[HN Gopher] Deputy US Marshal pleads guilty to obtaining cell ph...
___________________________________________________________________
Deputy US Marshal pleads guilty to obtaining cell phone location
unlawfully [pdf]
Author : arkadiyt
Score : 146 points
Date : 2023-07-09 16:04 UTC (6 hours ago)
(HTM) web link (oig.justice.gov)
(TXT) w3m dump (oig.justice.gov)
| amateuring wrote:
| if you can spy without consequence on a sitting president, why
| not on your ex as well?
| hanniabu wrote:
| > Pena pleaded guilty to unlawfully obtaining confidential phone
| records. He faces a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison. A
| sentencing date has not yet been set. A federal district court
| judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S.
| Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors
|
| He'll probably get 6 months probation
| gruez wrote:
| >He'll probably get 6 months probation
|
| That's the standard for most first time, non-violent offenses.
| public_defender wrote:
| > That's the standard for most first time, non-violent
| offenses
|
| In what country?
| gruez wrote:
| US, as per federal sentencing guidelines[1]:
|
| * baseline offense level of 9 [2]
|
| * -2 adjustment for acceptance of responsibility[3]
|
| * That gets you an offense level of 7, which puts him in
| the 0-6 months band[4], making him eligible for
| probation[5].
|
| IANAL but all of this is for offenses that make it to
| trial. If there's plea bargaining involved the sentences
| are probably even lighter.
|
| [1] https://www.ussc.gov/guidelines/2021-guidelines-manual-
| annot...
|
| [2] https://www.ussc.gov/guidelines/2021-guidelines-
| manual/annot...
|
| [3] https://www.ussc.gov/guidelines/2021-guidelines-
| manual/annot...
|
| [4]
| https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelines-
| manu...
|
| [5] https://www.ussc.gov/guidelines/2021-guidelines-
| manual/annot...
| public_defender wrote:
| This seems correct regarding this person and this
| conduct, but I disagree that this type of penalty is "the
| standard for most first time, non-violent offenses."
|
| Federal cases are a small percentage of total criminal
| prosecutions, and penalties vary widely across the
| country.
| KirillPanov wrote:
| Like selling drugs or "money laundering"? I don't think so.
| pclmulqdq wrote:
| I mean, there are lots of worse penalties for things
| related to organized crime. Things like minor fraud or
| burglary are often also in the probation bucket.
| devilbunny wrote:
| Minor fraud and burglary generally don't generate a
| federal prosecution. Doing what would otherwise be a
| fairly minor crime under the color of law should generate
| a hefty bench-slap (as the lawyers like to say).
| jbmc wrote:
| A similar recent story: https://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-
| government/capitol-aler...
| [deleted]
| runlevel1 wrote:
| And he got his access from the infamous Uvalde County Sheriff's
| Office where he was assigned to the Lone Star Fugitive Task
| Force.
|
| Indictment here: https://www.justice.gov/d9/press-
| releases/attachments/2022/0...
| monero-xmr wrote:
| It sounds like this was a piece of software where you uploaded a
| PDF of "proof" that you had the authority to track anyone in
| America, and then it let you. And someone finally bothered to
| look at the proof and it was a blank page.
|
| This is why I'm against giving the government the power to
| intercept communications or middle-man encryption. They always
| pitch it like "This power will be protected by courts and
| warrants and Fort Knox level security!!" and then it's a checkbox
| that any bureaucrat can use to violate civil liberties en masse.
| runlevel1 wrote:
| Ironically, some of the documents he uploaded included award
| certificates and a list of justifications for a merit
| promotion.
|
| Referenced in paragraph 13, but unfortunately not attached:
| https://www.justice.gov/d9/press-releases/attachments/2022/0...
| paddw wrote:
| > and someone finally bothered to look at the proof and it was
| a blank page.
|
| I think I agree more than not with your worldview, but it seems
| like in this case this was the first time the person tried to
| improperly use the system... and he was caught and is now being
| sentenced. So I would say this is an example of the system
| "working".
|
| I'm sure there are civil rights abuses that happen much more
| frequently, which we don't here about, but this specific
| incident seems like something that should be cheered.
| asdfasdlfkj wrote:
| According to the second sentence of the article, the officer
| tracked multiple people and their locations. He clearly
| wasn't caught the first time he used the tool inappropriately
| because he was found guilty of using it illegally multiple
| times.
