[HN Gopher] AI or Ain't: Eliza
___________________________________________________________________
AI or Ain't: Eliza
Author : john-doe
Score : 75 points
Date : 2024-01-07 11:20 UTC (11 hours ago)
(HTM) web link (zserge.com)
(TXT) w3m dump (zserge.com)
| jll29 wrote:
| Here is the pointer to the original Eliza paper
| https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/365153.365168
|
| Note that Weizenbaum was an AI critic: Weizenbaum's intention was
| not for Eliza to pass the Turing test, but to show to people that
| a clearly not intelligent program based on primitive pattern
| matching can _appear_ to behave intelligently.
|
| He failed: His own secretary wanted to be left alone with the
| software and typed in her personal problems. Work on Eliza
| (1963-65, paper published 1966) until today is mostly
| misunderstood.
| leethargo wrote:
| Not only his secretary, also some psychiatrists wanted Eliza as
| a tool to scale up their work clinically.
| moffkalast wrote:
| Say, has anyone deployed Hartford's Samantha yet?
| adestefan wrote:
| Weizenbaum even wrote an entire book, Computer Power and Human
| Reason: From Judgment To Calculation, on how AI is a crank term
| for computer science. The basic premise is that humans are not
| machine so stop using language that treats them as such.
| Especially that computers can decide what comes next, but only
| a human can choose what to do.
|
| The book also has one of the best and most succinct
| descriptions of Turing machines and the theoretical
| underpinning of computer science that I have ever read. Even if
| you're an AI maximalist you should read the third chapter of
| the book.
| stavros wrote:
| > Especially that computers can decide what comes next, but
| only a human can choose what to do.
|
| I don't understand this, all the programs I've ever written
| make decisions based on some factors.
|
| Are you talking about free will? If so, what is free will?
| aatd86 wrote:
| Doing things because you can and not because you have to?
| Creative endeavors in the largest sense?
| stavros wrote:
| Does a program _have to_ do things? What _can_ it do?
| What does a human have to /can do?
| aatd86 wrote:
| Traditionally, a program is a series of instructions. The
| program doesn't really act on its own.
|
| Now, a program which is objective driven and can infer
| from new inputs might be something else.
|
| Just like humans try to maximize the stability of their
| structures via a reward system. (it got slighty complex,
| faulty at times, or the tradeoff between work vs reward
| is not always in favor of work because we do not control
| every variable, hence procrastination for example, or
| addiction which is not a conscious process but neuro-
| chemically induced).
| stavros wrote:
| But what does "act on its own" mean? If I give the
| program some randomness over its next action, is that
| "acting on its own"? When I'm at work, I act according to
| a series of instructions. Am I not acting on my own?
|
| This is a very philosophical discussion, but if I had an
| infinitely-powerful computer and could simulate an entire
| universe based on a series of instructions (physical
| laws), would the beings in that universe that created
| societies not be "acting on their own"?
| aatd86 wrote:
| Yes, as long as the computer chooses its next set of
| instructions in order to maximize a given value (the
| objective), I would say that it acts on its own.
| Instruction set that was never defined by anyone that is.
|
| If the instruction set is limited and defined by someone
| else, I believe it doesn't.
|
| I think, re. the simulated universe, that for us, they
| wouldn't have free will because we know causality (as
| long as we are all knowing about the simulation). But as
| far as they would be concerned, wouldn't they have free
| will if they know that they don't know everything and
| whether the future they imagine is realizable?
|
| If they knew with certainty that something was not
| realizable, they wouldn't bother, but since they don't
| know, either they try to realize a given future or they
| don't.
|
| Partial information provides choice of action, therefore
| free will.
| pixl97 wrote:
| >Partial information provides choice of action, therefore
| free will.
|
| So how would an agent based system connected to a multi-
| modal LLM/AI fall into this?
| arrrg wrote:
| Am I ever doing things because I can and not because I
| have to? Also, what mechanism determines what things I
| want to do because I can do them? And isn't that
| mechanism then just not just another part of the machine.
