[HN Gopher] Slack's Google Drive App can share your private Docs...
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       Slack's Google Drive App can share your private Docs and Drive
       files
        
       Author : justswim
       Score  : 229 points
       Date   : 2023-10-12 06:44 UTC (14 hours ago)
        
 (HTM) web link (www.kapwing.com)
 (TXT) w3m dump (www.kapwing.com)
        
       | Mandatum wrote:
       | No shit.
        
       | mrabcx wrote:
       | Everyone should have realized by now that online services can not
       | guarantee any level of security.
        
         | Frost1x wrote:
         | It's often used as an argument to prop up service models
         | though: use our service because it's _more_ secure than not. In
         | theory it makes sense. In practice, security through obscurity
         | I think doesn 't get enough justice.
        
       | pwarner wrote:
       | I use the OneDrive aka SharePoint integration for slack and I've
       | never seen this issue.
        
       | seanhunter wrote:
       | I always felt these kind of integrations ask for so much access
       | in return for so little additional functionality. Do I
       | 
       | A- give you access to all my documents so you can make a
       | thumbnail when I attach a document or
       | 
       | B- not do that and not get a thumbnail, so I just look at the
       | document outside of slack before attaching it?
       | 
       | That's never been a complicated decision for me.
        
         | gorlilla wrote:
         | Soon enough every thumbnail will just be [THIS PAGE HAS BEEN
         | LEFT INTENTIONALLY BLANK] once legal realizes and has IT push
         | new corporate templates onto everyone.
        
           | chinathrow wrote:
           | Don't worry, the algorithm will find the most suitable page
           | to minify for you.
        
         | paxys wrote:
         | The key feature of the integration isn't the thumbnail, but
         | that Slack indexes your Google Drive files so they show up in
         | search. That is absolutely worth it IMO.
        
           | ceejayoz wrote:
           | That's similarly bad, though, at times.
           | 
           | If I search "Draft performance improvement plan for ceejayoz"
           | and a document I don't have access to comes back, that's a
           | fairly significant data leak.
        
             | prng2021 wrote:
             | Except that's not how it works. Your search results only
             | include the documents you have access to.
        
             | oooyay wrote:
             | Disclaimer that I work at Slack.
             | 
             | The search you experience runs against permissions so
             | something like that doesn't happen.
        
               | ceejayoz wrote:
               | If Slack is already checking those permissions, fixing
               | the thumbnail issue should be fairly straightforward,
               | yes?
        
               | mlhpdx wrote:
               | Does that mean Slack has implemented, correctly, Gmail's
               | complicated permission model? Glad I've never enabled
               | that integration.
        
               | theolivenbaum wrote:
               | It probably just uses Google drive search API and
               | includes the results into slack's own results.
        
               | Y_Y wrote:
               | > Disclaimer that I work at Slack.
               | 
               | I suppose by this you mean that you _do_ work at Slack,
               | but that 's not really a disclaimer, is it? More of a
               | "claimer".
        
               | SoftTalker wrote:
               | The proper word here is "disclosure" not "disclaimer." I
               | see this mistake all the time.
        
         | ilyt wrote:
         | And the worst part is that before web that just worked - file
         | managed did the thumbnails (or custom open dialog) and nothing
         | needed to be sent to cloud...
        
           | madeofpalk wrote:
           | Right - before you shared things with other people, it didn't
           | have the problems of sharing things with other people.
        
         | jjice wrote:
         | Agreed and I think it's due to two things:
         | 
         | - The app just requests may more permissions than required.
         | Often times you'll see an app that just requires read access
         | that is requested read, write, personal email, and blood of
         | your first born.
         | 
         | I worked on a service that integrated with a lot of services
         | that store data that one would deep business sensitive. When
         | I'd always minimize permissions while setting up development, I
         | had PMs/decision makers require that we ask for maximum
         | permissions so future changes are easier. Felt wrong to me.
         | 
         | - The service (OAuth2 provider) not have fine-grained enough
         | permissions. Sometimes there would only be the option for
         | "read" or "write". Sometimes you'd get access to "read
         | documents", but you couldn't restrict the type of documents.
         | The more options there are, the more confusing it can be, but
         | the more control and security the user has and I think that's
         | much more important than development confusion.
         | 
         | I will say that I really appreciated what Notion does where
         | they'll give you the ability to approve access to individual
         | pages and while querying for pages you'll only ever see ones
         | you've been granted access. The other side is that now a user
         | has to approve each next page. The is also the option to allow
         | everything existing and going forward. I think that's a great
         | middle ground that gives control to the user. Whether the
         | average user takes advantage of that is another question all
         | together.
        