|
| The officer very clearly was not forthcoming with the
| investigation, judging from him falsifying documents after
| the investigation started. So he may have other undetected
| crimes.
|
| In fact, the only fair conclusion I think you can draw is
| that some officer(s) use the tool inappropriately. Because
| it's not clear if all uses are audited, or this officer was
| found on a random check. But in my opinion saying "the system
| worked" is inappropriate given the lack of data.
| kelipso wrote:
| Is this some kind of parody? He got caught because it was a
| literal blank piece of paper. Anyone with any sense would
| write some bullshit paragraph and I'm sure plenty did and got
| away with it.
| bjornsing wrote:
| Yea I sometimes get a feeling that a large portion of the
| population just doesn't understand conditionals. If you tell
| them "you have the authority to do X if Y", they just ignore
| the Y part.
| matheusmoreira wrote:
| People who are drunk on power subscribe to the "ask for
| forgiveness, not permission" philosophy. They think
| everything they do is right and just. They cannot understand
| or even believe people would not trust them and see the
| conditional as a pointless hindrance, bureaucratic red tape
| meant to stifle upstanding people like them.
| vjk800 wrote:
| Also, the system doesn't really penalize this philosophy.
| Try to do everything by the book and you find that you
| can't really get anything done. Cut some corners, you get
| shit done and, in the worst case, you get a mild slap on
| the wrist several years later.
| tourmalinetaco wrote:
| And completely break down some walls, injuring others in
| the process? Get a promotion, and if caught just move
| somewhere else to do the same thing over again.
| mopenstein wrote:
| People love to wield power over those they oppose and don't
| care if the system they implement is abused until they're
| the targets of the abuse.
|
| For example: most people love the police when they coercing
| wealth from strangers to fund their projects but hate when
| the same police step on their chest until they stop
| breathing during a traffic stop.
| vacuity wrote:
| Your first sentence is generally true but
|
| > when they coercing wealth from strangers to fund their
| projects
|
| I have no idea what you're referencing here, so I can't
| say if it's abuse or not.
| kelipso wrote:
| Because the government and pretty much all those power ignore
| Y, and whenever they get caught, vast majority of cases they
| don't get punished. Of course anyone remotely intelligent
| would ignore the Y part too. Only extremely gullible people
| with their blind trust in government would look at Y part and
| nod along. This particular case very much the exception.
| vjk800 wrote:
| It's not about understanding, it's about seeing these sort of
| rules bent dozens of times first and then finally doing it
| yourself. Rules are only as strong as their enforcement and
| in many cases it turns out that no-one has neither the
| incentive nor the ability to enforce them very hard.
| bjornsing wrote:
| After some bantering with Swedish police officers on
| Twitter I've come to believe that many of them simply do
| not make a distinction between what they have the authority
| to do, and what they can get away with in practice.
| AnthonyMouse wrote:
| One of the things that would help this if anytime any of
| these surveillance powers get used, they have to be used as
| part of a _specific_ ongoing investigation, and when that
| investigation is closed, everything related to it becomes a
| matter of public record.
|
| And then you have some hard rules like, investigations are
| automatically closed after the statute of limitations runs,
| or if the target of the investigation dies, or the victim
| chooses not to press charges etc. Things not in the control
| of the investigators, so they can't keep an investigation
| open forever to prevent their abuses from becoming public.
| zozbot234 wrote:
| This is unworkable, sadly. I don't want my past location
| data to become a "matter of public record" merely because
| I have been caught up as a bystander in some random law
| enforcement investigation and it all ends up in the case
| file.
| AnthonyMouse wrote:
| Obviously personally identifying information could be
| redacted without doing so for the request itself.
|
| But you're just reiterating the problem that third
| parties are _collecting_ the location data of _innocent
| bystanders_. Otherwise it wouldn 't exist to be in the
| file.
| matheusmoreira wrote:
| See also LOVEINT. Every once in a while, some NSA spy gets
| caught spying on their loved ones. Not even incompetence, just
| plain malice and abuse. Looks like they don't even face any
| criminal charges either.
|
| Governments are essentially adversaries, enemies we have to
| defend against. It must be mathematically impossible for them
| to abuse their power. Anything short of that is not enough.