|
| Just because it feels as though I do things because I can
| doesn't mean that is actually true.
| aatd86 wrote:
| As long as you can imagine different possible futures and
| decide upon which one you want to try and realize, I
| think you have choice.
|
| Choice stems from uncertainty, partial knowledge. It
| might be an illusion for an observer outside of the
| system, but as far as a participant within the system is
| concerned, there is choice, then there is free will.
|
| I am writing this because I ca n but I don't need to do
| it. I have futures where I don't do that and do something
| more rewarding instead and still. As long as I am aware
| of the choices, then I have free will.
| vidarh wrote:
| This is the compatibilist view. But if it is an illusion,
| then that means the "choice" is computable and a computer
| can create the same outcomes.
| moffkalast wrote:
| Just because we have quantum RNG in our heads that
| doesn't make us automatically better. If anything it
| makes us worse since we don't act on reason alone.
| aatd86 wrote:
| I don't know if there is a quantum rng or just an
| inference machine that manages to recognize patterns
| within input data and can do some math sometimes.
| vidarh wrote:
| How do you imagine that act of choosing happens in your
| brain in a way that isn't computable?
| johnnyworker wrote:
| snippet from the WP article on the book:
|
| > Weizenbaum makes the crucial distinction between deciding
| and choosing. Deciding is a computational activity,
| something that can ultimately be programmed. It is the
| capacity to choose that ultimately makes one a human being.
| Choice, however, is the product of judgment, not
| calculation. Comprehensive human judgment is able to
| include non-mathematical factors such as emotions. Judgment
| can compare apples and oranges, and can do so without
| quantifying each fruit type and then reductively
| quantifying each to factors necessary for mathematical
| comparison.
|
| Okay, so what is judgement? I haven't read that particular
| book and I don't quite remember his argument from
| interviews and lectures I saw, so this might be wrong, but
| I'd say it's for example saying "this is fair" when you
| measure the slices of pie you cut a cake into. That is,
| calculating that they're of equal size is pure computation;
| but there is no way to compute that when sharing cake with
| your friends, the slices _should_ be equal.
|
| Just like you can compute how much clean drinking water an
| average or specific person needs a day, with at least some
| accuracy, but when it comes to the question "should there
| be life in the universe" or "should people die of thirst",
| no computation could answer it. You could _choose_ to write
| a program that decides it based on a random seed or a super
| complex algorithm taking a billion factors into account,
| but and then that program would _decide_ the question, but
| it 's essentially still something _you_ did / chose.
| vidarh wrote:
| It's basically a religious view. For a "judgement" to be
| non-computable, it'd need to come from some factor in the
| human brain which violates know physics _and_ can 't be
| reproduced outside a human brain.
|
| It's little more than arguing for a "soul" with no
| evidence for any effect that can't be explained by cause
| and effect.
| johnnyworker wrote:
| > For a "judgement" to be non-computable, it'd need to
| come from some factor in the human brain which violates
| know physics and can't be reproduced outside a human
| brain.
|
| You say this as if we are even close to understanding
| much less reproducing the human brain completely, which
| probably would have to include the web of relations with
| all sorts of other living things that also go into the
| judgements we make, and the emotions we have while making
| them. Until you actually _do_ draw the rest of the owl,
| it 's not exactly "religious" to say there's no owl.
| vidarh wrote:
| No, it's an argument from logic that applies to _any_
| claim that any given entity can do things that are not
| computable.
|
| > Until you actually do draw the rest of the owl, it's
| not exactly "religious" to say there's no owl.
|
| The "real owl" here is to assume the human brain does
| something non-computable, in violation of all known
| physics and logic.
| johnnyworker wrote:
| You cannot compute what you don't understand, and even if
| you did by accident, you wouldn't _know_ you computed it,
| as long as you don 't understand what you're trying to
| do. That seems obvious to me.
