[HN Gopher] Google Blog: Android's theft protection features kee...
___________________________________________________________________
Google Blog: Android's theft protection features keep your device
and data safe
Author : Josely
Score : 106 points
Date : 2024-05-15 17:12 UTC (5 hours ago)
(HTM) web link (blog.google)
(TXT) w3m dump (blog.google)
| daghamm wrote:
| Looks like they have added tons of features for this. This one
| really caught my eyes.
|
| "Theft Detection Lock is a powerful new feature that uses Google
| AI to sense if someone snatches your phone from your hand and
| tries to run, bike or drive away"
| oittaa wrote:
| A rare case of actually useful AI features. Thumbs up!
| duxup wrote:
| Is it AI or just ... recognizing a pattern?
|
| How much data could it have to look at in the time that
| someone "snatches" a phone?
| cflewis wrote:
| AFAICT all machine learning models right now are just
| pattern matching.
| SushiHippie wrote:
| The article continues with:
|
| > If a common motion associated with theft is detected,
| your phone screen quickly locks - which helps keep thieves
| from easily accessing your data.
|
| So it's probably a machine learning model that was trained
| on motion data of snatches, but it's likely not AI in the
| sense of LLMs.
|
| But I wonder how many false positives this could yield. For
| example you are in a hurry and you snatch your phone from a
| table. How precicesly can this model decide with just
| motion data, if this was theft or not.
| ckozlowski wrote:
| I'm trying to decide if parents with small children will
| either love or hate this feature.
| duxup wrote:
| Google is really going to crush those little toddlers
| dreams of finally getting their hands on the phone :(
| duxup wrote:
| Would be interesting to know the difference between a
| snatch and me rushing out the door...
| lupire wrote:
| Do you often interact with your phone via the screen
| while rushing out the door?
| ceejayoz wrote:
| Yes?
| Terr_ wrote:
| Probably the acceleration vector. If the phone is rapidly
| moved a meter away from you, either it's being snatched
| or it's being thrown.
|
| Edit: To clarify, I was thinking of horizontally, in the
| direction that corresponds to the top of the screen, as
| if you were bent over using the phone--probably holding
| the bottom-of-screen--and then someone grabbed the top-
| of-screen to pull it away.
| curiousObject wrote:
| _> If the phone is rapidly moved a meter away from you,
| either it 's being snatched or it's being thrown._
|
| Good heuristics. Also that must not be a mainly
| _downward_ rapid movement, which probably only means you
| just dropped your phone.
| Terr_ wrote:
| I think a lot of the false-positive cases where the
| screen gets locked are acceptable in context.
|
| I mean, most people dropping their phone will be too
| glad/devastated that the device did/didn't escape harm to
| bother being annoyed that they have to unlock the screen
| again.
| roblabla wrote:
| I mean, worse case scenario, your phone just locks (I
| assume to the lockscreen, where you have to re-enter your
| pin). It doesn't seem like such a big problem?
| sunshowers wrote:
| It's a classifier, like ML has done for many years.
|
| There's a saying that when something becomes mainstream
| it is no longer considered AI. Fun to see that being
| reversed.
| 0cf8612b2e1e wrote:
| Personally, I would take the false positives. Way too
| much of my life is locked into securing this fragile
| black rectangle. Unlocked phone has access to basically
| everything. I personally do not do any finances on my
| phone, but all of the MFA works through it.
|
| If I snatch a phone from the table (probably already
| locked?) or drop it, I will suck up the additional login.
|
| I have long thought about the utility of a little
| locking-beacon. If phone suddenly gets out of range,
| should auto lock. If only Bluetooth were not so
| unreliable.
| whiplash451 wrote:
| My Apple phone won't let me do some sensitive things if I
| am in an unusual location. It's a default setting.
| 0cf8612b2e1e wrote:
| If my phone gets nabbed, a motivated thief would do
| nefarious actions the minute they get out of site. So
| presumably just a few blocks away from a usual location.
