[HN Gopher] Key Consciousness Connections Uncovered
___________________________________________________________________
Key Consciousness Connections Uncovered
Author : isaacfrond
Score : 85 points
Date : 2024-05-02 08:37 UTC (14 hours ago)
(HTM) web link (neurosciencenews.com)
(TXT) w3m dump (neurosciencenews.com)
| soderfoo wrote:
| Just to confirm: this paper focuses on the 'awakeness' aspect of
| consciousness, not self-awareness, correct?
|
| My science literacy is lacking.
|
| Personally, I find self-awareness the more fascinating area of
| study, but any brain research pretty fascinating.
| b800h wrote:
| Yep. It does frustrate me that they use the term this way.
| nicklecompte wrote:
| In the past we used the word "sentience" for this, but sci-fi
| confused "sentience" with "sapience," and now we have four
| terms that are meaningless, causing pointless arguments
| because different people interpret them in different ways.
|
| - consciousness
|
| - sentience
|
| - self-awareness
|
| - sapience
|
| (It really doesn't help that 3/4 these are too poorly-
| understood to even have a good formal definition.)
| glenstein wrote:
| I'm okay to live and let live and not litigate differences
| here as long as usage is meaningful and contributes to
| precision (although it would be perfectly fair to insist
| that's exactly what's being lost here).
|
| I understand, for instance, that for some people there's an
| important difference between morality and ethics, but
| modern scholarship in meta-ethics that is perfectly up to
| speed on this vocabulary sees no benefit to policing that
| particular distinction.
| groestl wrote:
| Obligatory book recommendation in that regard "I Am a Strange
| Loop", by Douglas R. Hofstadter
| denton-scratch wrote:
| > Just to confirm: this paper focuses on the 'awakeness' aspect
| of consciousness, not self-awareness
|
| That's how I read it. I'm interested in consciousness, but
| neither in terms of "self-awareness" or of "awakeness".
| Awakeness just means you aren't asleep. The term "self-
| awareness" implies awareness, which _might_ be what 's meant by
| consciousness, and it assumes there's a Self, which is a
| metaphysical concept, not susceptible to scientific
| invetigation.
| coldtea wrote:
| > _and it assumes there 's a Self, which is a metaphysical
| concept, not susceptible to scientific invetigation._
|
| I don't think this is correct.
|
| Not only because metaphysical concepts can still be
| suscpeptible to scientific investigation (as can e.g. time,
| reality, and so on. For example for reality "do we live in a
| simulation" could be something some scientists do try to
| determine), and because some metaphysical concepts just
| turned into practical concepts this way.
|
| But also because self-awareness and the concept of self can
| be defined in quite practical terms too (e.g. a higher level
| loop on top of regular thinking referencing the lower level,
| or similar ideas like in Hofstadter).
| glenstein wrote:
| Made the point better than I could. Also I would just
| contribute that a long line of anti-science apologism has
| taken the form of declaring that certain concepts are
| beyond the reach of scientific investigation. Evolution,
| human nature as understood in evolutionary terms, orbital
| mechanics past a certain point of Newtonian modeling,
| anaesthesia, etc.
| NayamAmarshe wrote:
| Time is not exclusively a metaphysical concept, the
| perception of time is.
|
| Reality, again is a very vague word in physics. One
| definition is, real is that which always is, not that which
| is not. Material nature is subject to constant change,
| there is nothing in the material universe that is
| immovable, unchanging and eternally static and stable.
|
| Eastern philosophy describes the reality as the 'Self', the
| self is eternally existing without a causation but this
| Self, the observer, requires an observation and hence the
| concept of material nature comes into place to justify the
| existence of the observer but the Self is mutually
| exclusive to the material nature. The Self is not an
| manifestation of the material nature, otherwise it would be
| ever changing, like material nature.
|
| For science to explain consciousness, it has to drop the
| idea of a controlled experiment. You cannot empirically
| verify certain thing to be true, this is what metaphysics
| is for.
| denton-scratch wrote:
| > But also because self-awareness and the concept of self
| can be defined in quite practical terms too (e.g. a higher
| level loop on top of regular thinking referencing the lower
| level, or similar ideas like in Hofstadter).