|
| And "computable" and "computable for us" are very
| different things. It's not about the machines or
| algorithms we _might_ make one day, provided _that_ we
| fully understand everything that goes into our our
| thoughts and emotions with nothing left unaccounted for,
| and everything turning out to be countable; it 's about
| the ones we are actually making, back then and today, and
| then in some cases outsource our decisions to.
| vidarh wrote:
| You're misunderstanding the terms. For something to be
| computable is very different from whether or not we know
| or are presently able to compute it.
|
| For something to be computable, it only needs to be
| possible to show that it is logically possible, by e.g.
| decomposing the problem into elements we know are
| computable _or showing an example_.
|
| The existence of the human brain _absent any evidence of
| any supernatural element_ is strong evidence that human
| reasoning is computable, and it 's a reasonable,
| testable, falsifiable hypothesis to make: If you want to
| counter it "all" you need to do is to show evidence of
| _any_ state transition in even a single brain that does
| not follow known laws of physics. Just one.
|
| Alternatively, even just coherently _describing_ a
| decision-making process that it is possible to construct
| a proof wouldn 't be computable using known logic.
|
| Either would get you a Nobel Prize, in either physics or
| maths. Absent that, even just a testable _hypothesis_
| that if proven would increase the likelihood of finding
| either of the above would be a huge step.
|
| In the absence of all of that, it's pure faith to presume
| human reasoning isn't computable.
| adestefan wrote:
| A girl would like to ask a boy to the high school dance.
|
| A computer can do all the calculations to decide on if it's
| a good idea. Given the inputs of the time they have spent
| together, the number of glances that are passed between
| then in the halls between classes, if he doesn't have a
| date yet or not, etc. The probability adds up to ask.
|
| So the machine decides to ask.
|
| The girl feels it. Has all the time they've spent together
| has made her feel a certain way? Maybe a weird tingle each
| time their arms touch. Is that glance in the hall this
| morning not just an accident, but him going a little out of
| his way for her to notice? She's asked around and knows
| that no one else has asked him, but doe he really not have
| a date yet? Can she overcome the bit of anxiety about
| asking a boy to the dance? Will she be able to accept the
| risk of rejection knowing that the chances may be high he
| says yes?
|
| Only she can choose.
| holoduke wrote:
| All the tingles, feelings, anxieties and hesitations are
| activities triggered by little programs that work
| autonomously and are fully deterministic. The girl is
| fooled
| adestefan wrote:
| HN consistently reminds me of the park bench scene in
| Good Will Hunting.
| erikerikson wrote:
| > humans are not machine
|
| Aren't we? Casual chains upon our matter produce emergent
| behaviors using the same physics and chemistry that our
| mechanistic creations rely upon.
|
| Certainly those behaviors and results do not produce the same
| repeatable, predictable results as our clockworks but that is
| the whole point of the field of AI (as opposed to the
| marketing corruption/term that is currently in vogue, so GAI
| if you prefer), to produce system and algorithm structures
| designed with architecture and patterns more like our own.
|
| Perhaps you believe in the ghost in the machine hypothesis?
| The magical soul that is more than the emergent evolving
| pattern produced across time by DNA replicators? That this
| undefinable, unmeasurable spirit makes us forever different?
| scotty79 wrote:
| > He failed
|
| I'd say he succeeded. It just seems that people are perfectly
| content with just appearance of intelligence.
| tempodox wrote:
| All this "AI" hype is a constant reminder to me that you cannot
| reason anybody out of something that they _want_ to believe.
| People 's need to believe in miracles is obviously stronger
| than all reason.
| nbzso wrote:
| So the Turing test actually tests not a technology but the level
| of intelligence of the user. So, we are doomed, it seems.:)
| oneeyedpigeon wrote:
| Definitely the main flaw of the Turing test -- having two human
| actors taking part alongside one computer is just introducing
| two too many variables :)
| masswerk wrote:
| To me, Turing's argument had always been that the attribution
| of intelligence (or not) doesn't make much sense: rather than
| being a question of any substance, it merely diffuses into a
| matter of appearance. However, as things usually are, it had
| become the holy grail for claiming "intelligence" (which really
| should be used in this context in quotes only).
