Russian & Ukrainian military.
|
| As we create, so we destroy for tactical reasons. Telegram's
| founder was just arrested for "failure to moderate". PGP was
| regarded as "munitions export". Tor is apparently wide open to
| the NSA through traffic analysis.
|
| Even as a small portion of our government wants freedom of
| communication, most of it is strongly opposed.
| coliveira wrote:
| The goal of US gov is not to create, it is to control.
| OutOfHere wrote:
| The US government is not one thing. It is diverse agencies,
| often working together, but sometimes in opposition. It is
| not guaranteed that all agencies have the same goal of
| control.
| ants_everywhere wrote:
| Telegram can't moderate the encrypted content. Most of Telegram
| is not encrypted. A more apt comparison might be Facebook
| groups.
| lawlessone wrote:
| Telegram dude was already allegedly cooperating and moderating
| for the Russian government. If true he loses any argument that
| suggests he was defending privacy or free speech.
| mapt wrote:
| Are you at all familiar with "Telegram Dude"? A fugitive of
| the Russian Government, an expat whose Facebook-like social
| network VKontakte was seized by the Russian Government,
| before he fled Russia and started an encrypted messaging app
| in response?
|
| I'm no expert on his current activities, but this isn't a
| situation without Known Context.
| upon_drumhead wrote:
| there are news articles (I admit, of questionable origin)
| the claim he visited Russia yearly for the past decade. I
| do wonder if it the situation is a little more complex then
| he was a fugitive of the Russian Government
| jjulius wrote:
| Further, there have been constant references, in articles
| from very reliable, reputable sources (see: CNN, NYT,
| FOX, etc.) since Russia's invasion into Ukraine about
| Russia's use of Telegram. I don't know that I could count
| the number of times I've seen phrases akin to, "based on
| conversations between Russian military commanders on
| Telegram," used as a source. The issue is that Russia's
| military essentially sucked at setting up their own
| communications channels, so they fell back to Telegram.
|
| Even Politico and the WSJ can confirm...
|
| https://www.politico.eu/article/telegram-ceo-arrest-
| pavel-du...
|
| https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/russia-military-
| telegram-fo...
| eitland wrote:
| Thing is, Ukraine also use Telegram a lot.
|
| It is forbidden for military to military communication,
| but openly used a lot for information from authorities to
| the public.
|
| A reason why russia use it is because they don't have
| anything better.
|
| Ukraine on the other hand had fairly advanced systems
| well before recent Western military aid started arriving.
| kfreds wrote:
| > Tor is apparently wide open to the NSA through traffic
| analysis.
|
| Would you be willing to clarify what you mean by that?
|
| To start with, are you saying that Tor is wide open to traffic
| analysis
|
| (1) by anyone,
|
| (2) by powerful attackers such as the NSA, or
|
| (3) by the NSA specifically?
| roywiggins wrote:
| The allegation is usually that the NSA owns enough of the Tor
| network to deanonymize people using it.
| dumbo-octopus wrote:
| "owns" not necessarily in a financial sense, more that they
| have very comprehensive access to ip metadata the world
| over.
| jjulius wrote:
| Semantics.
| avery17 wrote:
| They also run a ton of nodes. So yes they own part of the
| network financially.
| thisconnect wrote:
| Not just that, nsa can observe enough of the whole intrnet
| traffic and do deep packet inspection. Afaik tor does
| explicitly not protect against such an observer in their
| threat model.
| ddtaylor wrote:
| > do deep packet inspection
|
| There is no DPI on Tor networks. Traffic analysis for de-
| anonymization for Tor works by knowing all the variables
| in the system and solving it, not by looking at any
| content of the packets themselves.
|
| The last time something like that was possible at all in
| Tor it broke it entirely and destroyed the anonymization.
| The bug involved a vulnerability in the way Tor handled
| the traffic confirmation attack on Onion Services. This
| attack allowed malicious relays to embed uniquely
| identifiable information into Tor cells (the packets used
| in the Tor network).
| g-b-r wrote:
| No, you just need to observe the timings, and only of the
| first and last segments of the communication
|
| Western nations will probably have access to them in most
| cases, at least for traffic originating and ending in one
| of them
| ddtaylor wrote:
| That's not deep packet inspection, just FYI. Timing and
| traffic correlation attacks never get any access to the
| packet information and piggy back on existing network
| weaknesses (correlating IP addresses based on timing
| metadata)
| dooglius wrote:
| (2), the Tor design is explicitly stated as being vulnerable
| to a "global passive adversary" (you can search that phrase
| online for details)
| natpalmer1776 wrote:
| I've heard (and perpetuated) hearsay about Tor being
| compromised, but I can't find where I heard that information
| originally.
