[HN Gopher] Plane Crash Rates by Model
___________________________________________________________________
Plane Crash Rates by Model
Author : hosteur
Score : 83 points
Date : 2023-06-27 20:42 UTC (2 hours ago)
(HTM) web link (www.airsafe.com)
(TXT) w3m dump (www.airsafe.com)
| whats_a_quasar wrote:
| Cool dataset! Though I would hesitate to draw conclusions from it
| as a passenger, since the # of events is so low. Someone would
| need to do the statistics to see if the B737 and A320 series have
| enough flights to be significant.
| doctor_eval wrote:
| "In 2013, the global 737 fleet had completed more than 184
| million flights over 264 million block hours since its entry
| into service."
|
| https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_737
|
| "The global A320 fleet had completed more than 164 million
| flights over 303 million block hours since its entry into
| service."
|
| https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Airbus_A320_family
| stevehawk wrote:
| ? B737 has been flying for nearly sixty years at this point.
| lovemenot wrote:
| An interesting perspective on these numbers is to consider
| Concorde. Though it flew several times per day on average, for a
| couple of decades, Concorde went from 0.0 (perfect) to 11.36 in a
| single event. By far the worst on the list.
|
| I glean from this data point just how safe aircraft are in
| general.
| blutack wrote:
| Another possible confounding factor is that these aircraft have
| different operational profiles. The 747 variants were likely be
| to employed on longer haul routes whereas a 737 will be doing
| multiple individual flights per day in more crowded airspace.
|
| It would be interesting to see this normalised by landing cycles
| given that the takeoff & landing are perceived at least within
| light aviation to be highest risk portions of a flight.
| yread wrote:
| Those are rookie numbers compared to stuff like MA60. First
| flight in 2000, 110 built, 67 still active, 57 exported, 26 in
| storage due to maintenance problems, 14 incidents (luckily only 1
| fatal)
| turnsout wrote:
| Wikipedia: Of the 57 MA60s exported by January
| 2016, at least 26 were in storage after safety concerns,
| maintenance problems or performance issues; six others were
| damaged beyond repair.
|
| Not quite a glowing track record...
| reso wrote:
| That second 737MAX crash was full criminal negligence on the part
| of Boeing. The first crash was caused by bad design, the second
| crash was caused by Boeing's choice to do a big PR push to
| prevent regulatory action and keep the planes in the air. The
| families should own that company by now.
| cpgxiii wrote:
| > the second crash was caused by Boeing's choice to do a big PR
| push to prevent regulatory action and keep the planes in the
| air
|
| You mean the intervening time in which every single operator of
| the 737MAX was told to review emergency procedures? In which
| every platform for aviation news was focused on the behavior of
| MCAS and how to disable it? And in that time Ethiopian Airlines
| grossly failed in its duty to train its crews on MCAS
| specifically and upset/emergency recovery more generally, as
| evidenced by the accident flight. Read the NTSB and BEA add-ons
| to the report; I think it's clear that the crew would have been
| hard-pressed to recover safely from an serious event.
|
| I really don't want to defend Boeing here, the design of MCAS
| was obviously grossly flawed, made significantly worse because
| other Boeing airframes with a similar system used multiple AoA
| sensors. _But_ given that the effects of MCAS misactivation are
| similar to a trim runaway, which is supposed to be a memory
| item for 737 pilots, the inescapable takeaway is that a lot of
| pilots simply weren 't/aren't prepared to handle rare but
| critical in-flight emergencies that builders and certification
| authorities take for granted.
| redox99 wrote:
| > The first crash was caused by bad design
|
| That's underplaying it. The design was negligent, and the whole
| "secret" MCAS is insane.
| jgerrish wrote:
| I wouldn't want to own a company that did that. Or be forced
| into a relationship or moved out.
|
| I'm not saying Boeing is a bad company. Lots of workers have
| put their lives into that company and believe in what they
| build.
|
| I'm just saying putting ownership into the hands of possible
| victims seems to put more work and responsibility into their
| laps, not less.
