[HN Gopher] Spying on a smartphone remotely by the authorities: ...
___________________________________________________________________
Spying on a smartphone remotely by the authorities: feasibility and
operation
Author : joebiden2
Score : 100 points
Date : 2023-07-08 14:49 UTC (8 hours ago)
(HTM) web link (security.stackexchange.com)
(TXT) w3m dump (security.stackexchange.com)
| erealquestionis wrote:
| To me the real question is. Technical feasibility aside.
|
| Would the cell phone manufacturers (Apple, Samsung, Motorola,
| Nokia, Xiaomi, etc) say no when faced with the possibility of
| losing market share in France. Because of a law pushed through
| under the cover of security. Many a liberties have slipped under
| that blanket cover called security.
|
| I think they will put in this feature if it's not already there.
| nickserv wrote:
| Wouldn't be surprised if it's just a toggle they activate when
| building the ROM...
| abecedarius wrote:
| Google Search withdrew from China when China went over the
| line, as they saw it.
| lyu07282 wrote:
| I think the way it probably works is that if the US gov. wants
| to root someones phone anywhere in the world they just do it
| via some API given to them by apple/google directly.
|
| If a foreign country wants to do it to someone on foreign soil
| (like the saudis to bezos did [1]) they exploit some
| vulnerability brought on the free market (like the
| whatsapp/video message exploit chain the saudis used, or
| exploits like the NSO zero-click iMessage exploit [2]).
|
| If a foreign country wants to spy on its own citizens who
| protest the government, they could just use the local phone
| carriers capability to silently ping, update firmware or change
| system settings remotely, those are intentionally part of the
| mobile standards (including intentionally weak encryption) so
| governments can spy on its people.
|
| [1] https://www.wired.com/story/bezos-phone-hack-mbs-saudi-
| arabi... [2] https://www.wired.com/story/apple-imessage-zero-
| click-hacks/
| ofslidingfeet wrote:
| We already know for a fact that they can surveil virtually all
| smart devices including appliances and televisions due to the
| Vault 7 leaks, and this would tend to be corroborated by the
| national geospatial intelligence agency telling congress that
| they have a high resolution 3d map of the entire globe's events
| at any given time.
| aftbit wrote:
| Here is a link to Vault 7 on WikiLeaks:
| https://wikileaks.org/vault7/
|
| Here's a link to Wikipedia's article on the leaks:
| https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vault_7
|
| The only one that mentions televisions is Weeping Angel (cool
| name) which attacks Samsung F Series Smart Televisions. Likely
| they can indeed target other devices but I'm not sure I'd go as
| far as saying that Vault 7 shows that they can target
| "virtually all smart devices".
|
| Or am I missing something? Can anyone provide more concrete
| evidence?
| ofslidingfeet wrote:
| I probably just got confused, but thank you for linking to
| the information about Vault 7 directly so that anyone can
| simply appraise for themselves whether or not I seem
| confused.
|
| That's what I love about HN and Reddit, and similar websites:
| All the helpful counterpoint, especially when someone
| criticizes the intelligence community. Thank you so much!
| bambax wrote:
| A little OT but strongly related: in France you can go to prison
| if you refuse to give your phone's password to the police
| (nothing like a "free country", I guess).
|
| Is there a way to set up a phone so that typing a "special"
| password puts the phone in an alternate state with different apps
| and content, etc. (and possibly erase the regular content)?
| ElDji wrote:
| You simply comply and give your phone PIN that somehow doesn't
| work.
| flangola7 wrote:
| - I presume that's considered willful destruction of evidence
| and interfering with an official investigation, and worse
| charges than whatever you were probably facing (unless you
| really did fuck up and committed something bad).
|
| - Investigators are not going to be typing your password into
| the running original device, they're going to be trying it
| against an offline clone of the encrypted storage. All that
| will happen is the decryption won't succeed and they'll tell
| you that it was the incorrect password and continue holding you
| until you give it up.
