[HN Gopher] Topological Problems in Voting
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Topological Problems in Voting
Author : rtolsma
Score : 28 points
Date : 2024-06-15 01:20 UTC (21 hours ago)
(HTM) web link (www.ryantolsma.com)
(TXT) w3m dump (www.ryantolsma.com)
| johnkpaul wrote:
| Hmm, is this author related to the Physics for the Birds YouTube
| channel?
|
| That channel just released a video on the same topic.
|
| https://youtu.be/v5ev-RAg7Xs?si=X1LY6Qc_s-HDqI3S
| unfamiliar wrote:
| Am I missing something or does the article fail to explain the
| point of Arrow's Theorem? Is it satisfied for the discrete case,
| provably impossible, or what?
|
| > While this applies to discrete rankings and voter preferences,
| one might wonder if it's a unique property of its discrete nature
| in how candidates are only ranked by ordering. Unfortunately, a
| similarly flavored result holds even in the continuous setting!
| It seems there's no getting around the fact that voting is pretty
| hard to get right.
|
| I don't follow any of this paragraph.
| pxeger1 wrote:
| I agree, it could do with a little more proofreading. Arrow's
| theorem states that no voting state which ranks candidates can
| satisfy the the given conditions.
| contravariant wrote:
| I'm not quite sure why one would use a sphere, unless you were
| specifically trying to get a version of Arrow's theorem.
|
| If anything it looks like it fails _precisely_ because the space
| is not homologically trivial, but I 'm a bit unsure how to make
| that precise. A similar set up with just [0,1]^n as preference
| space works perfectly fine just by averaging all the scores for
| each candidate.
|
| I kind of sense that requiring a function X^k -> X to exist is
| somehow hard if X is not 'simple', but I'm not yet sure what the
| obstruction is.
| lukifer wrote:
| Arrow's Theorem is often invoked as a criticism of alternative
| voting systems (RCV, etc). And not while not wrong exactly, it
| seems textbook "perfect being the enemy of the good". (It's also
| one reason I prefer Approval Voting, which in addition to its
| benefit of simplicity, sidesteps Arrow by redefining the goal:
| not perfectly capturing preferences, but maximizing Consent of
| the Governed.)
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