|
| I've been in abusive situations, and hearing philosophies like
| that worries me.
|
| I understand it's one small part of what you said and the rest
| of your comment was helpful.
| addisonl wrote:
| It's a figure of speech.
| duncan-donuts wrote:
| I think, "The families should own that company by now" is a
| figure of speech that means Boeing should have paid the
| families so much money that they no longer exist. I could be
| completely wrong but that's how I interpreted it.
| jeron wrote:
| sometimes ignorance is bliss - I'd prefer not to know the crashes
| by model and fly without thinking about the statistics
| turnsout wrote:
| They're all dramatically safer than driving to the grocery
| store, fwiw
| janalsncm wrote:
| Are they? Just at a glance, there is about 1.35 deaths per
| 100 million vehicle miles traveled (VMT). Assuming I live a
| mile away from the grocery store, I will need to drive 2
| miles round trip. That means I can be expected to be in a
| fatal accident after around 37 million round trips.
|
| The safest plane on the list is the list is the Embraer E170.
| It has 0.03 deaths per million flights or one death every 33
| million flights. So it's actually more dangerous. And most
| people will be flying on Boeing 737s or Airbus A320s which
| are about 3-20x more dangerous per flight.
|
| In any case, my takeaway is that people drive _a lot_ so the
| denominator is pretty big. And if we remove driving drunk to
| the grocery store /driving there on NYE then driving is even
| safer.
| dangerboysteve wrote:
| The list is completely pointless. It assumes the issue is the
| equipment. Maybe list the operator, country, and cause of
| incident.
| jmpman wrote:
| The Embraer 190 shows 1 incident, but when you click to read the
| details, there were two fatal accidents. Why the discrepancy?
| napsterbr wrote:
| From the details page:
|
| > This is not a numbered fatal event because the Legacy
| aircraft, although based on the design of the ERJ135 regional
| airliner, was not airline passenger flight.
|
| This particular crash is widely known here in Brazil. The two
| pilots from the small aircraft had turned off the plane
| transponder. They had a mid-air collision with a 737. Everyone
| at the 737 died.
|
| The two pilots of the Embraer 190 are Americans. They were
| sentenced to jail in Brazilian court but were never arrested to
| this day (not sure why).
| cameldrv wrote:
| The 737MAX definitely has a bad record, but this data is somewhat
| out of date. Very roughly speaking, The MAX has been back in
| service for 1.5-2.5 years depending on jurisdiction. Boeing has
| produced 1196 of them. A typical narrowbody flies about 4.5 or so
| times per day. If you figure two years of service, that gives
| about 2 million flights a year or about 4 million flights since
| the ungrounding. Add that to the 0.65 million on the linked page
| and you get 4.65 million flights.
|
| That gives a fatal rate of 0.43/million flights which is pretty
| bad, the same as the somewhat notorious ATR42/72, but nothing
| like the number on the page.
| wkat4242 wrote:
| And the ATRs tend to operate from small airports with short
| runways and low ILS categories (if at all!) I guess that's a
| bit more dangerous.
|
| I flew at an airport myself where ATRs operated as well,
| nothing bigger. ILS was only a low category and only available
| in one direction. It seems a lot tougher than landing a 737 at
| a high-facility big airport with runways that can accommodate
| even widebodies.
| twelvechairs wrote:
| The simple point for most people is that new design planes tend
| to have higher numbers and older design planes (where all the
| issues and quirks have been seen) tend to be very safe.
| water9 wrote:
| The Boeing 777 should be the safest as none of the accidents were
| the fault of the aircraft itself
| mechhacker wrote:
| When I found out about MAX and what happened with the design,
| after leaving that industry, I was amazed it had gotten approved.
|
| That number there indicates that.
| TheBigSalad wrote:
| Wasn't the cause a software bug that was fixed and not a design
| issue?
| JumpCrisscross wrote:
| It was a regulatory bottleneck prompting an inefficient
| design that required a software fix to fly, which relied
| mortally on the inputs from a sensor that was optionally non-
| redundant outside the United States.