|
| - This is hardly unique to France, US courts have jailed
| suspects for refusing to provide passwords in numerous cases.
| https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2017/03/man-jailed-indef...
| godelski wrote:
| On point 3, while I agree he shouldn't be required to give up
| his password, we should note that they did find child porn on
| other devices and that there is testimony from another
| witness of more porn on those hard drives. I'm just saying
| that this is a bit different than there being no sufficiently
| prosecutable evidence and the courts requiring it. In fact,
| that's why they claim his 5th Amendment rights aren't
| violated (though obviously the length of his sentence relies
| upon that). He could currently be prosecuted under the
| current evidence, and that matters.
|
| https://cdn.arstechnica.net/wp-
| content/uploads/2017/03/rawls...
| vhcr wrote:
| About point 2, modern devices have a secure enclave, which
| means that copying the encryption key is pretty much
| impossible.
| flangola7 wrote:
| Impossible for the average thief, not impossible for
| government or Fortune 500 actors. There are private
| contractors in business solely dedicated to developing and
| licensing enclave cracks, and popping them is routine
| procedure for most law enforcement departments, even
| smaller ones.
|
| Fundamentally you can't have a key and the data inside the
| same physical box and expect encryption to remain intact.
| Enclaves are just security through obscurity on steroids.
| bambax wrote:
| > _Investigators are not going to be typing your password
| into the running original device, they 're going to be trying
| it against an offline clone of the encrypted storage_
|
| Oh no, absolutely not. We're not talking about
| "investigators" here, just random cops in a random precinct
| who have zero infrastructure, zero knowledge about anything,
| and aren't pursuing any serious "investigation".
|
| They will absolutely type your password into the running
| device. They're doing this all the time.
| rolph wrote:
| nuggets to supplement discussion
|
| https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baseband_processor
| GeekyBear wrote:
| Can the thing France just made legal be done?
|
| > French police should be able to spy on suspects by remotely
| activating the camera, microphone and GPS of their phones and
| other devices, lawmakers agreed late on Wednesday, July 5.
|
| https://www.lemonde.fr/en/france/article/2023/07/06/france-s...
|
| Why would anyone stir up the civil libertarians if the thing you
| are making legal is not possible?
| wombat-man wrote:
| I would assume this is possible. If the gov wants to bad
| enough, I'd guess most OSes have a way to remotely control and
| observe. A state has resources to research 0days, bank them,
| and use them as needed. But probably not worth using unless
| it's for a high value target.
| dvhh wrote:
| Considering most mobile phone operator would require you to
| install additional software to be able to use their network
| and that they would most likely cooperate with the authority
| if asked by the justice department.
| nickserv wrote:
| That's not the case in France.
|
| You can use any unlocked phone with any operator (assuming
| it can connect to EU cellular networks of course). Nothing
| in particular to do, just put in the SIM and it works.
|
| I've never bought a phone from an operator, but I think
| it's also possible to switch operators without switching
| phones quite easily, no software update required.
| Simorgh wrote:
| Well, what would be considered a high-value target?
|
| Even if warrants are initially mandated for a specific
| search, couldn't this erode into, 'it's just a quick scan'?
|
| What if it's 'useful' to 'quick scan' their own President?
| 'Confirming their security'.
|
| Could this evolve into a subtle shift in the balance of
| power? In other words, a political crisis?
|
| Where the intelligence agencies have informational advantages
| over any elected office.
|
| From information into knowledge, you could easily have behind
| the scenes figures who have unmatchable insight and ability
| to coordinate.
|
| Suddenly every target has value...
| wombat-man wrote:
| This is a rambling post...
|
| I don't know what argument you're trying to make.
| Governments will research 0days because other governments
| are doing it, and it's best if you find them first and work
| out a defense. You know, in case you want to mess with
| someone's nuclear centrifuges and to avoid having yours
| screwed with.
|
| Do you think that it should not be legal for the government
| to investigate a crime?
