[HN Gopher] Court Ruling Could Affect the Future Direction of DAOs
___________________________________________________________________
Court Ruling Could Affect the Future Direction of DAOs
Author : wallflower
Score : 84 points
Date : 2023-04-06 13:33 UTC (9 hours ago)
(HTM) web link (www.jdsupra.com)
(TXT) w3m dump (www.jdsupra.com)
| a1371 wrote:
| > The plaintiffs alleged they lost $1.7 million in the
| cyberattack and that the repayment plan would take thousands of
| years to make them whole
|
| Creative repayment plan.
|
| > the court focused on statements by the bZx Protocol developers
| that creation of a DAO would insulate the Protocol "from
| regulatory oversight and accountability for compliance with U.S.
| law
|
| Looks like they attempted the "citizen of the earth" card.
| poof131 wrote:
| Regulatory arbitrage in Web3 seems to be coming to and end. My
| assumption is
|
| 1) If your contract is upgradeable it isn't decentralized. Might
| as well be hosting on EC2.
|
| 2) If a multi-sig runs your governance contract or treasury it
| isn't decentralized. Might as well form an LLC or C corp.
|
| 3) From a more NatSec perspective, if a SEAL team or the FBI can
| reach a few people in your DAO and your project would shut down,
| you aren't decentralized.
|
| Which all seems good and as it should be, to stop people LARPing
| as decentralized to avoid regulations.
| sharemywin wrote:
| Seems to me to make sense. if you don't file any paper work with
| the state and agree to start a money making enterprise with more
| than one person your a general partnership. Whether your an
| active or passive investor or not would probably depend on how
| much "work" you put into the partnership(not related to the
| article just my thought). Not a Lawyer so take anything I say as
| anything more than uneducated internet speculation.
|
| Other than the risk of all your assets getting hacked and stolen
| to doesn't seem like a bad way to "enforce" a contract.
|
| Maybe would be better if things were split up into different
| accounts with different people holding different keys so you
| don't have a single point of failure.
|
| Just like with SVB there should be some kind of insurance for
| large accounts. with various audit and other processes to keep
| things "safer"
| JumpCrisscross wrote:
| > _your an active or passive investor or not would probably
| depend on how much "work" you put into the partnership_
|
| Legally, it requires paperwork filed _ex ante_. As the article
| notes, several states have DAO LLC constructs. DAOs that don 't
| incorporate do, and should, expose their holders to unlimited
| liability. That is the default. (If you and I start an
| unincorporated car-washing business, and it destroys someone's
| car, we will be jointly sued and liable, though I may
| separately have individual claims against you if you made all
| the wrong decisions.)
|
| The situation all this seeks to avoid is profit-seeking
| enterprise having everyone who stood to gain when things went
| well standing up saying "not it" when things don't. If a DAO-or
| any other business or person-causes you injury, it shouldn't be
| your job to figure out who contributed to what degree.
| zoklet-enjoyer wrote:
| Wyoming has a DAO LLC
|
| https://sos.wyo.gov/Business/Docs/DAOs_FAQs.pdf
| pavlov wrote:
| Interesting law. It seems that this kind of DAO is a Wyoming
| LLC with all the existing obligations and the extra requirement
| that you have to file Wyoming paperwork if your smart contracts
| are modified: Articles of organization shall be
| amended when: (i) There is a change in the name of the
| decentralized autonomous organization; (ii) There is a
| false or erroneous statement in the articles of organization;
| or (iii) The decentralized autonomous organization's
| smart contracts have been updated or changed.
|
| A DAO may not be "foreign", but it's not defined what exactly
| that means: _" The secretary of state shall not issue a
| certificate of authority for a foreign decentralized autonomous
| organization."_
|
| I'm guessing that most DAOs don't want the legal liability of
| an American LLC, so there may not be a lot of takers.
| wsh wrote:
| In context, "foreign" means an entity registered in another
| state or country. See the FAQ: Can I register
| my out-of-state DAO? No. A certificate of authority
| for a foreign DAO cannot be filed pursuant to W.S.
| 17-31-116.
| rtkwe wrote:
| What does that even mean for a DAO to be out of state? Is
| it based on people with voting power in the DAO?
| houston_Euler wrote:
| IANAL, but I believe it means that the company can't be
| headquartered somewhere else.
| WorldMaker wrote:
| I think the more interesting question is what does it
| mean for a DAO to be considered _in state_ to qualify for
| this type of LLC? Do they need to keep at least a PO Box
| as presence in the state? Some amount of real estate?