|
| I treasure my dog-eared copy of GEB. Having said that,
| Hofstadter sets out to argue for a "emergent phenomenon"
| explanation of consciousness, and I don't think his "loops
| within loops" argument works. It's not really an argument;
| it's finger-painting. He's trying to point in the direction
| of an argument (which is fine, even admirable; GEB is
| almost entirely concerned with allusion and suggestion.
| It's supposed to make you ask questions).
|
| It's quite easy to argue that the idea of a self (or the
| sense of being a self) is emergent, or an illusion; it's
| much harder to explain "idea" and "sense" in those terms,
| unless you resort to non-conscious[0] senses and non-
| conscious ideas.
|
| Basically, I agree that you can explain everything in terms
| of emergent phenonemena, _except_ the subjectivity of
| consciousness /awareness. We experience it directly, we
| know it's real (it's the only thing we know!), and nobody
| has come up with a way of showing that it's real, or even
| saying what it is, or how we could show it's real. Dougie's
| loops are just a distraction.
|
| [0] I say "non-conscious" rather than "unconscious" because
| I don't want Freudian woo to intrude.
| HarHarVeryFunny wrote:
| Objectively self-awareness is just inner-awareness vs outer-
| awareness - what you might consider as another sense, but
| where the sensory inputs are parts of the brain rather than
| external (eye, ear, etc). So, the watcher and the watched are
| both the same - the brain.
|
| The "self" is just a psychological construct - the actor
| behind our actions, which in fact is just the brain. This is
| just the way our brain has evolved to understand/predict an
| evolutionary landscape full of autonomous agents, who we need
| to model to predict their behavior. There's no fundamental
| difference between "self" (my-self) and "you" (your-self) -
| our brain observes some (inner or outer) entity as a causal
| entity, and models it.
| raincom wrote:
| Self-awareness = awareness of oneself. The moment one thinks,
| feels in terms of "I think, I feel, I see, I hear, etc".
| denton-scratch wrote:
| Yes, of course. I think I was suggesting that "awareness"
| and "consciousness" could be considered to be synonyms. If
| that's correct, then you can't use self-awareness as
| evidence of consciousness, because it begs the question
| (i.e. circular reasoning).
| Symmetry wrote:
| Right, and not qualia either.
|
| I'ts a bit more complicated than just awakeness, though. If you
| flash an image on a screen for a very short period of time, you
| won't ever be able to remember what it said or be able to tell
| someone what it said, but it can still have a slight effect on
| your behavior for about a second. There is information that are
| senses are providing to our brain that never makes it to
| conscious awareness.
|
| Sometimes people have brain injuries that prevent the transfer
| of information from some parts of their brain to their
| consciousness. Someone with blindsight has an injury that
| prevents them from being consciously, in this sense, aware of
| their visual field. They can still pick up items in front of
| them when asked. But they can't describe what is in front of
| them, and if the close their eyes they can't remember where
| something is and still pick it up like a normal person can.
|
| I'd highly recommend _Consciousness and the Brain_ for an in-
| dpeth look at research in this area.
| glenstein wrote:
| Right, and I think the key here is that we should be ready to
| see key elements we believe are necessary for conscious to be
| distributed across numerous systems, rather than uncovering a
| singular unitary thing. And so it's not a matter of "oh, this
| study only found XXX but it didn't find _consciousness_ ".
|
| But it might be that the process of coming to full empirical
| understanding is that we take an idea that used to be black-
| boxed, and open it up to find numerous particular mechanisms,
| numerous layers. Kind of like how originally we thought there
| was one Vitamin B but then came to learn there were numerous
| subclasses that were different in important ways.
| Symmetry wrote:
| That's true, but its also true that some connections might
| be reasonably said to be key for sensory information to
| find its way into working memory so I wouldn't dismiss the
| title.
| glenstein wrote:
| >Personally, I find self-awareness the more fascinating area of
| study
|
| I know what you mean by that, and fundamentally I agree with
| the basic idea. But (!!!) I don't think the idea of _self_
| awareness is nearly so critical as its made out to be, and I
| think it gets conflated with the other thing, described as the
| something-its-like-to-be (SILTB) quality.
|
| I think outward, worldly awareness is enough, and whether or
| not a 'self' is among the things that fall into awareness (1)
| isn't strictly necessary, as that self might be backgrounded
| and unconscious, and (2) is sometimes just adopted as phrasing
| to indicate the presence of the SILTB quality even though I
| don't think it necessarily has anything to do with that.