| mechhacker wrote:
| Yep. They were trying to compensate for different
| feel/behavior to the pilots without additional training. I
| really don't see how that was approved by a competent
| agency...
|
| Ended up in those two horrible crashes in perfectly good
| airplanes.
| someweirdperson wrote:
| I think regulations refering to a competent agency
| doesn't require any competency in the normal sense of the
| word.
|
| And perfectly good those planes were not, they had broken
| AoA sensors.
| JumpCrisscross wrote:
| > _don 't see how that was approved by a competent
| agency_
|
| The version that flies in America has two AoA sensors. To
| my knowledge, those planes didn't have a problem.
| wkat4242 wrote:
| Don't forget a lot of countries rely on the FAA for
| guidance because they don't all have the resources or
| manufacturer access to thoroughly evaluate an aircraft
| themselves.
|
| Also, even with two AoA sensors the pilot had to switch
| to the alternate because the MCAS wouldn't know which one
| was right. This is why usually 3 sensors are used in
| redundant systems.
| MilStdJunkie wrote:
| Because when you're a DER (Designated Engineering
| Representative), you're still getting your paycheck from
| Boeing, and being a fussy DER is not a fast track to
| success. I can't lay down too much more specifics, but
| anecdotally, that's how things go, and not just at Boeing
| either. Seen it at a lot of suppliers too. You're a
| "good" DER, or you're on the short list next round of
| layoffs[1].
|
| DERs have been getting more and more sign off authority
| on increasingly critical core airworthiness systems,
| stuff no one would have _dreamed_ of delegating to a DER
| twenty years ago.
|
| The actual full time agency people, well, depends on how
| much they're fishing for a corner office. But by and
| large, they were hardasses, thank God. All three of them.
| Particularly the EUROCAE Dutch guys. Whew!
|
| But none of this is important as the Boeing culture,
| which . . ehhhhhhyyyyuuuuuchhh . . could use some
| improvements. To phrase it one way.
|
| [1] There's always layoffs, good times and bad, because
| everything is funded contract to contract, week to week.
| I had a _goddamn amazing_ analog engineer get pink
| slipped, packed his stuff, and then - after all that - he
| got called back _before he got his boxes in the car_.
| "Whoops! We didn't mean it! Turns out no one else in the
| universe knows how to do this!". Luckily, he was a canny
| old gent, and responded with a well-deserved, "Sure. I'll
| come back in. But it's gonna cost ya".
| mechhacker wrote:
| I saw bits and pieces of this interacting with DERs when
| I was working in the field, and you're touching on what I
| saw first hand. Thankfully I wasn't working on anything
| related to the MAX.
| jacobn wrote:
| My understanding was that there was a design issue that was
| supposed to be fixed by software, and that software in turn
| had a bug.
| [deleted]
| axus wrote:
| The design was not "backwards-compatible" with existing pilot
| training, but the plan was to use software as a cheap fix.
| They said pilots would not need new training, and were
| betting lives on the reliability of software and humans.
| rawgabbit wrote:
| It's not a bug. Boeing deliberately chose to mislead the
| airlines and pilots on what they were doing and used software
| to hide the fact. On top of that there was no redundancy for
| the single indicator which triggers the nose down/pitch down.
| The software issues is downstream of the managerial
| malfeasance.
| Zak wrote:
| What I'm seeing here at a glance is that newer aircraft other
| than the 737 MAX are significantly safer than older aircraft.
| someweirdperson wrote:
| Or easier to fly / pilots better trained / airports and atc
| having improved.
| cperciva wrote:
| Removing the "no longer in production" planes and sorting by
| fatal crash rate per million flights: Embraer
| E170/E190 0.03 Boeing 737-600/700/800/900
| 0.07 Airbus A318/A319/A320/A321 0.09 Boeing 777
| 0.18 Airbus A330 0.19 Boeing 767
| 0.28 ATR 42 and ATR 72 0.44 Boeing 737
| MAX 7/8/9/10 3.08 Bombardier Dash 8 UNK
| Canadair CRJ series UNK
| bratao wrote:
| As a Brazilian, I'm happy to see the Embraer as the first. I
| hear from pilots that Embraer planes have excellent
| survivability and glide times.