|
| The system is made up of people, some of them may abuse
| their access. Other laws, in theory, will hold them to
| account.
| kelipso wrote:
| More than likely what happened is they made it so it's easily
| doable by barely trained cops and then they secretly lobbied to
| make it legal.
| vxxzy wrote:
| This question has been in my head recently. How feasible is it
| really? The answer in the link isn't comprehensive. Is it really
| out of the question for manufacturer's to ship a particular
| version of a device and software for a target country? Nation
| states have a history of backdooring or weakening particular
| technologies.
| anonym29 wrote:
| Baseband backdoor. No need to target the OS or the primary CPU.
| squarefoot wrote:
| Exactly, and we're talking about governments, not competing
| companies. "You wanna sell phones or build infrastructure
| here? Fine, here's a truckload of appliances to put in the
| middle of each pipe; no questions please". There are many
| ways a government can ruin businesses even without swatting
| their offices or raise public anger, they just need to apply
| different bureaucratic pressure where it is needed so that
| for example a permit, tax installment or reduction, whatever
| that otherwise would take 6 months will require say 5 years
| or more.
| aftbit wrote:
| Are basebands not sandboxed at all? There's no conceivable
| reason that my baseband should be able to access my camera,
| microphone, or the contents of my display in normal
| production use, as that's all filtered through the CPU
| typically. Why not have an MMU that limits the baseband to
| DMA in a specific chunk of memory and reduce the attack
| surface dramatically? It's not just effective against nation
| states. With such a protection, 0-click OTA attacks targeting
| the baseband would have a much smaller blast radius.
| Veserv wrote:
| Historically the baseband was the primary processor with
| full control and the CPU was subordinate. This is because
| the baseband code was developed by the chip manufacturer so
| they gave themselves full control over the system to make
| it easier for themselves.
|
| This may no longer be the case right now as the primacy of
| the CPU has become increasingly obvious, but it should
| still be the default assumption since having the baseband
| in control lowers costs to the chip manufacturer which is
| their lifeblood.
| euniceee3 wrote:
| Any signs of these in the wild?
|
| I know it is a valid threat, but even in the cases that set
| this precedent there was a team of 140 and they did not
| leverage a baseband exploit.
| aSockPuppeteer wrote:
| I only have my experience with this so it requires you to
| have a phone that is off and without a battery or in a
| faraday(foil) shielded bag. Be in an area your government
| doesn't want regular people to be (unacknowledged military
| base), turn on the phone.
|
| I've done this many times so I know how long it takes to
| power on my phone to a "usable" state on my iphone and
| android.
|
| I can't take my phone inside where I work and they have
| mobile phone detectors which set off alarms if you bring
| one near any door or the inner facility fence. I put my
| phones inside a foil cooler bag with ice packs so they
| won't overheat inside the car.
|
| My guess is that there was a cell site simulator and it was
| setup to take over any phone which comes in the area. I got
| the same result with my android and iphone. Phone boots,
| weird hang where all indicators appear but I cannot
| interact with the phone. Wait at least one minute then I
| can use the phone.
|
| I think this is why governments don't like China developed
| 5G technology. It doesn't have their default back doors.
| zozbot234 wrote:
| How could we know for sure? Basebands are 100% proprietary,
| we have no idea how they operate and even less of an idea
| of how their operation might be subverted.
| anonym29 wrote:
| This is why I'm an open source advocate. It's not that
| open source automatically makes software/firmware
| trustworthy, it's that closed source empirically
| guarantees the software/firmware can never be deemed
| trustworthy.
| scarface_74 wrote:
| And yet there have been plenty of long standing security
| issues in Linux...
|
| Why would you think that a bunch of people volunteering
| their time would be more motivated to look for security
| issues and even those that are found, how many would be
| disclosed responsibly instead of being sold to places
| like Pegasus?
| yjftsjthsd-h wrote:
| Nobody said that FOSS was perfect, only better.