| taneq wrote:
| That's my reading, arousal/somnolence as opposed to being
| insensate vs. sentience.
| m3kw9 wrote:
| One can be awake and still not be conscious
| rytill wrote:
| Why do you find self-awareness to be the more fascinating area
| of study? It makes complete sense that something could be self-
| aware if it could be aware of anything at all. What more do you
| need to research/understand about self-awareness?
|
| It is far more interesting to me that there is "awakeness" to
| experience than that we can be aware of our selves (in the same
| way we can be aware of anything else).
|
| A complete understanding of sentience including its causes
| would be a far more satisfying and ethically impactful body of
| knowledge than a complete understanding of self-awareness
| (assuming they are not inextricably linked somehow).
| librasteve wrote:
| afaict this is novel research that has found a "default
| application loop(?)" in our brains that is associated with being
| awake ... and differs from goal oriented states - i have wondered
| if/when such an inner loop would be found since it is quite easy
| to turn consciousness on/off (sleep, anaesthetics, drugs ymmv)
| and then fMRI can be used to find differentiated activity
| patterns. This is pretty good evidence that Panpsychism is
| bollocks, if you needed it.
| loafer-project wrote:
| Interesting find on the "default application loop," but it
| hardly debunks panpsychism. Panpsychism suggests that all
| matter has proto-conscious traits, not just brain-like
| consciousness. The brain patterns we're identifying with fMRI
| are just how human consciousness manifests, based on our
| specific neural setups. This doesn't necessarily exclude other
| forms of consciousness inherent in different forms of matter,
| which might be beyond our current detection capabilities. Let's
| not conflate our present understanding of human consciousness
| with the broader, philosophical nature of consciousness itself.
| glenstein wrote:
| >Panpsychism suggests that all matter has proto-conscious
| traits, not just brain-like consciousness.
|
| I think a cornerstone of panpsychism is that none of the
| concepts presently available to any physicalist explanation
| is sufficient or on the horizon, _therefore_ it is necessary
| to entertain such ideas as a universe-spanning proto-
| consciousness.
|
| I find this position to be pre-emptive, not in the spirit of
| scientific open mindedness, not compatible with any research
| program that could prove or disprove it, and _completely_
| emptyhanded in any conversation that seeks to understand
| consciousness in functional or structural terms as well as
| completely emptyhanded in even beginning to explain the
| combination problem.
|
| Until it gets its act together and gets out of alpha-testing,
| I fault pansychism proponents for bringing a "teach the
| controversy" approach to a table of scientific investigation
| at which they are yet to have earned a seat.
| altruios wrote:
| I mean, experiments should be able to test this? Maybe in
| the future someone will find a way to adapt the double slit
| experiment to test for 'choice' on a fundamental particle
| level. "Can a particle choose for itself?"
| glenstein wrote:
| That's a very creative potential experiment, and I do
| hope some such experiments can be proposed!
|
| However, my understanding of the double slit experiment
| is that the "observer" in the experiment means something
| more like measurer or measurability, which can be done by
| devices. And it shouldn't be construed as being deeply
| tied to consciousness in philosophically important sense.
| altruios wrote:
| My understanding was 'measuring is touching' with light,
| imparting energy into the delicate system, and no
| measurement can be done at that scale (thanks to the
| rules of light frequency/energy) that can both detect it
| and be weak enough to not bother the result.
|
| So when I say like the double slit needs to be adapted,
| it would need to account for such. It would need to test
| for 'choice' from a particle... somehow...
|
| Or... maybe randomness as a concept is flawed. Maybe
| randomness === '(some level of informed?) choice' from
| particles we are not privy too. not some 'hidden
| variable' but a dynamic ability to 'choose'?
|
| How would we prove random is random and not a
| choice/decision we can't see or understand?
| nathan_compton wrote:
| My problem with panpsychism is that its scientifically
| vacuous. A brain is conscious in an obvious, observable way.
| An equivalent amount of sand is not. We need an account of
| why the brain behaves the way that it does, but panpsychism
| furnishes no such account and the content of that accounting
| would basically _be neuroscience_ as we know it, including
| all the philosophical difficulties of why things feel like
| things at all (this, I feel, is also vacuous, but a different
| question). Thus panpsychism is of no help at all for
| explaining anything so what precisely is the point of
| believing it?
