[HN Gopher] Winner's Curse: Negotiation Mistakes to Avoid
       ___________________________________________________________________
        
       Winner's Curse: Negotiation Mistakes to Avoid
        
       Author : andsoitis
       Score  : 88 points
       Date   : 2023-08-24 18:33 UTC (1 days ago)
        
 (HTM) web link (www.pon.harvard.edu)
 (TXT) w3m dump (www.pon.harvard.edu)
        
       | JackFr wrote:
       | In bond trading a BWIC (bids wanted in competition) or 'bid list'
       | is a list of bonds for sale that a seller would send to a number
       | of banks with a set time for all bids to be in. As a bidder you
       | would be notified of whether or not you won the bonds, and the
       | what the second best price was (the cover). This would allow you
       | to know where you were with respect to the other bidders.
       | 
       | Except back in the old days (pre-crisis) there was no way to keep
       | people honest, and people would routinely lie about the cover and
       | always tell everyone the cover was just a tick below the winning
       | bid, so if someone made an egregiously bad bid, hopefully they'd
       | never realize...
       | 
       | Now all transaction get printed on the TRACE feed, which is
       | probably better for the market.
        
         | nico wrote:
         | Reminds me of house buying. Realtors are experts at getting
         | bids and creating a high stakes competition with 0 transparency
         | or accountability. They can easily lie or mislead people (and a
         | lot of them do).
        
       | petesergeant wrote:
       | I'm currently building a set of tools to teach negotiation skills
       | through interactive scenarios, with a hope to focus on enterprise
       | sales, and then eventually using machine learning to analyse
       | actual negotiations. If that's something you have a need for
       | right now (esp if you work in enterprise sales), do feel free to
       | drop me an email at pete@negoat.io
        
       | slavboj wrote:
       | The negotiation is won before the actual bid by having a better
       | cost / payoff structure going in.
        
         | georgeecollins wrote:
         | [flagged]
        
         | FrustratedMonky wrote:
         | If all bidding processes followed rational rules.
        
       | smath wrote:
       | I think what this article misses is that 'value' is a
       | personal/subjective thing. Value is not the same as price. To me,
       | the value of a house might be higher than to you (say because I
       | am more desperate to move out of a tiny apartment). This does not
       | hold for the jar of coins example in the article of course.
        
         | WalterBright wrote:
         | Value is the price you would buy/sell it for. There is no other
         | useful definition of value.
        
       | rahimnathwani wrote:
       | When you place bids or asks in a market where some participants
       | are knowledgable ('informed'), the execution of your transaction
       | indicates a likelihood that your counterparty is one of those
       | informed traders.
       | 
       | This should prompt you to adjust your initial bid or ask price.
       | Knowing this dynamic in advance, you can set your initial bid or
       | ask with the assumption that it will be executed by an informed
       | trader, or assuming an X% chance that the trader is informed.
       | This is part of the reason for the existence of bid/ask spreads.
       | 
       | Winner's curse seems similar. When deciding your bid, you have to
       | decide 'if I will in the auction at this price, will I be
       | happy?'.
       | 
       | This is subtly different from "what's the most I'm willing to pay
       | based on the information I have today?".
        
       | jrh3 wrote:
       | This is just "Buyer's Remorse"
       | 
       | Value and price are wonderful, but something is worth what people
       | are willing to pay for it.
        
       | chias wrote:
       | Doing my best to summarize what I got from this article:
       | 
       | 1. In an auction, is possible to over-bid on a thing
       | 
       | 2. If you over-bid on a thing and you win, that's not good
       | 
       | 3. It's better to not win the auction than it is to win it by
       | bidding higher than you value winning the auction
       | 
       | 4. The Big Insight: before you bid, stop to think about whether
       | you're about to bid higher than you value what you're bidding on.
       | 
       | ...what am I missing? Why is this interesting? What does this
       | have to do with negotiation? What are the negotiation mistakes to
       | avoid?
        