| Some number of state-resident members with voting power?
| Do the other usual LLC requirements apply?
| JumpCrisscross wrote:
| > _What does that even mean for a DAO to be out of
| state?_
|
| A Delaware corporation doing business in California must
| file as a foreign corporation in the latter. It sounds
| like Wyoming is saying a DAO can't incorporate out of
| state and take advantage of the Wyoming DAO LLC, but this
| doesn't appear to have been fleshed out.
| davidjfelix wrote:
| I think that clarification makes sense though. You'd normally
| (this may vary from state to state) need to amend an Articles
| of Organization if your LLC Operating Agreement changed,
| which usually outlines the nature of a joint-ownership model.
| Since that's handled via smart contracts, you'd want those to
| be legally binding, which would imply that you need to follow
| the normal meatspace government lawyer process of updating
| your articles of organization.
| naikrovek wrote:
| dear Lord,
|
| I've been very good, mom said that she is thankful I helped her
| with housework and that my room has stayed very clean. as always,
| I donate all of my income to charity and volunteer for 40 hours
| every week. can I have one thing? just one thing? my one wish is
| to never have my day cluttered with f*king blockchain BS again.
|
| thank you
| tiku wrote:
| Nah Blockchain is here to stay.
| Canada wrote:
| What would happen in the case of a general partnership where 5
| people put some money together to buy a house for $1M:
|
| Partner 1: $500,000
|
| Partner 2: $250,000
|
| Partner 3: $249,000
|
| Partner 4: $999
|
| Partner 5: $1
|
| They issued paper receipts representing these proportions. All
| agreed that any rent collected would be paid to the paper holders
| Pro rata. All parties have to show up to review/approve/reject a
| tenant, and all have to show up to collect the rent on the due
| day. Each person writes their own receipts and signs all the
| others, so no one party is more in charge than any other. Partner
| 3 sells 100,000 receipts to someone else, we'll call Person A,
| for $101,000. Then the house burns down and is lost, so there's
| not going to be any rental income now and nobody is interested in
| buying the receipts anymore. None of the parties did anything to
| cause the fire.
|
| Now who can sue successfully?
|
| (Not saying the facts of the case in the article match my
| hypothetical exactly.)
| vkou wrote:
| > Now who can sue successfully?
|
| Nobody? All I see is six morons that have joint ownership in a
| house that were all too cheap to pay for insurance. And since
| nobody's at fault for the fire, tough cheese.
|
| Person A might be able to sue whomever sold him the receipts,
| but only if he was lied to about how the organization
| functions.
| [deleted]
| gamblor956 wrote:
| This is a pretty standard partnership issue.
|
| In your scenario, nobody's at fault for anything, so nobody can
| sue anybody.
|
| But what if Partner 2 set fire to the house? Then the other
| Partners (now including Person A but not Partner 3) could sue
| Partner 2 for losses.
|
| Or what if Person B, a tenant, suffered harm due to negligent
| maintenance of the house? Person B could sue _any or all_ of
| the Partners (now including Person A but not Partner 3) for
| damages. And each partner would be "jointly and severally"
| liable for all of Person B's damages (so if Partner 5, owning a
| tiny portion of the partnership ended up getting sued and owing
| damages to Person B, they would need to sue the other partners
| for reimbursement).
|
| But note that Partner 3 selling his partnership interest to
| Person A would, in many states, trigger the dissolution of the
| original partnership. In this case, it doesn't matter since
| they never bothered to form any custom organization documents
| or financial allocations.
| mr337 wrote:
| I have been out of the loop of DAO and how they are organized and
| manage changes. My first explaining of that was in Folding Ideas
| part of Decentraland [1]. The DAO portion did not look so good.
|
| So still trying to figure out if this is just a phase or there is
| some legitimacy to a DAO.
|
| 1 - https://youtu.be/EiZhdpLXZ8Q?t=4923
| user3939382 wrote:
| Oh no https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_access_object
| the88doctor wrote:
| This case just confirmed what we already knew before: DAOs are
| just groups of people working together, and they don't get any
| special treatment just because they coordinate their activities
| via blockchain instead of email.
|
| Enforcement will be the interesting part. If a DAO has anonymous
| members and no LLC or corporate structure associated with it,
| then a court can rule that the members are liable, but it could
| be very difficult to enforce that liability.
| luckylion wrote:
| Why would it be difficult to enforce individual liability? The
| DAO needs to interact with the outside world somehow, pay bills
| and get paid etc, and distribute income to members, so you can
| just follow the money, can't you?