| pessimizer wrote:
| FOSS doesn't mean "volunteers." FOSS means that the
| source is viewable, legally usable, and that changes can
| be made and redistributed without permission from the
| author(s).
|
| Volunteers can make closed source software, massive
| corporations and governments can make FOSS.
| anonym29 wrote:
| >And yet there have been plenty of long standing security
| issues in Linux...
|
| * See the first half of my second sentence.
|
| >Why would you think that a bunch of people volunteering
| their time would be more motivated to look for security
| issues
|
| * So they're not harmed by the vulnerabilities. I'm on a
| big tech red team. I routinely look for (and report)
| vulns in open source software that I use - for my own
| selfish benefit.
|
| >and even those that are found, how many would be
| disclosed responsibly instead of being sold to places
| like Pegasus?
|
| * Not all of them, that's a fair point. But I'd rather
| have the ability to look for them in source than need to
| look for them in assembly.
|
| * Keep in mind that the alternative you're proposing
| (that proprietary code can be more trustworthy than open
| source code) is pretty much immediately undermined by the
| fact that the entities who produce proprietary code are
| known to actively cooperate and collaborate with the
| adversary - look no further than PRISM for an example.
| Microsoft, for instance, didn't reluctantly accept - they
| were the first ones on board and had fully integrated
| years before the second service provider to join (yahoo,
| iirc).
|
| * If you want to start a leaderboard for "most prolific
| distributor of vulnerable code", let's see how the Linux
| project stacks up against Adobe and Microsoft. I wouldn't
| even need to research that one to place a financial bet
| against "team proprietary".
| smoldesu wrote:
| > Why would you think that a bunch of people volunteering
| their time would be more motivated to look for security
| issues
|
| I don't. I trust that bad actors are less motivated to
| insert malicious code, and I trust that transparency
| enforces good practices. All sufficiently complex code
| has unintended behavior, what matters to me is how you
| stop third parties from using my device beyond my
| control.
|
| > and even those that are found, how many would be
| disclosed responsibly instead of being sold to places
| like Pegasus?
|
| What do you think everyone else does with their no-click
| exploits? Send them to Santa?
| anonym29 wrote:
| Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence, especially
| when searching for evidence left behind by competent
| adversaries (e.g. NSA, GCHQ, etc) who have a strong
| motivation to remain undetected.
| dragonwriter wrote:
| > Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence
|
| But it is also not evidence of the thing for which there
| is absence of evidence.
|
| EDIT:
|
| > especially when searching for evidence left behind by
| competent adversaries (e.g. NSA, GCHQ, etc) who have a
| strong motivation to remain undetected.
|
| No, there is no "especially"; absence of evidence means
| no basis for any affirmative belief, period, equally for
| any fact proposition. Arguing for "especially... " is
| exactly arguing for a case where absence of evidence is
| evidence for the thing for which there is an absence of
| evidence.
| anonym29 wrote:
| I'm not asserting that it is.
|
| In risk management, you shouldn't ignore known unknowns
| like that, you should either adapt your threat model or
| risk accept, not simply consider that risk nonexistent
| until proven.
| godelski wrote:
| > Is it really out of the question for manufacturer's to ship a
| particular version of a device and software for a target
| country?
|
| Another means: is it really infeasible for a nation state to
| intercept and modify devices that are being sent to a specific
| country/person?
| zozbot234 wrote:
| This answer is dangerously naive. Phone basebands and radios are
| full of vulnerabilities, if you don't want your phone to be a
| potential surveillance device given any minimally sophisticated
| adversary you should either turn off the radio or preferably shut
| it off entirely and remove the battery.
| anonym29 wrote:
| Hypothesis B: it's not dangerously naive, it's deliberate
| misinformation designed to coax technical but unskeptical
| people into lowering their guard against this class of threat.
| zozbot234 wrote:
| Of course, but see Hanlon's razor.