| [deleted]
| gffrd wrote:
| They're also a great ride! I've been on a few Embraers, and
| been super impressed with their "feel" as a passenger.
| gtirloni wrote:
| It's impressive, indeed. But I'd curious to know how it
| compares to other planes of the same size.
| cperciva wrote:
| Looking at this list I'm struck by the separation between
| narrowbody jets which generally make shorter flights (Embraer,
| 737, A318-A321) and widebody jets which generally make longer
| flights (A330, 767, 777).
|
| The exceptions of course are 737 MAX (we all know why) and ATRs
| (which I'm not familiar with -- anyone know why they have a
| high fatal crash rate?)
| inejge wrote:
| ATRs had some design problems with ice accumulation[1] and
| are in certain ways quite unforgiving, but I suspect that the
| "problem" is their popularity with all kinds of smallish
| outfits whose training and maintenance are sometimes lacking.
| Case in point, this year's Nepalese crash[2], where the
| airline is prohibited from operating in the EU, and the
| preliminary report indicates that the plane crashed because
| one of the pilots effectively deactivated the propellers
| instead of adjusting the flaps while descending, causing a
| stall.
|
| [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Eagle_Flight_4184
|
| [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yeti_Airlines_Flight_691
| seabass-labrax wrote:
| > The exceptions of course are 737 MAX (we all know why) and
| ATRs (which I'm not familiar with -- anyone know why they
| have a high fatal crash rate?)
|
| Turboprop aircraft like the ATRs are generally considered to
| be more dangerous than jets. I couldn't find a MTBF (Mean
| Time Between Failure) specific to the Pratt and Whitney
| engines that the ATRs use, but an AOPA article from 2017
| suggests that turboprops in general are over three times as
| dangerous as jets[1].
|
| Here are some potential reasons that come to mind:
|
| - Turboprop aircraft typically fly at lower altitudes than
| jets do, where there is more inclement weather and less time
| to navigate to an airport in case of an engine failure.
|
| - Turboprops are more complex as a whole than jet engines;
| there is just more to go wrong (variable propellor pitch, for
| instance).
|
| - Smaller airlines are the main operators of turboprop
| aircraft. I don't like to suggest that they are less
| competent on the maintenance front, and certainly don't have
| any evidence for this, but maybe this comes into it.
|
| - Most fatal aviation accidents occur on landing, and since
| turboprop aircraft are typically used for shorter flights,
| they will make more landings per mile flown (nautical miles,
| of course, in ICAO world).
|
| [1]: https://www.aopa.org/news-and-media/all-
| news/2017/august/pil...
| mannykannot wrote:
| Another thing about the ATRs, being the only turboprops on
| the list, is that they are more suitable for small
| airports, and most of the airports in difficult terrain are
| small airports. Therefore, you are more likely to see ATRs
| flying tricky routes than the others on the list.
|
| At least one crash, however (American Eagle 4184) was due
| to a flaw in the design: ice rapidly accumulated where it
| could not be dislodged by the de-icing system.
| pengaru wrote:
| > ATRs (which I'm not familiar with -- anyone know why they
| have a high fatal crash rate?)
|
| French-Italian collaboration, what could possibly go wrong?
| notahacker wrote:
| There's a case for adding some weighting by flight hours/km
| as the widebody flights are on average longer, but it's less
| clear what that should be, especially with most of the
| accident risk being takeoff or landing. On the other hand,
| the displayed safety record of the 747-400 is exceptionally
| good. Much of the widebody/narrowbody distinction is just
| statistical noise (as others have pointed out, a third of the
| 777 accidents are a single flight being hit by a missile, and
| another third a suspected suicide) and widebodies are less
| common aircraft so the accident rates are noisier.
