[HN Gopher] You can link an OpenPGP key to a German eID
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You can link an OpenPGP key to a German eID
Author : upofadown
Score : 132 points
Date : 2023-05-31 17:40 UTC (5 hours ago)
(HTM) web link (pgp.governikus.de)
(TXT) w3m dump (pgp.governikus.de)
| usr1106 wrote:
| This mostly looks like open software, which seems positive
|
| But in the end you can only get/use it using Google, Microsoft,
| Apple or Huawei. As a German citizen I don't agree that I have to
| sell my freedom to American companies or a Chinese one, which
| show little respect for our legislation. Neither as companies nor
| countries they reside in and whose legislation they have to
| comply with.
| tick_tock_tick wrote:
| > As a German citizen I don't agree that I have to sell my
| freedom to American companies
|
| I mean your government already sells it to the USA government;
| why would you expect it to go any other way?
|
| It doesn't look like it's going to change either especially
| since the EU is writing laws and policies that guarantee
| dependence on American tech companies.
| warkdarrior wrote:
| > > As a German citizen I don't agree that I have to sell my
| freedom to American companies
|
| > I mean your government already sells it to the USA
| government; why would you expect it to go any other way?
|
| Citation needed to show that German gov't _sells_ data to US
| gov 't. They may provide it for free, but I never heard of
| payments between gov'ts.
| zokier wrote:
| You can also use aosp, linux, freebsd etc:
| https://www.ausweisapp.bund.de/en/open-source-software
| usr1106 wrote:
| Looks good! Maybe my concern was invalid.
| usr1106 wrote:
| What's the primary key to identify a German citizien? The full
| name is certainly not unique. Even combined with birthdate
| duplicates do probably exist. Some countries have something like
| a social security number. Of course those exist in Germany, too,
| but using them cross-functionally has long been deemed
| unconstitutional. So the tax office can use the tax number, but
| that cannot be shown e.g. in your passport or drivers licence.
| Analogously with every other identifier. I think some law and
| order politicians have tried to weaken this up, but I guess it's
| still not fully allowed.
|
| Asking out of real curiousity. I am German citizen, but have not
| lived there after the first government office got a PC.
| haukem wrote:
| Germany does not use a global unique identifier like the social
| security number in the US. The Germans do not like such global
| identifier for people because the the Nazis used them and data
| protection is very important in Germany.
| r3drock wrote:
| This is in fact not correct. There are two unique identifiers
| for every german citizen, first the so called
| "Rentenversicherungsnummer" and the
| "Steueridentifikationsnummer". Both are assigned at birth.
| usr1106 wrote:
| The usage of the Rentenversicherungsnummer is strictly
| limited by law, basically to pension-related
| administration. It cannot be legally used for general
| purpose.
|
| The Steuerindentifikationsnummer used to be strictly
| limited to tax purposes. Against original political
| promises the legislation has been changed 2 years ago,
| weakening the limitations. I am not familiar with the
| details.
| haukem wrote:
| Yes that is correct, but they are not much used outside of
| the service they are intended for.
| germanier wrote:
| The Steuer-ID is now intended to be used as a global
| identifier. The law is already enacted, but there are
| still some technical questions open.
|
| See https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/pressemitteilungen
| /DE/202...
| usr1106 wrote:
| That's "propaganda" by the ministery, not answering many
| questions. They only claim that all government
| administration will become digital, smooth, and much
| cheaper.
|
| Is it allowed to use the Steuer-ID for non-government
| purposes?
| germanier wrote:
| An enacted law is not "propaganda", it's the law. You can
| ignore all the fluff around the factual statements if you
| like.
|
| The number is only intended to be used by government
| entities. The law restricts usage to census and
| communication with government entities (as well as
| already established tax-related use).
| lxgr wrote:
| Which makes it completely useless for applications like
| credit scoring.
| dale_glass wrote:
| https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_identity_card
|
| The document number in the upper right corner in the picture, I
| imagine.
| lxgr wrote:
| No, that is a document ID and changes with each reissuance.
|
| Germany has had a constitutional restriction in place
| explicitly prohibiting an SSN equivalent.
|
| These days, the tax ID can supposedly be used for that
| purpose, but I haven't seen much use of that yet.