| rezonant wrote:
| Worth noting Android (or at least Pixel) does have a
| feature like this, but it actually does the opposite:
| while a Bluetooth device is connected it keeps the phone
| _unlocked_. It would be way more useful in the reverse:
| that if a Bluetooth device _disconnects_ , it should
| _lock_.
|
| These are two different things, since I do not want my
| phone to have no lock screen just because my headphones
| are sitting near it, but if it is unlocked and suddenly
| my headphones disappear, that would be a useful
| precaution, even if it doesn't eliminate the risk on its
| own.
| KTibow wrote:
| I would expect this to not make a difference if your
| phone was already locked. But I guess Google could only
| lock the device if it was upright before being grabbed.
| nonameiguess wrote:
| How on earth do you even get training data for this?
| Recorded phone sensor outputs that are known for certain
| to be the result of validated, confirmed theft events
| can't possibly be that common. Are they paying people in
| Bangledesh a few bucks to be randomly assigned to group
| that either get robbed or tripped in the hope they throw
| the phone and labeling sensor data accordingly. When this
| type of motion recognition was first developed, they had
| labs and recorded people walking, doing jumping jacks,
| sitting and then standing, whatever, and labeled the
| patterns appropriately because they knew what was
| happening because it was happening in a lab.
| immibis wrote:
| AI is another word for training-based computerized pattern
| recognition.
| commoner wrote:
| There are free and open source apps for Android that
| automatically lock the device when the accelerometer
| detects rapid acceleration, which is a simple detection
| method. For example, Private Lock is on F-Droid:
|
| - Private Lock (source):
| https://github.com/wesaphzt/privatelock
|
| - Private Lock (F-Droid):
| https://f-droid.org/en/packages/com.wesaphzt.privatelock/
| duxup wrote:
| Very interesting.
|
| Gotta admit first thing I would do is stage a theft
| scenario to see how it works.
| medo-bear wrote:
| :) So one way I immagine it does this is by listening in on
| your microphone to determine a distress signal. Up to you if
| you think this is cool. In general people should ask
| themselves do they really want a semi-intelligent program
| someone else trained "living" in their phone. Yikes. I tried
| to uninstall the neural network package on my Android but it
| is impossible since it is an actual system package. Why on
| earth it should be an Android system package is beyond me.
| Moreover this issue persists even if you use a de-Googled
| privacy and security focused distribution like GrapheneOS
| vntok wrote:
| Yes but that's only in your imagination, it's not how the
| feature works. The feature works based on motion detection
| trained on specific "theft patterns".
| medo-bear wrote:
| Because you trust how it is marketed. The android neural
| network package is system deep, meaning it could easily
| bypass all software permissions for hardware
| quantumpacket wrote:
| You don't need Big Brother Google accessing your sensor data,
| nor do you need AI for this. I've been using this app for years
| and it works great in locking the device if someone grabs my
| device.
| https://f-droid.org/en/packages/com.wesaphzt.privatelock/
| sva_ wrote:
| You're saying it works great, which makes me wonder how often
| your phone has been snatched away?
| neilv wrote:
| Sounds potentially useful, but question...
|
| If you're trying to call 911, or you're trying to video an
| assault... and someone tries to stop you, such as by jostling
| you or your phone... what's the likelihood that this Private
| Lock will get in the way of that?
| michaelmior wrote:
| It's not clear that any sensor data needs to be sent to
| Google for thois to work. I suspect this is all on device.
| WheatMillington wrote:
| I don't understand the point of features like this. OK awesome
| that thief can't use it, but I've still lost my phone. It
| hasn't prevented any loss.
| nmeofthestate wrote:
| The phone is worth less to the thief, so theft becomes less
| lucrative and there is less incentive for the thief to steal
| your phone.
| jakubadamw wrote:
| The idea is that with features like this widespread, the
| probability of a theft leading to the thief repurposing the
| stolen device will be lower. Therefore, the incentives for
| thieves - the ones acting rationally within the paradigm of
| being a thief, at least - will be lower. Therefore, the
| number of thefts, generally, may go down. A few big ifs here,
| of course.