           | Obscurity4340 wrote:
           | > Blood of your first born
           | 
           | I mean, that's just straight-up reasonable. There's no free
           | lunches on this world /s
        
       | muglug wrote:
       | This is a strange thing to publish in a company blog post
       | (complete with interstitial adverts for Kapwing).
        
         | frowin wrote:
         | I don't see any problem here.
        
           | muglug wrote:
           | Full disclosure: I work for Slack.
           | 
           | Typically if you think you found a security vulnerability
           | and/or quirk, you contact the company before writing it up
           | and hitting publish[1]. That way the company is not left in a
           | potentially vulnerable state.
           | 
           | [1] https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Vulnerabil
           | ity...
        
             | agnokapathetic wrote:
             | This has been shared with Slack many times by many separate
             | organizations and always closed with WontFix / Working as
             | Expected
        
             | shkkmo wrote:
             | This was reported at least 4 years ago and Slack doesn't
             | apparently view it as a security issue:
             | https://nitter.net/SlackHQ/status/1171336897819529219
        
             | p337 wrote:
             | I disclosed this personally 4 years ago via hacker one. The
             | larger issue, imo, is that it indexes the content and
             | allows an attacker to craft search terms which reveal the
             | full contents of the document sort of like a blind SQLi. I
             | was told it was working as intended and my report was
             | black-holed on h1 and was told via email that it was
             | "informational" and not a vulnerability.
             | 
             | It's lame to come on here and act like people reporting
             | this are acting in bad faith. I asked for permission to
             | talk about it and was granted it, so I don't see why the
             | author of this post shouldn't be able to do the same
             | considering he doesn't even get into the search indexing
             | aspect. The company is in a vulnerable state due to
             | negligence in addressing the issue, not because it was
             | publicly disclosed.
        
       | filereaper wrote:
       | The title feels wrong and might cause panic.
       | 
       | A preview picture of the documents first page is shared whether
       | the user has permissions or not.
       | 
       | The entire document is not shared like what the title seems to
       | suggest.
       | 
       | For sensitive documents, this can certainly be a leak but its not
       | outright sharing in a traditional sense.
        
         | gorlilla wrote:
         | A preview of the first page is absolutely enough to put
         | companies on the wrong side of government and/or industry
         | regulations/compliance.
         | 
         | It may not be as astronomically bad as you immediately
         | imagined, but I don't see how the nuance makes any material
         | difference with the urgency in which this would need to be
         | contained/analyzed/investigated and reported timely where
         | required.
        
           | koolba wrote:
           | > A preview of the first page is absolutely enough to put
           | companies on the wrong side of government and/or industry
           | regulations/compliance.
           | 
           | So that whole, " _This page intentionally left blank_ ", is a
           | security feature?
        
             | benatkin wrote:
             | Until the preview uses machine learning to skip that and
             | show the first page containing content :)
        
             | TeMPOraL wrote:
             | Could be, except it's unlikely to be put on the _first
             | page_ , so at the very least, this integration is leaking
             | the title, classification and authorship - and through
             | that, existence - of a potentially sensitive document.
        
           | judge2020 wrote:
           | This is the point of the Slack app though. It does notify you
           | if x recipients can't see a document, but it doesn't attempt
           | to hide it from those who don't already have access.
           | 
           | Companies can turn off the Google Drive app in their Slack
           | workspace and block it in Google Workspace admin (and
           | generally allowlist which apps can request Drive permissions:
           | https://support.google.com/a/answer/7281227?hl=en ).
        
         | paxys wrote:
         | It is also only shared if the owner posts a link to the
         | document in a public channel.
        
         | bachmeier wrote:
         | As someone that has to do FERPA training every year, I would
         | classify that as a disaster.
        
         | Xelbair wrote:
         | Except if this page contains PII.
         | 
         | or sensitive company secrets
         | 
         | or relevant details of business deals
         | 
         | or is a payslip
         | 
         | etc etc.
         | 
         | It is a horrible breach, that shouldn't exist and should be
         | fixed ASAP. Also due to GDPR concerns.
         | 
         | Saying that it is non issue is very short sighted.
        
         | ec109685 wrote:
         | The reason it's implemented this way is that slack doesn't have
         | the ability to generate a per user thumbnail based on the
         | access rights of the document.
         | 
         | As the sender of the slack link, Slack should give the option
         | to include the preview or not, like it does for other unfurl's.
         | 
         | Where there would be a major problem is if someone could trick
         | slack to generate a preview of a link they don't have access
         | to.
         | 
         | Secondarily, I have seen slack show an obsolete preview, which
         | could result in something accidentally shared.
        