         | tommiegannert wrote:
         | Only bid if you have already sold the thing to someone not in
         | the auction. :)
         | 
         | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Winner%27s_curse
         | 
         | If you have alternatives to participating in this auction,
         | perhaps you should abstain. Also related to BATNA:
         | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Best_alternative_to_a_negotiat...
        
           | HWR_14 wrote:
           | That's only true if items with a defined but unknown at the
           | time of bidding. A piece of art doesn't suffer from the
           | winners curse if you are buying it to enjoy.
        
             | pessimizer wrote:
             | Yes it does. There could be another piece of art that you
             | would "enjoy" equally, but pay less for. If no other piece
             | of art will do, then you yourself are equivalent to the
             | pocket buyer.
             | 
             | edit: if you're using "enjoy" to mean "have a private value
             | rather than a shared one," a pocket buyer _is_ a private
             | value. If, instead, your level of enjoyment of the item is
             | around the same level as the rest of the bidders, then
             | there 's no reason why the Winner's Curse wouldn't apply.
        
           | tomjakubowski wrote:
           | > If you have alternatives to participating in this auction,
           | perhaps you should abstain.
           | 
           | totally off-topic I know -- it's a great answer to so many
           | dull thought experiments too. Like this one that was going
           | around Twitter recently:                   Everyone
           | responding to this poll chooses between a blue pill or red
           | pill.                - if > 50% of ppl choose blue pill,
           | everyone lives           - if not, red pills live and blue
           | pills die
           | 
           | Just walk away! It's so easy!
        
         | bawolff wrote:
         | > What does this have to do with negotiation?
         | 
         | You can negotiate for a contract job such that it costs you
         | more to do the job than your negotiated price, or otherwise
         | isn't worth it.
         | 
         | I agree its not the most insightful article
        
         | rocqua wrote:
         | A core point is the line "Analyze whether the asset has a
         | common value element. A common value asset, like a jar of
         | coins, has equal value to all bidders. If so, bid with
         | caution."
         | 
         | In auctions where the asset does not have equal value to all
         | bidders, the winners curse is less likely to apply. Because if
         | you guess the value of the object higher than all others, that
         | can happen because it is fundamentally worth more to you,
         | rather than because you had the most over-estimation.
        
           | HWR_14 wrote:
           | Which is why "jar of coins" is a bad example. To a collector,
           | a jar of coins may be worth more than face value, depending
           | on what is in there.
        
         | SkyPuncher wrote:
         | > 4. The Big Insight: before you bid, stop to think about
         | whether you're about to bid higher than you value what you're
         | bidding on.
         | 
         | How do you define value? How does it consider fungible factors?
         | 
         | ----
         | 
         | My wife and I "overbid" on our house. We have absolutely no
         | idea how much we "overpaid". Could be 0%, could be 10%, could
         | be -10%.
         | 
         | If we did it again, we'd take the exact same approach. Winning
         | that bid had little to do with the actual value of that house,
         | other than knowing where to put a value on the bid. It solved a
         | major problem for us - we need to move to a new city where
         | housing in in extremely short supply. Putting that bid in and
         | winning meant saving weeks/months of effort looking, touring,
         | driving out of state, putting bids in, holding our breath, etc,
         | etc.
         | 
         | In an auction, the winner will always give an unnecessary
         | concession (whether that's excess cash or some other
         | contractual term). That's simply the nature of competition;
         | especially with asymmetrical knowledge.
        
           | robotresearcher wrote:
           | The article clearly says that the phenomenon applies only to
           | auctions where the final value is approximately the same to
           | everyone.
           | 
           | You describe a situation where a quick purchase is very
           | valuable to you, so getting the sale is worth a higher bid to
           | you than to someone who could take their time getting a good
           | price, such as an investment buyer.
           | 
           | So the phenomenon is much weaker or irrelevant in your case
           | because all buyers are not estimating the same absolute value
           | to them.
        
           | WalterBright wrote:
           | > How do you define value?
           | 
           | The buyer defines it as he sees fit, so does the seller. No
           | sale happens unless they both agree on the value.
        