| theossuary wrote:
| That's just impossible. Even if everyone had perfect e2e
| encryption, the government could just ban it and throw people
| who use it in jail.
|
| You can't solve social problems with technology.
|
| What is necessary is a governmental system which tends away
| from the abuse of power. This requires better voting, more
| transparency, and the literacy and engagement of its
| citizens.
|
| The problem is, just like in Conway's game of life, the
| current system's state informs what states it'll progress to.
| If a system tends toward corruption or abuse and isn't
| actively changed, well eventually it no longer will be
| possible to change.
|
| https://xkcd.com/538
| neodymiumphish wrote:
| That's why you use a constitution strong enough to prevent
| the government from having authority to ban a tool like
| that. The solution's been known and described for 250+
| years now.
| mschuster91 wrote:
| The problem is, if you rely on tools - and a constitution
| is nothing else than a tool - you will end up developing
| a reliance on that tool. And all of a sudden, that tool
| breaks, and you're fucked.
|
| Democracy must be fought for _every single day_ , and for
| that matter so does _all_ progress. Democracy isn 't
| something a society automatically converges to and which
| everyone loves, it must actively be maintained or someone
| _will_ come, sow mistrust and preach "easy" solutions -
| and then you wake up and your country isn't a democracy
| any more.
| vacuity wrote:
| The US Constitution certainly isn't modern or flexible
| enough to definitively protect (users of) E2EE. There are
| arguments for their protection, but none is ironclad
| (like "this is speech that is protected" ironclad). I'm
| not saying the Bill of Rights was wrong in its time
| period, but it would be more appropriate to lay out
| fundamental principles that must be upheld, and
| protection for E2EE (users) could then be derived.
| There's some of that already, but not in a clear and
| comprehensive manner.
| theossuary wrote:
| That's silly. A constitution is just a piece of paper. It
| has no inherent power. It's the institutions put in place
| to enforce the constitution that give it power. If those
| institutions rot, the constitution will not protect you.
| As we've seen time and again.
| tchalla wrote:
| You can address social problems with transparency in
| access.
| wpietri wrote:
| > Anything short of that is not enough.
|
| I like that in spirit, but not as a practical standard. A
| major function of government is to prevent abuses of power.
| So I'm more inclined to shoot for overall minimization of
| abuse.
| zozbot234 wrote:
| Well, in this case a random law enforcement deputy could
| get sensitive location information about random people with
| no meaningful cross-check of any sort - and this has only
| come to light after the fact, as part of a criminal
| investigation. So there's reason to be highly skeptical
| that the status quo is the best we can do when it comes to
| preventing abuse across the board.
| AnthonyMouse wrote:
| > A major function of government is to prevent abuses of
| power.
|
| But they can still do this. If you want to know where
| someone is, instead of compelling devices or carriers to
| spy on everyone at all times, you attach a tracker to the
| suspect's vehicle, or assign an agent to follow them.
| That's more expensive -- which is the deterrent to abuse.
|
| A bad cop doesn't have time to follow around their ex all
| day. They do have time to follow around the subject of an
| official investigation, because that's their job. Tracking
| devices cost money, so it limits the number of people who
| can be tracked at once and prevents mass surveillance.
|
| The argument for compulsory backdoors is purely an
| efficiency case, but efficiency is less important than
| preventing abuse.
| zozbot234 wrote:
| The carrier is not spying on you here. A cell phone
| network has to know your phone's location in order to
| function at all, and this info has only gotten more and
| more fine-grained with newer network standards. There's
| nothing wrong with granting access to such data with
| proper authorization.
|
| The "expense" involved in getting warrants approved is a
| better check on abuse, since it's very easy to do this as
| part of official law enforcement duties, and quite hard
| otherwise - the corrupt cop will need to come up with
| some reasonable justification, and not have it fall apart
| under deeper scrutiny. Of course if your local judge will
| rubber-stamp blank_document.docx as a proper "warrant"
| you have a problem again. But that can be addressed in
| turn.
| AnthonyMouse wrote:
| It would be simple to design a cellular data network that
| didn't tie account holders to devices. Issue access
| tokens good for e.g. 10 GB of data to the mobile device.
| Don't store the token in connection with the account.
| Anyone could buy a prepaid card with tokens for cash at
| any convenience store. The network identifies the device
| via the token, which is temporary and anonymous.