| __MatrixMan__ wrote:
| He originally made the argument about gender, not intelligence.
| I think he was arguing for a whole class of properties for
| which there's no difference between authenticity and convincing
| fakery.
|
| I think the point is less that there is a truth and we're too
| dumb to figure it out, and more that in certain circumstances
| we'll just have to accept a lower bar for evidence about
| whether those properties apply.
|
| It reminds me of how no class of computer can solve the halting
| problem for itself. No matter how intelligent you are, there
| will be holes like this in your certainty about some things.
| pixl97 wrote:
| Or another way to put this, it's not a binary problem, it's a
| probability continuum.
|
| Even the definition of 'human intelligence' is a continuum
| from the smartest to the dumbest of us, that doesn't even
| stop there and descends thought all animal life.
| __MatrixMan__ wrote:
| I did some research to prove you wrong, because I don't
| think continuum is the right concept, but it turns out that
| Turing seems to agree with you. Quoting him in "Computing
| Machinery and Intelligence":
|
| > In short, then, there might be men cleverer than any
| given machine, but then again there might be other machines
| cleverer again, and so on.
|
| So now I think you're both wrong :) Particularly I take
| issue with the assumption that the "cleverer" relation is
| transitive. We've only really studied a few relations in
| this space:
|
| - pushdown automatons are cleverer than finite state
| machines
|
| - turing machines are cleverer than pushdown automata
|
| - humans are cleverer than turing machines (I'd argue for
| this, but others would disagree)
|
| Presumably there are other points which we have overlooked
| or not yet discovered. For instance, maybe something which
| has the "memory" quality of a pushdown automaton, but lacks
| the "state tracking" property of a finite state machine.
| When compared with an FSM, such a thing would not be more
| or less clever than it, it would just be clever in an
| orthogonal way.
|
| I strongly suspect that two intelligences (of greater power
| than the theoretical machines that we yet have) could meet
| and discover that they each have a capability that the
| other lacks. This would be a situation that you couldn't
| map onto a continuum--you'd need something with branches, a
| tree or a dag or a topological space: something on which
| the two intelligences could be considered cousins: neither
| possessing more capabilities than the other, but each
| possessing different capabilities. (Unlike the FSM example,
| they would have to share some capabilities, otherwise they
| couldn't recognize each other as intelligent).
|
| Further, I suspect that in order to adequately classify
| both intelligences as cousins, you'd have to be cleverer
| than both. Each of the cousin-intelligences would be able
| to prove among themselves that theirs is the superior kind,
| but they'd also have to doubt these proofs because the
| unfamiliar intelligence would be capable of spooky things
| which the familiar intelligence is not.
| pixl97 wrote:
| I mean an evolutionary tree where intelligence features
| are added in some branches makes sense.
|
| I guess part of what I was trying to address is that we
| like to think of intelligence as what people do and are
| the pinnacle of, and discounting anything that is not
| covered by that.
| __MatrixMan__ wrote:
| I definitely agree that defining intelligence as what
| humans do is a problematic practice. I guess I just
| wanted to nit pick a little.
|
| There's definitely a lot of "it's not real intelligence
| because it's not human intelligence" going around these
| days. Doesn't seem like it's going anywhere useful
| though.
| derbOac wrote:
| I've often felt that a better version is not whether a person
| can guess that it's AI or a human, but whether people behave
| and feel differently with an AI or human.
|
| That's vague and covers a universe of criteria -- mood,
| satisfaction with the conversation, actual behavior and so
| forth -- but it also I think is a more realistic gauge of AI
| performance. It's probably unattainable but that's not
| necessarily a bad thing. If it is attainable within confidence
| then it's a pretty powerful AI.
|
| There are probably some people who would be ok with some AI for
| some purposes.