| junga wrote:
| You must either own an ID card or a passport. This means
| having an ID card is optional. Does the German passport have
| a unique identifier as well? (never owned one) The tax number
| otoh is assigned at birth.
| flocked wrote:
| Yes it has a unique ID
| usr1106 wrote:
| Which changes whenever you get a new passport. Not what
| we would call a primary key in database design.
| lxgr wrote:
| One of the two tax number systems is, yes :)
|
| There's also another one which changes every time you move
| across financial administrative districts.
| netsharc wrote:
| I wonder if the city of birth is relevant too for uniqueness. I
| imagine the collision prevention then falls in the hands of the
| city administration office. It'd be funny if there's a Hans
| Muller born on 31 May 2023 in Frankfurt, and another Muller
| family wants to register a Hans, also born in Frankfurt, also
| on the same date, they might say "Sorry, that name is taken
| already".
|
| Of course it'd be complicated if e.g. the 2 Hanses were born in
| a foreign country with no such checks, and moved to Germany
| later on...
| usr1106 wrote:
| I have never heard that there would be legal basis to refuse
| registering a name because it's duplicate.
| [deleted]
| zokier wrote:
| The description implies that it does name matching only:
|
| > This online service compares the name read from your ID card,
| your electronic residence permit or eID card for citizens of
| the European Union with the name specified in your OpenPGP key.
| If the names match, your public key is electronically signed by
| Governikus, confirming the match.
| hannob wrote:
| Interestingly the whole page does not tell what one can
| practically do with this. Most likely: Nothing at all.
| Zemtomo wrote:
| The page describes it in the middle by describing how you can
| encrypt your email and use that connected mail box with it.
| hannob wrote:
| Yeah, I can use PGP to encrypt e-mail, with all the problems
| that come with it. However... I don't need a signature from
| governikus to do this.
| Zemtomo wrote:
| It becomes an official communication method.
|
| This should allow you to actually send legal save
| communication to the government.
| germanier wrote:
| There is no special legal status attached to that.
|
| Actual electronic signatures recognized by law are not
| based on GPG.
| usr1106 wrote:
| Neither can I find out a technical description what is actually
| certified and how. Email seems like a very insecure concept.
| How do they verify who controls a mailbox/email address?
|
| Signing message contents I understand. But email headers can be
| faked in various ways.
| haukem wrote:
| The service checks if the name in your PGP key matches the name
| in your identity card and signs your PGP key if it matches. I
| think it also checks if you can receive mails on the mail
| address in your PGP key.
|
| You can then use your PGP key to sign or encrypt emails or sign
| your git commits or other stuff you can do with PGP keys.
| Others who trust this signing service then known that this key
| really belongs to someone with your name.
| hannob wrote:
| > Others who trust this signing service then known that this
| key really belongs to someone with your name.
|
| Yeah, but who are these others?
|
| I mean I know how PGP key signing is supposed to work. But
| that all is entirely hypothetical.
|
| It would be meaningful if e.g. there would be a requirement
| for gov agencies to accept communication with such keys with
| the same value as written communication. But "some fictional
| people may care about this signature" is meaningless.
| c00lio wrote:
| There are no official uses.
|
| Government agencies are required to accept de-mail, which
| is a proprietary email-like service. However, rollout has
| been nonexistent even among government agencies such that
| you cannot practically use it anywhere, they are a decade
| behind their rollout plan. The system itself is design-by-
| committee fugly, insecure and plain weird. You have to get
| an account with a commercial provider, all of which have
| closed down by now. PGP/GPG cannot be used with de-mail
| (except if you copy&paste the ascii-armored ciphertext into
| the software), and de-mail encryption is intentionally
| breakable anyways (officially "to scan for viruses").
|
| The eID/ePA "elektronischer Personalausweis" electronic
| RFID passport which you need to use is another such weird
| proprietary waste of taxpayer money, accepted nowhere
| because it doesn't follow any standards and using the RFID
| function (e.g. as a bank for opening an account) costs tens
| of thousands per year just for the certificate you need. So
| nobody uses it and nobody enables the RFID functionality.
| Therefore the govt got the brilliant idea (among other, far
| less pleasant ideas such as requiring it for certain
| payouts) to offer free signatures on GPG/PGP keys using the
| ePA.
