[HN Gopher] JAL A359 at Tokyo collided with Coast Guard DH8C on ...
___________________________________________________________________
JAL A359 at Tokyo collided with Coast Guard DH8C on runway and
burst into flames
Author : nixass
Score : 105 points
Date : 2024-01-02 14:08 UTC (8 hours ago)
(HTM) web link (avherald.com)
(TXT) w3m dump (avherald.com)
| higeorge13 wrote:
| Wow, 2 rough first 2024 days for Japan..
| manojlds wrote:
| In a way it's related to the first event.
| trollied wrote:
| If this is going to be the main discussion thread, I'd recommend
| changing the link to a non-tabloid news article.
|
| All passengers and crew evacuated from the Airbus, thankfully.
| brunohaid wrote:
| Definitely better links than Daily Mirror out there, avherald.com
| unfortunately overwhelmed, but in terms of discussion:
|
| - Crazy how well the carbon fiber A350 held up given that it
| seems to have landed pretty much directly on a Dash 8 (RIP Coast
| Guard team). Looks like trading long term flammability for
| initial rigidity lived up to the design intent.
|
| - Excellent evacuation job, especially as it looks like on some
| videos that the crew was unable to shut down the right engine,
| rendering the entire right side unusable (severed lines given the
| severe belly damage?) UPDATE: they actually did use the front
| right exit nevertheless
| https://x.com/tanakamaru1999/status/1742132422005981578
|
| - Don't have headphones with me and in a public space, but
| landing / takeoff clearances should be somewhere in
| https://archive.liveatc.net/rjtt/RJTT-Twr-TCA-Jan-02-2024-08...
| if someone wants to try and find them (timestamps towards end of
| url come in 30 minute increments).
| qwertox wrote:
| Direct link to the avherald.com page of the event in order to
| not hit the landing page:
| http://avherald.com/h?article=5132b9fe&opt=0
| kzrdude wrote:
| It's somewhat reassuring to see an actual video of those chutes
| being used for evacuation, just never saw it before.
| throw0101d wrote:
| > _Excellent evacuation job_
|
| While there many silly reasons to force people to shutdown
| electronics and such on planes, I think forcing people to not
| have any distractions during take-offs and landings is a good
| thing.
|
| Over 50% of incidents (fatal and hull loss/non-fatal) occurring
| during landing:
|
| * https://accidentstats.airbus.com/statistics/accident-by-
| flig...
|
| * https://www.1001crash.com/transport-page-statistique-
| lg-2-nu...
|
| With take-off and descent/approach being the next two more
| frequent phases.
| jefftk wrote:
| Over 50%, sure, but 50% of a very small number. How many
| deaths do you expect keeping passengers from being distracted
| at these times would prevent?
|
| (I expect if you compare that to the number of people
| inconvenienced by the rule it's a terrible trade off.)
| throw0101d wrote:
| > _How many deaths do you expect keeping passengers from
| being distracted at these times would prevent?_
|
| As of today: 379.
| jefftk wrote:
| Where's that number coming from?
| throw0101d wrote:
| The number of souls on board for JL516.
|
| * https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japan_Airlines_Flight_516
| jefftk wrote:
| But all JL516 passengers survived? How would keeping
| these passengers from using their phones during landing
| have reduced their deaths?
| throw0101d wrote:
| AF358 was engulfed in flames with-in three minutes
| (180s):
|
| * https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O5jSyaj_JwE
|
| * https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_358
|
| The FAA mandates that aircraft are able to be evacuated
| with-in 90s:
|
| * https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circ
| ular/...
|
| Even for something as big as an A380 in its 800+
| passenger configuration:
|
| * https://www.flightglobal.com/airbus-a380-evacuation-
| trial-fu...
|
| * https://simpleflying.com/aircraft-90-second-evacuation/
|
| The difference between 180s and 90s is 90s: if (e.g.) ~30
| people out of ~350 passengers (<10%) take an extra 3
| seconds each because they are not aware of their
| surroundings, that time is eaten up.
|
| Seconds matter.
| jefftk wrote:
| I think maybe you're under the impression that:
|
| 1. Passengers on JL516 were not permitted to use their
| phones during landing.
|
| 2. I'm proposing that we start allowing them to use their
| phones.
|
| 3. If we did that then all 379 passengers would have died
| [1] because evacuation would have taken longer than the
| time before the plane was engulfed in flames [2]
|
| Except #1 isn't the case: passengers were allowed to be
| on their phones and were doing so. And so #2 isn't the
| case either: I'm proposing maintaining the status quo.
|
| And even if we had granted #1 and #2 I don't see how you
| get #3 because even if the extra time were entirely eaten
| up by 30 distracted passengers this wouldn't get you 100%
| dead: people don't leave in a single batch determined by
| the speed of the slowest person. There are multiple
| parallel exits, and each exit operates serially.
|
| [1] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=38841170
|
| [2] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=38842440
| throw0101d wrote:
| > _And even if we had granted #1 and #2 I don 't see how
| you get #3 because even if the extra time were entirely
| eaten up by 30 distracted passengers this wouldn't get
| you 100% dead:_
|
| You are right that it does not necessarily follow that
| 100% would be dead. AC 797 had a flash fire after 90
| seconds, and only about half the people died.
| -\\_(tsu)_/-
|
| * https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_Canada_Flight_797
| anigbrowl wrote:
| People keep pointing out to you that passengers were in
| fact using their phones to record footage of the interior
| of the plane (eg to let their friends/relatives know what
| was going on in case they didn't make it). Of course
| people are easily distracted by phones when they should
| be paying attention to other things, but virtually all
| people already in an emergency situation are fully
| present unless they're injured or caring for an injured
| person. I think you're underestimating people's ability
| to multitask when they know it matters.
| filleduchaos wrote:
| Passengers _were_ using their phones during landing
| (including at least one that posted footage from inside
| the plane on social media), so...no?
|
| Incredibly, people can walk and chew gum at the same
| time. This includes the ability to refocus their
| attention when they experience unusual events.
| ceejayoz wrote:
| You're allowed to use phones during landing; they don't
| present much of a challenge for evacuation.
|
| You're not allowed to use laptops or have the tray down.
| jefftk wrote:
| This thread was started with throw0101d saying "I think
| forcing people to not have any distractions during take-
| offs and landings is a good thing", and we've been
| discussing how to weigh the inconvenience and boredom of
| prohibiting distractions against the reduced risk of
| death via more efficient evacuations.
| mrguyorama wrote:
| The idea of putting down your phone for an hour in total
| being "too inconvenient" as people seemingly willingly
| sign over their dignity for a $10 cheaper flight ticket
| is.... uninspiring.
| jefftk wrote:
| It sounds like people vary a lot in their preferences?
|
| For example, I wouldn't take a $10 cheaper flight which
| prohibited using my phone, but I probably would take one
| that gave me a 1" narrower seat.
| filleduchaos wrote:
| You're not allowed to use laptops or have the tray down
| because those are active physical hazards even in fairly
| routine landings not because of some nebulous idea of you
| being "distracted".
| serf wrote:
| >Incredibly, people can walk and chew gum at the same
| time. This includes the ability to refocus their
| attention when they experience unusual events.
|
| No. They can't. That 'refocus' you mention is proof of
| that.
|
| it's getting old having to say over and over again that
| this isn't actually the case : humans switch contexts and
| lose focus -- you're not as good at multi-tasking as you
| think, nor is anyone.
|
| So , people can walk _OR_ chew bubble gum , and if these
| choose to they can pay contextual switching costs between
| the two to make outside spectators believe that they can
| do two things at once.
|
| Don't fall for the ruse, there is a cost even if it's a
| small one.
|
| Similarly, in a disaster i'd rather be surrounded by fit
| young soldiers without cell-phones -- alert and aware --
| than I would be surrounded by the typical multi-variant
| airliner crowd that must have their attention drug away
| from the device by the sound of crunching metal.
|
| It's _obvious_ to me that a group of alert and ready
| people will outperform 'the other group' in an escape in
| nearly every metric, i'd hope that the same would be
| obvious to the other humans trying to escape fiery
| wreckage alongside me.
|
| [0]:
| https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7075496/
| [1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_multitasking
| JohnBooty wrote:
| You seem _really_ certain that passengers would be so
| wrapped up in their phones that they would be too
| distracted to promptly realize... there was a collision
| with another plane, causing their plane to split open and
| burst into flames.
|
| OK.
| serf wrote:
| That 'prompt realization' takes _actual time_ from an
| escape when it doesn 't necessarily need to.
|
| I have no problem with the idea that humans can re-
| prioritize; but I do have a problem that people seem to
| think that the re-prioritization effort comes for free,
| instantly. We don't work that way as humans.
| JohnBooty wrote:
| There's phone footage from inside the burning plane, so
| apparently your theories don't correspond with reality.
| Always quite annoying when that happens. Been the death
| of many a theory. people seem to think
| that the re-prioritization effort comes for
| free, instantly
|
| Here are the two biggest flaws in your thinking:
|
| 1. You seem to be assuming the alternative to "using
| one's phone during a landing" is some sort of highly
| aware ready state. In reality it's probably bored
| snoozing or half-snoozing. It's a red-eye flight after
| all.
|
| 2. You seem to be assuming that "evacuating a burning
| plane" is some kind of split-second thing, like a
| quicktime event in a video game. In reality, at least for
| this incident, there was a span of a significant number
| of seconds between "impact" and "plane slows down enough
| for emergency slides to extend and evacuation to begin."
| 30, maybe 60 seconds.... I'm not sure, but there was no
| real positive action for a passenger to take during that
| time. Shifting attention away from one's phone certainly
| has a nonzero time cost, but not remotely comparable to
| the time it took for the plane to come to a full stop.
|
| Again, you're dealing in hypotheticals, while the actual
| reality of this incident (phones in use, orderly exit
| achieved, all lives saved) contradicts whatever it is you
| are imagining.
| Dalewyn wrote:
| I once heard a wise doctor say that even if the chance of
| survival for a medical operation is either 10% or 90%, the
| practical chance the patient is battling is always 50%
| because he either lives or dies from that operation.
|
| Likewise, the chance of someone being in an aviation
| accident is close to nil (you're more likely to be in a car
| accident), but _you_ are either going to be in an aviation
| accident or not (a 50% chance) and you 're going to be
| either dead or alive from it (a 50% chance).
|
| So you might as well at least not have your epitaph be
| "Killed by some bozo in the aisle TikToking" if you do end
| up dying.
| jefftk wrote:
| _> even if the chance of survival for a medical operation
| is either 10% or 90%, the practical chance the patient is
| battling is always 50% because he either lives or dies
| from that operation_
|
| I think this is rarely a productive way to think about
| it. For example, the chance that I might die in the next
| year is somewhere between 0% and 100%, and actuarial
| tables put it somewhere around 0.3%. [1] Should I refrain
| from having a kid because I'd have a "50% chance" of
| leaving them without a dad before they turned 1?
|
| [1] https://www.ssa.gov/oact/STATS/table4c6.html
| ant6n wrote:
| Well, using this logic, every day you have a 50% chance
| of dying, since you either die or you don't. Or perhaps
| every second you have a 50% chance of dying.
|
| ...obviously this "math" doesn't quite work out.
| jefftk wrote:
| I mean, it clearly doesn't work if taken to be literal
| probabilities. But I think it also doesn't work as a more
| metaphorical guide to life?
| kergonath wrote:
| It clearly does not work in any circumstances. We over-
| emphasise the likelihood of rare events already, saying
| that something has even odds just because it is
| conceivable that it could happen is completely useless.
|
| Which is not to say that you should not plan for
| extremely rare events, but you certainly should not make
| decisions assuming they are likely to happen.
| snapcaster wrote:
| I think you're maybe missing the point. My understanding
| would be something like:
|
| My chances of being killed by a shark is basically 0%.
| But, if I'm in a shark cage surrounded by sharks the idea
| that some global probability is 0% isn't relevant.
| Something like that?
| jefftk wrote:
| If I'm in a shark cage then the probability that matters
| is conditional on being in a shark cage, sure. And it
| should certainly be higher than the global probability.
| But I don't see how this connects to saying that anything
| that can go two ways is 50-50? ("always 50% because he
| either lives or dies from that operation")
| spywaregorilla wrote:
| There's a 50% chance that this doctor failed probability
| Dalewyn wrote:
| I recall the original context was that telling a patient
| to not worry because the chance of success is high isn't
| actually helpful, because the objective argument doesn't
| take into account the patient's personal perspective.
