[HN Gopher] FTX's Venture Capital Backers Face 'Serious Question...
___________________________________________________________________
FTX's Venture Capital Backers Face 'Serious Questions,' CFTC
Official Says
Author : mirthlessend
Score : 83 points
Date : 2023-01-21 15:04 UTC (7 hours ago)
(HTM) web link (www.bloomberg.com)
(TXT) w3m dump (www.bloomberg.com)
| LatteLazy wrote:
| I don't see any immediate evidence there were conflicts of
| interest here (happy to be proven wrong). I do see an astounding
| lack of any of the actual work an investment manager should be
| doing. Such a huge degree of laziness that I think it should be
| criminal. People at these firms didn't just squander their
| client's cash (this wasn't money lost because not ever bet is a
| winner, it was basically given away). They actively assisted one
| of the worlds largest frauds. Arthur Anderson were basically
| destroyed because they enabled Enron. And Enron was a much
| subtler, more complex fraud. There are serious questions to be
| answered here IMHO.
| gumby wrote:
| This feels like a stretch by the CFTC.
|
| The investors' LPs should have a bone to pick with what happened
| to their money, but there's a good reason why you have to be a
| qualified investor to become an LP. But the funds themselves
| aren't CFTC regulated anyway.
|
| The real issue is the utter fraudulence of the whole
| crypto"currency"* sector, but the CFTC doesn't have authority
| over that (not clear anyone does, unfortunately) and that's not
| the subject of action here.
|
| * I refuse to overload the abbreviation "crypto" when it has a
| perfectly useful definition already.
| raincom wrote:
| What if LPs were agents of pension funds, endowments, etc? Such
| LPs have no skin in the game.
| cactusplant7374 wrote:
| Kevin O'Leary invested and was paid as a promoter. He has made
| more than he lost. What is to say that the funds aren't in on
| the con?
| jbirer wrote:
| [flagged]
| hef19898 wrote:
| You mean getting political conections like SBF by bein a big
| donor? Your argument seems a tad flawed...
| drowsspa wrote:
| Lol this is probably the quickest arrest of a financial
| fraudster ever
| jmyeet wrote:
| There's a lot of finger pointing here. Luckily there's a lot of
| blame to go around. Let's start with the two obvious questions:
|
| 1. How did VCs give _billions_ in funding to someone without
| insisting on an adult in the room? I mean having a respected CFO
| to report on the company 's finances. Additionally, there should
| be regular board meetings and an audit committee who reviews such
| documents; and
|
| 2. Why was the SEC so toothless here? For anything connected to
| the US financial system or operating within US jurisdiction, the
| SEC should, at the very minimum, be ensuring compliance with
| custodial assets.
| HWR_14 wrote:
| > the SEC should, at the very minimum, be ensuring compliance
| with custodial assets.
|
| FTX claimed that none of the things they had custody of were
| securities. Most crypto claims the same. Why would the SEC be
| able regulate them? Their case for not being securities seems
| reasonable.
| TacticalCoder wrote:
| > 2. Why was the SEC so toothless here?
|
| The head of the SEC, Gary Gensler, 's former boss happens to be
| the father of the CEO of Alameda-the-scam.
|
| SBF and Caroline Ellison: these fraudsters were _very_ well-
| connected.
|
| As a sidenote early on in the scandal a US _senator_ wrote that
| there were suspicion that SBF was working hand in hand with
| corrupted officials to engage in regulatory capture of the
| cryptocurrencies exchange market.
|
| And when did the shit hit the fan for SBF? Once he got very
| cocky and tweeted how he was going again to DC and how CZ (from
| Binance) was not allowed to go there.
|
| These were SBF's famous last words. CZ answered that SBF wasn't
| a team player. Then the leak on Coindesk happened and all the
| articles exposing the SBF/FTX/Alameda scam came out.
|
| Ain't it "strange" that it all unfolded after a tweet were SBF
| was boasting about how he was going to DC while CZ wasn't
| welcome there?
| pclmulqdq wrote:
| A paper billionaire fucked with a cash billionaire and found
| out what happens when you try to do that.
| diegocg wrote:
| > How did VCs give billions in funding to someone without
| insisting on an adult in the room?
|
| Don't know how the whole VC thing works but I suspect that the
| people who took the decision weren't risking their own money,
| and they probably won't face many consequences.
| [deleted]
| kasey_junk wrote:
| For 2, it's (still) not clear who the chief regulator for
| crypto should be. The SEC has tried at times to assert
| authority there with pushback all around.
|
| The current legislative push is to make the CFTC the regulator.
| The CFTC both by mission and culture is more hands off. It's
| also much smaller in size than the SEC so focuses on cases
| where the law is more obviously being broken (eg boiler rooms
| selling leveraged gold contracts as physical gold to senior
| homes).
|
| Crypto is a cutting edge area where the laws and regulators
| have not kept up and where until recently most of the
| participants liked it that way.