| anonym29 wrote:
| Sounds like the perfect cover for malice, lol
|
| If ((Assume it's stupidity) == (discount/ignore the risk)),
| then assuming it's stupidity is never the safer assumption,
| even if it's empirically more likely to be the correct
| assumption, no?
|
| All boils down to an individual's threat model at the end
| of the day anyway, though.
| rgrieselhuber wrote:
| I'm always amazed at how many people don't understand
| this. Hanlon's Razor is just a way to sound smart while
| indulging in self-soothing biases.
| zopa wrote:
| Malice is not falsifiable: anything could always just be
| another trick. So unless you want to end up believing
| everything is malice, it's best to start with the benign
| explanations, until you're sure they don't fit.
| rgrieselhuber wrote:
| The context here is government spying on its own
| citizens. Not sure how that warrants starting with benign
| explanations.
| mdp2021 wrote:
| "Stupidity" (term picked after Cipolla) is not a benign
| explanation. The entity stuck in the ice of Cocitus, at
| the bottom of hell, in Dante Alighieri's Commedia, is an
| apex of impotence.
|
| But yes, it is an interesting proposal (perspective) to
| "resist from tempting explanation and picking the less
| attractive first" - just like the grit in delayed
| gratification.
| mdp2021 wrote:
| The practice of assessing whether a tempting evaluation
| of "malice" can instead cover evidence of structural
| faults is part of the effort towards seeing things as
| they are. And keeps you away from paranoia.
| anonym29 wrote:
| Spoken like someone being paid to stigmatize rational
| skepticism.
| mdp2021 wrote:
| I proposed rational skepticism.
| rgrieselhuber wrote:
| The notion that paranoia is the default emergent state of
| not assuming incompetence when potential malicious
| incentives can be easily articulated is just yet another
| ideological presupposition.
| mdp2021 wrote:
| That part about paranoia was a half-joke. But no, it was
| not suggested (that was not a <<notion>>) that paranoia
| would be a <<default emergent state>>. It is tough a
| temptation of many.
|
| And while you will often be able to identify <<potential
| malicious incentives>>, you have to put those
| possibilities together with the rest of those which can
| complete the set.
|
| Assessments must be complete.
|
| --
|
| Edit: oh, by the way, importantly: _paranoia_ ( "off-
| thought") means "delusionality", and in that sense the
| statement <<And keeps you away from paranoia>> was
| literal. "Be "cool" and exhaustive in assessment, and you
| will avoid getting stuck in alluring stories". The half
| joke was about the current use of the term (in the
| popular interpretation of the clinical state).
| rgrieselhuber wrote:
| I think it's fair to say that money / power / sex will
| easily account for potential malicious incentives. The
| mindset that Hanlon's Razor fosters slows down the
| pattern recognition process that humans have built up
| throughout our entire existence. When building systems
| that must be resilient against corruption, the concept of
| zero trust serves well here.
| mdp2021 wrote:
| But you have to always check. Yes, you do slow down <<the
| pattern recognition process that humans have built up
| throughout>>: because it is not reliable. It becomes
| (more) reliable through the exercise of doubt and
| assessment.
| DANmode wrote:
| Shutting it off, if actually done, is the only way to stop
| future upload of payload.
|
| Say, a transcribed text of a conversation, for example's sake.
| numpad0 wrote:
| What's the path of least resistance to find RCE on baseband?
| alexawarrior wrote:
| Any broadband chip since 3G ships with proprietary drivers which
| have backdoors. I tried to build an open phone, worked for one of
| the major telcos, and could never get around the driver issue in
| trying to make an open phone.
|
| BUT sophisticated attackers like US or Israeli governments (and I
| assume Russian or Chinese but I don't have direct experience with
| these) don't need these backdoors, getting anywhere near your
| phone is enough to root it to allow installation of spyware,
| according to my CSO who worked in naval intelligence. There are
| simply too many vulnerabilities for there to be a hardened device
| in the consumer space. Some are better than others (Apple) but as
| Bruce Schneier says, if you are worried about this sort of thing
| you really have to be totally disconnected from the internet and
| exchange encrypted physical media.