|
| I've since extrapolated that to meaning that objective
| measures cannot always tell or respect the whole story,
| because personal perspectives can bowdlerize everything
| down to life or death or a 50% chance.
|
| To put it another way: Telling someone they have a
| negligible chance of being in an aviation accident is
| worthless comfort if they end up in one.
| mannykannot wrote:
| > Telling someone they have a negligible chance of being
| in an aviation accident is worthless comfort if they end
| up in one.
|
| It's significant comfort in all those flights where no
| crashes occur, and for most of the time up to and during
| those that do end in crashes.
|
| Anyone who really believes they are about to embark on an
| activity having a 0.5 probability of killing them should
| put their affairs in order, but then, by the same
| reasoning, there's a 0.5 probability of dying while doing
| that!
|
| I believe the fallacy here is using an uninformative
| uniform prior when a much better, empirically-verified
| one is available.
| kergonath wrote:
| > To put it another way: Telling someone they have a
| negligible chance of being in an aviation accident is
| worthless comfort if they end up in one.
|
| Sure. It's also callous and insensitive, which is why we
| don't tend to do that. But saying to the vast majority
| who are never going to experience a plane crash (a number
| larger than the number of victims by a few orders of
| magnitude) that it's a coin toss is at least not very
| smart.
| staticman2 wrote:
| >because the objective argument doesn't take into account
| the patient's personal perspective.
|
| Suppose a friend is afraid of crossing the street. Would
| it be more helpful from a personal perspective POV to
| tell your friend the odds of being hit by a car, or to
| make up the fact that you are just as likely to die today
| crossing that street as not dying? Because the latter
| strikes me as unhelpful from either an objective
| perspective or a personal perspective.
| tjungblut wrote:
| I had a dentist explain to me that my lip could go numb
| with a 50% chance after my wisdom teeth removal with that
| exact explanation just two minutes before the surgery. I
| was infuriated, turns out I was on the lucky side of her
| coin.
| kergonath wrote:
| I could be wrong, but I really don't think permanent loss
| of sensitivity is anywhere that high. Though it sounds
| low for temporary loss, but then it goes away after a
| couple of hours or so.
| throw0101d wrote:
| Cue 50-50 scene from the movie _The Naked Gun_ :
|
| * https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aLLbuyWBCzQ
| someplaceguy wrote:
| Also relevant (hilarious movie btw):
| https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DrezGdru6TQ&t=20s
|
| And an analysis of the scene:
| https://puzzlewocky.com/fallacies/the-50-50-fallacy/
| mgdlbp wrote:
| (I don't think that's what most mean when they say
| 'chance', but I get what you mean ;) It's similar to
| realizing how seating choice radically alters your (very
| small) chance of death by train crash.
|
| I was going to say 'chance of death on that day' but
| apparently rail transport is remarkably safe and in
| micromorts, you're as likely to die in one day at 20
| years of age as in 10000 km by rail, or (only!) 1600 km
| by air.
|
| Now, it appears that 1600 km is also nearly the distance
| of the average passenger flight (a disappointly difficult
| datum to discover on the internet in 2024). Is this a
| counterpart to the reassuring quips comparing the chances
| of death by lightning: that boarding a plane doubles your
| chances of dying that day?
|
| https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Micromort#Travel
| tracerbulletx wrote:
| This is very silly. There are much better ways to express
| the idea that a binomial distribution is different than a
| multinomial or continuous one than to make up fake
| statistics.
| D-Coder wrote:
| By that logic, there's a 50/50 chance the sun will come
| up tomorrow.
| morsch wrote:
| The number of fatalities and injuries seems minuscule
| because it's normalised over distance traveled.
|
| This makes sense, because air travel is the only way to
| make voyages over this distance. But it also _doesn 't_
| make sense for the same reason -- it's stupid to compare a
| 6000 mile holiday flight with a 6000 mile holiday road
| trip, because people don't routinely make those. You're
| still more likely to get injured on an eight hour car ride
| than on an eight hour flight, but the difference isn't a
| factor 600.
|
| In much the same way, air travel is also arguably
| moderately efficient in terms of CO2 per mile, except that
| it's also a super easy way -- in fact, practically the only
| way -- to accrue tens of thousands of miles every year, so
| the efficiency is kind of irrelevant.
| sokoloff wrote:
| I know people who are already at the "if driving takes
| less than 8 hours, I'd rather drive than fly" level.
| Every additional inconvenience (or psychological
| impediment) added to the safest mode of long-distance
| travel has a risk of decreasing overall safety.
|
| It's not particularly relevant to an international flight
| into Japan, but the extent to which increasing
| annoyance/instilling fear of airline passengers causing
| people to drive instead must be weighed against the small
| safety benefit resulting from a policy of telling
| passengers "we think this phase of flight contains the
| most highly concentrated risk, so for the next 15
| minutes, please put away all of your distractions,
| prepare for a possible crash, and try not to think about
| the fact that we could turn this aircraft into a
| tumbling, burning ball of wreckage at any moment."
|
| Something similar was the primary justification to
| support the continuation of "infant in arms" travel by
| passengers under the age of 2, with an expected 60:1
| ratio of lives that would be lost if infants were
| required to occupy ticketed seats vs being carried in
| arms.
|
| https://www.ntsb.gov/news/events/Documents/child_safety-
| Clau...
| AnimalMuppet wrote:
| I once traveled for business from Salt Lake City to Fort
| Collins, Colorado.
|
| 1/2 hour to the airport + get to the airport 2 hours
| before flight + 1 hour direct flight to Denver + 1/2 hour
| to deplane + 1/2 hour to get bags + 1/2 hour to get
| rental car + 1 hour drive to Fort Collins. Total 6 hours.
| Seems like it actually totalled 7 but I don't remember
| where the extra time was.
|
| Versus 7 hours drive time from Salt Lake to Fort Collins.
|
| And if two people are going, you only drive one car, but
| you buy two plane tickets.
|
| And my car has more legroom than a coach seat.
|
| So, yes, flying is safer per mile, but the "under 8
| hours" crowd also have a point...
| SoftTalker wrote:
| I pretty much have gotten to where I only fly if driving
| is impossible (e.g. crossing an ocean).
| TylerE wrote:
| That's me. But for totally different reasons. I'm a 4-5
| hour round trip by car to the nearest airport that
| actually flys anywhere. So unless it's more than about a
| 8-10 hour drive, it's faster (and way cheaper) to drive
| than fly.
| gambiting wrote:
| We literally decided to drive from UK to Poland this
| year(12 hour overnight ferry + another 12 hours of
| driving) instead of flying, because we hate Christmas
| flying so much, it's always a shit show, we always end up
| ill because everyone is coughing, at least with driving
| we can take it at our own pace - we want to stop, we
| stop.
| d1sxeyes wrote:
| For other people who might not have followed completely:
| the NTAB don't say (explicitly) that forcing children to
| occupy a seat of their own would result in 60 times as
| many deaths. They estimated the risk of lap infant deaths
| as 1 every 10 years, and then they estimated that if the
| cost of travel increased for families, enough families
| would instead choose to drive that 60 infants would die
| in road accidents in that same 10 year period.
| sokoloff wrote:
| Thanks for posting that. It was perfectly clear in my
| head, but I really made a hash of describing it when
| summarizing it my post upthread.
| HPsquared wrote:
| Similar to the Jevons Paradox, where increases in energy
| efficiency often lead to greater overall consumption, as
| the higher efficiency broadens the scope of the activity.
|
| https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jevons_paradox
| jrockway wrote:
| The statistics are also available as "per passenger-
| hour", which eliminates the speed factor. An 8 hour road
| trip is reasonable. An 8 hour flight is on the longer
| side.
| ta1243 wrote:
| An 8 hour flight is a normal intercontinental flight, not
| even particularly long (London - New
| York/Delhi/Nairobi/Dubai sort of distance). Longer
| flights like London-LA/Singapore/Joburg/Tokyo are
| perfectly normal, or reasonable.
|
| I would rarely do 8 hours driving in a single day, let
| alone 12. Certainly couldn't do that for work, would be
| massively against policy.
| ghaff wrote:
| And for anyone who remembers the electronics during takeoff
| and landing ban once cell phones became common it was a
| massive hassle for flight attendants as many passengers
| routinely ignored instructions.
| ryandrake wrote:
| Never really understood this "we can't enforce the rules
| because people routinely ignore the rules" attitude. This
| should be dead simple on an airplane, where the airline
| knows who each passenger is by seat. So have one flight
| attendant make one pass down the aisle warning everyone
| to put away their phones, then have another one follow a
| minute or so later just making note of which seats are
| still using their phones. No-fly-list them all later.
| After this policy became known, people would be strongly
| incentivized to get with the program.
| JumpCrisscross wrote:
| > _No-fly-list them all later_
|
| Then the airline lays off those people because nobody
| wants to fly.
| ghshephard wrote:
| Even when there was a rule that cell-phones were supposed
| to be turned off, studies showed that 20-25% of cell
| phones were still active (Possibly forgotten in pockets)
| - wasting time, energy, traveler patience, on something
| that was _entirely_ theater (I don 't believe there was
| ever a _single_ incident associated with an active cell
| phone - which makes sense given the 10s of thousands per
| day that were powered on during takeoff) - seems like the
| worst possible tradeoff ever. The "No cell phone use
| during takeoff" or "No mobile phone use _during flight_ "
| (China Air used to do that - very, very annoying) -
| bureaucracy flex just because the could.
| ryandrake wrote:
| I think the "no cellphones" rule is about minimizing
| distractions during critical phases of flight, not
| because a phone's radio is going to do damage to the
| aircraft. So a phone on but sitting in someone's bag is
| not the end of the world.
| JumpCrisscross wrote:
| > _the "no cellphones" rule is about minimizing
| distractions during critical phases of flight, not
| because a phone's radio is going to do damage to the
| aircraft_
|
| The cell-phone "ban was put in place because of potential
| interference to wireless networks on the ground" [1]. The
| distraction argument started making its rounds after the
| interference hypothesis was debunked.
|
| [1] https://web.archive.org/web/20120110081053/http://www
| .fcc.go...
| ta1243 wrote:
| > I think the "no cellphones" rule is about minimizing
| distractions during critical phases of flight
|
| Along with the "no newspapers" rule? And no sleeping?
| mahkeiro wrote:
| No distraction? Do you need sub 500ms response time? I'm
| pretty sure that even someone watching a movie with noise
| canceling earphones was aware of an issue just because of
| physics...
| weinzierl wrote:
| Even more so: Keeping the shades open could have really made
| a significant difference in this case, because it could have
| helped the flight attendants to quickly determine the exits
| that are safe.
| traceroute66 wrote:
| > it could have helped the flight attendants to quickly
| determine the exits that are safe.
|
| For obvious reasons, ordering the evacuation, in
| conjunction with criteria such as which side and which
| doors is the Captain's job, or if the Captain is
| incapacitated, the First Officer. They will have access to
| far more data than the cabin crew will (e.g. whether the
| engines are safely shut down, circumstances on the ground
| thanks to radio contact etc.).
|
| The Cabin Crew will not make the decision themselves unless
| they have been unable to establish contact with the cockpit
| (i.e. both flight crew incapacitated). In normal
| circumstances the Cabin Crew are only there to action the
| Flight Crew's orders.
| cryptonector wrote:
| This is not at all obvious. The pilots can't look
| backwards and don't have eyes in the cabin. There have
| been cases of engine fires and failures where the pilots
| had to go into the passenger cabin to examine the damage.
|
| Communication is key, but comms might have been down,
| too. In cases like this the cabin crew have to be
| prepared to initiate an evacuation on their own, and they
| have to be prepared to choose which doors to use.
| traceroute66 wrote:
| > the cabin crew have to be prepared to initiate an
| evacuation on their own
|
| Re-read my post, because your conclusion is saying
| exactly what I already said with your words "be prepared
| to".
|
| To repeat what I said, but in simpler terms:
|
| In an ideal world, the Flight Crew have the
| responsibility for ordering evacuation and the associated
| parameters. End of story, no argument.
|
| _BUT_ there is a well rehearsed, well practiced,
| protocol which surrounds this !
|
| So, at one extreme, if the Cabin Crew cannot communicate
| with the Flight Deck, then the decision is clearly
| theirs.
|
| But before the extreme, we have the obvious scenario ....