           | anamexis wrote:
           | It seems like you're using a different definition of overbid
           | here. You didn't bid higher than what you value the house at,
           | presumably, otherwise you wouldn't do it again.
        
         | yccs27 wrote:
         | Intuitively, you might think "I'll just bid a few cents less
         | than what the thing is worth to me, then I'll get a fair deal".
         | However:
         | 
         | 1. You likely don't know the value exactly, so you might
         | overbid (or underbid)
         | 
         | 2. If you overbid, you will probably get the thing and lose
         | money
         | 
         | 3. If you underbid, you are less likely to be awarded the
         | thing, so on average the gains (from getting it below value)
         | are lower than the losses (from overpaying).
         | 
         | 4. The Big Insight: To still get a good deal on your average
         | auction _win_ , you need to adjust your bid downwards to
         | account for your imperfect knowledge.
        
           | crdrost wrote:
           | Yes. It's not a terribly interesting article but I would
           | describe it from an external perspective as,
           | 
           | "People bid based on a sort of mean value: they don't know
           | how much this thing is worth to them, so they make an
           | uncertain guess, that guess has a mean.
           | 
           | "But, that guess also has a standard deviation. And if you
           | have 100 identical people doing a one-time closed bid on the
           | thing, they all have identical mean valuations but the bid
           | that will win will probably be 2-3 standard deviations over
           | the mean. In these situations, _the more wrong you are, the
           | more likely you are to win, and the less you will like what
           | you win._ This is the winner 's curse.
           | 
           | "You can avoid this by being cognizant of your status as one
           | of the pool of 'identical people', how many people are
           | similar to you, and tempering your bids downward in relation
           | to that. A jar full of money has a similar value to everyone
           | who is in the audience -- this creates the dangerous
           | condition! A unique statement piece from an otherwise
           | unremarkable artist, is going to attract some interested
           | parties and some revulsion: so if you dig it, you are
           | probably in the minority and don't need to worry so much
           | about the winner's curse."
        
           | JamesBarney wrote:
           | Or to put it another way.
           | 
           | Everyone has incomplete information. If you bid more than
           | everyone else it's because one of the following is true.
           | 
           | 1. It is more valuable to you than anyone else.
           | 
           | 2. Everyone else is mistakenly undervaluing it
           | 
           | 3. You are mistakenly overvaluing it
           | 
           | If you don't have inside information, or have a unique reason
           | why it is worth more to you than anyone else. Then 3 is far
           | more likely than 2.
        
             | grotorea wrote:
             | Could you say this is "wisdom of the crowds" working
             | against the bidder?
        
           | User23 wrote:
           | Overbidding has guaranteed downside. Underbidding has non-
           | guaranteed upside. It's pretty clear that if you're playing
           | an iterated game then you always underbid. Of course it's a
           | different story if it's a unique item that you really want.
        
             | [deleted]
        
           | tomcam wrote:
           | Methinks you just restated GP's points with slightly less
           | clarity
        
             | WalterBright wrote:
             | It's just discounting one's bid by the amount of the
             | perceived risk.
             | 
             | For example, we discount the price of a used car by an
             | estimate of how much of its useful life is used up. But
             | that cannot be gauged precisely, hence risk.
             | 
             | We discount the price even further if bought from an
             | individual rather than a used car dealer, because the risk
             | of hidden defects is higher.
             | 
             | Risky investments are priced lower than more secure
             | investments.
             | 
             | Many people say that free markets require perfect
             | information. They don't, not at all. The imperfect
             | information is called "risk" and affects the price
             | accordingly.
        
               | tomcam wrote:
               | Not surprisingly, your explanation is the most coherent
               | of all of them
        
               | WalterBright wrote:
               | Another way risk is reduced by paying more is purchasing
               | warranties and insurance.
        
             | hgsgm wrote:
             | No, that poster's #3 added the key insight.
        