| 0xEF wrote:
| I've always felt that system lock was about preventing
| theft of the device data, not prevention of flipping the
| device itself. Like tons of other people, I have sensitive
| apps and data on my phone (banking, cloud services, etc),
| but unlike tons of people, I take great care to ensure
| logouts after I am done accessing said apps or data. Even
| so, a thief snatches my phone, I don't care what happens to
| the phone itself, so long as the data is safe.
| 0cf8612b2e1e wrote:
| Knowing the thief does not have access to my email, banking
| apps, nudes, etc is worth a huge piece of mind.
| hn_throwaway_99 wrote:
| That caught my eye too. For whatever reason I thought of how
| Ross Ulbricht, Silk Road founder, was arrested when FBI agents
| used a ruse to snatch his laptop from him before he could lock
| the screen.
| neverokay wrote:
| This is how a feature like this worked on my iPhone.
|
| 1.iPhone detects I'm in an unusual location (I'm not, vpn). It
| just decided this all of a sudden, and I've used vpns in the past
| without issue.
|
| 2. Goes into lockdown mode
|
| 3. You need Face ID to disable lockdown mode
|
| 4. Face ID cannot be used in lockdown mode. Go back to step 3
|
| Step wtf: We're now trapped out.
|
| 5. I have to reset my phone. I forgot that I have eSIM, so
| resetting deletes my phone number too.
|
| Step holy shit: Apple let me delete my entire sim card in about a
| one click warning lol.
|
| -----
|
| These people don't dog food their own shit at all. Had to disable
| Face ID after an event like that.
| r00fus wrote:
| Do you have advanced data protection turned on?
| neverokay wrote:
| Maybe? Does it excuse this oversight by the iOS team?
| vntok wrote:
| > iPhone detects I'm in an unusual location (I'm not, vpn)
|
| VPN literally moves your phone to an unusual location, for all
| intents and purposes.
| neverokay wrote:
| So I'm supposed to go into lockdown every single time? Fine,
| but don't lock me out with FaceID so I can override it at
| least.
|
| Apple needs to revisit that feature because that lockout
| could have happened at a critical time.
| stacktrust wrote:
| What were the visible indicators that the phone had entered
| lockdown mode? It usually requires user consent, followed
| by reboot.
|
| iOS Lockdown Mode does not usually constrain the method of
| unlocking the phone.
| neverokay wrote:
| Maybe I'm crazy? If you have an iPhone, enable faceid and
| put it into lockdown mode manually (I just remember it
| happening automatically).
|
| Tell me how you get out of lockdown mode.
| stacktrust wrote:
| My iOS devices are in lockdown mode 99% of the time. To
| disable lockdown mode, go into Settings > Privacy >
| Lockdown Mode, it offers the option to "Turn Off and
| Restart", then asks for a passcode.
|
| The behavior being described sounds a bit like malware.
| If it happens again, the best option is to Force Restart
| (VolUp, VolDown, hold side button until the device
| reboots), which cannot be intercepted by any apps which
| might be trying to simulate iOS system prompts.
| roblabla wrote:
| no, it doesn't? It changes your publicly visible IP. Your GPS
| data still shows you in the original location. Your wifi
| localisation and 5g antennas would still be in the original
| location. It'd also be _trivially easy_ for the OS to know
| that the user is behind a VPN, given the only way to do so is
| through APIs dedicated to VPN use.
| lupire wrote:
| That's not true at all. Phones geolocate themselves using
| satellites, cell towers, and WiFi access points.
| sophacles wrote:
| It moves your IP address to an unusual location. I highly
| doubt that it changes your GPS coordinates, nearby wifi, cell
| towers, etc that can be used in location detection.
| xmprt wrote:
| > You need Face ID to disable lockdown mode
|
| It's impossible to use the apple ID password or lockscreen
| password/PIN for this?