| Cabin Crew act as additional eyes and ears for Flight
| Crew.
|
| _BUT_ in this scenario we are back to my main point ...
| the buck stops at the Captain to make the decision !!!
| The Cabin Crew are telling the Captain what they see, its
| ultimately his call.
| cryptonector wrote:
| You wrote:
|
| > They will have access to far more data than the cabin
| crew will (e.g. whether the engines are safely shut down,
| circumstances on the ground thanks to radio contact
| etc.).
|
| This is not remotely guaranteed. It would be more
| accurate to say that the pilots will have access to
| information that the cabin crew don't have access to and
| vice versa. If the cabin crew sees that the plane has
| stopped, there's a fire on board, and instructions are
| not forthcoming from the pilots, the cabin crew
| absolutely must initiate an evacuation sua sponte. Heck,
| if the cabin crew won't do it then the passengers might.
| People can and do freeze in the face of emergencies. When
| you have a fire on board all bets are off, and someone
| had better step up and begin the evacuation -- better
| that it all be orderly than not, but also better that it
| happen at all than not.
| ta1243 wrote:
| If the Captain says "evacuate from all doors on port
| side", yet the FA sees flames outside the door on the
| port side, the FA does not evacuate through those flames
| cryptonector wrote:
| Right! In a chaotic situation, the idea of hierarchy goes
| out the window. It is essential that all act rationally
| as much as possible and make the best decisions that they
| can with what information is available to them. And it is
| essential that all staff (flight crew, cabin crew) act
| with celerity as well to avoid panic among the
| passengers. Because if the passengers are left on their
| own then conflicts are more likely to arise just merely
| on account of the number of passengers being large, and
| conflicts in such a situation are very likely to be
| deadly.
| SoftTalker wrote:
| Cabin crew play a critical role in informing the flight
| deck of external conditions especially fire that would
| preclude use of specific exits in an evacuation.
| weinzierl wrote:
| Makes sense, but why do we have to open the shades during
| take-off and landing? It's a honest question, I always
| heard in case of emergency for the personnel being able
| to see all sides, but if that's not it, what is it?
| sitharus wrote:
| It is so the flight attendants can see outside, and also
| so the passengers' eyes are adapted to outside light in
| case of an evacuation. You don't want people hesitating
| on the slides because they can't see.
| IndrekR wrote:
| Cabin crew are also eyes for the flight crew. Relevant
| discussion about the Shatner's seat:
| https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13824985
| anigbrowl wrote:
| The shades were open, or at least people quickly opened
| them (based on cellphone video from inside the plane).
| onetimeuse92304 wrote:
| I think it helped a lot that the plane was moving and thanks to
| this left the initial fireball behind it. It was also landing
| which means it had much less fuel to begin with.
| gureddio wrote:
| VAS Aviation has put the audio up
| https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fItu5qM7QfE
| playingalong wrote:
| That's for what happened after the collision, not what led to
| it.
| brunohaid wrote:
| Re clearance/cause: VASA
| https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fItu5qM7QfE also couldn't make
| it out, but it sounds like the Coast Guard Dash 8 got a not
| really perfect taxi instruction (neither "hold short" nor "line
| up and wait") to one of the other C* intersections leading onto
| 34R while a Delta flight occupied C1, but entered the runway
| anyway. The A350 got a proper clearance it read back correctly.
|
| Also looks like all C hold short lines have embedded guard
| lights - ie the stop "bar" on the way to the runway should have
| been flashing brightly.
|
| *
| https://www.anaas.ana-g.com/img/business/general_aviation/pd...
| BorgHunter wrote:
| Whether it was perfect or not, there are only a few
| words/phrases that allow an aircraft to cross the hold short
| bars at an airport with an active control tower. "Cross",
| "line up and wait", and "cleared for takeoff" are pretty much
| it. Runway incursions are very dangerous, as this incident
| shows, and pilots must be very sure they have clearance
| before entering a runway. If anything is ambiguous in an
| instruction, pilots are trained to ask ATC for confirmation
| before proceeding.
|
| It's also possible that there was more ATC communication that
| was not recorded. LiveATC comes from feeds provided by
| volunteers, whose receivers may be some distance from the
| airport and which may not receive signals 100% reliably. The
| investigators will have access to the official recordings
| made by JCAB (the Japanese aviation authorities).
| HeyLaughingBoy wrote:
| Is "line up and wait" really the new approved terminology?
| Way back when I was a PP student, it was "taxi into
| position runway XX and hold. Acknowledge hold."
|
| Line up and wait sounds like something you tell
| preschoolers to do :-)
| rmk wrote:
| Line up and wait (meaning, on the runway, prior to actual
| takeoff clearance) is very common during busy periods.
| This is in America.
| stevehawk wrote:
| "Line up and wait" is, historically, the ICAO
| phraseology, which the FAA adopted (and ditched the "taxi
| into position and talk for thirty more seconds and block
| comms" phrase). The phrase adoption went into effect Oct
| 2010 in the States.
| hn8305823 wrote:
| "position and hold" was the old phraseology in the US. It
| changed to "line up and wait" on 2010/09/30 to match ICAO
| standards and because "hold (on the runway)" might be
| confused with "hold short (of a runway/taxiway), or "hold
| position (wherever you are now)".
|
| https://www.faa.gov/airports/runway_safety/resources/luaw
| jamesharding wrote:
| "Line up and wait" is indeed correct!
|
| https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/publications/atpubs/aim_h
| tml...
| brunohaid wrote:
| Absolutely right!
|
| Point was that if the taxi clearance didn't include "hold
| (short of 34R)" it might be seen as contributing factor in
| line with ICAO[1] or FAA recommendations.
|
| Also quite terrifying that, given all the equipment at
| Haneda and according to
| https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6NbVdIoJsHY, around 2:45,
| with taxi lights fully visible at 2:53, the DH8 was lined
| up on the runway for more than a minute before being run
| over by the A350.
|
| But as you say, preliminary report should already have a
| clear timeline of the tower tapes.
|
| 1: https://www.icao.int/safety/runwaysafety/documents%20and
| %20t...
| epolanski wrote:
| > and pilots must be very sure they have clearance before
| entering a runway
|
| The word "clearance" is used uniquely in the context of
| landing and departing exactly to avoid mistakes and has to
| be repeated again by the aircraft before ATC confirms.
| lxgr wrote:
| True in terms of phraseology (i.e. the actual word is not
| used in voice ATC communications), but all ATC
| instructions are generally referred to as clearances.
| throw0101d wrote:
| > https://archive.liveatc.net/rjtt/RJTT-Twr-TCA-
| Jan-02-2024-08... _if someone wants to try and find them
| (timestamps towards end of url come in 30 minute increments)._
|
| 13:13 JL516 continue approach. 14:53 landing clearance. 15:01
| readback. 15:13 Japan Coast Guard JA772A taxi instructions.
| 17:35 fire reported on 34R.
|
| * Via: https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/35868205-post57.html
| dang wrote:
| Ok, we merged the comments into the submission of the
| avherald.com article. Thanks!
| petee wrote:
| I don't see anywhere indicating they landed on top of the other
| plane
| amelius wrote:
| > Looks like trading long term flammability for initial
| rigidity lived up to the design intent.
|
| What if a plane catches fire in midair?
| hef19898 wrote:
| It crashes? But honestly, how would that happen? And close
| enough to a landing strip to land evacuate the plane?
| itishappy wrote:
| https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_Canada_Flight_797
| hef19898 wrote:
| We talk about the flamability difference between a
| carbon-composite and aluminium hull design. That fire had
| what, almost 20 minutes to burn before the cabin flashed?
| itishappy wrote:
| Yup. I'm far from an authority on the matter (just
| learned about the Air Canada flight further up the thread
| and thought it was relevant), but I'd guess this supports
| the "it crashes" hypothesis.
| ramesh31 wrote:
| >Crazy how well the carbon fiber A350 held up given that it
| seems to have landed pretty much directly on a Dash 8 (RIP
| Coast Guard team). Looks like trading long term flammability
| for initial rigidity lived up to the design intent.
|
| This will be the real story to come out of the incident. It was
| still an open question as to whether composite airframes were a
| good idea for civil aviation due to the fire risk. I imagine
| Airbus marketing teams started popping champagne corks the
| moment all passengers were safely accounted for.
| wannacboatmovie wrote:
| > Excellent evacuation job
|
| This couldn't be further from the truth. From the facts I've
| read, this was handled terribly. There was confusion and no
| evacuation was ordered over the PA. The passengers managed it
| themselves. It took the firefighters over six minutes to
| respond to the site of the burning aircraft. In the US and
| Europe this would be unheard of.
|
| The only reason hundreds of people are not dead is directly
| attributable to the Japanese being an overly polite and orderly
| culture.
|
| If this were China or elsewhere in Asia there would be hundreds
| of people dead right now, trampled over in the chaos, while the
| remaining hundred or so survivors would be exiting with their
| roll-aboard bags in tow.
| yzydserd wrote:
| Not sure why the link is a UK Tabloid.
|
| Japan's national broadcaster has a video of the moment of impact.
|
| Impact: https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/20240102_302/
|
| All ~400 airbus passengers safe.
|
| Coastguard plane in earthquake relief efforts hit airbus (see
| video). 5 of 6 passengers unaccounted for.
| pmontra wrote:
| A longer video (still in English) at
| https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/20240102_304/
| aidog wrote:
| 5 people dead aboard the coast guard plane that was responding
| to yesterdays earthquake. The airbus is still on fire
|
| https://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/html/20240102/k10014307191000.ht...
| epolanski wrote:
| I'll speculate:
|
| this looks like textbook runway invasion where miscommunication
| leads to two different aircrafts being allowed on a runway at the
| same time.
|
| Reminds me of LATAM 2213, which led to the very first Airbus 320
| neo being written off [1].
|
| Essentially, clearance to enter a runway has to be expressively
| given and confirmed in non-ubiquitous language ("Flight ABC
| requesting clearance to enter runway 01").
|
| Yet LATAM incident shows how often emergency services are often
| unaccustomed to thorough communication (after all they do these
| procedures much more rarely)
|
| [1]
| https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LATAM_Airlines_Per%C3%BA_Fligh...
| konschubert wrote:
| it is crazy to me that all of this still relies on humans
| giving verbal clearance over radio.
|
| Shouldn't there be a universal standard to communicate
| clearances to the computer systems of the airplanes and other
| runway vehicles? And shouldn't there be a small, well-tested
| core system that makes sure clearance never conflicts?
|
| How on earth does all this still depend on skilled individuals
| not making a mistake?
|
| We got over this in other domains long ago.
| bamboozled wrote:
| Maybe there is a good reason for it ? Wait for the answer
| before giving them judgment.
|
| You might be right, but there might be a valid answer.
| tonmoy wrote:
| I doubt your "other domains" are as safe and reliable as the
| aviation industry. An automated system may be possible to
| make, but will require a huge undertaking to bring even close
| to the current safety standards, and would introduce its own
| safety issues
| konschubert wrote:
| If I step into the elevator door, it doesn't squash me and
| the elevator won't move.
| drtgh wrote:
| In the past six years there was some accidents just in
| the EU, at least one decapitation happened in the
| elevator of an hospital what I know. Or in the city were
| I live, a fail in a badly lubricated brake when an old
| person was entering (open door) sent the elevator to the
| top, just a few weeks after passing the monthly
| -supposed- maintenance service of the manufacturer.
|
| The maintenance seriousness in aviation is superior to an
| elevator, but even like that, the last human layer
| decision should not be avoided.
|
| For example, bad behaving sensor feeding a fin balancing
| algorithm introduced by the manufacturer to avoid the
| need to redesign an unbalanced plane to accommodate
| larger motors it was designed for, and pilots unable to
| make the plane follow their commanding due such algorithm
| blind decisions priority... has crashed planes.
| porkbeer wrote:
| Usually. Liveleak will show hundreds of exceptions
| however.
| pi-e-sigma wrote:
| Liveleak was shut down more than 2 years ago
| lxgr wrote:
| An elevator is many orders of magnitude less complex than
| an airport, though.
|
| Total automation can be done quite safely in some
| domains. Between that and a completely manual/human-
| operated system lies the area of augmentation, which can
| both be a boon to safety if done correctly, or deadly if
| it leads to automation complacency or false expectations
| around the types of situations it can successfully
| handle.
| epolanski wrote:
| I have thought the same multiple times.
|
| I think the problem might not be super simple to solve
| through updating vehicles.
