[HN Gopher] The Tyranny of "The Plan"
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       The Tyranny of "The Plan"
        
       Author : kiyanwang
       Score  : 17 points
       Date   : 2023-02-24 16:16 UTC (1 days ago)
        
 (HTM) web link (www.infoq.com)
 (TXT) w3m dump (www.infoq.com)
        
       | shoo wrote:
       | here's a rough summary:
       | 
       | 1. Mary recounts her experience of working with computerised MRP
       | planning systems. These detailed plans were fragile and would
       | need to be thrown out once reality began to diverge from the
       | plan, then re-planned. Contrast with a pull-based approach
       | (Toyota etc)
       | 
       | 2. What did they do before computers? Anecdote/case-study of how
       | the Empire state building was designed and delivered on schedule
       | and under budget. Summary of success factors: teamwork of
       | owner+architect+builder. deeply experienced builders - fixed
       | price contract! focus on key constraint of material flow.
       | Decoupling of workflow "pacemakers" - the building was designed
       | to allow parallel construction of components - windows could be
       | fitted in parallel to floors, once the steel frame was built.
       | Cash flow thinking. Schedule was not based on design of building,
       | the design of building and the workflow to construct it was based
       | on the schedule and other constraints.
       | 
       | 3. Sketch of how "pull scheduling" could work for a software
       | product. Delivery broken into sequence of 2-3 month increments.
       | Don't make all the decisions up front. At the end of each
       | increment, decide what will be worked on in the next increment.
       | Time-box not scope box. E.g. decision point after first two
       | months to review customer interest and decide technical approach.
       | Mary emphasised need to really understand customer problem,
       | intention, technical approach, and have everyone in the project
       | talking the same way ("if you don't figure this out, if you don't
       | pass this test, you stop and fix it, and you don't go on with the
       | rest of the schedule"). Then 3 months of working on proof of
       | concept, then review proof of concept and decide alpha features,
       | etc. Baseline features for production release not decided until
       | after reviewing results of beta.
       | 
       | 4. Discussion of reliable workflows. Inputs from suppliers,
       | outputs to customers. Rapid feedback if inputs or outputs are not
       | fit for purpose. Identify and fix root causes of problems.
       | 
       | 5. "Where do plans come from?". Anecdote/case-study of the US
       | Polaris missile system. Complex, highly political project,
       | unconstrained budget. Use of PERT [1] to manage project
       | publicised by program director: "a facade to keep Congress happy"
       | - but PERT not actually used to manage the project in early years
       | - constant requirement and scope change, PERT bypassed by
       | technical officers and contractors. Summary of success factors:
       | quality of leadership - one technical director had control over
       | performance requirements and signed off on all major decisions
       | for first 8 years, focus on development, decentralised
       | competitive organisation (three different contractors developed
       | competing designs for each major subsystem, then a winner was
       | selected. each contractor had technical freedom to propose
       | whatever they thought best), emphasis on reliability, espirit de
       | corps.
       | 
       | [1]
       | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Program_evaluation_and_review_...
        
         | kneebonian wrote:
         | > Mary recounts her experience of working with computerised MRP
         | planning systems. These detailed plans were fragile and would
         | need to be thrown out once reality began to diverge from the
         | plan,
         | 
         | So I've been studying a lot about WW1 recently and one of the
         | things that struck me was the incredible similarity between how
         | many of these generals operated in the early years of the war.
         | With detailed down to the minute plans that would account for
         | everything, trying to be more and more precise, and how the
         | bigwigs on a software project operate, with a belief that if
         | they can just nail things down more tight and make sure they've
         | got every dependency mapped out they'll finally make it work
         | and it will avoid other problems.
         | 
         | The results are the same as the WW1 battles the first part goes
         | well, things seem to flow along as predicted everything is
         | great in the first day, but as things go on reality diverges
         | more and more from the plan and the more people insist on the
         | plan the worst things get because they haven't been able to
         | adapt to the real world.
         | 
         | My point is the tighter and tighter your plans are and the more
         | comprehensive they are and the more autonomy they take from
         | individuals on the ground doing the actual work, the more
         | likely it is to go poorly and the more catastrophic it will get
         | the longer you push on.
        
       | jt2190 wrote:
       | Mary Poppendieck (2009) Video
        
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