| neverokay wrote:
| If you have FaceID enabled, it will require that to disable
| lockdown mode (and I already explained the loop about how
| lockdown mode disables biometric auth like Face ID). I can
| get into the phone with my pin just fine, but the phone is
| still locked down. When lockdown mode disables biometric
| auth, I couldn't get into bank, brokerage or any app
| requiring that auth.
|
| Maybe I'm just crazy because it seems like a ridiculous
| oversight.
| stacktrust wrote:
| _> I can get into the phone with my pin just fine, but the
| phone is still locked down. When lockdown mode disables
| biometric auth, I couldn't get into bank, brokerage or any
| app requiring that auth._
|
| Never heard of this behavior, but it's not associated with
| the Apple feature called "Lockdown Mode", which does not
| constrain use of secure enclaves for Touch ID or Face ID
| authentication, https://support.apple.com/en-us/105120
| buildbot wrote:
| I wasn't aware lockdown mode can be enabled without you
| explicitly doing so.
| stacktrust wrote:
| _> resetting deletes my phone number too_
|
| There's an option during reset to keep the eSIM,
| https://allthings.how/how-to-factory-reset-iphone-without-er...
| rurp wrote:
| Big tech companies locking you out of your own stuff is an
| underrated threat vector.
|
| I recently had a similar debacle with my Google account when I
| was travelling out of state and lost my phone. I needed to
| access my account quickly and fortunately knew my password and
| had added my partner's phone number as a 2fa method for exactly
| this kind of scenario.
|
| Well when I went to log in Google took it upon themselves to
| disable that 2fa method, because it thought there were more
| secure options available. Except there weren't because I was
| far from home and all of my other devices!
|
| I was pretty shocked that Google would change my security
| settings without any notice to me and confirmation on my part.
| neverokay wrote:
| I've opted for a backup phone on a $10 line to always have
| SMS if necessary for 2fa. I don't take it outside.
|
| Quite frankly I need to make a stronger commitment to
| memorizing three passwords for life.
|
| But to your point, yes I have critical apps where the main
| threat vector is being accidentally locked out.
| atomicfiredoll wrote:
| I've lost 2 different gmail accounts, apparently due to
| Google deciding to change or not respect my security
| settings. It's hard to say for sure. Meanwhile I still have a
| Hotmail email address. (This isn't me saying Microsoft
| couldn't cause similar issues, but I've at least been able to
| get things fixed through support in the past.)
|
| I'm of the same mind that providers can be underrated risks,
| because it doesn't always cross people's minds that the
| provider could be that seemingly incompetent. It's certainly
| a potential situation to consider when dealing with companies
| that have poor support. And unfortunately, not all of them
| have great support or self-service tools like account
| recovery codes.
| thescriptkiddie wrote:
| Maybe someday they will bring back the ability to back up your
| phone, so that you can restore your data to a new device without
| having access to the old one.
| xnx wrote:
| Doesn't Google/Android have the ability to backup the phone to
| your Google Account?
| https://support.google.com/android/answer/2819582?hl=en
| refulgentis wrote:
| Yes, it's tied to your Google Account
| shuckles wrote:
| iPhone can be backed up to a Mac or PC.
| hedora wrote:
| Even then, some apps "know better" and are not backed up.
| Signal is one of the bigger offenders on this front
| (despite there being options for E2E encrypted / on-site
| backup in iOS).
| hiatus wrote:
| Signal has its own backup feature that will backup to a
| file on your device on Android as well.
|
| Settings -> Chats -> Chat backups
| oittaa wrote:
| It's not an exact copy of all the data. For example random
| downloaded files don't get backed up and restored unless you
| migrate from an old device[0]. It would be nice to be able to
| do a full device local backup and restore.
|
| [0]https://support.google.com/android/answer/6193424?hl=en
| amlib wrote:
| In my experience the backup is very limited and most app data
| is lost, specially annoying are banking apps that require you
| to go to a physical bank branch in order to re-pair your
| restored phone and restore full access to your bank account.