| orbz wrote:
| Jurisdiction of the enforcing party must have overlap with
| the individual members targeted. In practice I would expect
| any member under that jurisdiction would bear full
| responsibility of the actions of any of the collective
| members.
| WorldMaker wrote:
| If you assume a DAO is de facto a corporation/partnership (as
| this court decision suggests), most US States (including
| California, which is relevant to this specific case) and many
| countries start from an unlimited, collective liability
| default for corporations/partnerships and limited liability
| is the properly registered (and taxed!) opt-in. (The article
| also points to states that are not California that realize
| this and have started to offer easy LLC opt-in for DAOs.
| Presumably in part because it is a potential tax revenue
| source.) [IANAL, but this is fascinating.]
| olliej wrote:
| It is an organization, there is no question there.
|
| The question is whether it is a general partnership or not,
| and by the rules listed it would appear to be.
|
| Collective ownership implying collective liability is not
| novel or new, and existed long before LLCs and LLPs did.
| Legislation allowing those is relatively recent because it
| has obvious benefits, but comes at the cost of some degree
| of regulation. In the true crypto spirit of "regulation ==
| bad" this DAO took the path of not making itself an LLC or
| LLP (and in fact explicitly terminated the LLC), which
| means it seems fairly obvious that it's a general (e.g.
| unlimited liability) partnership as the court appears to be
| concluding.
| _navierstokes wrote:
| Sometimes you can't follow the money, because the DAO members
| can use privacy tools to hide the coins, similar to what
| Tornado Cash allowed you to do.
| AlexandrB wrote:
| Many of them don't even coordinate their activities via
| blockchain because it's too slow and expensive[1].
|
| [1] https://www.banklesstimes.com/news/2023/03/08/off-chain-
| gove...
| ceejayoz wrote:
| For a rather hilarious example of this, PeopleDAO's
| "autonomy" turned out to be a few guys with a Google Sheet.
| They accidentally shared the link and someone added
| themselves to the payout list, to the tune of $120k.
|
| https://www.theblock.co/post/219214/peopledao-hacked-via-
| goo...
| zoklet-enjoyer wrote:
| Governance activities are talked about on forums and
| chatrooms. Governance is voted on on-chain
|
| Edit: I'm posting too fast, so here's an edit for a reply
|
| I don't know anything about Ethereum DAOs. Check out
| Tendermint chains (Cosmos, Osmosis, Crescent, Stargaze,
| EVMOS, Kava). Gas is cheap and all voting is on-chain.
| Governance discussions happen mostly on a forum called
| Commonwealth and then they're put on chain and voted on by
| validators and stakers.
| AlexandrB wrote:
| Except when it's not: https://docs.decentraland.org/player/
| general/dao/overview/ho...
|
| > To circumvent the very high gas fees associated with full
| on-chain governance, Decentraland's DAO uses a combination
| of free, off-chain voting for the community and a multi-sig
| wallet controlled by a "DAO Committee" to enact those off-
| chain decisions on the Ethereum blockchain.
|
| I'm not a huge follower of the crypto ecosystem and DAOs,
| but this kind of thing seems like it's pretty common.
| localplume wrote:
| [dead]
| miracle2k wrote:
| There are all kinds of governance models, as there should
| be.
|
| > a multi-sig wallet controlled by a "DAO Committee" to
| enact those off-chain decisions
|
| DAOs may empower a multi-sig with certain allocated funds
| to spend according to a mandate. This is ok. It's like
| saying America is not a democracy because regulators can
| make new rules that congress is not voting on.
|
| It also possible to have off-chain voting, but still
| enforce those results on-chain using a fraud-proof like
| system, and some do this. Lots of design space to play
| with.
| squeaky-clean wrote:
| How do you guarantee the off-chain votes haven't been
| tampered with during the initial off-chain step?
| rjbwork wrote:
| >It's like saying America is not a democracy because
| regulators can make new rules that congress is not voting
| on.
|
| That actually does appear to be the opinion of the
| current supreme court, and you can expect further rulings
| counter to historical precedence WRT chevron deference.
| Shared404 wrote:
| Slightly off topic, but I quite like this video over
| Decentraland/the metaverse:
| https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EiZhdpLXZ8Q
|
| It's an in depth look/critique.
| aww_dang wrote:
| This is actually very common for the allegedly
| decentralized apps. A centralized service controls the
| actual application while some resulting data is recorded
| to the blockchain. Decentralized in name only, but most
| users don't know and those who understand are only happy
| to oblige the hype.