         | richdougherty wrote:
         | I haven't read the article, but "The Winner's Curse" is an
         | economics concept I'm familiar with.
         | 
         | Basically, The Big Insight is that every bidder has an estimate
         | of the value of something, and the true value might differ from
         | these estimates. If you're the winner of a transaction then you
         | have likely _overestimated_ the value. Since you had the
         | highest estimate, you probably overestimated.
         | 
         | But it only arises in certain situations. In practice, it
         | depends on whether all bidders have the same information. If
         | you have more information your estimate might be correct. It
         | also depends on whether the item has different value to
         | different bidders, as it might truly be more valuable to the
         | winner.
         | 
         | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Winner%27s_curse
         | 
         | > Savvy bidders will avoid the winner's curse by bid shading,
         | or placing a bid that is below their ex ante estimation of the
         | value of the item for sale--but equal to their ex post belief
         | about the value of the item, given that they win the auction.
         | The key point is that winning the auction is bad news about the
         | value of the item for the winner. It means that he or she was
         | the most optimistic and, if bidders are correct in their
         | estimations on average, that too much was paid. Therefore savvy
         | bidders revise their ex ante estimations downwards to take
         | account of this effect.
        
         | vikingerik wrote:
         | You're not missing anything. This article is junk and says
         | nothing that we don't already know about the winner's curse (or
         | you can easily look up anywhere.) It's only a vehicle to sell
         | reports via that popup.
        
           | tomcam wrote:
           | OTOH I can now use "Winner's Curse" as the name of my direct
           | to video screenplay which will appear on Netflix starring
           | that guy from the really good show a couple years back, and
           | maybe with a Bruce Willis cameo
        
           | pessimizer wrote:
           | And now you can look it up in this article, written in
           | different words and from the perspective of the individual
           | participating in an auction. That's not junk.
        
           | Zetice wrote:
           | We? I didn't know this had a name or was formally recognized,
           | and at best I had an intuition for it rather than an explicit
           | understanding of what was going on.
           | 
           | This article solidified the concept for me, and I'm grateful.
           | Why so cynical?
        
             | samtho wrote:
             | > This article solidified the concept for me, and I'm
             | grateful. Why so cynical?
             | 
             | If it were not posted on HN you wouldn't have seen it, I'm
             | guessing. As for the article itself, it is a surface-level,
             | paraphrased encyclopedia entry on this observation. It
             | could have provided more value with more than just a jar of
             | coins as an anecdote, perhaps showing how this can apply in
             | face-to-face negotiations.
             | 
             | I think it's fair to be skeptical of intentions because of
             | low-effort junk out there that exists solely as a lead gen.
        
         | andsoitis wrote:
         | It not only describes the issue it also provides some tools for
         | decision making such as:
         | 
         | a) widening one's aperture of what is an auction:
         | 
         |  _Auctions pervade our world, from mergers-and-acquisitions
         | deals and procurement auctions to eBay._
         | 
         | b) ideas to avoid the trap:
         | 
         | - Analyze whether the asset has a common value element. A
         | common value asset, like a jar of coins, has equal value to all
         | bidders. If so, bid with caution.
         | 
         | - Assess your capabilities and compare them with those of other
         | bidders.
         | 
         | - Before placing each bid, pause to consider how you would feel
         | if you won the auction.
        
       | m_coder wrote:
       | I have settled on a strategy of bidding that seems to work when I
       | am actively bidding (this goes only for little stuff not land and
       | such). When I hope the other person bids, then I know I don't
       | want the item at the stated price. I can feel intuitively that I
       | will not want the item if I get it.
       | 
       | Does anyone have a help for the opposite scenario? In this
       | scenario I have not yet bid but the price is quite low and I
       | don't want to bid in case I missed something. The price stays
       | very low and the item is sold. I am left kicking myself for not
       | sticking my neck out there and making a good deal. Maybe I should
       | bid once and see if I like it. The problem is that one bid might
       | get it...
        