|
| Could you point me to any notable incidents or events that has
| lead to this recurring sentiment?
| upon_drumhead wrote:
| From https://github.com/tst-race/race-docs/blob/main/what-is-
| race... it sounds pretty similar to how TOR works
| Rhapso wrote:
| yeah reading this it feels like it lacks anything tor isn't
| already better at
| ants_everywhere wrote:
| The US military is kinda weird because the offensive and
| defensive sides have opposite interests when it comes to privacy
| and anonymity.
|
| (1) The defensive side wants the ability to de-anonymize and
| decrypt everything on demand so they can catch threats to the US.
|
| (2) The offensive side wants to promote anonymous encrypted
| communications so they can encourage pro-democratic dissent in
| authoritarian regimes.
| rhplus wrote:
| Group (1) also wants their adversaries to feel confident that
| the encryption promoted by (2) is secure, so that they use it
| to communicate candidly.
|
| It that respect, (2) is just a mouthpiece for (1), provided
| there's a back door or vulnerability that only (1) knows about.
| chefandy wrote:
| > provided there's a back door or vulnerability that only (1)
| knows about.
|
| Do you have any examples from existing tools, e.g. Tor, for
| which that's true? Tor's been around a long time-- surely
| something would have surfaced at this point, but I haven't
| really paid attention to it.
| inhumantsar wrote:
| Tor is an interesting example. A number of attacks are made
| possible by monitoring Tor exit node traffic, especially at
| the scale nation states can bring to the table.
|
| https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tor_(network)#Exit_node_eav
| e...
| chefandy wrote:
| Sure-- but that structural shortcoming has been a thing
| for a long time-- I wouldn't consider it a secret
| vulnerability that Tor was facilitating for US
| intelligence, as was initially implicated. I'm not in the
| field, but it seems like it would be way more useful for
| law enforcement working against criminals naive enough to
| think tor would be a one-stop op-sec solution (e.g. ANOM)
| than for nation-state-level counterintelligence.
| seanlinehan wrote:
| https://blog.cloudflare.com/how-the-nsa-may-have-put-a-
| backd...
| throwaway201606 wrote:
| Methods provide the highest leverage if you "own" the
| common element used across the most system components ie
| the lowest common denominator.
|
| Saying it another way, don't attack platforms, tools and
| channels, attack protocols since they are used across
| platforms, tools and channels
|
| To this end, some examples:
|
| Attack on
|
| 1) encryption - RSA backdoor
|
| https://blog.cloudflare.com/how-the-nsa-may-have-put-a-
| backd...
|
| 2) hardware - Processor Backdoor
|
| https://forums.whonix.org/t/expert-claims-nsa-has-
| backdoors-...
|
| (this link is specifically great for this subject as it
| lists more than 10 different attack / compromise programs
| that are being run - with quite a few of them being
| protocol attacks - in the comments section )
|
| 3) networking - network gear firmware backdoor
|
| https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-
| advisories/aa...
| antishatter wrote:
| Uk gov selling or giving enigma away knowing they had
| broken it
| natpalmer1776 wrote:
| If I remember correctly, Tor has been broken due to 'threat
| actors' owning enough exit nodes to successfully de-
| anonymize traffic given enough time and information.
|
| pretty sure this is hearsay from a message board, but I
| can't for the life of me recall where or when I heard this.
| OutOfHere wrote:
| There is no real evidence that DARPA is morally compromised
| by the NSA in any way. This is unlike for NIST where there is
| evidence of such compromise.
|
| Moreover, it is not DARPA doing the development. They fund
| other entities to do it.
| hangonhn wrote:
| > There is no real evidence that DARPA is morally
| compromised by the NSA in any way. This is unlike for NIST
| where there is evidence of such compromise.
|
| Wait. Can you clarify this? I know that NIST's standards
| were compromised by the NSA or at least there is evidence
| of it. However, this is not necessarily the same as being
| morally compromised. The story I've read is that the NIST
| was taken for a ride by the NSA but weren't in bed with
| them. Is the narrative I have incorrect?