| tiku wrote:
| Depends on the chain. Lots of "better" chains than Ethereum.
| Some are even integrating EVM and Solidity.
| rvcdbn wrote:
| By this line of reasoning wouldn't Ethereum miners be liable
| too? (assuming this was all implemented on ethereum)
| rocqua wrote:
| They don't cooperate for profit, they compete with eachother.
|
| Everyone in a mining (or staking) pool seems more likely to
| count as a general partnership.
| latchkey wrote:
| ETH no longer has miners since the switch to PoS. There are
| now stakers, validators, liquid staking tokens, block
| builders, ... it has gotten a lot more complex than it was
| before.
| olliej wrote:
| What? Why would they be liable? The whole point is the
| liability in a partnership is shared between the partners:
| that is the entities that own the partnership.
|
| Miners (staker?) aren't partners in the DAO: being a miner
| doesn't make you an owner of anything, anymore than being an
| employee or contractor to a partnership in the real world
| would make you liable for the actions of your
| employer/client.
| houston_Euler wrote:
| I believe miners wouldn't, because while they might
| technically coordinate their efforts in deciding which
| version of a cryptocurrency to mine, they aren't pooling
| their resources and representing themselves as a single
| entity.
|
| That's partly what makes these individuals an unincorporated
| organization.
| nico wrote:
| How would it work for non-US DAOs?
| lcnPylGDnU4H9OF wrote:
| If the DAO is very explicit about non-US residents, they
| should also be able to show that in court, and it could be
| determined that the US citizens who ignored that waived any
| protections the court would otherwise offer. Alternatively,
| it might instead be that the DAO should have done more to
| ~spy on~ "know" their customers so they could determine that
| they're not serving US citizens.
| 8note wrote:
| The US could still argue that there's a US nexus in that
| the tokens are converted to US dollars
| ARandumGuy wrote:
| Whenever an organization does something, someone or something
| has liability. If you don't go through the process to create an
| LLC, that someone is the members of the organization. Liability
| doesn't go away just because you organize via a blockchain.
| lacy_tinpot wrote:
| The entire purpose of an LLC is to limit personal exposure to
| such liabilities. I don't see how this won't just extend to
| something like DAOs.
| 8note wrote:
| I could see legal changes to bring in limited liability to
| DAOs, but I don't think DAO users will like the rest of
| what that entails, eg reporting and kyc requirements.
|
| Thsoe will likely make daos more useful, but less
| differentiated from existing structures
| tiku wrote:
| If the actions are done by code or an AI, who is liable?
| olliej wrote:
| The owners.
|
| For example: Imagine I have a cow, and the cow escapes and
| goes on a rampage. I didn't make the cow escape, I didn't
| tell it to go on a rampage, and cows think for themselves
| so are autonomous.
|
| That doesn't mean I get to claim the cow is liable for the
| damage.
| yifanl wrote:
| Whoever made the decision was it to implement them as an
| actor, most likely?
| JumpCrisscross wrote:
| > _Whoever made the decision was it to implement them as
| an actor, most likely?_
|
| Directly, the holders of the DAO tokens. That's what this
| case is about. Those holders may have further claims
| against the people who implemented the code or AI. But
| the liability begins with the general partners, _i.e._
| holders of the governance tokens.
|
| Will be interesting to see the first judgements enforced
| against holders of a DAO.
| [deleted]
| majormajor wrote:
| Yeah, booby traps are the first example I can think of
| illegal automation that comes to mind where the property
| owner is liable. Setting up something and not pulling the
| trigger yourself doesn't absolve you.
| pjc50 wrote:
| The last people with intent who touched it, usually, which
| may mean the developers. Certainly that's what happened to
| the TornadoCash developers.
|
| You can't just wind up a toy with a bomb strapped to it,
| walk away, and disclaim the consequences; nor can you do
| that with code.
| Teever wrote:
| What if we can't tell who the last person was? Do we just
| go down the line until we find someone to blame? What if
| that person didn't add any of the menacing features of
| the code?
|
| What if the last 'person' was gpt4? is openai
| responsible?
| wildzzz wrote:
| If they can't find the person solely responsible for
| something, then they got away.
|
| If you make an AI that is hooked up to the internet and
| it does something criminal, you'd be liable. You can't
| just let your pitbull roam the streets and not be held
| liable when it bites someone.
| Teever wrote:
| What if I release the AI onto the internet, and then
| tragically die in a car accident? Who is responsible for
| the AI? What happens when the AI spawns more AI, who is
| responsible for that?
