[HN Gopher] Intel SGX Fuse Key0, a.k.a. Root Provisioning Key Wa...
___________________________________________________________________
Intel SGX Fuse Key0, a.k.a. Root Provisioning Key Was Extracted by
Researchers
Author : tiagod
Score : 68 points
Date : 2024-08-26 16:56 UTC (6 hours ago)
(HTM) web link (twitter.com)
(TXT) w3m dump (twitter.com)
| kzrdude wrote:
| What's the impact of this?
| RockRobotRock wrote:
| May help break DRM? But not sure
| ronsor wrote:
| PC Blu-ray players all require SGX. Now that's permanently
| broken.
| lxgr wrote:
| Apparently that's been on the way out for a while now:
| https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=32442894
|
| Now I'm curious, thouyh: Have there really never been any
| software Blu-ray players supporting AMD?
| toast0 wrote:
| Blu-ray is fine, it's Ultra Blu-Ray (aka Blu-Ray 4k) that
| needs SGX for officially licensed playback. No AMD
| support there. But non licensed play back is fine.
| gojomo wrote:
| Some of Signal's designs for contact privacy, including in the
| new usernames feature, rely on trust in SGX.
|
| If anyone (including Signal) can pretend to be a secure SGX
| environment, you're back to trusting Signal's
| personnel/operations, rather than Intel/SGX, for some of the
| metadata/contact privacy they've historically touted.
|
| More info (2020): https://medium.com/@maniacbolts/signal-
| increases-their-relia...
| eklitzke wrote:
| Just to expand on this, since it wasn't originally clear to
| me from reading your post, the contact privacy feature is
| about using SGX enclaves for the purpose of populating your
| known contacts on Signal. When you log into Signal for the
| first time your phone locally has all of your known contacts,
| and the Signal app wants to know which of these contacts
| already have Signal accounts. The secure enclave is a
| mechanism where you publish your entire contact list from
| your phone to the Signal servers, then they can send back the
| subset of those contacts that actually have Signal accounts.
| The point of the enclave is that this is all done in a way
| where Signal can't see what contacts you sent them, nor can
| they determine which contacts were matched and sent back to
| you.
| ein0p wrote:
| That seems like misplaced trust. There's no way US Government
| does not have a back door to SGX. Which is probably why the
| CIA/In-Q-Tel-funded Signal is using that in the first place.
| inhumantsar wrote:
| it's used quite a bit in finance for things like transaction
| signing. the keys used to create signatures only ever exist
| within the SGX enclave, similar to how yubikeys and HSMs do the
| same thing.
|
| compromising SGX wouldn't suddenly open up all of these
| transactions to exploitation though, since the attacker would
| need (presumably root) access to the machine and the keys could
| always be rolled.
|
| I'm no expert but I suspect it would mean urgent firmware
| updates for anyone relying on SGX
| chc4 wrote:
| I'm under the impression enclave keys have been extracted before,
| and Intel was able to mitigate by essentially publishing a key
| revocation update that made models with the extracted keys not be
| trusted for remote attestation. Is that also the case with these
| keys?
| fallingsquirrel wrote:
| That doesn't solve the greater issue. Let's say you bought an
| Intel CPU because your company requires remote attestation.
| Then a researcher publishes an exploit. Then Intel pushes an
| update that revokes keys from your model of CPU. What would you
| do, go happily spend $500 on a new one? Should we landfill
| millions of CPUs everytime the mouse pulls ahead of the cat?
| bananapub wrote:
| this is obviously entertaining, but the entire history of SGX is
| just getting owned over and over and over:
| https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Software_Guard_Extensions#List...
___________________________________________________________________
(page generated 2024-08-26 23:01 UTC)