| lokar wrote:
| I've never heard of that. Is it outside the US?
| izacus wrote:
| Banking apps willfully prevent backups on both platforms,
| it's not something you'll get from the phone.
|
| Someone put "prevent backups" on banks security audit
| checklist and that's that.
| amlib wrote:
| My main issue, at least here where I live, is that you
| can only have a single phone paired to your bank account.
| If anything happens to your phone, that's it, you are
| locked out of accessing your bank acc. You used to be
| able to access your bank account from a telephone call
| (sure, very arctic and insecure nowadays) or from the
| bank website without requiring the phone app to
| authenticate.
|
| Had they provided a second form of access, independently
| of a single phone, I would be more than fine with it.
| xnx wrote:
| These are good features, but I don't know if they help much
| against the "$5 wrench" vulnerability: https://xkcd.com/538/
|
| There have been multiple thefts in Chicago where "Police said the
| gunmen forced one of the victims to reset his phone password
| while threatening him with a pistol. They made another victim log
| into their banking apps."
| (https://cwbchicago.com/2024/05/chicago-bucktown-robbery-spre...)
| bezier-curve wrote:
| That sounds terrifying... what's wrong with people?
| morning4coffe wrote:
| WTF. This sounds like the next level
| lotsofpulp wrote:
| Hence why you should not have banking/brokerage apps on your
| phone (or their passwords in your iOS keychain), except maybe a
| checking account with a couple thousand dollars in it.
| hwbunny wrote:
| You can have, just tucked away in some folder.
| rezonant wrote:
| Uh, you know there's an app search on iOS right?
| hwbunny wrote:
| Against the 5$ vulnerability, if you are that important, go for
| a gun permit and train on pigs so in a real life situation you
| wouldn't freeze.
| rurp wrote:
| No, random people should not try to get into gun battles to
| protect their phone. If you're that worried about the rare
| chance of being forced to unlock your phone by criminals you
| can limit which financial apps you have on the phone.
|
| Despite some popular fantasies, buying a handgun and shooting
| some targets (or live pigs?!?!) does not turn one into an
| action hero. That kind of escalation is likely to get the
| phone owner or another innocent person killed. It's a stupid
| risk, especially given that there are much better ways to
| protect your phone data.
| jsheard wrote:
| Hopefully the upgrades to factory reset protection actually work
| this time. There's a seemingly never-ending supply of ways to
| bypass Androids FRP by doing some weird incantation to break out
| of the inital setup wizard.
| shuckles wrote:
| As an iOS user it's a bit shocking to hear that Android hasn't
| had a functional activation lock. iPhone has had that for
| almost 11 years. I suppose this is a case where Apple's
| hardware and software integration is especially notable.
| cantSpellSober wrote:
| Android has activation lock. This announcement is about FRP.
| hedora wrote:
| What's the distinction?
|
| On iOS, if the device is stolen, after a reset, you can't
| set the phone up (and it's been like that for over a
| decade).
|
| Google says that's exactly what FRP does.
| vlovich123 wrote:
| No an Android user, so I'm not sure what distinction you're
| making. On iOS there's not really a distinction between the
| two [1].
|
| > Activation Lock is an Apple feature designed to prevent
| the unauthorized transfer or use of Apple devices. Built
| into Apple's Find My system, it's Apple's implementation of
| factory reset protection, which manufacturers are legally
| required to include in order to sell smartphones in the US.
|
| Given that it's been legally required since 2015 to sell
| smartphones, this must be something else.
|
| [1] https://www.kandji.io/definitions/what-is-activation-
| lock
|
| EDIT: Looking at the actual announcement.
|
| > Factory reset upgrade prevents a reset by a thief. For
| some criminals, the goal is to quickly reset your stolen
| device and resell it. We're making it more difficult to do
| that with an upgrade to Android's factory reset protection.