       | remote_phone wrote:
       | I have extensive experience bidding on eBay auctions, I probably
       | engaged in 10 auctions a month for several years in a row.
       | 
       | The first few times I definitely encountered winners curse. But
       | the real/only solution is having accurate price discovery and
       | having a game plan. I will do research to find the current market
       | value and bid in the bottom end of the range. If I miss it, the
       | market is liquid enough such that I can try again and if i hit
       | it, then I am happy because I got it for a low price.
       | 
       | On items with lower liquidity and availability I still need to be
       | patient and disciplined with my bidding. This is the only way to
       | do online auction bidding.
       | 
       | Oh and also sniping in the last 30 seconds.
        
         | BeetleB wrote:
         | > Oh and also sniping in the last 30 seconds.
         | 
         | I really don't know why eBay hasn't "solved" this.
         | 
         | In real world auctions, bidding continues until no one bids.
         | This eliminates sniping as a tactic.
         | 
         | My favorite auction site was ubid.com, which had this policy.
         | There always needed to be a 5 minute period of no bids for the
         | auction to end. This way, you can comfortably tell the
         | automated system your max bid and not worry about snipers.
        
       | PanopticonMan wrote:
       | This is basically the adverse selection concept which is
       | explained incredibly well in Agustin Lebron's book (ACX review -
       | https://astralcodexten.substack.com/p/your-book-review-the-l...)
       | but without as much depth or nuance.
       | 
       | Price discovery in an auction is great for the market, not
       | necessarily for the bidder with incomplete info. This article
       | feels like a long intro to an article that never actually starts.
       | 
       | NB: No offence to the author if you read this! Criticism is
       | probably just because it was info I already knew.
        
       | twothamendment wrote:
       | I was hoping for more. I guess I watched, bid and lost enough
       | eBay auctions to realize that people would bid up the price of a
       | used item well beyond the price of buying it new on any number of
       | retail sites. The thrill of winning was the only explanation I
       | could come up with.
       | 
       | eBay or whatever the "jar of coins" is, I try to figure out what
       | it is worth to me before placing the first bid - and never go
       | beyond that. If I fail to overpay, I'm OK.
        
         | ghaff wrote:
         | Back in the day, there was a certain exciting novelty to eBay,
         | often for people who had little experience with auctions.
         | People could also convince themselves that if everyone else
         | thought something was worth more than they did, maybe they knew
         | something--but most likely they didn't. So, yeah, the thrill of
         | the hunt was certainly part of it.
        
         | WalterBright wrote:
         | I suspect some of those are shills.
         | 
         | The problem with eBay auctions is the time limit. It pays to
         | "snipe" them one second before the close. I realized this in
         | the early days of eBay, and within a few months everybody knew
         | it.
         | 
         | eBay could fix this by not closing an auction if there are bids
         | within the last 5 minutes, but they show no inclination to.
        
       | mentos wrote:
       | Thinking of the scene in Succession now 'Congratulations on
       | saying the biggest number!'
       | 
       | https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1E_L87IJnw8
        
       | rwmj wrote:
       | Like the infamous UK 3G radio spectrum auction that both raised
       | huge amounts of money for the Treasury and led to the winners
       | suffering massive loses.
       | 
       | http://www.gsmhistory.com/3g_auction/#3g%20auction
        
       | onetimeuse92304 wrote:
       | This is, unfortunately, more frequent problem than many people
       | think.
       | 
       | I have seen so many contracts in the corporate world where each
       | side wants to get as much as they can for themselves. What they
       | should be doing instead is figuring out how to make both sides of
       | the contract happy. They should be thinking and answering "If
       | this contract is signed, would both sides be happy and would it
       | result in a lasting and successful relationship?"
       | 
       | The best strategy is to price your services right, make sure the
       | contract is adequately serving both sides and, ideally, that both
       | sides will be getting something from it that will make them happy
       | to continue the relationship.
        
       | LordShredda wrote:
       | I think this applies to more than just auctions. Bidding to take
       | on a contract or a responsibility, that turns out to be more than
       | what you expected. Or overselling yourself and going through
       | great pains to reach a position with very few worthwhile
       | benefits.
        