|
| ATRs are turboprops that fly a lot into relatively difficult-
| to-land small airports. Also, the accident rate under-counts
| the amount of flights they've actually made by more than some
| of the other aircraft.
| cperciva wrote:
| I agree that there should be some mileage weighting; but on
| the other hand, long distance widebody flights are usually
| piloted by more experienced crew (they're preferable and
| flights are typically assigned by seniority).
|
| It would be interesting to see statistics for maydays as
| well; most shorthaul flights have the advantage of having
| nearby airports for their entire route.
| quickthrower2 wrote:
| This is interesting info, especially with the MAX outlier. But
| not enough to go on if you want to do "rainman" calculations. You
| would need to know the operator, their country, their airline
| safety culture etc.
|
| If you can classify each crash into a % score "due to pilot
| training issues", "due to design flaw", "due to maintenance
| skimping". Also need to take into account time. I think if a
| plane crashed today because of wind changing direction under a
| thunderstorm, it is more likely to be called a pilot training
| issue, but go back far enough and it is a weather issue instead.
|
| Just based on stuff I read. I am not a pilot or expert.
| TechBro8615 wrote:
| The MAX is the one plane I will absolutely not fly on. It's
| nice to see the numbers, but as you say, fairly unsurprising.
| It's also nice to see that the 787 and A380 have never crashed,
| since those are my favorite planes.
| wkat4242 wrote:
| It's not a bad plane. Every pilot now knows its flaws. Don't
| forget one flip of a switch would have saved all those lives.
| The problem was the pilots never knew that switch was even
| there.
|
| I'd fly on it just fine, I wouldn't feel unsafe. Though I'd
| regret providing profits for the company that deliberately
| let those people die.
| paulryanrogers wrote:
| Isn't it more than the MCAS itself but also the reliance on
| one sensor (redundancy optional expense) instead of
| standard of three?!
| wkat4242 wrote:
| Well yes both. But either way, if the pilots had known
| MCAS existed, all they would have had to do was switch it
| off.
|
| In both cases they had plenty of time to do it.
|
| Knowledge is key, even with 3 sensors it's possible 2 of
| them fail, though much less likely.
| sokoloff wrote:
| ET302's crew _did switch it off_ [correctly]. They then
| switched it back on in an attempt to fly the airplane out
| of the emergency.
| seabass-labrax wrote:
| The scandal with the MCAS though was in large part
| because Boeing went out of their way to hide the
| existence of this system to save their customers training
| costs, and therefore win more sales from existing 737
| operators. On the contrary, Airbus, for instance, provide
| detailed guidance for what to do if either one, two or
| all three of a system like the ADIRS (Air Data Inertial
| Reference System) were to fail during a flight, even
| though that is extremely unlikely.
| sokoloff wrote:
| ET302's crew (the second Max crash) also knew about the
| plane's fault mode and almost saved the craft. If they'd
| have continued to command nose-down manually [after
| correctly executing the runaway trim disable checklist
| memory items and then re-enabling the power to the
| offending system in order to command aircraft-nose-down
| trim for a short time], they'd have almost surely flown the
| airplane back to base.
|
| It was Boeing's fault, but the crew _almost saved it_ and
| inexplicably re-enabled the fault after correcting it. They
| were _so close_ ...
| JimtheCoder wrote:
| "I think if a plane crashed today because of wind changing
| direction under a thunderstorm, it is more likely to be called
| a pilot training issue, but go back far enough and it is a
| weather issue instead."
|
| I certainly hope that a plane would not crash due to wind
| changing direction...
| devilbunny wrote:
| https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Delta_Air_Lines_Flight_191
| JimtheCoder wrote:
| Fair enough. A microburst on approach would technically be
| classified as a change in wind direction.
| dghlsakjg wrote:
| "Low Level Wind Shear" is the technical name.
|
| It is the ninth leading cause of landing and takeoff
| fatalities.