| With this upgrade, if a thief forces a reset of the stolen
| device, they're not able to set it up again without knowing
| your device or Google account credentials. This renders a
| stolen device unsellable, reducing incentives for phone
| theft.
|
| > More steps for changing sensitive device settings to
| protect your data. Disabling Find My Device or extending
| screen timeout now requires your PIN, password or biometric
| authentication, adding an extra layer of security
| preventing criminals who got a hold of your device from
| keeping it unlocked or untrackable online.
|
| > When enabled, our new enhanced authentication will
| require biometrics for accessing and changing critical
| Google account and device settings, like changing your PIN,
| disabling theft protection or accessing Passkeys, from an
| untrusted location.
|
| AFAIK this has always been true for iOS, or true for as
| long as I can remember at least.
|
| The rest is pretty neat & unique to Android though (e.g. a
| separate PIN-required space for certain apps like bank or
| health data, automatic protection on snatch, fast-lock
| using very low-overhead authentication mechanism).
| shuckles wrote:
| Perhaps you are using "activation lock" to mean the carrier
| imposed requirement that some mobile phones are restricted
| to their network? On iOS, it seems like activation lock
| refers to exactly the feature that Android is touting
| finally works with new updates to FRP.
| daghamm wrote:
| Are you thinking of sim lock?
|
| Android and ios boot mechanism are pretty identical:
| secure boot -> unlock modem -> unlock user area. There
| are some differences in where in the CPU this happes and
| how it is protected but Pixel phones are pretty close to
| iPhone even if we look at such details.
| codegladiator wrote:
| > Factory reset upgrade prevents a reset by a thief. For some
| criminals, the goal is to quickly reset your stolen device and
| resell it. We're making it more difficult to do that with an
| upgrade to Android's factory reset protection. With this upgrade,
| if a thief forces a reset of the stolen device, they're not able
| to set it up again without knowing your device or Google account
| credentials. This renders a stolen device unsellable, reducing
| incentives for phone theft.
|
| Can I turn this off ?
| rany_ wrote:
| They've already done this for a while. It's called FRP (Factory
| Reset Protection). I'm pretty sure that even my Android phone
| from 2017 had this feature.
|
| I don't know why they're touting it as a new feature.
| cantSpellSober wrote:
| Yeah they even mention it in their help pages
|
| > _Expect to unlock your screen or enter Google Account
| information [after reset]_
|
| https://support.google.com/android/answer/9459346?hl=en#veri.
| ..
| AshamedCaptain wrote:
| Frankly the only new feature I read on this announcement is
| the "auto-lock on sudden movement" which seems like a minor
| evolution of a feature they had 10 years ago that does the
| opposite (prevent auto-lock when the device is stationary).
| stusmall wrote:
| It's definitely older than that. I remember implementing it
| at an old job. That device ran 4.4 and was later upgraded to
| 5. I know we had it in our 5 builds but I can't remember
| about the KitKat builds.
| JohnMakin wrote:
| > I don't know why they're touting it as a new feature.
|
| This is powered by _AI_! /s
| 101008 wrote:
| Some people reported it here that their phones were stolen, and
| then were contacted by the thiefs to reveal the PIN. To prove
| they were serious, thiefs attached addresses and names of the
| victim relatives.
|
| I know this wouldn't happen in USA or any serious country
| (because these people were prosecuted), but in 3rd world
| countries (where phone theft is super common) this will still be
| a problem.
| umanwizard wrote:
| I left my phone (iPhone) in an Uber in Mexico and the driver
| ignored my attempts to contact him to get it back. A few weeks
| later someone attempted to spear-fish me: I was sent a
| realistic-looking message pretending to be from Apple saying
| that my phone had been found and I needed to log in to iCloud
| to see its location. Of course, it linked to a fake iCloud
| page.
| daghamm wrote:
| This is actually a pretty common problem with iPhone thefts in
| US.
|
| First the phone shows up the other side of the globe, then
| someone either tries to trick you or threaten you to remove it
| from your account.