       | ajonit wrote:
       | On the topic of negotiations, I would recommend a book "Never
       | Split the difference" by Chris Voss a former FBI hostage
       | negotiator. He takes you through his own experience of handling
       | various hostage situations, salary negotiations etc.
        
         | mizzao wrote:
         | I read all the classic negotiations books and think this one is
         | the only one you need to read. IMO its core idea is NOT "how am
         | I supposed to do that", as other posters say, but the role of
         | empathy and uncovering hidden information in high-stakes (or
         | even regular) negotiations
        
         | BeetleB wrote:
         | I recommend the book for the psychological/emotional tips.
         | 
         | Otherwise, it's a pretty poor book:
         | 
         | https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=27335076
        
         | jabroni_salad wrote:
         | This book has created a whole class of very annoying people who
         | do nothing but repeat "How can you make this deal better for me
         | at no cost to myself" in an endless loop and have no strategy
         | for what to do when the other party isn't willing to negotiate
         | themselves downwards for free.
        
           | WalterBright wrote:
           | Both parties can employ that strategy, and there's no sale if
           | they cannot agree. It's self-correcting.
           | 
           | If you find it annoying behavior on the part of the other
           | party, walk away.
        
         | LVB wrote:
         | I enjoyed the interview with him on Lex Fridman's podcast, too.
         | Some repeat of the book, and some new material.
        
         | unsupp0rted wrote:
         | "How am I supposed to do that?"
         | 
         | "Well, I've got these hostages here, so I suppose the 'how' is
         | up to you."
        
           | WalterBright wrote:
           | People who take hostages aren't very smart, so being poor
           | negotiators is par for the course.
        
           | mizzao wrote:
           | How do I know the hostages are alive?
        
             | unsupp0rted wrote:
             | What else can you do? Err on the side of all the hostages
             | being dead?
             | 
             | That'll make for some spicy firing + public disgrace + jail
             | time if you're wrong.
        
       | nicechianti wrote:
       | [dead]
        
       | wouldbecouldbe wrote:
       | Opening a harvard site, having to close a popup with "No I dont
       | want to win negations..."
       | 
       | Then forcing popups.
       | 
       | Seems like they went all in.
        
       | 2ICofafireteam wrote:
       | I have ZERO online bidding experience but have gone to a few in
       | person (equipment, tools, livestock).
       | 
       | Some advice I received from a general contractor applies to
       | auctions: You never lose money on a contract you don't win.
       | 
       | I've seen FOMO and pissing matches run up bids when simply
       | putting a value on each lot you're after and sticking to it seems
       | best.
       | 
       | Leaving an auction empty handed only feels bad for a few minutes
       | and is easier the next time.
       | 
       | Once upon a time, at least in person, the auction house took
       | there share out of the sale price (the buyer's share) but
       | everyone where I am has charged it as a fee to the buyer for at
       | least 15 years, so consider that when setting your number.
       | 
       | Anecdotes:
       | 
       | I've been in a bidding war, hit my number and stopped, had the
       | exasperated Auctioneer try to goad me, and lost.
       | 
       | I've witnessed unbridled enthusiasm make equipment sell for 80%
       | of the cost to buy new.
       | 
       | Once a bidding frenzy at a fur auction meant the price of
       | squirrel pelts doubled and my colleague made $16K snaring
       | squirrels that year. BTW: At least in the 90's, the People's
       | Liberation Army was the biggest buyer of squirrel fur; I was told
       | they were used to fringe hoods on winter jackets. That may have
       | been as case of get the pelts no matter what.
        
         | fakedang wrote:
         | > At least in the 90's, the People's Liberation Army was the
         | biggest buyer of squirrel fur; I was told they were used to dr
         | hoods on winter jackets. That may have been as case of get the
         | pelts no matter what.
         | 
         | If Mao hadn't gone on his retarded crusade against squirrels,
         | they wouldn't have had to do that lol.
        
       ___________________________________________________________________
       (page generated 2023-08-25 23:01 UTC)