|
| It makes sense when you realize that airplanes can only fly
| when the apparent wind (their speed through the air) is high
| enough, and landing and takeoff is when you are crossing that
| transition zone between high enough to fly, and not flying.
| If you go from a 10 kt. headwind to 10 kt. tailwind fast
| enough, it is exactly like losing 20 kts. of speed.
| Especially on small prop planes, that is more than enough
| speed difference to go from comfortable approach speed to
| dangerously close to stall speed.
| avereveard wrote:
| I wonder how would it change by excluding chartered flights and
| crashes
| cm2187 wrote:
| So the fatality rate across the B737 family is 0.24 per million
| flights, the rate for the A320 family is 0.09 per million
| flights. That's 3 times the risk of death boarding a B737 vs
| boarding an A320.
|
| If we apply the same logic than people who wanted to mandate
| covid vaccines for the population not at risk, reducing a
| minuscule risk by a factor of 3 to another minuscule risk is
| hugely important and therefore people shouldn't be allowed to fly
| on those dangerous B737!
| janalsncm wrote:
| If covid deaths were as rare and as non-communicable as
| airplane fatalities, you would have a good point.
| ClumsyPilot wrote:
| > reducing a minuscule risk
|
| Official stats say COVID killed a million people in US alone
| and 6 million globally. Thats more than Ebola, more than
| tuberculosis.
|
| War in Ukraine killed far less, is it miniscule?
|
| Furthermore, we still have people getting repeat infections -
| and full extent of damage is unknown, but its not pretty. Its
| quite clear that covid is close to tuberculosis than it is to
| ordinary flu
| cm2187 wrote:
| > _Official stats say COVID killed a million people in US
| alone and 6 million globally_
|
| with a median age of 80. I am talking about the population
| not at risk (i.e. young, no serious medical condition).
| kayodelycaon wrote:
| The 737 NEO is 0.07. Earlier 737 models predate the Airbus 320
| by nearly 20 years. The equivalent Boeing planes are marginally
| safer in context.
|
| The 737 MAX has a horrible ratio because it's very new and had
| a very serious flaw on launch which caused multiple crashes.
| Whether or not it's equivalently safe now is yet to be proven.
| cm2187 wrote:
| The point is that even the 737 max number is minuscule and
| not worth worrying if you are only flying a few times a year.
|
| People are bad at understanding tiny numbers. The probability
| of not crashing on the Max being 999,997 out of 1,000,000 I
| think is a bit easier to process.
| makestuff wrote:
| Would it be incorrect to interpret this data that Airbus planes
| have a safer track record? Obviously the 737 has almost twice as
| many flights, but the crash rate is more than double.
| xiphias2 wrote:
| What matters is Boeing MAX vs everything else. It needs a few
| years more of testing at least until we can trust that it's
| safe.
| kube-system wrote:
| Who is we? Basically every aviation safety regulator has
| tested and verified that the MAX fixes are sufficient and
| have returned them to service. Even China.
| nostromo wrote:
| They also certified them prior to those fatal incidents.
| kube-system wrote:
| As it is with every commercial jet.
| twbarr wrote:
| The 737 has also been around a lot longer. The 737NG has a rate
| of 0.07 compared to the A32x's 0.09. The A330 is 0.19 while the
| 777 is 0.18. But even this is kind of misleading. All but three
| of the fatalities (total fatalities, not accidents) due to the
| 777 come down to intentional acts that would have destroyed any
| aircraft.
| rootusrootus wrote:
| The 737 spans almost 60 years. The earlier planes had a much
| higher rate of accidents, which skews the overall numbers given
| that today you'd have a hard time finding one of those in the
| sky, especially on a passenger route. The 737NG has one of the
| best safety records of any class of plane flying today. Aside
| from a 737 MAX, right now if you find yourself on a 737 it's
| nearly guaranteed to be an NG, which is just about the safest
| airplane currently in use.
| kube-system wrote:
| The 737 NG has a lower crash rate than any Airbus on the list
| at 0.07. Hop on a 737 in the US and this is probably what
| you'll be on.