| Telephone routing is done via VoIP which anyone has the
| option of routing through a VPN.
|
| It's designed the way it is now on purpose, to spy on
| everyone.
|
| > The "expense" involved in getting warrants approved is
| a better check on abuse
|
| Except that they don't actually get warrants when they're
| doing abuse, they just lie about it because the phone
| company has minimal incentive to check and the victim who
| does typically isn't notified.
|
| > Of course if your local judge will rubber-stamp
| blank_document.docx as a proper "warrant" you have a
| problem again. But that can be addressed in turn.
|
| "Quis custodiet ipsos custodes" is in latin because it
| was published circa 100 AD. No effective solution to this
| problem has yet been uncovered.
| vacuity wrote:
| Want mathematical assurance that your government won't abuse
| power against you? Either you have to be the government or
| you don't live in a society with a government. Abuse isn't so
| easily constrained. Try proactive regulations, vigilance, and
| strict punishments (not comprehensive). Best effort, but what
| else can you do?
| AnthonyMouse wrote:
| "Government can never abuse power or government can
| systemically abuse power" is a false dichotomy. You can
| make it cost more so it happens less.
|
| Encryption is the common example. As far as anybody knows
| the government can't break e.g. AES. But they can still
| find out what's on your device because with a warrant they
| can install surveillance devices in your house to capture
| it when you enter your passphrase, then seize your device.
|
| Which makes it possible but not easy, which limits the
| scope for abuse.
| vacuity wrote:
| > "Government can never abuse power or government can
| systemically abuse power" is a false dichotomy.
|
| I didn't make it a dichotomy. I was just commenting that
| "mathematically impossible" is too strong to the point of
| absurdity. Not fun at parties, but I would hope it's fine
| on Hacker News. I then provided a rough overview of a
| system to mitigate abuse. We're not even disagreeing
| about trying to minimize government abuse.
|
| To discuss your example of encryption, the abuse is the
| government installing and using the surveillance devices
| (let's assume the suspicion isn't beyond reasonable doubt
| or whatever and the warrant is invalid). The question is
| whether that abuse is prevented or routed and justice is
| enacted.
| bettercallsalad wrote:
| But three letter agencies do it all the time without any warrants
| and when caught no repercussion either last I checked. Maybe the
| DOJ attorneys can get to those as well?
| runlevel1 wrote:
| It's disturbing how much this information is sold and resold:
|
| * Securus purchased the location data from 3Cinteractive
| Corporation, which was located in Boca Raton, Florida.
|
| * 3Cinteractive Corporation, in turn, purchased such data from
| Technocom Corporation (doing business as LocationSmart), which
| was located in Carlsbad, California.
|
| * Technocom Corporation (doing business as LocationSmart)
| purchased this data directly from telecommunications services
| providers.
|
| * This capability enabled Securus's registered users to obtain
| the location data entered in the LBS platform, or, in other
| words, to ascertain the approximate physical location of a
| particular cellular telephone on demand.
|
| Source: https://www.justice.gov/d9/press-
| releases/attachments/2022/0...
| jhelps wrote:
| The cellphone companies have been selling the realtime location
| of all subscribers since at least 2018. It doesn't depend on
| whether you have location enabled either, since it figures out
| your location from the towers! On top of that, one of them had
| an unauthenticated API, meaning anyone in the world could track
| the realtime location of any US phone #[0].
|
| If all of this bothers you, contact your state legislators.
| Most state privacy laws don't protect against ISPs selling your
| location & browsing info, even though that would be the common
| expectation. Maine's law is simple and does a good job[1][2].
|
| 0: https://www.wired.com/story/locationsmart-securus-
| location-d...
|
| 1: https://www.natlawreview.com/article/maine-s-new-internet-
| pr...
|
| 2: Maine's law survived a federal challenge, and ISPs have
| dropped their appeals:
| https://www.mediapost.com/publications/article/377285/broadb...
| csdvrx wrote:
| > It doesn't depend on whether you have location enabled
|
| It's even better: the location can be enabled through a
| network initiated request. This is because A-GPS works "both
| ways". See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Assisted_GNSS#SUPL :
| SUPL Position Calculation Function (SPCF) lets the client or
| the server ask for the client's location.