         | rjmunro wrote:
         | Many of my documents are only one page, especially private
         | confidential ones like communications with HR.
        
       | darkerside wrote:
       | Even more than that, the page is cached as it was at the time it
       | was shared. I've seen this happen with documents that were later
       | edited, with hilarious results.
        
         | hunter2_ wrote:
         | Isn't that the case with "unfurling" anything, though? Whether
         | Slack generates a thumbnail or just pulls text from meta tags?
         | Same with other apps like Teams, FB Messenger, etc? None of
         | this is known to poll for changes frequently enough to avoid
         | the hilarity of caching.
        
       | jeromegv wrote:
       | It seems odd because I did share Google Doc private docs very
       | often in Slack in the past, and Slack would tell me that this was
       | not a public document so it could not show a preview. So I wonder
       | if something changed.
        
       | freetanga wrote:
       | If you keep your personal files on GDrive, they might be personal
       | but they are not private.
        
       | hunter2_ wrote:
       | Would the terms established by Google, agreed to by a developer
       | creating an integration like this, include a need to respect
       | permissions unless the user explicitly requests (or is explicitly
       | informed of) additional access for parties beyond those already
       | granted access by Google's system directly? If so, it seems like
       | this could be reported to Google who would pull it down and force
       | Slack to comply, if Slack doesn't want to on their own.
       | 
       | I suppose the installation of the integration already involves a
       | Google-served message along the lines of "Slack will be able to
       | see everything as you do" but that's not quite explicit enough
       | for a user to then extrapolate "...and may share it however they
       | like without telling you." Like of course they could, but they
       | shouldn't, unless it's super clear, and it's not.
        
         | btown wrote:
         | https://developers.google.com/terms/api-services-user-data-p...
         | is somewhat ambiguous on this front:
         | 
         | > Limit your use of data to providing or improving user-facing
         | features that are prominent in the requesting application's
         | user interface;
         | 
         | > Don't allow humans to read the data, unless: You first
         | obtained the user's affirmative agreement to view specific
         | messages, files, or other data, with the limited exception of
         | use cases approved by Google under additional terms applicable
         | to the Nest Device Access program...
         | 
         | Did Slack make it clear to the user sharing their Drive link
         | that the preview isn't just visible to them, but to anyone in
         | the channel or who has access to the link? Was that clear
         | enough to be affirmative agreement? Is the little area where
         | the preview is shown while you're composing a Slack message
         | prominent enough to display that it will include a screenshot
         | of the data?
         | 
         | Clearly, Slack thinks the answer to all these questions is yes,
         | and Google either agrees or isn't enforcing their guidelines
         | here.
         | 
         | (...As an unrelated point, the fact that the Nest Device Access
         | guidelines are an explicit exception to even this modicum of
         | user visibility, that the guidelines aren't linked, and can be
         | unilaterally changed by Google without notification to users
         | is... well, why I don't own Nest devices.)
        
       | machiste77 wrote:
       | How would someone in the slack workspace discover the thumbnail
       | image url?
        
       | jrmg wrote:
       | But the recipient already has access to the shared document?
       | 
       | Is the concern that the recipient might share the link to the
       | image? Again, they already have access to the shared document if
       | they want to leak it.
       | 
       | I don't think accidental discovery is possible - there's a long
       | shard of random data in there. It's no more discoverable than the
       | share link.
        
         | p337 wrote:
         | If you use the drive integration, you share it with Slack.
         | Slack then creates a thumbnail that is visible in that channel.
         | Imagine pasting a sensitive HR document in the big company chat
         | with everyone in it. No one in the group may have permission
         | via Google, but they can see the thumbnail (and search its
         | contents!) if they have access to the slack room.
         | 
         | Edit: I should note, this is my fuzzy recollection of how it
         | worked 4 years ago when I reported it to Slack. YMMV
        
       | jordigg wrote:
       | This has been true since the integration was released and main
       | reason it's been disabled at most companies I've worked at.
       | Definitely nothing new and reported to Slack and Google multiple
       | times, always replied with working as expected. If you don't like
       | how it works, remove it. Recently the UI and options changed a
       | bit and you can now disable previews but I believe is a user
       | setting and not a organization setting.
        
       | frizlab wrote:
       | Same is true for tickets that have security policies in Jira.
        
       | orliesaurus wrote:
       | I understand importance of respecting access control but if
       | you're sharing a Google Drive on a private or public slack
       | workspace, you probably are doing it wrong to begin with because
       | anyone who has access to the channel is ideally someone you trust
       | with the content ur sharing
        
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       (page generated 2023-10-12 21:01 UTC)