[HN Gopher] Mining Pool Game Theory During Forks
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       Mining Pool Game Theory During Forks
        
       Author : b10c
       Score  : 25 points
       Date   : 2024-07-15 15:25 UTC (4 days ago)
        
 (HTM) web link (b10c.me)
 (TXT) w3m dump (b10c.me)
        
       | roenxi wrote:
       | There is one aspect to the situation that I'm not sure this blog
       | post factored in - the miners have an enormous incentive to
       | preserve confidence in the integrity of the chain. If we assume
       | that crypto behaves like a social network where there are super-
       | linear advantages to a large number of participants, the most
       | important thing for a large miner is that none of the rational
       | participants feel like they are playing win-lose games with the
       | miners. The worst-case isn't losing a block. There are lots of
       | blocks out there. The worst case is a market participant in
       | YourCoin decides to go hawk OtherCoin instead because they don't
       | know what blocks are trustworthy in the short term.
        
         | wongarsu wrote:
         | However this is only true for miners that are loyal to a coin.
         | If you are in a mining pool that mines whatever is profitable
         | and immediately exchanges it for your favorite currency then
         | you don't care about any given coin. You still want to preserve
         | trust in crypto as a whole though, so you wouldn't go
         | completely crazy
        
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