|
| As part of the FCC's updated 911 requirements, where cell
| phones (with no set location) are required to be routed to
| the correct 911 center, aGPS was developed to not only help
| GPS get a faster TTFF (time to first fix), but to transmit
| location data to the carrier (and to anyone else who can
| intercept the data)
|
| > If all of this bothers you, contact your state legislators
|
| If you don't like that and want a quick fix, on android
| devices check /data/vendor/agps_supl/agps_profiles_conf2.xml
| for ni_request="true": this is the Network-Induced Location
| Request functionality, where the network asks for the GPS
| position. Change that to false.
|
| Personally, I believe 911 AGPS is of limited use: if I'm
| unconscious and can't dial, the phone 911 AGPS working won't
| do me any good. If I'm conscious and I can dial, I can also
| open a map app.
|
| Still, if you want to keep the 911 stuff, just change
| reject_non911_nilr_enable="false" to true (because yes, by
| default, everything goes - 911 or not)
|
| There's also lpp_enable="true" (LTE Positioning Protocol, yet
| another method by which cellular providers can pinpoint your
| location via aGP S), imsi_enable="true" (which transmit a
| unique identifier along with the AGPS request!)
|
| Check also /data/vendor/agps_supl/agps_profiles_conf2_prv.xml
|
| Or even better: don't use a phone. I have a 5G/LTE module in
| my laptop when I need internet connectivity: it's turned off
| the rest of the time (rfkill block wwan). You can also
| disable the power to this M2 port (saving battery if you care
| about that)
| gszr wrote:
| This is very interesting - thank you for sharing your
| knowledge. Any other related rererences - the tech that
| enables this sort of tracking?
| csdvrx wrote:
| > Any other related rererences - the tech that enables
| this sort of tracking?
|
| It's everywhere in mobile devices. It's better not to use
| them.
|
| If you must use one, you must at least have root to
| disable AGPS + add stringent iptable rules to disable any
| outgoing communication by default: you should only enable
| connections per app, or per IP/domain for what you need.
|
| Still, that'll be of a limited help since the baseband
| manages connections (3GPP profiles etc) and does the
| equivalent of NAT to your device.
|
| For all I know, the baseband could tell android "location
| disabled? sure thing!" while still getting GPS fixes +
| sending the position by UDP packets processed by the
| baseband OS: Android won't even see it! Yet by virtue of
| sharing the same IP (or being "enriched" with your IMSI
| as you can see above), you will be totally trackable.
|
| Doing anything more requires running free software on the
| baseband: there're now free-software firmwares like
| https://github.com/the-modem-distro/pinephone_modem_sdk
| (I'll submit that for discussion)
|
| It started from initiatives like https://www.reddit.com/r
| /PINE64official/comments/hflat0/pine... but now you even
| have a free software bootloader for the modem (see
| https://github.com/Biktorgj/quectel_lk)
|
| If you want, you can also recover the stock firmware
| (https://github.com/Biktorgj/quectel_eg25_recovery), but
| the ability to audit from top to bottom to disable data
| exfiltration requires a 100% free software solution.
| mistrial9 wrote:
| there were rumors of gray market identity traders in the 2000
| times, within the USA. What changes is accuracy, timeliness,
| noise levels and verifiability, off the top of my head...
| Apparently completely legal identity document sales have gone
| on since the 1950s at least, around driving registration, home
| address, employment and related things. Since that is in the
| USA, with newer laws and an alleged emphasis on citizen rights,
| I can only imagine that other large political powers have had
| this for centuries.
| ClumsyPilot wrote:
| this reads like a supply chain of a drug cartel
| ransackdev wrote:
| I've been asking where the hell these companies are getting our
| data to begin with for awhile because it has to be through
| shady means, even if technically legal.
|
| Tracking a user and selling that data should not be able to be
| slapped deep down in some TOS that grants intrusion into your
| life at that level. I wish laws would be changed to require
| explicit tracking requests for this type of data, that has to
| be conspicuous and separately authorized in addiction to any
| TOS.
|
| I wonder if these are all shell companies to hide the "origin
| server" for this CDN of unauthorized surveillance data.
|
| I'm also curious how many of these are just middle men that do
| nothing but markup and resell, vs how many of these companies
| do anything to enrich the data before flipping it.