| glenstein wrote:
| I also think that once you prod for explanations of
| combination, or why consciousness seems to be deeply
| associated with a specific kind of structural function and
| complexity rather than such things as size and mass,
| panyschist answers about where consciousness "shows up"
| just start to more closely approximate ordinary
| consciousness research we are already doing.
| tasty_freeze wrote:
| Panpsychism is as necessary to explain consciousness. Why
| can't it (and qualia) just be emergent behaviors?
|
| We might as well posit pancandleness in order to explain the
| candleness of candles. Without such a thing, why call a
| candle a candle? It would merely be just a temporary
| arrangement of molecules.
| llamaimperative wrote:
| 1. You're definitely still conscious when you're asleep --
| dreams are certainly conscious experiences
|
| 2. We don't actually _know_ what the internal subjective state
| of apparently-unconscious people are e.g. in drug-induced
| states
|
| Even if all of that were different, it still is not a disproof
| of panpsychism.
| exe34 wrote:
| That's a new use of the word "conscious" for me. How do you
| personally define consciousness?
| llamaimperative wrote:
| Internal subjective experience. To "have" a point of view,
| not in the argumentative/opinion sense but in the "there is
| experience being experienced" sense.
| exe34 wrote:
| What does it mean to have a point of view? Does a kalman
| filter qualify? Why not?
| llamaimperative wrote:
| I've never been a Kalman filter so I have no idea.
|
| The thing that is inscrutable to me by virtue of not
| having been a Kalman filter myself is what I'm referring
| to as "point of view."
|
| I don't _really_ know that anything or anyone at all is
| conscious (except for me), but it sure seems like lots of
| other things are, based on the way they behave.
| exe34 wrote:
| So for some things, you are happy to watch the way they
| behave and assume they have this magical property of
| consciousness like yourself, but for a kalman filter,
| you'd have to be one to determine if it has a point of
| view?
|
| You still haven't said what a point of view is in this
| context, if you can have it, and some other unspecified
| beings have it but you can't say upfront if a kalman
| filter has it.
| llamaimperative wrote:
| There's nothing incoherent here. Whether talking about a
| human, a dog, or a Kalman filter, the only mechanism by
| which I can _infer_ (not fully _determine_ ) whether it's
| conscious is by observing its behavior. Some things
| behave in ways that look more conscious than other
| things. Motor control, goal-seeking behavior, and doing
| things that imply self-awareness all point in the
| "probably conscious" direction, but none is dispositive.
| Other humans certainly give the appearance of being
| conscious while Kalman filters don't appear that way. But
| you can imagine a totally believable robot (a la
| Westworld) that behaves outwardly identical to a
| conscious human but is not conscious. We don't know
| enough about consciousness to determine whether it
| actually is or actually isn't, which also applies to the
| Kalman filter question: it doesn't _appear_ to be
| conscious (unlike the robot) but we don't have a way to
| determine whether it is (like the robot).
|
| I've said multiple times what a point of view is, I think
| you're just too caught up in argumentation to read the
| text in front of you.
|
| You agree that you have experiences, correct? Your
| ability to experience experiences is what it means to
| have a POV. The _name_ of that characteristic is
| "consciousness."
|
| It is _probably_ the case that some objects experience
| experiences (like you _presumably_ do and I definitely
| do), and other objects do not.
| exe34 wrote:
| > and I definitely do
|
| Prove it.
| llamaimperative wrote:
| Are you trying to make my argument for me? Because that's
| my argument.
| exe34 wrote:
| No I get the impression you really want to say qualia,
| but don't want the backlash.
| llamaimperative wrote:
| What would the backlash be? Has "qualia" fallen out of
| favor among people who think being asleep == not being
| conscious? Frankly given that opening confusion I am
| surprised you've heard the word qualia.
| 2snakes wrote:
| Right. If we weren't conscious we wouldn't know we had slept.
| It is an experience of nothingness.
| tshaddox wrote:
| > If we weren't conscious we wouldn't know we had slept.
|
| How do you figure? It's not uncommon to fall asleep, wake
| up, and be convinced that you never fell asleep even when
| people next to you tell you that you were unresponsive,
| snoring, talking in your sleep, etc.