| exabrial wrote:
| Oh yeah, like that time you guys locked me out of my phone after
| I reset it, lent it to a friend, who reset it when they returned
| it to me? And I called you dipshits to resolve the problem, and
| you refused to unlock it, despite having a fucking receipt
| showing I literally purchased the phone FROM GOOGLE?
|
| Thanks asshats! Hard nope on any "AI" here.
| neilv wrote:
| > _With this upgrade, if a thief forces a reset of the stolen
| device, they're not able to set it up again without knowing your
| device or Google account credentials. This renders a stolen
| device unsellable, reducing incentives for phone theft._
|
| Is this going to be a significant deterrent to mugging in
| practice, or are muggers still going to approach for your wallet,
| and take the phone in any case (to prevent calling, and to flip
| it for parts)? Is there data?
|
| For muggers that want the phone not to be tied to a Google
| account, is a mugging going to turn in a more intense and lengthy
| encounter, while they make you deactivate your account on it?
| (And they're getting nervous about how long it's taking, and take
| it out on you.)
|
| Personally, my first choice is not to be mugged. But, if/when I
| do get mugged again, my second choice is that it be a quick and
| smooth transaction, in which everyone remains calm, and I don't
| get physically hurt nor develop PTSD.
| jpalawaga wrote:
| Are most phones stolen through muggings?
|
| In my experience, they're lifted from people's hands while
| walking, taken out of back pockets, out of lockers, from the
| window sill at bars/restaurants, etc.
|
| this would certainly deter that sort of activity.
| neilv wrote:
| I guess that information will also be be useful, when
| weighing "X% less likely that your phone is taken when your
| wallet is taken from your gym locker" against "Y% more likely
| that a mugging turns into a maiming".
| Angostura wrote:
| Sounds like an incentive to increase the number of muggings
| sagarm wrote:
| You could make this argument against locking your house or
| car, or password protecting your bank accounts, ... really
| any kind of security.
| neilv wrote:
| Nice, I didn't catch that one: Let's say that phone
| snatch&grab is just an easy entry point for people driven
| to bottom-end crime, and their current snatch&grab is
| suddenly no longer paying off, but the most immediate
| barrier to that can be gotten past, if only they step up to
| getting the phones in muggings.
| qmarchi wrote:
| This isn't anything new and has already led to a significant
| reduction in mobile phone thefts.
|
| On Android, it's called FRP and has been part of the Android
| CTS since ~2015.
| chpatrick wrote:
| Right, I thought we had that for ages.
| xnx wrote:
| > is a mugging going to turn in a more intense and lengthy
| encounter, while they make you deactivate your account on it?
|
| This is already happening.
|
| "Police said the gunmen forced one of the victims to reset his
| phone password while threatening him with a pistol. They made
| another victim log into their banking apps."
| (https://cwbchicago.com/2024/05/chicago-bucktown-robbery-
| spre...)
| redbell wrote:
| In unrelated topic, I've always been wondering how Google was
| able to acquire this _.google_ TLD?!
| zamadatix wrote:
| It's mostly a matter of "they spent (and continue to spend) a
| lot of money on it" but you can read about who has applied and
| what the requirements are here
| https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb/base-agreement-...
| utrack wrote:
| It sounds great, but they could also block the settings' switches
| in the pull-down drawer first...
|
| As far as I understand, this whole Find My/Remote Lock stuff will
| stop working when the thief pulls the bar down and activates the
| Airplane mode. Then all the data is one vulnerability away from
| being accessed.
|
| This is the case on _Google_ Pixel 8 Pro and it 's been there for
| ages; I assume it's the same for other vendors.
| teamspirit wrote:
| Right. I just recently switched to iOS and was pleased to turn
| that on. It took a minute to remember why only sometimes I was
| able to access the settings pulldown until I finally realized I
| had to wait for face unlock to finish - I felt pretty silly
| when I remembered.
|
| I'm surprised this isn't a feature on android yet.
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