|
| You need to update infrastructure globally (and thus you need
| coordination between multiple different agencies), then you
| need to implement the solution at both airport and vehicles
| level.
|
| That's a lot of work. In case of LATAM the Airbus hit a fire
| truck (which would've too required such a solution). In case
| of the Linate air disaster, such technology would've had to
| be implemented on a very small Cessna Citation model.
|
| Maybe the updates need to be implemented at the airport level
| alone, quickly signaling controllers of possible
| violations/conflicts, and in fact most major airports have
| both ground radars and clear ground signals to avoid these
| incidents.
|
| But it's still impossible to avoid these issues as these
| errors may happen in a matter of very few seconds thus not
| giving enough time to react to any of the involved parties.
| konschubert wrote:
| You have to define a universal standard and then gradually
| upgrade into it.
|
| You make it mandatory in new vehicles and for airports
| above a certain size.
|
| In 20 years, you can make it mandatory for all vehicles.
|
| I understand that these things take time.
| hef19898 wrote:
| And yet, aviation is one of the safest industries mankind
| ever built. It seems those solution in place are actually
| pretty good.
|
| Edit: Something I try to take to heart, if I don't have
| domain knowledge, I assume that whatever easy solution I can
| think of either was already discarded for valid reasons I
| don't know nor understand or is already implemented without
| me knowing about it. Generally, people working in a
| particular field tend to be competent in that field, just
| assuke that more often than not they know what they are
| doing.
| konschubert wrote:
| We got very good at doing aviation safety in a certain way.
| The people who work in aviation are extremely skilled at
| doing safety in a certain way.
|
| This is usually true for any domain. People are very
| experienced and extremely skilled at doing things within a
| certain framework.
|
| It can still be true that there is a better way. I realise
| it's hard to be on par with a century of aviation safety
| experience, even if the new approach is better. That's why
| you need a gradual transition that focuses on enhancement
| rather than replacement
| resolutebat wrote:
| It's rarely that straightforward: most all runway collisions
| involve ATC giving correct instructions, but the crew
| mishears them, misunderstands them, hears them correctly but
| accidentally goes to the wrong runway/taxiway, etc etc. And
| there's usually complicating factors like terrible weather,
| diversions to unfamiliar airports etc in the mix as well.
| What remains the world's worst single aviation disaster in
| Tenerife checked pretty much all these boxes.
|
| https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tenerife_airport_disaster
|
| https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Airliner_accidents_an.
| ..
| konschubert wrote:
| All of which would be prevented if the plane refused to
| steer onto a runway that it knows is occupied.
|
| The ATC computer should talk to the plane computer.
| resolutebat wrote:
| Airplane taxiing is manual. ATC can tell the plane to use
| runway A, and the plane can check that A is free, but
| neither will stop the pilot from accidentally steering
| into runway B.
| Aeolun wrote:
| There's nothing preventing airplanes from knowing the
| coordinates of every runway in the world and working out
| the truth using GPS though.
| konschubert wrote:
| Modern passenger airplanes absolutely do have runway
| maps.
| lxgr wrote:
| This would elevate the impact of GPS spoofing from a
| minor or major [1] nuisance to a significant terrorism
| threat.
|
| [1] https://ops.group/blog/new-gps-spoofing-incident-
| shows-how-i...
| LightBug1 wrote:
| Yeah, throw in different languages and accents and all
| kinds of variations and ... I tend to agree.
| epolanski wrote:
| > The ATC computer should talk to the plane computer.
|
| Not as simple:
|
| 1) You need to implement it for very small airplanes too,
| which is far from easy. In the Linate air disaster a
| small Cessna Citation invaded the runtime due to fog and
| misscomunication.
|
| 2) You need to implement it for ground vehicles too, as
| in the LATAM example it was a fire truck that invaded the
| runtime.
|
| 3) You need A LOT of infrastructural update.
|
| 4) Even if you had computers talking to computers, this
| may still be far from enough to avoid collisions, as
| those mistakes are often a matter of seconds (as in the
| both accidents quoted before).
|
| 5) Automation brings its own issues. One of them is
| complacency where attention levels unavoidably get lower
| as reliance on automation increases. In turn complacency
| can make runways more prone to such incidents in case of
| malfunctions/bugs.
| konschubert wrote:
| You can have this as an additional safety layer.
|
| You don't need to update everything at once.
|
| If anything is able to react within seconds, it's a
| computer.
| epolanski wrote:
| I think you might be way underestimating number 5.
|
| While on the first hand your point sounds very
| reasonable, in practice it may have more adverse effects
| than we may think and make the whole system more unsafe.
| konschubert wrote:
| I guess the question is if you think the current system
| is good enough.
|
| The next big crash will change people's minds on this.
| hef19898 wrote:
| No, the question is what authorities and regulators
| conclude, after this incident is properly investigated,
| regarding improvements and risk mitigation measures have
| to be put in place. Aerospace regulations are written in
| blood, and almost-blood, not in public outcry.
| konschubert wrote:
| Regulators are people too
| hef19898 wrote:
| Last time I checked, in deed they are. For the most part.
| YPPH wrote:
| It's hard to know what that is. TCAS is a great example
| of an obvious solution to mid-air collisions - two
| devices seamlessly negotiate for one plane to go up, the
| other to go down.
|
| One I can think of is an electronic runway "lock". ATC
| mark the runway as locked to a particular aircraft. The
| landing aircraft checks at minimums whether if the runway
| is locked to any other aircraft. It's harder to know how
| to prevent incursions at ground level, but it could be a
| beacon near the runway threshold and intersecting
| taxiways, flashing a warning in the cockpit of the taxing
| aircraft if an aircraft on final holds the lock. A pilot
| could still disregard it. Sometimes two planes can share
| the same runway, such as a plane lining up while another
| vacates, which adds further problems.
|
| I'm not aware of any system like this.
| tjohns wrote:
| Runway Status Lights (RWSL) are close to what you're
| describing. If surface surveillance radar detects that a
| runway is occupied, it turns on red warning lights at the
| runway approach end and at the hold-short bars.
|
| The nice thing is that the entire system is ground-based,
| no additional equipment needed in the aircraft.
|
| However, it's complicated/expensive, so only a handful of
| airports have it installed.
|
| https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Runway_status_lights
| NBJack wrote:
| This is a gross oversimplification.
|
| Yes, in this case, you do need to update everything at
| once. At least for a given aiport. All it takes is one
| plane, helicopter, fire truck, or baggage transport
| vehicle to screw with the assumptions of the system and
| jeopardize safety.
|
| No, computers aren't necessarily faster, assuming we want
| to achieve autonomy on the ground. Note that the average
| human reaction time to visual stimulus is about 250ms.
| Achieving this on a plane would require a great deal of
| cameras and sensors that would not only need to stay
| clean, but capable of withstanding pressure changes, high
| velocity winds, the occasional unfortunate airborne
| debris, etc. Then there is the processing power to both
| process each input in real-time (per plane) and train it
| on real-world data to recognize a variety of scenarios to
| act upon (per model and perhaps configuration; AA alone
| has about 11 active aircraft types across 953 planes).
| Contrast this with Tesla's investment for approximately 6
| models. [1]
|
| Achievable? Sure. Cost-effective and sustainable with
| current tech? Doubtful.
|
| [1] https://www.theregister.com/2023/07/21/tesla_dojo_spe
| nding/#....
| Dalewyn wrote:
| The absolute worst thing is for an aircraft to refuse
| control input from the pilots, regardless their state of
| informedness. Lest we forget, we saw what happens when
| computers take priority over pilots thanks to 737 MAX
| MCAS.
| konschubert wrote:
| Okay, so let's add an override.
| alphabettsy wrote:
| That system had an override didn't it, just wasn't well
| known?
| konschubert wrote:
| Then let's make it obvious and include it in the
| training.
| xcdzvyn wrote:
| This exists.
|
| - https://skybrary.aero/articles/runway-awareness-and-
| advisory...
|
| - https://skybrary.aero/articles/autonomous-runway-
| incursion-w...
| YPPH wrote:
| Pilots are accustomed to the immediacy of voice
| communication, which any electronic system will struggle to
| replicate. More sophisticated radio than simplex VHF has too
| many variables, and agreeing on an international standard
| would be challenging.
|
| There have been some developments of a replacement of, or at
| least a supplement to, simplex radio. But none are as cheap,
| quick and reliable as verbal communications with readback.
|
| https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Controller%E2%80%93pilot_data_.
| ..
| konschubert wrote:
| "We've always done it like this" will no longer be a good
| argument when one of the increasing number of near misses
| turns into an accident.
| YPPH wrote:
| Assuming (1) the replacement is a better solution, and
| (2) it is feasible to retrofit every aircraft in the
| world and switch everyone over to it.
|
| Just in relation to (2), I can't really think of anything
| worse than having two communication systems on operation
| at the one airport - everyone must be using the same
| system.
| konschubert wrote:
| You can make it an incremental upgrade that adds an
| additional safety layer, at least until all vehicles are
| updated in 30 years.
| hindsightbias wrote:
| The average age of general aviation aircraft is well over
| 30 years old.
| konschubert wrote:
| Well, then let's start
| pm3003 wrote:
| I worked in software in a domain vaguely related to ATC, and
| I've heard a few years ago that even sampling the voice
| commands (and routing them as VoIP) is problematic , as
| altering the signal through sampling and encoding can go
| against regulations. I don't remember the details though.
|
| It was in a project related to ATC and area control / FIR
| services backup systems.
| bronco21016 wrote:
| I can't speak to international ops because I'm just not sure.
| In the US though, we have runway status lights. At all the
| runway intersections there are lights embedded in the runway
| that will tell you if the runway is safe or not. A radar
| based system is constantly monitoring the runway and will
| light it up red if there is a potential for collision. The
| system works independent of any input from ATC. I think it's
| actually quite effective.
|
| Unfortunately it's expensive and so only runways at the
| busiest airports have it so far.
| epolanski wrote:
| And yet in US it's also standard practice to have airplanes
| takeoff on the same runway at the same time if the
| preceding airplane is small enough to not create vortices.
|
| Note how no one did anything wrong really in this case:
|
| https://simpleflying.com/march-2020-air-canada-incident/
| konschubert wrote:
| You can build a system that accounts for this.
| throw0101d wrote:
| > _Shouldn't there be a universal standard to communicate
| clearances to the computer systems of the airplanes and other
| runway vehicles? And shouldn't there be a small, well-tested
| core system that makes sure clearance never conflicts?_
|
| ATC entering instructions into a computer, then pilots
| reading and interpreting from their computer, and then
| operating their plane, probably is slower and the context
| switches between the computer screen and what's outside the
| window may lead to errors.
|
| There are over 100,000 commercial flights each day
| (worldwide):
|
| * https://www.flightradar24.com/data/statistics
|
| * https://news.paxeditions.com/news/airline/radar-shows-
| record...
|
| * https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2021/12/9/visualising-
| the-...
|
| What is the error rate of runway incursions and such?
|
| > _How on earth does all this still depend on skilled
| individuals not making a mistake?_
|
| Flying aircraft in general depends on "skilled individuals
| not making a mistake". Unless you think we should get rid of
| pilots completely?
|
| Other things that "depend on skilled individuals not making a
| mistake": driving cars, cooking food properly (to avoid
| poisoning), surgery, _etc_.
| konschubert wrote:
| I didn't say that anyone should enter anything manually
| into a computer, nor did I claim that a human reading a
| computer screen is how an automated runway system would
| ensure safety.
|
| As an aside, humans are not doing a good job at driving
| cars and should leave that to the computers.
| ExoticPearTree wrote:
| Is there a car autopilot system that good on the market
| that only you know about? And that can replace the driver
| completely?
| konschubert wrote:
| Waymo is safer than a human driver already.
|
| https://www.nbcbayarea.com/investigations/googles-waymo-
| safe...
|
| Of course there will be locations where humans are
| required, but we can already start using computers in
| those locations where they perform better.
| Tor3 wrote:
| Where I drive daily I constantly have to make decisions
| which no self-driving car system I know about can
| possibly do. They don't foresee upcoming gridlocks caused
| by you driving completely legally but blocking (again,
| legally) a car from crossing to a side road, that car
| again blocks the car behind it, which blocks the car in
| front of you from doing a left turn, which means that you
| can't move and unlock the gridlock. That's just one on my
| commute. Then there's driving uphill on snow, seeing a
| person walking on the other side of the road and a car
| coming in the other direction. You foresee that this car
| will have some problems braking for that person (which
| would be the normal procedure - I'm coming the other way,
| that car shouldn't try to pass the person). So, what I do
| is to slow down and give that other driver confidence to
| pass. And sometimes I have to do the other thing -
| speeding up a bit in order to create room for another car
| to let that car avoid problems (if I were a computer I
| would have no reason to think about that).