| 2snakes wrote:
| There is a difference between what is experienced in the
| mind and consciousness. What you're describing are
| aspects of emptiness (and content or lack of content) as
| experienced by the mind waking/dreaming/deepsleep. But
| consciousness / Atman is always aware and awake.
| glenstein wrote:
| >You're definitely still conscious when you're asleep --
| dreams are certainly conscious experiences
|
| I would say yes and no. I think we all feel there's something
| different about wakeful consciousness vs sleeping
| consciousness, and also, it seems that we are indeed
| sometimes "out cold" and that something like an "activation
| loop" (new term to me) might be necessary to play a role in
| distinguishing these various states.
| ryan69howard wrote:
| > I would say yes and no.
|
| Why would you say that? Why can't you say "I don't fully
| agree".
| BlueTemplar wrote:
| My own concern is more about how Dualists can justify their
| metaphysics, and where does consciousness stops when
| considering less complex systems than humans. (Also
| aggregations of systems, like a country !)
| gilbetron wrote:
| A great book on this topic is Consciousness and the Brain (
| https://www.amazon.com/Consciousness-Brain-Deciphering-Codes... )
|
| It really shows how a lot of who we are is unconscious and
| happening without us being aware.
| xjay wrote:
| See also: The Elephant in the Brain [1]
|
| > The main thesis of the book is that we are very often not
| aware of our real reasons for most of our behaviours. Our
| behaviors are optimised for living in a social group and very
| often, from the point of view of natural selection, it is
| useful if we are not consciously aware of our real motivations.
| [1]
|
| [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Elephant_in_the_Brain
| Crontab wrote:
| That's sounds interesting. Thanks for sharing this.
| hvs wrote:
| A related book that I found interesting is "The Ego Tunnel" by
| Thomas Metzinger [1]. He's a philosopher but also brings in
| current (for 2010) neuroscience research into the study of
| consciousness and the feeling of a "self".
|
| [1] https://www.amazon.com/Ego-Tunnel-Science-Mind-
| Myth/dp/04650...
| yboris wrote:
| My favorite is _Consciousness Explained_ by Daniel C. Dennett
|
| https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consciousness_Explained
| bschmidt1 wrote:
| It's always exciting when new correlates are discovered, but this
| doesn't really uncover anything about consciousness per se. At
| least not as classified by David Chalmers and others who use the
| term _The Hard Problem of Consciousness_ - which seems to show
| that consciousness is impossible to understand in our current
| paradigm. Understand meaning - to the point we could reproduce
| it.
|
| The Hard Problem is contrasted with the so-called Easy Problems -
| which are still very hard to solve, and many of them still aren't
| - but they are ultimately of a class of solvable problems, like
| neural correlates, the role of dopaminergic pathways, and so-on.
| These everyday neurological findings are needed to make progress
| toward understanding the brain, but they don't really have
| anything to do with consciousness.
|
| Some definitions: let intelligence mean the
| acquisition and understanding of knowledge let self
| mean who you refer to when you say "I" or "me" let
| consciousness mean raw sensations/happenings: *the aroma of
| coffee*, *the taste of chocolate*, *the sound of a drop of water*
|
| Intelligence and selfhood fall under the Easy Problems - both
| philosophically and neurologically. We have machines that for all
| intents and purposes are intelligent. Even though it's not
| perfect, we know what kind of problem that is and how to solve it
| mechanistically. While nobody has invented a true "self" yet, if
| we ever find out exactly what conscious experiences are,
| scaffolding those experiences with self/identity becomes an
| organizational task (an Easy Problem). Still a very hard one
| involving neural correlates, cortical pathways, etc. from which
| we may derive new algorithms and paradigms, but ultimately
| solvable.
|
| So that leaves the mystery of raw experiences ("the aroma of
| coffee") which do not seem solvable in any scientific sense. You
| could say that a digital camera that detects faces in its
| viewfinder is intelligent, but it doesn't "see" the face, we know
| that it only unconsciously "detects" the face. So a mystery
| arises when we examine the human eye, because we see basically
| the same hardware as the camera: Lens (lens), sensor (retina),
| wire (optic nerve), chip (visual cortex). Even after mapping the
| entire visual cortex to all visual features, it just doesn't get
| us any closer to understanding that raw experience of "sight"
| that happens when you look at something. It's not the same thing.