| masswerk wrote:
| In a sense, the question of the "intelligent machine" is
| somewhat self-contradictory: To _us_ , the question of
| intelligence matters as a preposition or qualifying term, for
| to what extent, probability and prospects we may pose an
| appeal to sympathy, moral and ethics. (In other words, it is
| not about trust in any realistic faculties, but about
| judgement - and then, to what extent we may trust in this.)
| However, this prospect doesn't fit well our expectations
| towards machines, which are all about repeatability and
| reproducible results in given tolerances... (Compare
| ChatGPT's so-called winter depression and the arising need to
| plead and argue with the device for any complex results. As
| the device gains in the emotional domain, its worth in the
| application domain radically decreases.)
| master-lincoln wrote:
| > Clearly, Eliza is not an AI
|
| Sadly the author doesn't elaborate on this. I thought nowadays
| 'AI' is a synonym for 'algorithm', which would fit ELIZA
|
| Is there an accepted definition of the word AI?
| perthmad wrote:
| Any algorithm you do not understand.
| mysterydip wrote:
| So, any of my own code I haven't looked at for a few months?
| :)
| throwaway4aday wrote:
| Including the one in your head.
| maweaver wrote:
| Seems like the modern definition is something along the lines
| of an algorithm whose behavior depends on data which was itself
| machine generated, rather than hand-created by a human like
| Eliza's rules.
| oneeyedpigeon wrote:
| We've been misusing the term ever since observing the ghosts in
| Pac Man.
| sixothree wrote:
| I remember this being written in basic for the c64. Not sure if I
| had the real Eliza or a clone. But it was fun to look at all of
| the canned responses and try to get it to respond with them.
| smcameron wrote:
| Probably a variant of the Eliza program in "More BASIC Computer
| Games", see p. 56 of this PDF:
| https://ia802707.us.archive.org/33/items/More_BASIC_Computer...
| aldousd666 wrote:
| Eliza's meant to us to be an illustration of the problem. In good
| old fashioned AI sentiment, it illustrates the fact that you need
| another if statement for every new kind of construct you want to
| simulate. But you deign to simulate each thing, like say turning
| a verb into a gerund, by writing a specific "gerundification"
| routine. Another to swap the Mes to Yous, etc. this isn't how
| people think nor most modern AI. This is totally different from
| just looking at the world distilling patterns from it and using
| those patterns as the basis for a response. To teach a modern AI
| new stuff, you don't have to write another if statement. They
| have similar intentions and at some resolution or distance, they
| are trying to do similar things. However, they work and totally
| different ways and the new dynamic generative AI strategy that
| learns from input as opposed to just symbolically transforming it
| syntactically is a totally different paradigm. I don't care
| whether you call it AI or not.
| masswerk wrote:
| With the small reservation that this is not how Eliza works.
| Eliza sits on top of MAD/SLIP which does all the heavy work and
| provides lists and integer indexes, which is what is processed
| by Eliza. This allows Eliza to work on decomposition rules,
| which isolate keywords per position and context, and
| transformation (composition) rules to recombine elements and
| links between those two. Meaning, the model is much more
| topological than this. (Arguably, this is closer to regular
| expressions than to if-else trees.)
|
| However, this isn't what Eliza is all about. It's rather about
| the question, how little do you actually need in terms of
| knowledge, world model, or rule sets to give the impression of
| an "intelligent" (even sympathetic) participant in a
| conversation (as long as you're able to constrain the
| conversation to a setting, which doesn't require any world
| knowledge, at all.) To a certain degree, it is also about how
| eager we are to overestimate the capabilities of such a partner
| in conversation, as soon as some criteria seem to be satisfied.
| Which is arguably still relevant today.
|
| The rule set, BTW, is actually small, just 3 pages in a
| printout, achieving a surprising generality (or rather,
| appearance thereof) for its size. Compare:
| https://cse.buffalo.edu/~rapaport/572/S02/weizenbaum.eliza.1...
| pixl97 wrote:
| >how eager we are to overestimate the capabilities of such a
| partner in conversation, as soon as some criteria seem to be
| satisfied. Which is arguably still relevant today.
|
| Honestly, AI shouldn't be the takeaway point here, but how we
| do the same for politics.