| nawgz wrote:
| Are you trolling? Using 737 NG would be like using Airbus NEO
| variants, which ALL were excluded from the list in the single
| aisle category for having a 0.00 crash rate...
| twbarr wrote:
| The NG has been produced since 1997 and there are
| essentially no pre-NG aircraft in Western service. The NEO
| is equivalent to the MAX.
| wkat4242 wrote:
| Equivalent to the MAX perhaps except no hidden suicide
| system on board..
| kube-system wrote:
| The NEO is a much newer plane with much less history than
| the NG which has been around since the mid 90s. I'm sure
| it's safe too.
|
| It is fair to compare the A320 family with the NG. They are
| comparable planes and have comparable crash stats too.
| (0.09 vs 0.07)
| nawgz wrote:
| That's such a misleading number. The numbers you post
| EXCLUDE both NEO and MAX crash rates, but meanwhile the
| MAX would grossly inflate 737-NG rates and NEO flights
| would slightly depress A320 rates
|
| I highly suggest not citing those numbers
| kube-system wrote:
| The planes are grouped the way they are because they are
| mechanically of the same generation, not because they
| have similar names. The NEO and MAX are newer generation
| planes than their predecessors.
| laverya wrote:
| There are 6 times more "events" listed for the 737-NG
| variants as there are for the MAX, so there wouldn't be
| much inflation.
|
| (There's also more than 100x more flights with the NG
| than the MAX)
| TillE wrote:
| I think there needs to be a more selective filter if this data is
| supposed to mean anything. The evaluated incidents include
| terrorist bombings, the deliberate Germanwings crash, etc.
| notahacker wrote:
| Think it's difficult to make much of the data even with a
| filter. A lot of other incidents are due _mainly_ to pilot
| error, bad weather conditions or inadequate maintenance, but
| the aircraft don 't altogether escape blame for those types of
| incident. Actual incidents known to be down entirely to bad
| aircraft design are exceptionally rare amongst late generation
| aircraft (but some of the more mysterious crashes _might be_ ).
|
| The ATR figures are inflated by their flight cycles info being
| years out of date (and based on knowledge of what ATR supplied
| to commercial databases, likely incomplete), but you'd also
| expect them to be higher than some of the other aircraft types
| purely because of how they're used (flown into smaller
| airstrips in hilly regions). At the other end of the scale, the
| 747-400 performs excellently with only two passenger crashes,
| but it's also had four fatal freighter crashes not counted. I
| bet the calculated "rate" includes freighter flight cycles
| though
|
| But above all, airliner fatal crashes are exceptionally rare,
| and some of the near misses and non-fatal incidents are more
| indicative of design flaws
| NikkiA wrote:
| My first reaction on seeing the fokker stats was 'well, yeah,
| it's heavily used in the Alps and Himalayas, of course it's
| had a lot of incidents'
|
| Ironically, the 727s numbers are probably skewed in the
| opposite way to the 747 - there were loads of passenger
| incidents with the 727, but it's been somewhat of a workhorse
| for freight in the developing world over the last 40 years.
| petesergeant wrote:
| You said:
|
| > The evaluated incidents include terrorist bombings
|
| From the site:
|
| > Excluded would be events where the only fatalities were to
| crew members, hijackers, saboteurs
|
| The numbers in the "Events" column are not the same numbers as
| are on the linked Events page, if that makes sense.
| 0xffff2 wrote:
| Those statements aren't at odds are they? Terrorist events
| that results in death of at least one passenger are included,
| despite terrorist activity (presumably) having nothing to do
| with specific model of airplane.
| notahacker wrote:
| It includes fatal accidents _caused by_ hijackers or
| saboteurs, provided they manage to kill passengers and not
| just themselves
| TechBro8615 wrote:
| I wondered about that, because isn't the hijacker
| technically a passenger too? I wonder if their deaths are
| excluded from the data.
| voisin wrote:
| Would those incidents be frequent enough to make anything but a
| de minimus impact?