|
| I applaud all progress toward understanding the brain, and
| sometimes wonder why the whole of humanity are not all focused on
| solving problems like death and aging (by way of solving
| consciousness), as it seems like pretty much the most important
| possible thing to all of us!
|
| Favorites on the topic: Donald Hoffman, John Searle, David
| Chalmers, Dan Dennett, Colin McGinn, Susan Blackmore, Sam Harris.
| qudat wrote:
| I'm of the opinion that the thalamo-coritcal loop, combined
| with chaotic brain activity, and randomness, give rise to
| consciousness. The "hard" problem is only hard when we put
| consciousness on a pedestal. If we have learned anything from
| LLMs it's that some clever statistics and data compression
| which predicts the next word can give rise to complex and
| seemingly "intelligent" behavior. LLMs are not conscious, but
| they lift the veil of our conceit. There's no hard problem of
| consciousness, it's an artifact of a chaotic thalamo-cortical
| loop that recursively processes inputs -- including outputs
| from previous neuronal activity.
|
| https://bower.sh/what-is-consciousness
| bschmidt1 wrote:
| Has nothing to do with a pedestal, it's a scientific
| observation.
|
| > a chaotic thalamo-cortical loop
|
| The _aroma of coffee_ is not explained by the words "chaotic
| thalamo-cortical loop" - those are words used to loosely
| describe which neurons activate _when_ I experience the aroma
| of coffee, but they are not _the_ aroma of coffee, and there
| 's no proof that they are even causal to that experience.
| It's a logical fallacy because many correlations are not
| causes but effects, and some are entirely unrelated. Example:
|
| The green stoplight correlates with cars driving, but they
| don't _cause_ a car to drive. No amount of learning about
| stoplights will teach you about how a car moves. From far
| away you simply noticed that the green light is loosely
| correlated with the cars moving, but that 's all you know.
| That's what is meant by the phrase _correlation is not
| causation_ - "False Cause Fallacy".
|
| LLMs have nothing to do with consciousness, that's artificial
| _intelligence_ which as I defined above is _not_ the same as
| having a sensation. Intelligence (and selfhood, and other
| psychiatry) are all happening _within_ the conscious process,
| they shouldn 't be conflated with it.
|
| > There's no hard problem of consciousness
|
| If there's no problem - meaning, it's well-understood to the
| point you can reproduce it - then why has nobody been
| successful at producing it in isolation? The answer is, we
| don't know what consciousness is to the point we can
| reproduce it.
|
| To deny consciousness outright is to deny the first-person
| observation that you're having right now. Empirical science
| is based on observational evidence, and there is
| observational evidence of an experience from your perspective
| - the fact of your experiential existence owes a grokable
| explanation - even if it is caused by or correlated with
| neurons in brains.
| mpartel wrote:
| > Even after mapping the entire visual cortex to all visual
| features, it just doesn't get us any closer to understanding
| that raw experience of "sight" that happens when you look at
| something. It's not the same thing.
|
| Seems plausible that a detailed enough mapping of correlates
| one day uncovers a single
| thing/feature/location/architecure/pattern/whatever that is
| present only when qualia are, and absent in all other
| processes. That would at least point us in a concrete
| direction.
| bschmidt1 wrote:
| Yeah but that's like saying what propels a car forward is a
| green stoplight, it's just a correlation you can observe that
| could have nothing to do with it - might not even be
| indirectly causal.
|
| When you think deeply about the Hard Problem, it's really The
| Impossible Problem because there's no way to solve it within
| our subject:object and "self" paradigms. Yet the problem
| persists.
|
| Take something like _the memory of the first time I tied my
| shoes_ - maybe you can find the exact neuronal correlations
| to that experience I have when I think of that, but they won
| 't _be_ that memory, nor do they even give up the ingredients
| to engineer that in some alternate setting. The memory itself
| seems like a completely different phenomenon that the neurons
| (themselves, concepts in consciousness) can never explain on
| their own.
| mpartel wrote:
| I agree in the sense that answering "what really are
| qualia" may be as impossible as answering "what really are
| quantum fields". At some point we may be forced to accept
| "it just is", but that doesn't mean we can't make
| meaningful progress first, just like in physics.
|
| For instance, either new physics is involved or it isn't.
| Finding solid evidence for or against it does not seem
| impossible, and it would definitely constitute meaningful
| progress, at the very least by ruling some theories out.
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