| notch898a wrote:
| Yeah this reminds me of a thought experiment with
| Ethereum virtual machines. If someone writes and produces
| the code for tornado cash, publishes it on the internet
| as free speech but never deploys it obviously they are
| not at fault. So lets say they publish it and some
| anonymous person from Somalia publishes it to the
| Ethereum network and the nodes absorb the program.
|
| When then is responsible for the tornado cash instance?
| The Ethereum VM node operators who have no idea they're
| even running it? An unknowable person from Somalia?
| EdwardDiego wrote:
| Most likely the node operators would be held to be liable
| if they're hosting illegal content and take no steps to
| prevent it.
| notch898a wrote:
| Right now the node operators worldwide even to this day
| are running tornado cash on their EVM, including
| validating transactions to sanctioned contract addresses.
| ARandumGuy wrote:
| The person responsible will be whoever the courts think
| is responsible. Courts use case law and judicial
| precedent to determine responsibility for a wide variety
| of complicated legal situations.
|
| Things do get murky when there isn't a lot of existing
| precedent. That's why it's risky to engage in activities
| that are, let's just say "legally innovative."
| vkou wrote:
| The people who own it.
|
| Which, in this case, are the bag-holders. Looks like there
| are benefits to having a real corporation, instead of
| trying to re-invent corporate governance from scratch,
| without any input from the courts...
| jcranmer wrote:
| > Enforcement will be the interesting part. If a DAO has
| anonymous members and no LLC or corporate structure associated
| with it, then a court can rule that the members are liable, but
| it could be very difficult to enforce that liability.
|
| The default form of legal structure for a cooperating group of
| people is general partnership--unless you take specific legal
| steps to avoid forming a general partnership, that is how the
| courts will view the partnership. General partnerships means
| that all partners are _jointly and severally liable_.
|
| In layman's terms, that means you just have to find _one_
| person involved in the DAO, and sue them, and then you get to
| collect the full judgement from _that_ person (alone), and it
| 's now _their_ problem to get cooperation from the other
| partners for the liability.
|
| (If this sounds like a terrible idea, it is. That's why there
| exists all sorts of fancy legal structures that avoid putting
| people in this position. But if you're not going to use any of
| them, you get the terrible idea instead!)
| wilg wrote:
| My important and real DAO [1] is not worried about this
|
| [1] https://earth.cheap/
| nosequel wrote:
| Thanks for the laugh. I really hope you reach your goal of 5.3
| quadrillion dollars.
| [deleted]
| saurik wrote:
| I found another article by some lawyers that is interesting about
| this case:
|
| https://us.eversheds-sutherland.com/mobile/NewsCommentary/Le...
|
| What I find most fascinating is that most "DAOs" you see are
| entirely window dressing: at the end of the day, there are a few
| people who actually run the assets and control the code being run
| who are merely promising to take direction at the whim of the
| people who hold some token, which is effectively just an illegal
| way to build a corporation and sell stock.
|
| It is possible to do something that is actually run by a truly
| decentralized and autonomous mechanism but there are serious
| limits; like, if you are running things on just Ethereum you can
| write code that handles code upgrades by using an on-chain
| vote... but it would not be trivial (I won't say quite
| impossible) for the DAO holders to then vote to transition the
| system to Polygon somehow, as what would that _mean_ from the
| perspective of the code running on Ethereum? Or like, you couldn
| 't have the DAO on Ethereum do something as simple as own a .com
| domain name.
|
| This situation is in some sense no different for this DAO. They
| apparently had an actually-decentralized one on Ethereum, which
| is surprising as it is so rare... but, as mentioned in this
| article I found--and not in the article linked for this thread
| which is concentrating on the general partnership question--they
| cut corners when they decided to go multi-chain, and the DAO
| supposedly owned contracts on a couple other networks, including
| Polygon.
|
| The hack then wasn't "the DAO decided to use buggy code and now
| the DAO members are liable": it was a phishing attack against a
| single developer sitting on a single key that allowed for control
| of the code--and thereby the money--on Polygon, as the DAO was
| only really able to ask that developer to take action and then
| hope he did it.
|
| That extra context to me makes this whole thing even more of a
| fascinating case study. Like, one might then just want to say
| "this thing was never decentralized to begin with: the owner of
| the key was liable" and yet weirdly the case isn't brought merely
| against that developer... it is brought against the DAO that in
| some sense supposedly hired the developer and was negligent in
| letting the one developer have the key for all the money on
| another network, something they never should have done!