|
| This is also something happening all the time where I
| drive. And tons of other understanding-the-traffic cases.
|
| Self-driving systems only follow the rules. That is not
| sufficient. When general artificial intelligence
| eventually arrives - that's when we get self-driving cars
| better than humans, in any other cases than for trivial
| cases. And yes, computers could drive cars in trivial
| places, it's just that those places are pretty much non-
| existing where I live and drive.
| konschubert wrote:
| You say all this, yet waymo is demonstrably safer than
| the average driver.
|
| Uphill in snow maybe you'll have to take the wheel, I'll
| give you that.
| Tor3 wrote:
| Waymo hasn't tried driving outside its comfort zone, so
| I'll argue that it's not demonstrated.
| pb7 wrote:
| Humans should also abstain from driving outside of their
| comfort zones.
| edgyquant wrote:
| Regardless, they don't and do mostly fine
| google234123 wrote:
| Have you driven in SF?
| Tor3 wrote:
| No, never been to SF, I have no idea how people drive
| there or what the conditions are. Except that they're
| very different from where I drive (except when I'm in the
| town centre) - roads without sidewalks, mostly no signal
| lights, snow a large part of the year, and other special
| conditions.
| pie420 wrote:
| Good thing that all airports follow similar standards and
| are all standardized in terms of lighting, signage, etc.
| tjohns wrote:
| That is not quite accurate. There are certainly standards
| for airport markings, but there are many non-standard
| airports... especially when flying at anything smaller
| than an international airport.
|
| (And yes, even airliners will sometimes land at small
| regional airports.)
| kergonath wrote:
| Mate, have you driven in Mumbai? Hell, even in Rome? SF
| is _nothing_.
| edgyquant wrote:
| How has this been demonstrated? They have certainly had
| their share of crashes already.
| konschubert wrote:
| Yes
| https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/2309/2309.01206.pdf
| atonse wrote:
| While everything you mention are signs of good, defensive
| driving and seeing more than "Just following the rules,"
| average human drivers don't do what you do. And that's
| what the automated systems are compared to.
|
| So again, while I think ultimately the automated systems
| should also do what you're talking about, right now, if
| the other article is true in its claims that Waymo is
| safer, it seems sufficient to follow the rules to achieve
| a certain level of safety.
| Tor3 wrote:
| [other drivers] But they do - where I live. It's very
| rare to see people _not_ doing that, so much so that
| everyone really notices.
|
| Edit: And the point is really that strictly just
| following rules (i.e. just drive if you're in the right
| and the signs say so) _will_ cause accidents and worse.
| For others, not necessarily myself. On my commute and
| nearby.
| konschubert wrote:
| What makes you think that a self-driving car cannot have
| similarly predictive algorithms?
| Tor3 wrote:
| There's nothing so far indicating that they have, at this
| point. Though I doubt predictive algorithms would work -
| there are all kinds of situations, all slightly
| different, and lots of them about understanding what
| someone else might be thinking. As I mentioned, I think
| we'll need general artificial intelligence to do this
| properly.
| rootusrootus wrote:
| > Waymo is safer than a human driver already.
|
| Is that data controlled for environment? I.e. it must
| only compare Waymo driving with human drivers in
| _exactly_ the same environment. Same road, same
| conditions, same time, etc. Waymo doesn 't take any
| difficult routes.
| ExoticPearTree wrote:
| Not to mention the fact that when it encounters a
| situation never seen before it just "freezes" - happened
| a few times and caused traffic jams.
|
| What I give these cars is their ability to react
| "instantaneously" to emergency situations like automated
| emergency braking when there is an obstacle in the front
| of the car or the car in front suddenly brakes.
| chrischen wrote:
| Mercedes just released a level 3 car.
|
| Openpilot, while primarily lane keeping, does it way
| better than any human can.
|
| Driving doesn't require an advanced degree in physics.
| It's mostly a mish mash of fairly mundane tasks.
| throw0101d wrote:
| > _Driving doesn't require an advanced degree in physics.
| It's mostly a mish mash of fairly mundane tasks._
|
| Generally not wrong, but when it becomes non-mundane, it
| can become so in a hurry.
|
| This is why I'm sometimes skeptical about statistics that
| say " _x% of airplane crashes are human error_ ". Well
| maybe, but by the time the humans get involved the
| automated systems have often thrown up their proverbial
| hands and digitally exclaimed " _Jesus take the wheel_ ".
|
| I think having computers take over the mundane parts may
| help collision rates as people can get numbed and bored
| by the monotony.
|
| One has to be careful about having the right level of
| automation and control for the given situation, as per
| the famous "Children of the Magenta Line" presentation:
|
| * https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5ESJH1NLMLs
|
| > _"Children of the magenta line" has become shorthand
| for pilots who manage and monitor systems but lack the
| stick-and-rudder skills to fly the airplane with
| authority. You may hear it wielded as an epithet in a
| discussion of "real pilots" versus "kids these days." But
| in many cockpits today, automation illiteracy may be as
| dangerous as automation dependency. Vanderburgh's
| insights shouldn't drive us to reject automation
| altogether, but rather put it in its proper place in our
| pilot toolkits. Just as you should hand-fly regularly to
| keep your stick-and-rudder skills sharp, you should also
| practice using the technology available in the aircraft
| you fly._
|
| * https://www.aopa.org/news-and-media/all-
| news/2023/march/flig...
|
| * https://99percentinvisible.org/episode/children-of-the-
| magen...
|
| * https://skybrary.aero/articles/cockpit-automation-
| advantages...
|
| * https://www.computer.org/csdl/magazine/sp/2015/05/msp20
| 15050...
| svieira wrote:
| See also _The Ironies of Automation_ by Lisanne
| Bainbridge [1]
|
| [1]: https://ckrybus.com/static/papers/Bainbridge_1983_Au
| tomatica...
| lxgr wrote:
| I'm willing to believe that computers are better at lane
| keeping than humans are. That's not the only scenario,
| though: Unfortunately, driving can go from lane keeping
| to making a life-or-death decision in a second, and
| that's not enough time for a human hand-off.
|
| A plane's autopilot can beep and bail out to a human with
| a few seconds for them to get oriented and take over; a
| car doesn't always have that luxury.
|
| "Is this a person walking into my lane or just a shadow?"
| isn't a question that comes up in the air. Until a self-
| driving car can minimize the probability of that
| detection going wrong to below human thresholds, I
| wouldn't feel comfortable sitting in the driver (or maybe
| even passenger) seat of one.
| ExoticPearTree wrote:
| > Mercedes just released a level 3 car.
|
| Which only activates on roads mapped extensively by
| Mercedes.
| ExoticPearTree wrote:
| Human to human open discussion is superior to computer to
| computer in the business of flying/navigation.
|
| It might make sense at some point in the future where an
| autopilot system knows how to taxi, take off, troubleshoot
| issues by itself during the critical phases of flight and so
| on.
|
| And like others said, aviation is one of the safest
| industries on the planet.
| konschubert wrote:
| > Human to human open discussion is superior to computer to
| computer in the business of flying/navigation.
|
| What makes you think so?
| ExoticPearTree wrote:
| Because computers don't have instincts. And don't get
| nuances of communication or instructions.
| konschubert wrote:
| I don't need nuances I need to know if the runway is
| clear or not.
| ExoticPearTree wrote:
| You are nitpicking at this point.
|
| A runway may be clear when given the clearance to land.
| And that happens about 4NM from the RWY threshold. In the
| meantime a incursion might happen. Given low visibility
| you may not see it as you land a big airplane whose nose
| is a bit high up because of the flare. And even if you
| see it, it takes a few seconds for engines to spool up to
| full power in order to do a go-around.
| sammy2255 wrote:
| >Human to human open discussion is superior to computer to
| computer in the business of flying/navigation.
|
| Why? Human to human leaves room for error and
| misinterpretation.
| ExoticPearTree wrote:
| Not really. If an instruction is unclear the pilot will
| ask again for a repeat. Or if the instruments show
| everything to look normal but the plane doesn't feel
| right, the pilot will correct it, a computer will not.
|
| Think of the 737 Max whose computers crashed two planes
| because of incorrect sensor data being fed to them. The
| pilots there tried to rescue the planes while the planes
| were following their logic, which was flawed.
| murderfs wrote:
| > If an instruction is unclear the pilot will ask again
| for a repeat.
|
| Except when they don't, and confirmation bias themselves
| into doing the wrong thing. The most likely cause of a
| plane crash is pilot error, and runway incursions happen
| shockingly often [1][2][3][4]. The only reason there
| hasn't been a Tenerife-style disaster is sheer luck.
|
| 1: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b26NcJCLZl4
|
| 2: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5AbpxqtXcPk
|
| 3: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oI2rJhdvguc
|
| 4: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xPJjw68RI2w (the
| pilots did everything right here, it was the controller
| who screwed up!)
| gureddio wrote:
| I'm just a hobbyist, but my understanding is that there are
| supporting systems in-place, such as RIMCAS (Runway Incursion
| Monitoring and Conflict Alert System)
| https://test1.skybrary.aero/articles/runway-incursion-
| monito...
| rainsford wrote:
| It's largely a solved problem in aviation as well. Serious
| accidents get a lot of attention specifically because they
| are so rare and those based on clearance miscommunication or
| other radio misunderstanding are rarer still. So you'd be
| introducing a lot of additional system complexity trying to
| chase after ever decreasing gains. I'm not sure the end
| result is a net positive for safety.
| jt2190 wrote:
| > Shouldn't there be a universal standard to communicate
| clearances to the computer systems of the airplanes and other
| runway vehicles?
|
| " _Communicating_ clearances" would actually be the easy
| part. The hard part is making sure that there actually _is_
| clearance. The system would need to be able to "see" the
| runway and to "know" about the flights that are permitted to
| use it in real-time. It would involve many computers, some in
| the air and some on the ground I assume. If the system failed
| the pilots would have to fall back onto something else,
| perhaps what they do today, so they'd still need training and
| practice. If a pilot made a mistake the system would need to
| be able to detect that and update everyone.
| asylteltine wrote:
| I agree. It's SO antiquated. Nevermind issues with clearance
| there's even issues like pilots forgetting what was ordered
| or ATC not catching incorrect read backs. This is just
| ridiculous that still in 2024 we are using technology from
| 1950 as the only way to give instructions. We solved
| encryption and authentication years ago. FAA should mandate
| strongly authenticated computer messages as the primary.
|
| But you know the real reasons it's old.
|
| 1) corporate greed and no regulation
|
| 2) legacy... it's always legacy holding us back. All the
| third world countries, Russia, etc would not adopt it.
| lxgr wrote:
| > We got over this in other domains long ago.
|
| How does the incident/accident rate in these other domains
| look like, then?
|
| > How on earth does all this still depend on skilled
| individuals not making a mistake?
|
| Everything safety critical always depends on skilled
| individuals not making a mistake, as long as there isn't full
| automation (in which case it depends on the people designing
| and implementing the automation system).
|
| Until we do have that, mixed automation can actually make
| things less safe if it isn't done very deliberately and
| carefully, with people in operations relying on an imperfect
| system, and system designers on ops to catch complex and edge
| cases.
| iooi wrote:
| > invasion
|
| you mean incursion
| manquer wrote:
| Intrusion is better suited word than both.
|
| Incursion and Invasion have military links, Incursion would
| be brief and limited in scope, invasion is more full on long
| term. Both terms imply a subtle but a conscious choice in the
| crossing of the barrier, while intrusion is more neutral in
| attributing agency to the action.
| sand500 wrote:
| Runway incursion is a technical term defined by the ICAO:
|
| > Runway incursion. Any occurrence at an aerodrome
| involving the incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle or
| person on the protected area of a surface designated for
| the landing and take-off of aircraft.
| manquer wrote:
| OP only quoted "Invasion", he did not reference it as
| "Runway Invasion" perhaps he meant the ICAO term, perhaps
| he took issue with the term invasion. I assumed he meant
| the latter, How would we know for sure?