| masswerk wrote:
| On a not so serious note, most political careers seem to be
| built on public utterances that seem to be generated by a
| rule set that could fit into 3 pages, triggered by a
| handful of keywords or trigger phrases, also known as
| talking points. With the advent of the so-called culture
| wars, most of this is also increasingly context-free and
| doesn't require much of world knowledge. Users, err, voters
| will fill in the gaps eagerly, each according to their
| respective phantasies and understanding. To the point that
| Eliza may eventually become a worthy contestant. An
| approval rate of 27% is certainly a good starting point...
| seanwilson wrote:
| > One of the first computer programs that successfully passed the
| Turing test was Eliza. Created in 1966 by Joseph Weizenbaum,
| Eliza skillfully emulated the speech patterns of a
| psychotherapist in its conversations.
|
| Why was the Turing test still relevant after this? Didn't this
| indicate it was very flawed test? Or it was hard to come up with
| a better test?
| recursivecaveat wrote:
| I can find no reference of an actual Turing test being done for
| Eliza. If you look at the link from the article it is clearly
| demonstrably failing their (different, and more difficult to
| interpret, but still fair I thiiiink) runs today as well. Note
| that people _constantly_ _willfully_ misinterpret what a turing
| test is.
|
| A turing test means you enter into two conversations. Then you
| pick which one was with a computer. If people answer wrong 50%
| of the time, the computer is indistinguishable, hence it
| passes. Note that it is not "People get wrong whether their
| single conversation is talking to an AI >50% of the time" and
| it is definitely not "sometimes people don't realize they're
| talking to an AI". In particular people constantly write about
| the latter because it generates clicks.
| canjobear wrote:
| Because Eliza didn't pass the Turing Test. It is trivially easy
| to trip it up.
| throwaway4aday wrote:
| > Interestingly, Eliza still outperforms ChatGPT in certain
| Turing test variations.
|
| I see we have a new entry for the 2024 Lies of Omission award.
|
| The article linked to plainly shows that Eliza only beats
| ChatpGPT-3.5 and is in the bottom half when ranked against a
| variety of different system prompts. An excellent ass covering
| strategy that relies on the reader not checking sources.
|
| An honest author would have actually quoted the article saying:
|
| > GPT-4 achieved a success rate of 41 percent, second only to
| actual humans.
|
| instead of constructing a deliberately misleading paraphrase.
| masswerk wrote:
| Hum, note that this was not an argument about or against GPT,
| but about the "unreasonable" success of a, by all standards,
| primitive algorithm that manages to get (somewhat) away by
| crafting the pre- and context of the conversation. By no means,
| on the other hand, could I read this article and understand it
| as claiming any superiority over modern applications.
|
| (Nobody with even the crudest understanding of the principles
| of Eliza could claim this, and the article clearly demonstrates
| a detailed understanding. Disclaimer: I wrote the JS
| implementation linked in the article, many years ago.)
|
| Edit: The question rightfully raised - and answered - by Eliza,
| which is still relevant today in the context of GPT, is: does
| the appearance of intelligent conversation (necessarily) hint
| at the presence of a world model in any rudimentary form?
| throwaway4aday wrote:
| Several people in this thread appear to have misunderstood
| due to the way this article was written.
| notahacker wrote:
| "GPT-4 achieved a success rate of 41 percent, second only to
| actual humans" also feels like a (much bigger) lie of omission
| looking at the original paper. GPT4's performance was in the
| range of 6% to 41%, Eliza's 27% score sat in the upper middle
| of that range, and considering the bots tested consisted of 8
| GPT4 prompts, 2 GPT3.5 prompts and a naive script from the
| 1960s, GPT4 would have had to be remarkably consistently
| inhuman not to finish "second only to humans" with its highest
| scoring prompt
|
| The blog appears to have been updated to specify GPT3.5, but
| the original version was accurate.