|
| In some sense, then, this is a remarkable win for the concept of
| a DAO. I mean, sure: some people likely wanted a DAO to be some
| kind of "regulatory arbitrage" (as noted in complaints about them
| here on Hacker News) and are going to be sad at the idea that the
| DAO holders actually have some kind of liability in the actions
| that the DAO takes...
|
| ...but that was NEVER--I am serious: NEVER--an informed take on a
| DAO. The point isn't to make it somehow impossible to sue the
| people who own it, it is to build a new form of organization
| wherein the ownership is liquid and people have a direct
| democracy over the actions of the organization. If someone sued a
| co-operative--a common form of company where the customers and/or
| employees are the owners; I have had numerous friends who lived
| in the local student housing co-op and I'm myself a member of the
| local food co-op--it would not be surprising or disappointing to
| me if all the people who were deemed owners had some potential
| liability.
|
| Now, I don't think the co-op holders (such as myself if my local
| food co-op does something bad, even though I absolutely am
| allowed to go to meetings and vote on their actions!) actually
| have much liability, but only because American corporate law is
| out of control on liability separation; like, I personally think
| big tech shareholders should have joint and several liability
| over the shit decisions these companies make that harm customers;
| but that (very sadly to me and I believe incorrectly) isn't how
| it tends to work in the United States... hell: the employees and
| even managers of the company taking the actions often don't have
| liability, which is just crazy-town.
|
| But so, OK: when I see this argument that the DAO can actually be
| a defendant and can actually have liability that can actually be
| shared among its owners, to me that is an almost-incredible
| vindication of the concept. Hell: apparently, the companies that
| were the original developers of this mess in fact were considered
| to NOT have liability anymore, having SUCCESSFULLY transferred
| that to the DAO? That's hilarious!!
|
| Now, does this mean it is a good idea to own "shares" in a DAO?
| Hell no ;P. And yeah: I'd like to think this would kill a lot of
| interest in holding a non-negligible quantity (as it can be hard
| to not own any, which is why this article focused on non-
| negligible) of the tokens for a DAO, in the same way I can't
| imagine many people would own stock in Apple if they could be
| held _joint and severely liable_ (which maybe is actually going
| "too far"... we here in the US love our liability extremes ;P)
| for its actions.
| zeryx wrote:
| DAOs require a legal identity, otherwise one will be provided.
|
| For anyone who has been thinking about the intersections between
| DAOs and the law, this was obvious.
|
| You can still manage your membership on chain, and there are
| plenty of great structures that are more DAO friendly - my
| organization uses a MI LLC structure (midao.org is what we used)
| throwanma wrote:
| "... In The US"
| olliej wrote:
| Why do people think "doing the same as X but 'with blockchain'
| instead of paper" means "legally different from X"?
|
| If doing X is illegal, adding blockchain to it doesn't magically
| mean you're not doing X.
|
| If doing X means you have to pay taxes, doing X with linked lists
| doesn't mean you don't have to pay taxes.
|
| If doing X means you have a bunch of liabilities, then doing X on
| a block chain means you have a bunch of liabilities.
|
| The only thing that makes a DAO different from a partnership is
| that decision making is arguably public on the blockchain,
| instead of an email thread. Again, why would you think that doing
| it on a blockchain makes it different from email, or in person,
| or whatever.
|
| Now in fairness, I certainly didn't think of DAOs as being an
| unlimited partnership, but that's largely because I didn't think
| about it because they seem fairly pointless. As the court seems
| to be saying a DAO is fairly clearly a partnership, and they very
| deliberately terminated the LLC and didn't create an LLP, so the
| lack of liability protection follows logically from that.
| UncleEntity wrote:
| > And the question remains whether the court would reach a
| different result if it turns out that the named plaintiffs hold
| BZRX tokens. That could mean those plaintiffs are fatally
| conflicted from pursuing their claims, as they would effectively
| be both plaintiffs and defendants under their theory of the case.
|
| This is the part I don't understand, if they succeed in making
| the case all "owners" are liable wouldn't they equally be liable
| for the money they lost?
|
| And the thousand years to get paid back part -- are you a hodl or
| not?
| JumpCrisscross wrote:
| > _wouldn't they equally be liable for the money they lost_
|
| They aren't equally liable, they are jointly and severally
| liable [1]. Equal liability implies a liability cap where there
| isn't one.
|
| [1] https://www.investopedia.com/terms/j/joint-and-several-
| liabi...
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