| seba_dos1 wrote:
| Depends on where you put the line between "open phone" and
| "baseband blackbox". Drivers are not an issue for phones like
| Librem 5 or PinePhone since they're using a separate modem
| module connected to the main SoC via USB and communicating over
| AT and QMI interfaces to which there are perfectly open
| drivers. The modem itself remains a vulnerable proprietary
| blackbox, but it does not have any access to your OS and you
| can cut it out from power while keeping the rest of the phone
| intact.
|
| Open basebands are not something we're anywhere close to having
| though, for many reasons.
| user6723 wrote:
| Google Play is a rootkit. Google will fully cooperate with any
| government. If you use GrapheneOS on a pixel device your
| bootloader is closed source and the system-on-chip is largely
| undocumented and impossible to audit without serious resources.
| So yeah. Shit's fucked man.
| TacticalCoder wrote:
| > Google will fully cooperate with any government.
|
| I'll remind you that on previous MacOS versions (8 years ago?)
| researchers had discovered that the Mac laptop's integrated
| webcam could be turned on _without_ the green LED turning on.
| So basically: the webcam turning on without the user knowing
| it. And way weirder: some random company somehow had the rights
| to sign code using that "feature".
|
| The story got pretty much killed.
|
| I'm sure if some digging had been done, you'd have found some
| three letter agency behind the shell company enjoying the very
| strange right to turn the webcam on on MacOS devices without
| the LED turning on.
|
| For everybody out there: rest assured though, Apple are the
| good guys and there's no way they have the ability to turn on
| the webcam of your Mac laptop today without you knowing about
| it. [1]
|
| [1] yes, this is sarcasm
| DANmode wrote:
| Related: https://www.digitaltrends.com/mobile/facebook-ios-
| camera-bug...
| godelski wrote:
| IANAL nor French, but reading the article, is this just saying
| that French police can get a warrant, issued by a judge, that
| allows them to tap a suspect's device (not longer than 6 months)?
| I just want to make sure I got the facts right.
|
| https://www.lemonde.fr/en/france/article/2023/07/06/france-s...
| joebiden2 wrote:
| As far as I understand that, since there is no explicit clause
| prohibiting an extension after 6 months. I think it is safe to
| assume that it can be extended by another 6 months provided the
| suspicion persists (i.e. a judge can be convinced).
|
| I'm not french myself, so take it with a grain of salt.
| qup wrote:
| Is there some kind of vote bot ring or something?
|
| This is a question with one short answer (at the time of my
| comment). It's hard to imagine why it made the top on its own
| merits.
| superchroma wrote:
| Most likely, moderation is on pause at Stack Exchange due to
| ongoing feuds with management.
| freecodyx wrote:
| But it's a good question. I want to know. I am assuming this is
| not possible. The only thing i know of is capable of doing so
| is pegasus. But it's very expensive afak.
| anonym29 wrote:
| You don't know what code is running on your baseband
| processor, do you?
|
| Do you know what other hardware your baseband processor has
| the ability to inspect?
| freecodyx wrote:
| Ok but we are talking remotely enabling camera and
| microphone. The baseband is only responsible of
| intercepting traffic. This needs kernel injection.
| zozbot234 wrote:
| In most SoC's the answer is 'everything' because there's no
| such thing as an IOMMU.
| paulryanrogers wrote:
| How big a concern is this if the data is encrypted by the
| kernel or user space?
| ignoramous wrote:
| There are atleast 2 more exception levels with higher
| privileges than the Kernel on arm64.
| Veserv wrote:
| Encryption does not help in this case. They have complete
| remote control over the entire CPU so they can just run
| the decryption code directly.
|
| Encryption only helps if the endpoints that can get
| access to the plaintext are not compromised.