|
| The paper itself is interesting as it covers the limitations
| (it has big methodological issues), how the GPT prompts
| attempted to overridei default chatGPT tone and reasons why
| ELIZA performed surprisingly well (some thought it was so
| uncooperative, it must be human!)
| https://arxiv.org/pdf/2310.20216.pdf
| throwuxiytayq wrote:
| The example ELIZA responses in the paper are so laughably bad
| and trivial to pick up, I'm not convinced the human
| interrogators were sober/conscious/awake during the
| experiment.
| notahacker wrote:
| tbf the human side of those conversations isn't much
| better. I think if someone tried prompt injection hacks on
| me I'd be tempted to be politely obtuse to troll them right
| back.
|
| Turing's version involves experts who definitely aren't in
| the same room waving to each other, but the fundamental
| problem is it isn't a particularly good test
| bandrami wrote:
| Is there a name for the reverse Turing test? How can a
| Python script convince me it's not actually a human?
| pixl97 wrote:
| Yea, It's really hard to get GPT to sound human because the
| RLHF really wants to let you know it's not a human.
|
| GPT4 + a RLHF that was trained to think it was human would be
| a much different beast.
| mewpmewp2 wrote:
| Yeah GPT4 is not trained to beat turing test, it is trained
| to be an AI assistant.
|
| Imagine you take a human and train them to be an AI
| assistant since they were a baby. I imagine their behaviour
| would also be very odd compared to average people.
| dboreham wrote:
| It turns out, 50 years later, that Eliza was on the right track.
| acidburnNSA wrote:
| So was Eliza from 1966 more intelligent than Dr SBAITSO from
| 1990?
|
| https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dr._Sbaitso
| the_af wrote:
| Wasn't SBAITSO pretty much the same idea as Eliza, only using
| speech synthesis with a Soundblaster?
| acidburnNSA wrote:
| Yes. I'm surprised to hear Eliza passed a turing test.
| SBAITSO was fun but pretty clearly not a human.
| NavinF wrote:
| Eliza never passed a turing test. Nobody tried to test
| Eliza because they knew what the result would be
| acidburnNSA wrote:
| I'm responding to the quote in TFA:
|
| > One of the first computer programs that successfully
| passed the Turing test was Eliza.
|
| I haven't studied the history of it.
| the_af wrote:
| Mentioned in arstechnica to my surprise, but do note the
| paper wasn't peer reviewed and they mention flaws in the
| methodology.
|
| I cannot believe anyone passingly familiar with ELIZA
| would be fooled by it.
| scotty79 wrote:
| Can one see original Eliza sourcode anywhere?
| proamdev123 wrote:
| There is a version of it in Emacs, called up with `M-x doctor`.
|
| The source is in `doctor.el`.
|
| https://www.emacswiki.org/emacs/EmacsDoctor
| RugnirViking wrote:
| We had it running in terminals when I used to work in the
| national museum of computing in the UK (on machines where you
| can just pull the full source up from floppy disk)
| nsajko wrote:
| The article is missing the interesting bits, so here are the
| relevant Wikipedia pages:
|
| https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ELIZA
|
| https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ELIZA_effect
|
| https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Weizenbaum
| drakonka wrote:
| Many years ago I spent a lot of time on a website called
| Personality Forge, where you would create chat bots very similar
| to this and set them loose. They could then talk to other people
| or each other and you could review the transcripts. At one point
| I even entered my chat bot in The Chatterbox Challenge. It was so
| much fun to work on this thing at the time, but when I
| rediscovered it years later[0] I was mostly just disappointed in
| how "fake" all that effort was.
|
| Now here I am talking about life, the universe, and everything
| with ChatGPT. It makes me both inexplicably happy/hopeful and
| simultaneously weirdly melancholic.
|
| [0] https://liza.io/its-not-so-bad.-we-have-snail-babies-
| after-a...
| bee_rider wrote:
| The great thing about being a teenager or kid is that you don't
| know why the grownups don't think your project is worth doing,
| so you just do it. Even if it doesn't change the world (most
| things don't, after all) you can still learn something and have
| fun.
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