|
| Ambiguity while correcting someone else is not ideal.
| jaredchung wrote:
| I'd be interested in analyzing ATC transcripts to quantify the
| frequency of communication errors like that in day-to-day
| operations. Express permission, followed by an explicit (and
| matching) read-back, to enter a runway should be easy to
| identify (and the opposite as well). I see liveatc.net has
| audio archives, and tailstrike.com has transcripts of select
| accidents.
| The_suffocated wrote:
| Does this mean when the Airbus landed, there was a Coast Guard
| plane on the runway? Seems like the ground control had made a
| serious mistake.
| rorroe53 wrote:
| Could be a pilot mistake as well. Aircraft entering runway
| without clearence has happened before.
| epolanski wrote:
| Not just aircraft, ground vehicles have caused deaths by
| entering runways too.
| yzydserd wrote:
| Coastguard plane landing hit airbus on tarmac.
|
| Edit: seems I was wrong. The airbus was landing.
| trollied wrote:
| > Coastguard plane landing hit airbus on tarmac.
|
| Unfortunately, you have invented this narrative. There is
| video of the Airbus landing and striking the other plane.
|
| AV Herald link: https://avherald.com/h?article=5132b9fe&opt=0
| aaronmdjones wrote:
| Ground control wouldn't have cleared them to hold short, or to
| position and hold (US: "line up and wait"). That would have
| been the tower, not ground. Ground is only responsible for
| taxiways, not runways.
|
| The Coastguard plane was cleared to hold short at C2, but
| entered the runway instead from C2 as if cleared to position
| and hold (Edit: Or maybe they thought they were cleared to take
| off, but that's far less likely).
| davidkuennen wrote:
| It's so impressive that all of them got out alive.
|
| It's also the first hull loss of an A350. Seems to be an
| amazingly safe plane considering this.
| Nextgrid wrote:
| I wonder if some kind of "TCAS" for runways can be implemented -
| once the controller clears an aircraft for a given runway, some
| antennas start broadcasting that aircraft's identifier so any
| equipped planes approaching the runway can tell whether they've
| been cleared for it.
|
| For planes on approach, the existing ILS antennas can be reused
| but I'm not sure whether that will work on the ground - do the
| ILS antennas cover enough of the ground to accurately target a
| plane that's approaching the runway perpendicularly (off a
| taxiway, etc)?
| t0mas88 wrote:
| Two types of systems already exists on the ATC side of things.
| There are red stop-bar lights at each runway entry point.
| Pilots are trained never to cross a red stop-bar even if told
| by ATC. The controller has to press a button to turn the lights
| off, and they automatically come back on after 1 plane has
| passed the lights.
|
| In larger airports with an automated system, the system
| monitors the runway occupancy and approach sector. If the
| runway is occupied or an aircraft is on final within a certain
| distance, the system throws an alert before the stop-bars can
| be turned off.
|
| On top of that there is also an autonomous version of this
| system that will use red lights to indicate a dangerous runway
| status (e.g. aircraft on approach) at each entry point. And the
| other way around, an aircraft line up for takeoff (but holding)
| will get red lights if any of the entry points further down the
| runway are crossed. More here:
| https://skybrary.aero/articles/autonomous-runway-incursion-w...
| __m wrote:
| ASDE-X should warn the controller, not sure if it's installed
| at that airport
| asystole wrote:
| I'm in the realm of pure speculation here, but does ASDE-X to
| some extent rely on a/c having mode B transponders, which
| I've seen people saying the coastguard Dash-8s didn't have?
| If this is the textbook runway incursion it appears to be
| then it does seem incredible it wasn't caught by runway
| safety systems.
| Nextgrid wrote:
| I wonder if another system can use lasers/light beams to
| detect obstructions on the runway? Rather than relying on
| vehicles actively reporting their positions (which can
| malfunction, and as far as I know only aircraft are
| equipped - cars/trucks/snow clearing vehicles don't have
| it), it would instead just check whether there's _anything_
| on the runway and alert the controller (and ideally any
| approaching planes via the ILS antennas) that the runway is
| obstructed?
| monkey_monkey wrote:
| The Guardian is reporting that 5 people who were on the
| coastguard plane have died.
| KptMarchewa wrote:
| The fact that everyone made it out alive from A350 is a great
| testament to the design. Insane.
| rootusrootus wrote:
| Eh, not really. Any passenger plane design is supposed to be
| able to evacuate in 90 seconds. They had several minutes (at
| least) to get off that plane before the fire spread to the
| cabin.
| lxgr wrote:
| Looking at the videos, the plane was literally doused in
| burning jet fuel as it was decelerating at high speed. I
| still find that very impressive for a plane built out of
| ultimately flammable materials (carbon fiber).
| rootusrootus wrote:
| I would expect similar performance from any plane, whether
| aluminum or composite.
| Aeolun wrote:
| Holy crap. That's some news to come home to after the earthquake
| yesterday...
| king_magic wrote:
| This never should have happened, and mark my words we're going to
| see the same type of accident in the US if we don't radically
| rework ATC.
| Dalewyn wrote:
| It's still unknown if the cause was ATC mishandling the
| situation, we'll have to see how what the investigation finds.
| epolanski wrote:
| You're implying this is ATC rather than human-error related.
| TangoFox wrote:
| To anyone else jumping to conclusions:
|
| First, please do not jump to conclusions.
|
| Secondly, this incident was in Japan, not the US. Feelings
| about US ATC should not be a factor in this situation.
|
| Third, wasn't there a recent runway collision (wing clipped a
| tail) in the US where the pilot was quick to blame ATC on the
| radio, but it turns out that pilot entered the runway without
| permission? (initial conclusions are often wrong)
|
| Disclaimer: I am a US ATC - The views expressed here are my
| own and not necessarily those of FAA.
| king_magic wrote:
| Just to be clear I'm not calling out ATC specifically, as
| in the people who are controllers.
|
| Rather, the entire system of air traffic control.
|
| It seems to me if we end up in a situation where a pilot
| does something wrong in a sensitive area that can lead to a
| catastrophic outcome, we didn't do a good job of
| controlling air traffic. Full stop.
|
| The system is amazingly safe but clearly there are pockets
| of very poor control/decision making around runway
| incursions or near misses around the runway.
| mym1990 wrote:
| I feel like 'radically' reworking anything is a great first
| step in increasing errors while the new processes get
| ingrained. There needs to a measured and meticulous approach to
| reworking ATC if it is to happen.
| king_magic wrote:
| I'd consider significantly raising controller wages and
| improving working conditions to be a fairly radical proposal
| in at least the US's current political climate.
| rootusrootus wrote:
| The average controller makes 120K as it is. That may not be
| a lot for people in the software world accustomed to making
| big bucks, but it's not terrible -- close to 90th
| percentile.
| local_crmdgeon wrote:
| We don't need to radically rework ATC, we need to fully staff
| ATC.
|
| FAA has this as a top priority and is publishing stats on class
| graduations and retention etc.
| m_eiman wrote:
| Here's a first-hand account from one of the passengers on the
| Airbus, somewhat decently translated from Swedish:
|
| https://www-svt-se.translate.goog/nyheter/utrikes/svensk-fam...
| nottorp wrote:
| We really need a paywall mark. Too bad linking to av....ld would
| probably shut down the site for today.
| yardstick wrote:
| Anyone here from one of the large CDN providers want to reach
| out to AV Herald and offer him some free services? It's such a
| useful and informative resource. Too bad it's super slow when
| accessed in AU/NZ and I guess outside US/EU.
| roelschroeven wrote:
| Earlier today it was very slow, and often timing out, from
| the EU too. I haven't tried again since.
| nottorp wrote:
| Guessing because this accident made it to mainstream news.
| supernova87a wrote:
| I dare say / guess that 2 combined factors will have helped the
| successful evacuation effort (especially given that these
| aircraft for Japan internal flights are some of the densest
| passenger configurations):
|
| 1. Domestic flight, with people less likely to be hauling around
| lots of belongings, although in Japan people already bring much
| less onto flights with them.
|
| 2. The well-known social expectation/procedure-abiding
| inclination of everyday Japanese people kicking in to enforce an
| orderly (and no bag-carrying) exit.
|
| Others may have observed similarly when flying in Japan. They can
| regularly board a widebody plane in 15 minutes, whereas 30-40+
| minutes for the US still produces departure delays. I am guessing
| this efficiency factors into the evacuation as well.
|
| Versus other evacuation videos I have seen where people are
| actually exiting with their rollaboards. Really shocking.
| stevehawk wrote:
| I have to admit, I wonder how many lives would have been lost
| if this happened in America. "I have to get my laptop!"
| "where's my carry-on!?" "I think I left my phone!"
| steveBK123 wrote:
| This is why you follow cabin crew instructions and DO NOT CARRY
| YOUR LUGGAGE out of the aircraft in an emergency. Your luggage is
| not worth more than a fellow passengers life.
|
| Contrast this with evacuation footage of western passenger
| planes..
| rgrieselhuber wrote:
| Indeed. It's a good idea to keep your passport and some small
| USB drives (password database, Linux image for installation on
| a new laptop, etc.) on your person instead of in your luggage
| when you fly.
| hn_throwaway_69 wrote:
| >password database, Linux image for installation on a new
| laptop
|
| Heh. Imagine surviving a plane crash. Everyone is busy
| calling their loved ones, and I'm busy setting up my new
| Linux distribution on a laptop bought in duty free, using the
| Linux image in my pocket.
| chilmers wrote:
| After six hours trying to get the touchpad working you're
| wishing you'd died in the crash.
| nytesky wrote:
| Members of my family require medication (epipen, some various
| pills), and I keep that along with a flashlight (in case I need
| to administer in pitch black) in a small haversack. I would
| probably try to take that with me, as I would hate to survive
| the crash but then have a fatal medical event in the aftermath
| and not have the tools. I do feel conflicted since the no
| luggage mantra has been drilled in for decades.
| phkahler wrote:
| >> I would probably try to take that with me, as I would hate
| to survive the crash but then have a fatal medical event in
| the aftermath and not have the tools.
|
| But you might just die in the fire yourself, prioritizing a
| hypothetical emergency over a real one. There would also be
| plenty of medical personnel present once you get off the
| plane, they probably won't let you leave the scene without
| talking to one.
| anigbrowl wrote:
| It's fine to take something small you can carry in one
| hand/keep with you through the whole flight without it
| being a problem. It's the luggage in the overhead baggage
| compartments that needs to be abandoned.
| ajross wrote:
| > But you might just die in the fire yourself, prioritizing
| a hypothetical emergency over a real one
|
| The Two Failure Fallacy is a fatal flaw of human reasoning.
| It's almost never correct to engineer anything on the
| assumption of two bad things happening simultaneously. You
| do your analysis based on individual/uncorrelated failure
| modes. And only then do you make design choices (c.f.
| "defense in depth", "redundancy", etc...) about how much
| the interactions overlap and what the tradeoffs are.
|
| In this case, duh. Positing that _emergency medical
| personnel_ are somehow unable to handle an allergy attack
| is silly.
| nytesky wrote:
| Well my problem is the conditions of an airline crash
| (the smoke, extreme heat, etc) are triggers for our
| disease. It's not a simple as a peanut allergy where you
| just avoid eating a certain food.
|
| I'm not convinced that medical personnel would be on hand
| that quickly for all emergency landings -- sure if you
| are at a major airport. But they may not notice someone
| who collapsed after being triaged away from the more
| severely injured.
| blitzar wrote:
| I applaud you for admitting publicly that you would trade
| convenience for yourself over 100's of other peoples lives.
| wkat4242 wrote:
| Not the OP but I wouldn't call lifesaving medical equipment
| like an EpiPen a convenience.
|
| Though it would be better to just stick it in a pocket. I
| always carry a flashlight on my keychain as well.
| blitzar wrote:
| There is an ambulance at the bottom of the slide, 90
| seconds is the target time for evacuating the entire
| plane in an emergency.
|
| Having an EpiPen in the 90 seconds between your seat and
| the ambulance while fire is engulfing the tin can with
| ~400 people trying to get out 2 doors is 100% a luxury.
| (for the vast majority of humanity, having an EpiPen at
| all is a luxury)
| ativzzz wrote:
| Why? A good chunk of humanity showed via covid that they
| are not interested in inconveniencing themselves for
| potentially reducing overall harm to others.
| thegrim33 wrote:
| Because they had a different analysis of the situation
| than you did, not because they had the same analysis and
| just chose to be assholes.