| numpad0 wrote:
| Why's IOMMU thrown around so casually in this forum as if
| it's a silver-bullet explosive reactive armors? They'd be
| running something like 30 years old giant main loop with
| "// don't remove this line, build breaks" comments
| everywhere, not like Rust microservices on formally
| verified microkernel.
|
| The main CPU/application processor/main CPU might be
| running better secured Unix/Linux and might be able to
| protect itself from peripheral CPUs, but that's not the
| point; a phone had always been a pair (minimum) of
| computers, traditionally referred to as Application
| Processor(AP) and Baseband Processor(BP), of only the
| slightly faster one is exposed to the user, and it's
| unclear what is going on inside the other one or how to
| handle it. That's the problem.
| anonym29 wrote:
| Ding ding ding, we have a winner!
| moyix wrote:
| I was under the impression that most modern (past few
| years) SoCs like Exynos, Qualcomm, Apple silicon all had
| IOMMU support. Sometimes it's misconfigured to be too
| permissive but that's getting better.
|
| Qualcomm SMMU:
| https://www.qualcomm.com/content/dam/qcomm-martech/dm-
| assets...
|
| Apple: https://support.apple.com/lt-
| lt/guide/security/seca4960c2b5/...
|
| Samsung (vuln indicating it wasn't configured correctly,
| but they still do have and use an IOMMU):
| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-39854
| Veserv wrote:
| It costs about 2-5M$ to buy or develop a new weaponized zero-
| click vulnerability that would allow you to simultaneously
| hack all 1,000,000,000 iPhones in use. So around 1/20 of a
| cent per iPhone.
| abwizz wrote:
| even for the single use case, 5M$ is not that far fetched
| in terms of opportunity cost.
| joebiden2 wrote:
| No, it's not a bot ring. I assume you think that because I
| posted links to stackexchange quite a few times the last few
| months. Instead, I just skim over stackexchange.com as part of
| my feed and when there's something what I assume HN interests,
| I post it here.
|
| I don't care much about Karma. I posted this specific topic
| since I find it kind of hilarious that police should now
| lawfully be able to do something they are almost surely not
| able to do. And I enjoy discussions to such topics here on HN,
| because most of the time the viewpoints mentioned here are at
| least of the same quality of the answers on stackexchange.
| qup wrote:
| It seemed ridiculous to me that it could make the top of HN.
| It was a question with no discussion, yet.
|
| If it had a discussion or even a good answer, it would have
| made perfect sense.
|
| I assumed the goal would be stack overflow karma, as that's
| actually valuable.
| godelski wrote:
| It rose to the top because of the question, the link about
| France, and because new posts get higher weights. It is at
| 79pts and 59 comments currently and about to fall off the
| front page. But also on the front page is a post with 6pts
| and 1 comment (1hr old), 17 points and 2 comments (2 hrs),
| 7pts and 2 comments (30 minutes). and a few more. Just a
| slow Saturday.
| throwawayadvsec wrote:
| Or maybe it's the perfect place to discuss this kind of
| topics.
|
| An Ask HN with the same kind of question could have reached
| the front page.
| generalizations wrote:
| I agree, and it's not even a good answer.
| l8_to_catch_up wrote:
| I know for a fact that my electronics (including smartphone) is
| being monitored (including this post) by my government.
|
| That probably doesn't surprise others. What isn't as known is
| that the government also intrudes into chats with other people on
| social media.
|
| They don't just monitor, but actively interfere.
|
| Edit: By the way, Nokias and other dumbphones (without physical
| off-switches -- the PinePhone has them, but good luck getting
| one) can also get their mic and GPS remotely activated. The
| partial solution is to get one with a removable battery and
| remove the battery whenever not in use.
|
| iPhones can be hacked into through IMEI if you connect them, but
| are useful, encrypted offline-only PDAs if you don't install any
| app.
|
| Also, if your electronics are being spied on by the government to
| this degree, chances are you are also being physically monitored.
| woozy3756 wrote:
| [dead]
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