| Eduard wrote:
| E. G. git commits can be signed with PGP.
| kkfx wrote:
| You generate a key pair signed by a public administration, so
| you can "self-start" your chain-of-trust without key-signing
| parties witch is and was the biggest GPG/PGP issue so far...
| piuantiderp wrote:
| Lmao, key-signing parties are bad as a concept but signed by
| a public administration is up there.
|
| Have PGP, have a web of trust with...people you actually
| trust.
| aborsy wrote:
| Is there a reputable identity provider that would verify a
| passport, SSN or similar, preferably in person, and link that to
| an OpenPGP key with metadata same as in the ID?
|
| Similar to this service, but linking not just the name, but more
| secure unique identity data. Linking the person's name to the key
| is not very useful, since there are many people with that name.
|
| That's basically a government issued smart card, that would allow
| the use of OpenPGP A-E-S keys for arbitrary data through a FOSS
| API.
|
| Keybase was a good idea, but it's semi dead.
| delsarto wrote:
| It's not exactly what you're saying but
|
| https://keyoxide.org/
|
| Is all the best ideas of keybase. Basically if you trust
| someone has control over multiple different accounts you can
| also trust their pgp key.
| howmayiannoyyou wrote:
| Clear (https://www.clearme.com) could have the business market
| LOCKED UP if they would - on an opt-in basis - tie their
| biometic data to an OpenPGP key. Its been proposed to them in
| the past but I think they suffer from myopia.
| toomuchtodo wrote:
| Their business model isn't identity. It's rev share with
| airports to cut the TSA line. The biometrics are theater as
| part of the product. (control-F "Risks Related to Our
| Business, Brand and Operations" from Clear Secure's most
| recent 10-K)
|
| > Clear doesn't do any actual security screening of
| passengers, a process reserved solely for the TSA. The New
| York-based company verifies customers' identities and escorts
| them to the front, using revenue-sharing agreements with the
| airports or airlines that control the lines to secure an
| advantage for its fliers.
|
| https://archive.is/fSiq4
| [deleted]
| CogitoCogito wrote:
| Wait they really do nothing more than verify identity? As
| in the same the the person working there does checking ID?
| Is the only purpose to get people to cut the line but to
| add smoke and mirrors so it seems like that's not the
| point? If that's the case, why don't airports just let
| people pay to cut the line?
| toomuchtodo wrote:
| > If that's the case, why don't airports just let people
| pay to cut the line?
|
| They do. That is what Clear is for (just as Ticketmaster
| takes the heat for venues or artists taking more from
| customers via fees). You mean "why don't they make it
| more overt?" That's a great question. Inquire with your
| Congressperson. Maybe get a copy of the airport's
| concession agreement with Clear if you can.
| CogitoCogito wrote:
| Yeah my point was why don't the make it more overt? I
| mean we're talking about airports here. Airlines nickel
| and dime you more and more. I'm surprised airports
| wouldn't just be open about. I mean there are already
| priority lanes and first class etc. Why hide the purpose
| of clear?
| nailer wrote:
| > but more secure unique identity data
|
| What kind of data?
|
| eID pretty much replicates Keybase, except it's concerned with
| real world identity (matching your given and surname to your
| pubkey) rather than pseudonymous identity (matching your
| twitter handle or reddit account or whatever else to your
| pubkey).
|
| > that would allow the use of A-E-S keys for arbitrary data
| through a FOSS API.
|
| You can use your ECC (or RSA) keypairs to negotiate an AES or
| chacha+poly session key. Most cryptosystems do that (ECDHE, or
| DHE for RSA) now since:
|
| 1. session keys are faster (in terms of CPU) than just
| encrypting with the remote's pubkey.
|
| 2. if the session key is stolen, you just get access to that
| session (perfect forward secrecy).
|
| 3. group chats just store the session key encrypted chat, plus
| copies of the session key encrypted with everyone's pubkey, to
| save storage.
| aborsy wrote:
| Social Security number, passport number, birth certificate
| data, drivers license , tax information, etc.
|
| Some numbers need to be verified every few years.
| tomrod wrote:
| An OpenPGP key could be the most stable of all identifiers
| out there!
| lxgr wrote:
| What if you lose it, or the private key leaks?