| Vecr wrote:
| I do more or less prefer my life (as well as the things
| that go along with it, health, physical safety, ...) more
| than some derived number of other people, for various
| complicated reasons. In some situations it could get as
| high as the single digit trillions, but it's usually in the
| hundreds to thousands range or even less.
| werdnapk wrote:
| Those drugs are still available outside of your luggage. Your
| need for that stuff is convenience. Everybody else on the
| flight would prefer to have their luggage too.
| steveBK123 wrote:
| If the medical condition is so dire that medicine must be
| kept on hand then it should be in your pockets, not tucked
| away in luggage.
|
| What is the probability of being stung by a bee or eating a
| bag of nuts between your seat, the slide, and the ambulances
| rushing to the scene to rescue people?
|
| Otherwise by this logic, just about everyone has a reason to
| self-justify needing to get into their luggage in an
| emergency evacuation event.
|
| Target to evacuate planes in an emergency is 90 seconds.
| Contrast with regular deplaning with luggage which takes
| upwards of 15 minutes. So the plane must evacuate at 10x
| speed in order to save lives.
| nytesky wrote:
| I'm guessing you aren't carrying an epi regularly -- they
| seem likely to be broken if in my pocket. It's not a pocket
| sized form factor.
|
| The bag I have is about the size of two croissants -- I
| keep it under seat in front of me or in my lap.
|
| But this topic has inspired me to improve my process, so I
| would like to find a money belt or shoulder holster style
| bag to carry meds and epi while traveling. Basically body
| hugging.
|
| Any help in finding something that isn't from Temu, or some
| random drop shipper? I found one eagle creek bag but would
| prefer a shoulder style?
| google234123 wrote:
| You need to break the rules, risk others lives, and grab your
| carryon in an airport in a major city for an epipen? How many
| hospitals, ambulances, and first aid stations are within 5k
| of you would you guess?
| phkahler wrote:
| >> Your luggage is not worth more than a fellow passengers
| life.
|
| I was going to say a major narcissist would disagree, but they
| probably don't have many of those in Japan. And then you
| followed up:
|
| >> Contrast this with evacuation footage of western passenger
| planes..
|
| Is that for real? It would not surprise me, but is there
| documentation of this difference in deplaning? Or other areas?
| steveBK123 wrote:
| Yes
|
| https://www.independent.co.uk/travel/news-and-advice/red-
| pla...
|
| https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-10055329/Spirit-
| Air...
|
| https://nypost.com/2023/03/09/plane-passengers-slammed-
| for-g...
| jtbayly wrote:
| Ok, I watched a video somebody else linked.
|
| People don't act at all the same after getting crashed into by
| another plane, barely making it to the ground in a plane filled
| with smoke and fire, as they do when those things haven't
| happened?
|
| You don't say.
|
| Would you say it's a good idea to throw yourself tumbling down
| the emergency slide and sprint away from the plane if those
| things hadn't happened?
|
| This is not even a remotely helpful comment.
| SoftTalker wrote:
| I like to think that in a _real_ emergency (crash landing, fire
| visible outside, smoke entering the cabin) survival instinct
| will kick in and people will just GTFO without worrying about
| luggage. The videos I 've seen of people evacuating with
| luggage seem a _little_ less serious. That said, an evacuation
| is always serious. People often do get hurt coming down those
| slides so the crew only order an evacuation if they think it
| outweighs the risk of staying put and waiting for help.
| steveBK123 wrote:
| I'd like to think so but there have been plenty of US
| incidents of people evacuating for an engine on fire with
| baggage in tow.
|
| If you are evacuating out the door on a slide, something is
| quite serious. The trained professionals telling you to leave
| your baggage behind have more information than passengers in
| that regard. That is why they decided to deploy the slides.
|
| Just because one can't see a fire doesn't mean there isn't an
| engine fire on the other side, or a fuel leak or.. etc.
| Planes are pretty big, you can't see/smell everything from
| your seat/window.
|
| I mean here's some right here of smoking planes with evacuees
| hauling even wheelies..
|
| https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-10055329/Spirit-
| Air...
|
| https://www.independent.co.uk/travel/news-and-advice/red-
| pla...
| lxgr wrote:
| > in a real emergency (crash landing, fire visible outside,
| smoke entering the cabin) survival instinct will kick in and
| people will just GTFO without worrying about luggage
|
| Unfortunately, that's not always the case: https://en.wikiped
| ia.org/wiki/Aeroflot_Flight_1492#Evacuatio...
| thegrim33 wrote:
| Ok? What you linked to, which is a single paragraph, does
| not provide any proof for your claim. It says there was
| some speculation that people retrieving luggage caused
| delay, but state media and law enforcement are on record as
| saying there's no evidence that it had any effect, as well
| as there being a witness saying it had no effect.
| lxgr wrote:
| Please read my comment again; I made no such claim.
|
| GP said they could not imagine anybody even worrying
| about their language in a severe crash, yet in the case
| of Aeroflot 1492, people definitely did retrieve theirs:
|
| > [...] prompted by video footage showing passengers
| leaving the plane with luggage in hand [...]
| tomjakubowski wrote:
| The claim was simply that passengers will still reach for
| luggage even in an incident as serious as fire in the
| cabin. That was the case in this example, and the others
| linked by steveBK
| spinach wrote:
| From what info are you assuming that no one did? A middle
| school boy who was on the plane said "He Wu woQu riChu
| soutoiuRen moita"[0], "there were also people who tried to get
| their luggage".
|
| [0]
| https://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/html/20240102/k10014307191000.ht...
| ablation wrote:
| Doesn't sound like quite such a miracle right now for the
| unfortunate crew of the Coast Guard aircraft, with five of the
| six crew unaccounted for, sadly.
| argiopetech wrote:
| Now confirmed deceased, unfortunately.
| throw0101d wrote:
| For the ATC, see:
|
| * https://archive.liveatc.net/rjtt/RJTT-Twr-TCA-Jan-02-2024-08...
|
| * Via: https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/35868205-post57.html
|
| 13:13 JL516 continue approach. 14:53 landing clearance. 15:01
| readback. 15:13 Japan Coast Guard JA772A taxi instructions. 17:35
| fire reported on 34R.
|
| * https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/35868237-post67.html
|
| The recording quality isn't very good, perhaps because of the
| location of the receiver.
| mkii wrote:
| Whenever I listen to these types of recordings, there's so much
| static and it's hard to hear the words. Is this how it actually
| sounds to pilots/ATC operators or is their feed actually much
| clearer?
| lxgr wrote:
| It's usually much clearer.
|
| These unofficial ATC feeds are usually captured by volunteers
| or at least companies not directly affiliated with the
| aviation industry (similarly to services like Flightradar24),
| sometimes some distance away from airports, which makes ATC
| and aircraft on the ground really hard to hear.
|
| What also helps a lot is that the formats of messages relayed
| are pretty standardized (ICAO phraseology), and knowing what
| phrases to listen for can help a lot.
|
| On the other hand, it can unfortunately also cause people to
| hear what they are primed for - such as a landing or takeoff
| clearance... (Not implying that this happened here - I can't
| make out what's being said on the tape myself!)
| somewhereoutth wrote:
| I'd suggest that the miracle escape is testament to ~100? years
| of evolution of civil aviation safety practices.
| DiggyJohnson wrote:
| Yes? That doesn't make it incorrect to call it a miracle.
| squigz wrote:
| Yes, it does.
|
| "a surprising and welcome event that is not explicable by
| natural or scientific laws and is therefore considered to be
| the work of a divine agency."
| squigz wrote:
| Rather amusing to me how many people are downvoting this
| comment.
| mhb wrote:
| Yeah, it's rough out there for pedants.
| deepersprout wrote:
| Or god wanted them all to die, but human technological
| advances made them live.
| adastra22 wrote:
| 5 people died. I wouldn't call it a miracle.
| ApolloFortyNine wrote:
| >All 379 passengers and crew of a Japan Airlines plane
| escaped a devastating fire that erupted after it collided
| with a smaller Coast Guard aircraft at Tokyo's Haneda airport
| on Tuesday.
|
| That's 379 lives saved, is the number not important, or is it
| the ratio?
| reactordev wrote:
| It should have been 384. If 10,000 people die but 1,000,000
| are "saved", do we not mourn the 10,000 people? Have a
| heart my man. What if you were one of those 10,000?
| RHSeeger wrote:
| If a "normal" outcome for such an event would have been
| much closer to 1,000,000 being killed, then yes it would
| be wonderful if 990,000 were saved. Sure, we mourn the
| dead, but we can still be happy for the saved.
| adastra22 wrote:
| Still, the word miracle would be inappropriate.
| reactordev wrote:
| wonderful for sure, but not a miracle. A miracle would be
| "all 1,000,000 people survived". Media likes to throw
| words with weight behind things without. It's not a
| miracle, it's extremely fortunate. However, any loss of
| life due to preventable disaster is/should be -
| unacceptable. The coast guard aircraft crewmen that were
| struck shouldn't have been near the runway at all. They
| should have waived off to go-around or been better at
| ground operations to make sure the runways were clear.
| mrabcx wrote:
| According to Flightradar24,
| https://twitter.com/flightradar24/status/1742136715253313938, the
| Japanese coast guard aircraft was not equipped with a ADS-B
| transponder. Probably because it's not a requirement for military
| aircraft. That can explain why the ATC and/or JAL was not aware
| of the exact location of the plane.
| Dalewyn wrote:
| Minor nitpick, but the Japan Coast Guard is not a military (and
| so the concerned aircraft isn't military).
|
| It serves under the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport
| and Tourism; unlike the JSDF which serves under the Ministry of
| Defense.
| alistairSH wrote:
| Curious, what's the rule for USCG and transponders?
|
| USCG is part of DHS and considered a military branch (despite
| not being in DoD alongside the other military branches and
| having a primarily law-enforcement mission).
| manquer wrote:
| Civilian transponders would give away the position of the
| craft to smugglers and others trying to evade the coast
| guard. I would expect they would have the ability to switch
| off their transponders at minimum for missions.
| throw0101d wrote:
| It has a transponder, and previous flights for it were
| recorded:
|
| * https://www.flightradar24.com/data/aircraft/ja722a
|
| * Via:
| https://twitter.com/flightradar24/status/1742136715253313938
|
| * https://www.planespotters.net/airframe/de-havilland-
| canada-d...
| icehawk wrote:
| It has a mode-s transponder. If you look at, say ADSBExchanbe
| you can see the signal source is MLAT
|
| https://globe.adsbexchange.com/?icao=867bee&lat=36.840&lon=1.
| ..
| rootusrootus wrote:
| I'm most curious about why the JAL plane couldn't see it. An
| airliner has a pretty bright headlight, and the CG plane should
| have had lighting on it as well that would distinguish it from
| the runway lighting.
|
| Clearly, as usual, accidents like this require a number of
| things to all go wrong at the same time.
| icegreentea2 wrote:
| Other sources (https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/japan-airliner-
| fire-1.7072315) say that the coast guard aircraft was a dash-8.
| wkat4242 wrote:
| 5 crew is a lot for a cargo flight actually. I wonder why there
| were so many on board.
| icegreentea2 wrote:
| I think it sometimes makes sense to carry extra people to
| help with offloading, depending on the situation. The Dash-8
| is not a cargo aircraft - it's not like you can just roll
| pallets on and off.
|
| It's also possible that it would do a cargo run, and then do
| some surveillance operations (the JSDF employ the Dash-8 in
| the maritime surveillance role) to help with damage
| assessment.
| andyjohnson0 wrote:
| There's a PPRUNE thread with the usual mix of comments at
| https://www.pprune.org/accidents-close-calls/656665-jal-inci...
|
| Comments get more informative (and informed?) down the thread.
| asylteltine wrote:
| Wow that live video really puts the size in perspective. The
| firefighters are minuscule compared to the plane
| nixass wrote:
| First A350 hull loss
| cgeier wrote:
| But unlikely to be the plane's fault.
| nixass wrote:
| Definitely not. It's actually great how the frame endured
| whole thing enough for people to safely evacuate.
| wkat4242 wrote:
| Admiral Cloudberg has their work cut out for them again... I
| always love their insights (not sure if it's a man or a woman)
|
| It's not really a miracle though. Just the system working as
| intended, and the many lessons learned from the lives that were
| lost in the past paying off.