| qchris wrote:
| If you haven't seen it already, there was a post a couple
| of years ago here that got some traction on this subject,
| in context of a FOIA-related lawsuit filing by a (I'm to
| understand) well-regarded cryptologist:
|
| https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=32360533
| hangonhn wrote:
| That's really informative. Thank you! Thank you!
| dooglius wrote:
| The defensive side also has a case for strong caring about
| adversaries de-anonymizing traffic of US citizens and
| businesses
| jatotebs wrote:
| TOR is PURELY designed for spies to use to hide among the
| network in countries throughout the world. It needs regular
| people to believe in it, to use it, but its only real purpose
| is for the spies. Regular users can and are deanonymised in
| real time and without using zero days. You just have to look at
| the network to see that you are almost exclusive connected to a
| series of entry/relay/exit nodes within 14 Eyes countries who
| share real-time data with each other. The servers are fast
| because most are using VPS. There was a time when it was more
| anonymous, when the relays would actually be random people's
| own computers across the globe, but it was too slow. The whole
| thing is gamed, and just because criminals are on there
| thinking they are anonymous is just because they are allowed to
| continue to keep the charade alive. I know I am going to be
| bursting bubbles here for 'true believers', but they have all
| been gamed for years. I'm surprised this info is Top Secret, it
| should be utter common sense to everyone by now.
| motohagiography wrote:
| this is an important problem to work on so I'm extra irritated by
| this. looked for the protocol written in standard/BAN notation,
| didn't find it. if you don't have that for a security protocol,
| what is there to evaluate or trust?
|
| - lack of a top level protocol description? Check.
|
| - quirky codeworded modules instead of useful feature
| abstractions? Check.
|
| - promoted by an intelligence agency? Check.
|
| I'd be really interested in novel solutions to this general
| problem, but how is this one not dumber than Urbit?
| dirtdobber wrote:
| DARPA isn't an intelligence agency.
| j33zusjuice wrote:
| They partner with them depending on the project, though.
| motohagiography wrote:
| anyone who knows what darpa does knows it's included in the
| IC, which a reasonable person would call an intelligence
| agency.
| dirtdobber wrote:
| DARPA is an R&D agency under the DoD. Even if you work on
| their classified projects, it's going to be under the
| umbrella of the DoD. There are specific R&D agencies for
| the Intel community (see IARPA).
|
| Some constructive criticism: it's better to just admit when
| you made a false statement than to double down on being
| wrong.
| bigfuz wrote:
| https://github.com/tst-race/race-docs/blob/main/RACE%20devel...
| motohagiography wrote:
| thanks, but in this there are no keys, key encryption keys,
| counters, deriavtion functions, or anything that would
| indicate how the security of identities and messages are
| preserved.
|
| sure, sequence diagrams, which are great to have and
| necessary, but there are no assertions about how security is
| done.
| bpshaver wrote:
| You misunderstand. This is not a solution to the problem, it is
| a program to fund research into solutions to the problem.
| motohagiography wrote:
| it's a specification with code. please, tell me more about
| what I don't understand though.
| Jerrrrrrry wrote:
| Reminds me of a recent quote: an ungovernable,
| decentralized, general trust-less computation protocol/escrow/rep
| using zkp+ and hormophic encryption was not able to be realized
| before the alfabit bois got a chance to mole into the development
| pipeline and backdoor the inevitable Merchanti Ultimatum;
| anything less would be a massive national security threat
| globally.
| miovoid wrote:
| Huh, do you quote yourself?
| the-alchemist wrote:
| Looks like a few folks are confused.
|
| 1. One of the underlying cryptographic principles is multi-party
| / secure-party communication
| (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secure_multi-party_computation).
| e.g., three people want to share their salaries to each other,
| but don't want the information to be traceable to back to the
| source.
|
| 2. Another is Steganography, hiding text in, say, an image, or
| audio.
|
| 3. You want to prevent the problems with Signal, Tor, Bitcoin,
| etc. This means, no "50%" problem like Bitcoin, no monitoring of
| exit nodes like Tor, no centralized distribution issue like
| Signal.
|
| Imagine:
|
| Alice "sends" a message to Bob by creating an account on Reddit
| and posts a cat meme which has the hidden text (steganography).
|
| Bob knows how to find the text in that cat meme, and responds by
| posting something on Twitter, which Alice can read and decrypt.
|
| All this is deniable (I didn't get anything from Alice!),
| available (e.g., Twitter goes down), and secure.
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