|
| A public key is a pretty bad identifier by itself. The
| combination of a good identifier with a public
| key/certificate binding to it is pretty powerful, though.
|
| The US has a good public identifier (SSNs), but they are
| completely unauthenticated. German arguably has the
| opposite: Widely available e-signature capable ID cards -
| but they only bind to your name (and DOB).
| numpad0 wrote:
| That kind of thing don't exist because it's illegal because
| it gets people killed and governments toppled. Privacy
| isn't human right for nothing.
| jmclnx wrote:
| [flagged]
| dale_glass wrote:
| You can do it in many (all?) of the EU, I think, since the ID
| card can be used to produce a cryptographic signature.
|
| It's not a GPG signature, but that would be an easy ramp to GPG
| signatures.
|
| These days though I think GPG is of dubious utility, you could
| just as well use your ID to sign stuff and stop at that.
| yokaze wrote:
| Well, in Spain you can use your eID directly:
| https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/wiki/DNIe-%28OpenDNIe%29#up...
|
| And you can get a standard X.509v3 certificate from the FNMT
| (https://www.fnmt.es/en/ceres), or other agencies, which
| identifies you online for government purposes.
| Dunedan wrote:
| Here is the gist (directly taken from the website):
|
| > Governikus provides the online service for authenticating your
| OpenPGP key on behalf of the German Federal Office for
| Information Security (BSI). This online service compares the name
| read from your ID card, your electronic residence permit or eID
| card for citizens of the European Union with the name specified
| in your OpenPGP key. If the names match, your public key is
| electronically signed by Governikus, confirming the match. The
| Governikus public key can be used to verify the Governikus
| electronic signature.
|
| So this is apparently useful if somebody wants to send an
| encrypted email to somebody else and want to ensure that only the
| desired person can read the email. For that the sender would have
| to check that the OpenPGP key got signed with the Governikus
| public key before encrypting and sending the message.
|
| What that doesn't seem to address are multiple people with the
| same name. So the sender know he's sending an email only John Doe
| can read, but he still don't know which John Doe it is.
|
| To me that sounds like something which makes only sense for a few
| limited use cases.
| haukem wrote:
| This is not indented as a bullet prove government
| authentication system, if you need this use the eID card
| directly.
|
| The goal is to have a CA for (existing) OpenPGP keys which
| checks if the name in it is matching the one from the identity
| card. When you sign a PGP key to tell that you trust it you
| should compare the name in the identity card or passport with
| the one from the key, this system does it automatically.
|
| One tricky part is that many people like me leave out some
| names in the PGP key. In the first implementation of the PGP
| signing service it only ensured that at least one first name
| and one last name is also in the PGP key. I do not know if this
| is still the case.
|
| The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) is
| supporting GPG4Win since many years, see for example here:
| https://www.golem.de/news/bsi-deutsche-behoerden-bekommen-gp...
|
| Disclaimer: I worked for Governikus some years ago and worked
| on the initial version of this service.
| kkfx wrote:
| I might be wrong but IMO the point is sign a key/subkey with
| something all trust, instead of having key-signing parties or
| unsigned keys. This allow John Doe to publish a public key
| other already trust it's belong to him.
| thriftwy wrote:
| In Russia you can get a key-certificate pair (x509, perhaps with
| GOST algorithms) signed by government CA and then sign documents
| with it.
|
| How different this OpenPGP key stuff is, minus the "OpenPGP is so
| bad we decided to sunset it" vibe?
| varjag wrote:
| The jab at OpenPGP feels unnecessary when your yardstick is an
| FSB signature using a GOST.
| thriftwy wrote:
| The problem with OpenPGP has nothing to do with security,
| ciphers, etc - it's tooling.
| woodruffw wrote:
| It's both: OpenPGP's mandatory primitives are not great.
| There are extension RFCs for more modern primitives, but
| they aren't mandatory.
| ilyt wrote:
| Isn't it just "the problem is hard enough that tooling have
| to be complicated" ?
|
| I don't believe that in 20+ years "nobody found a good
| UI/UX designers for it"
| c00lio wrote:
| The OpenPGP stuff in Germany is not officially required to be
| accepted as a paper signature replacement anywhere. They are
| just doing this as an advertisement for the eID/ePA electronic
| RFID passport functionality that nobody wants.
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