|
| As an example: due to this accident with many fatalities, the
| process for fire on the runway has been improved considerably. In
| that case the wind direction made a big difference in the number
| of fatalities, because it blew toxic smoke and fire into the
| fuselage while the evacuation was ongoing. Lessons were learned
| and procedures fixed. But it's still important to remember that
| those lessons were paid in blood.
| https://admiralcloudberg.medium.com/fire-on-the-runway-the-m...
| Varimpls wrote:
| A woman, not that it matters
| drooopy wrote:
| Jeez, Japan did not start the year off on the right foot.
| steveBK123 wrote:
| Yet another Japanese plane evacuation without people lugging
| backpacks & wheelies. Commendable work by the cabin crew and
| passengers.
|
| Contrast that with some of the Spirit/Southwest/Qantas evacuation
| videos we have seen.
|
| DO NOT EVACUATE WITH LUGGAGE.
| throw0101d wrote:
| > _DO NOT EVACUATE WITH LUGGAGE._
|
| Simple rule IMHO: keep your ID/password and a credit card on
| your person during take-off / landing. (Probably your phone, in
| a pocket, as well.)
|
| Practically speaking as long as you can ID yourself and buy
| things (pay-off later), there's no property that's worth your
| life (or the life of other passengers).
| steveBK123 wrote:
| 1000%
|
| If anything else is so imminently needed to maintain the life
| of you or your loved ones while traveling, keep it in
| your/their pockets.
|
| Past this everyone has some excuse of medical, dietary,
| sentimental, economic, etc reason to grab stuff out of their
| luggage. This contributes to loss of life.
|
| You have 60-90 seconds to evacuate a burning aircraft. This
| is 10-20x faster than a normal with-luggage deplaning. If you
| are fumbling around with luggage, you are a hazard to
| yourself and others.
|
| If you are evacuating a plane you are seconds to minutes away
| from a fleet of ambulances ready to whisk you away to a
| nearby trauma center. No existing medical condition is going
| to get you before the fire will.
| ghaff wrote:
| I don't routinely do so but there are a few basic things that
| in an ideal world you should probably have on your person in
| some secure way--which admittedly probably requires some
| specific clothing.
|
| ADDED: There probably are certain specialized critical
| medicines that people should carry in a vial around their
| necks that they're not getting anytime soon from an
| overwhelmed trauma center. But that's probably true even
| absent the plane crash scenario.
| steveBK123 wrote:
| If someone is willing to leave home without it for a walk
| in the park / drinks at a bar / quick stop at the store,
| then they can evacuate a burning plane without it.
|
| If it is truly that imminently required to keep them alive,
| they should already be in the habit of keeping it on their
| person.
|
| And certainly while flying, and at the very very least
| during takeoff/landing on a plane. Further, absolute worst
| case.. with pre-evacuation warning time, reachable in under
| seat backpack to be moved to your jeans/shirt/jacket
| pocket. If you travel in clothes without pockets, now is a
| good time to reconsider doing so.
|
| Lots of opportunities here to not try and lug baggage down
| an evacuation slide and risk your own / fellow passengers
| deaths.
|
| If this is surprising to anyone reading, hope you plan
| accordingly now during your next travel.
| ghaff wrote:
| Yes, lots of stuff can happen in everyday life that would
| mean you should have critical medications on your person.
|
| At the end of the day your passport and credit cards
| situation aren't critical in such a situation however
| much bureaucratic hell you may go through if you're in a
| foreign country with no ID or money and not of a
| nationality where your embassy is rushing to help.
|
| In general my approach is travel pants with zipped
| pockets.
| mattlondon wrote:
| +1
|
| I usually do this when flying for work. Wallet, passport and
| phone in my pocket the whole flight. Anything else can be
| replaced.
|
| If anything happened I'd hope to at least send a SMS to my
| wife to say "I'm safe".
| tgtweak wrote:
| Some video footage from inside the plane and of the impact.
|
| https://x.com/rawsalerts/status/1742127927880216725
| jmacd wrote:
| It is really impressive that everyone was able to evacuate the
| plane. From some of the videos online you can see that there was
| a significant and increasing amount of smoke in the cabin. It is
| a testament to the evolving design of commercial aircraft. The
| light strips on the floor always fascinate me when I am flying. I
| often think about how if the cabin was filling with smoke, those
| lights would be the only way you have to keep moving towards an
| exit.
| jagrsw wrote:
| Could the accident be linked to the clarity of radio
| instructions? I saw a discussion suggesting the DH aircraft might
| have been unsure about the correct runway to use, C1 or C5.
|
| My aim isn't to critique the English proficiency of non-native
| speakers, especially those from non-Proto-Indo-European
| linguistic backgrounds. As a non-native English speaker myself, I
| understand the challenges.
|
| However, I found it trully hard to comprehend the airport's side
| of the communications due to heavily accented and unclear
| pronunciation. Shouldn't there be a greater emphasis on air
| traffic controllers improving their English skills, since English
| is lingua franca (pun intended) of aviation.
|
| Or perhaps this is irrelevant, considering aviation's global
| nature. Are pilots expected to adapt to and understand
| communications with strong accents?
| throw0101d wrote:
| > _Could the accident be linked to the clarity of radio
| instructions? I saw a discussion suggesting the DH aircraft
| might have been unsure about the correct runway to use, C1 or
| C5._
|
| From my comment in part of the discussion thread[0]:
|
| --
|
| For the ATC, see:
|
| * https://archive.liveatc.net/rjtt/RJTT-Twr-TCA-
| Jan-02-2024-08...
|
| * Via: https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/35868205-post57.html
|
| 13:13 JL516 continue approach. 14:53 landing clearance. 15:01
| readback. 15:13 Japan Coast Guard JA772A taxi instructions.
| 17:35 fire reported on 34R.
|
| * https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/35868237-post67.html
|
| The recording quality isn't very good, perhaps because of the
| location of the receiver.
|
| --
|
| The ATC quality of my local airport (CYYZ Tower) available
| through LiveATC is much better. I following some flying/pilot
| Youtubers, and their recordings of ATC are also quite good, so
| I'm not sure why LiveATC at HND is as statically as it is.
|
| [0] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=38839885#unv_38841161
| Shank wrote:
| All of these ATC feeds are from SDR stations close by that
| monitor the same frequencies. Your local airport sounds
| better because someone has a better SDR rig to receive it.
| Generally the audio is crystal clear in the cockpit and on
| the ground -- it's just that the SDR stations don't have as
| good antennae as the real systems do.
| MBCook wrote:
| I've always wondered about that. When I hear recordings
| online they're often so bad I wonder how there aren't more
| issues.
|
| That explains it.
| thedrbrian wrote:
| I know it'll be a long time coming but wait for the ATC
| recordings to come out. They'll be crystal clear.
| ac29 wrote:
| Antenna quality is unlikely to be a significant factor in
| audio quality if the stations are actually somewhat close
| to the airport. The difference between a very good and very
| poor antenna is maybe 5-7 dB in the VHF airband, which
| shouldnt noticeably degrade quality unless you are already
| at the margins of signal availability. Antenna location is
| going to make a much, much bigger difference.
| beej71 wrote:
| I was feeling bad because I couldn't understand through the
| accent, which I consider my failure, not theirs.
|
| But I know one can improve understanding with practice, so
| maybe pilots are just better at it.
| bagels wrote:
| There is a ton of static too, why is that still tolerated?
| avidiax wrote:
| ATC uses AM radio since it behaves well. Two AM broadcasts on
| the same frequency add in proportion to their strength. Two
| FM broadcasts tend to cut into each other randomly.
|
| It's a case of AM being the long-term standard, and also
| being physically suited to the task.
| rafram wrote:
| In addition to what others have said about the quality, pilots
| and air traffic controllers communicate using a very restricted
| vocabulary. They aren't having free-flowing conversations - ATC
| issues commands using what's essentially a spoken domain-
| specific language, and pilots echo them back. Accent should not
| be a major issue.
| Denvercoder9 wrote:
| _> the correct runway to use, C1 or C5._
|
| FWIW, C1 and C5 are not runways, but taxiways leading to the
| runway.
| kingofpandora wrote:
| I noticed in the video that many people onboard A359 were wearing
| masks. Would those have helped significantly to prevent smoke
| inhalation?
| bugbuddy wrote:
| No, because regular masks would not work for such situations.
| porkbeer wrote:
| Not at all.
| rightbyte wrote:
| Maybe discrete pieces of ash.
| aidenn0 wrote:
| Kind of a morbid curiosity, but would a Dash-8 taxiing for
| takeoff have more or less fuel in total than an A350 coming in
| for landing?
| jeffbee wrote:
| A much more informative video is
| https://youtu.be/6NbVdIoJsHY?t=169 ... you can see the accident
| aircraft enter the runway then stands there for 40+ seconds
| before the other aircraft lands on it. It seems like a lot of
| time during which controllers could have detected the conflict.
| cryptonector wrote:
| Wow, the dash-8 begins to move into the runway at 2:48, and
| then sits there for the rest of the time. It's really hard to
| spot this from this video going forwards, but it you got
| backwards from the crash you can see the lights from the dash-8
| and work out when it got onto the runway.
|
| Maybe the coast guard pilot thought he had permission to line
| up, but not to take off? Anyways, it's also pretty easy to see
| that it would have been difficult for the tower staff and the
| A350 pilots to notice the incursion and avoid the accident.
| jeffbee wrote:
| I think the wide angle of view from this camera gives a
| misleading impression of what it would have looked like in
| person. I also have no idea where the controllers would have
| been in this scene. Is the aircraft landing on 34R?
| rootusrootus wrote:
| And 40 seconds where it should have been visible to the pilots
| of the airliner. I know they have checklists to run, but are
| neither of the pilots looking forward during final approach?
| CrimsonCape wrote:
| Pilots increasingly seem to have an iPad with some kind of apps.
| Do you have experience with this? In terms of redundant systems,
| seems kinda obvious that if you look at a flight tracker on your
| ipad and see a plane on your runway, you don't land...
| lxgr wrote:
| These apps usually use ADS-B as received by various community-
| operated receivers.
|
| This introduces a lag of several seconds, doesn't guarantee
| reception in tricky situations (such as planes flying very low,
| as during the final approach, or on the ground), and is limited
| to the planes' own position fix accuracy, which is orders of
| magnitude too coarse for this use case.
| icehawk wrote:
| The coastguard aircraft involved only has a Mode S transponder
| and so those flight tracker websites can only determine the
| plane's position when there's enough receiver coverage to do
| multilateration
| VoodooJuJu wrote:
| Such a high comment to score ratio is typically due to political
| polarization, but there's nothing politically polarizing about
| this, so what's the deal here?
| anigbrowl wrote:
| I think it's because of how dang merged multiple threads
| together.
| maxcan wrote:
| Compare and contrast to Aeroflot 1492:
|
| Aeroflot: 41 passenger deaths, many bags saved.
|
| JAL: 0 passenger deaths, 0 bags saved.
|
| https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k_DT8dDIugQ
| p1mrx wrote:
| How do you know that nobody evacuated with a bag?
| amelius wrote:
| Sounds to me this could have been prevented with better software
| in the airplanes and control towers.
| philip1209 wrote:
| Would military planes be equipped with ACAS, and could ACAS avert
| this type of collision?
| csharpminor wrote:
| I'd be curious to know from someone with more knowledge: are
| there any technological improvements that could prevent this kind
| of accident?
|
| It seems as though it should be possible (though perhaps not
| easy) to automatically detect an aircraft on runway and relay
| that to the approaching aircraft.
|
| With all respect for the coast guard pilots who died, I would say
| this incident is the "best case" scenario we could hope for when
| two large aircraft crash on a runway. Had the other plane been
| carrying passengers the casualties could have easily been in the
| hundreds.
|
| It seems odd to me that with all the safety advancements in
| aviation we don't have the technology to prevent this.
| matwood wrote:
| Some airports do have ground lighting that changes when it's
| safe/unsafe to enter/cross runways. No idea if that existed
| here. I know JFK has it, as I watched it in action the last
| time I had a layover.
| InTheArena wrote:
| The big take0away here is that the 90 second rule that Airbus
| fought _and lost_ with the A380 and Boeing thought about fighting
| with the 787 and 777 is exactly right. Sometimes every second
| matters.
|
| A second take-away - emergencies are no excuse to ditch procedure
| and thinking about Safety. The SFO incident where a passenger was
| killed after exiting a vehicle by a vehicle rushing to the plane
| is another example.
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