|
| Wouldn't it be funny if someone were to use these systems to
| get the location information for the executives at all of these
| companies, and it ended up online everywhere? I wonder if they
| would change their opinions on technical loopholes allowing the
| tracking of people without consent
| ianlevesque wrote:
| The answer is in the comment you replied to, "directly from
| telecommunications services providers".
| ransackdev wrote:
| Still doesn't answer my question of where my PII was
| acquired.
| mcculley wrote:
| I don't understand your question. Your telecom provider
| has your PII.
| ransackdev wrote:
| I'd like a definitive list which contains the source for
| each piece of data, the means that source acquired it,
| when they acquired it, and proof of my consent for it to
| be collected, stored, and sold to other parties who then
| sell it off to the highest bidder.
|
| "It came from teleco companies" is not due diligence
| enough for me, and it shouldn't be for you. That answer
| isn't an answer and the lack of accountability is how the
| companies continue to violate our right to privacy and
| flourish.
| ianlevesque wrote:
| Just to clarify my point I'm not condoning this at all,
| but the telcos themselves have been selling live location
| data of their subscribers to aggregator services for
| years.
|
| It's really infuriating to me that people say Google or
| Facebook are "selling their data" (they're not, they
| hoard data and sell targeted ads) when Verizon, T-Mobile,
| and AT&T literally sell your live, personally
| identifiable, non-aggregated, location data to third
| parties, hiding behind their subscriber agreement
| legalese.
| ianlevesque wrote:
| One of many sources:
| https://www.fiercewireless.com/regulatory/t-mobile-to-
| fight-...
|
| Just google it, more examples are easy to find.
| mcculley wrote:
| > "It came from teleco companies" is not due diligence
| enough for
|
| I never claimed this. I replied to the question about how
| a telecom provider would have PII. My mobile provider
| knows my legal name and other details. They obviously
| know which tower is closest to my phone at all times or
| my phone would not work. That it is terrible of them to
| sell this data was not in question.
| runlevel1 wrote:
| Your cell phone company knows your name, address, and can
| infer where you've been based on the cell towers your
| phone checks in with. So that one's a given.
|
| Here's a sampling of others:
|
| Mastercard sells information on your purchases.[^1]
| (Based on the info Oracle had on me, I suspect they might
| be one of the sources for Oracle Advertising.[^2])
|
| Equifax, who gets information from your bank, your car
| insurance company, your cable company, and loads of other
| places, makes a nice profit off selling your
| info.[^3][^4]
|
| ISPs know who you are, can infer a lot about you from
| unencrypted DNS queries and HTTPS SNI snooping, and
| they're happy to sell information about you.[^5]
|
| Then there are several tiers of companies that buy
| information from various other companies, aggregate it,
| and then sell that off. A veritable snowball rolling down
| a hill of privacy violation.
|
| [1]: https://www.wired.com/2012/10/mastercard-data-
| mining-holiday...
|
| [2]: https://datacloudoptout.oracle.com/request-your-
| data/verify-...
|
| [3]: https://www.inc.com/associated-press/equifax-data-
| money.html
|
| [4]: https://www.equifax.com/about-equifax/why-
| equifax/differenti...
|
| [5]: https://www.vice.com/en/article/93b9nv/internet-
| service-prov...
| ianlevesque wrote:
| And for completeness, here's an article about the
| telecoms themselves:
| https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
| switch/wp/2018/06/19...
| wildrhythms wrote:
| Our gerontocracy is unprepared to deal with issues related to
| technology and privacy. I don't think these data brokers need
| to hide at all. We already see how legislators (failed to)
| comprehend issues related to technology in the many of
| unproductive congressional hearings over the past few years
| (Google, Tiktok, Twitter, Facebook... all brought before
| congress with nothing to show for it now). I think issues of
| technology and privacy are moving too fast for our
| gerontocracy to possibly keep up.
|
| And I think our legislators show their ass in the case of the
| Tiktok hearing; effectively stating oh it's fine if the data
| is being bought and sold _by a US company_ (Oracle).
| ransackdev wrote:
| If our legal system isn't prepared to properly handle such
| things then it should default to being illegal to collect
| and sell data until the legislation is created to properly
| protect the rights of those who put them in office and pay
| their salaries.
|
| The default of "you will be violated until we get to it, if
| we are able to comprehend it" is a dystopia I hadn't
| imagined, yet here we are.
___________________________________________________________________
(page generated 2023-07-09 23:01 UTC)