| pcurve wrote:
| Depending on plane, it could.
|
| For example, 777 has had very few incidents, but its figure
| is impacted by MH370 and MH17.
|
| 747's number is also skewed (by about 10%) due to 3 incidents
| involving bombing and missile shootdown.
|
| By and large though, most plane crashes are due to human
| error, mostly by pilot. Terrorism, as well as maintenance or
| engineering defects are pretty rare.
| waiwai933 wrote:
| Probably, given how rare any fatality in commercial aviation
| is.
| twbarr wrote:
| One of the three 777 accidents is being shot down by a
| Russian SAM.
| zerocrates wrote:
| Another is the infamous MH370.
| water9 wrote:
| Another is the pilot error on Asiana flight in San
| Francisco.
|
| Another one is the crash at Heathrow, but that was Rolls-
| Royce's fault
| Someone1234 wrote:
| The entire dataset is microscopic. I'd say it could make a
| substantial impact.
| bjelkeman-again wrote:
| A really small datasets shouldn't be used for statistics.
| But is it small, considering there are millions of flights
| registered?
| Someone1234 wrote:
| Millions of flights, but less than ten crashes for most,
| and it was pointing out that even some of those are
| incorrectly categorized. When you're dividing A by B to
| get ratio C, you cannot ignore that A is bad data because
| B is good, it still makes for a C that is useless.
|
| All this dataset provides is that with small enough
| samples it is too noisy to draw reliable conclusions.
| lolinder wrote:
| You need a larger dataset if you're dealing with very
| small probabilities. If you measured millions of events
| and only saw 1 anomalous event, you have enough data to
| say that the probability of such an anomaly is extremely
| rare, but you don't have enough data to compare it to
| other very rare events.
|
| More concretely: if you flip an unfair coin 1 million
| times and get a single heads, you know that the odds of
| getting that heads are extremely low, but you can't yet
| say what the odds are. It's _possible_ that the odds are
| one in a million, but it 's also possible that you got
| very lucky or very unlucky relative to the actual odds.
| You have to have a lot of data in _both_ buckets before
| you can distinguish.
| rootusrootus wrote:
| If I'm doing the math right, there were only 3 fatalities on
| a 777 if you don't count MH370 or the Ukraine/Russian shoot-
| down. That would change the FLE from 2.01 to 0.01.
| henryfjordan wrote:
| I understand not wanting to count a shoot-down but why not
| count MH370? For all we know there was a safety issue with
| that aircraft that caused the crash.
| local_crmdgeon wrote:
| We basically know that it was suicide at this point.
| rootusrootus wrote:
| As I recall, there's a fair amount of circumstantial
| evidence at this point to suggest pilot suicide as the
| most likely cause.
| excitom wrote:
| After almost a decade of investigation the preponderance
| of evidence points to murder/suicide by the pilot. A
| safety issue is highly unlikely.
| lopkeny12ko wrote:
| This is a very USA/western-centric perspective. No SE
| Asia reporting is stating this.
| Pigalowda wrote:
| What do they say?
| tremon wrote:
| Isn't that because suicide is a taboo subject in many
| countries? This was at least the case for EgyptAir Flight
| 990 and SilkAir Flight 185, and IIRC people expressed the
| same thing about Malaysian culture.
| [deleted]
| irrational wrote:
| Why make such a useful table, but don't allow sorting by the
| columns?
|
| HTMl really needs a grid element that natively supports sorting
| and filtering.
| Waterluvian wrote:
| If I wanted to know "what planes are safest?" But I also want to
| correct for a bias like "Crash Airlines fields a lot of TypeX so
| TypeX seems crashier than it probably is" how would I approach
| normalizing that data?
| konschubert wrote:
| You could start by normalising by plane age.
| bagels wrote:
| Concorde made 90,000 flights?
| bowmessage wrote:
| Why is that surprising? There were 20 built, and were flown for
| more than 27 years.
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(page generated 2023-06-27 23:01 UTC)