| __derek__ wrote:
| Re: #2, as Matt Levine likes to say, everything is securities
| fraud. All the stuff that FTX did before was probably illegal,
| but it was in a grey area without a particular regulator. Once
| it became clear that FTX falsely claimed to investors that it
| had effective risk controls, didn't misuse/steal customer
| funds, and wasn't operating a giant Ponzi scheme, it moved
| squarely into the SEC's remit.
| rcme wrote:
| For 1, I think the obvious answer was that the Fed, thanks to
| ZIRP, created an environment where investors were clamoring for
| investment opportunities. This gave high-growth companes, like
| FTX was on paper, a lot of leverage with the terms of
| investment.
| jmyeet wrote:
| VCs have a fiduciary responsibility to their investors
| (technically, Limited Partners or LPs). Those investors could
| have a valid cause of action that the VCs were reckless and
| negligent in how they handled the FTX investment with no
| oversight.
| carlosdp wrote:
| Yea this is almost certainly the correct answer. I think any
| founders that raised a round in the last 2 years can easily
| understand how this happened.
|
| Especially to Sequoia, which felt like they were behind in
| crypto investments (while a16z was getting into all the "big
| winners"). Lots of pressure to deploy capital, and like the
| other commentor pointed out, there _was_ a massive a amount
| of real revenue being made by FTX.
|
| That likely also contributed to the lack of scrutiny. Who in
| their right mind would commit such massive and blatant fraud,
| when if they simply didn't touch client funds in any
| weird/illegal way, they would _still_ be an insanely rich
| billionaire!
| __derek__ wrote:
| > Especially to Sequoia, which felt like they were behind
| in crypto investments (while a16z was getting into all the
| "big winners").
|
| Sequoia had other peers that resisted this temptation,
| though, so the "blame ZIRP" argument isn't sufficient.
| tyre wrote:
| > like FTX was on paper
|
| FTX was high-growth in practice too. FTX was a phenomenal
| business. It wasn't like most crypto projects that are scams;
| their business and profits were genuinely massive.
|
| What they did was take consumer funds and loan them out
| without real collateral. That's bad and dumb and illegal, but
| doesn't change the fact that the growth and economics of FTX
| were real.
| pclmulqdq wrote:
| Crypto exchanges, like other platforms, grow because there
| is capital that wants to trade there. This means that they
| have the same bootstrapping problem as a competitor to Uber
| or Facebook.
|
| FTX's solution to that problem was Alameda Research, which
| traded huge volumes on their exchange. That, in turn, made
| the exchange look big enough to be a serious player, which
| drove customers and more growth.
|
| The "phenomenal" part of FTX's business was the fraud.
| zaphar wrote:
| Ahhhh yes, The this was a great business if only they
| hadn't thrown all the money out the window argument. If a
| business is throwing money out the window then it doesn't
| matter how good the _rest_ of the business is. The company
| is a bad business.
|
| FTX was high growth but apparently 0 profit which does not
| make a business good. Claims that, if only they hadn't been
| crooks and/or incompetent, this would have been great
| doesn't change the fact that they were, in fact, either
| highly incompetent or crooks.
| throwaway98797 wrote:
| isn't it enough that the VCs lost money and credibility
|
| do we need the heavy arm of the law in everything?
| spaceman_2020 wrote:
| Here in India, Sequoia has backed multiple startups that had
| glaring lapses in corporate governance (Zilingo and most
| recently, GoMechanic)
|
| This is another symptom of zero interest rate policies. It
| encourages bad behavior up and down the pecking order.
|
| There are already strong calls to reduce interest rates. Imo,
| most people crying out for lower interest rates are likely
| swimming naked and just want the tide to come back in.
| woodruffw wrote:
| This seems like misdirected blame: maybe low interest rates
| incentivize this behavior, but surely we expect VC firms to be
| _capable_ of operating within host legal frameworks, right?
|
| I think it's maybe more judicious to look at the culture these
| VC firms have fostered instead: one where law and civic
| interest are secondary at best responsibilities. Racing to an
| obscene valuation that gets saddled on public investors is the
| #1 priority.
| raincom wrote:
| A lot of human activity is mimetic--from learning
| slang/jargon, accents, all the way to hiring and laying off
| people. If one top tier VC invests in a company X, other top
| tiers pile on X, thereby increasing the valuation multiples.
| jmeister wrote:
| Parent is comment is referring to poor corporate governance,
| not necessarily illegal.
| spamizbad wrote:
| Yeah it's strange these firms, staffed with expensively
| educated professionals from top institutions, with decades of
| industry experience, somehow lose all autonomy if interest
| rates get too low for too long.
|
| It seems like every egregious mistake firms make somehow gets
| traced back to interest rates. A very convenient way to
| absolve people of responsibility.
| vba616 wrote:
| >it's strange
|
| I don't understand what's strange about it. Short term
| thinking spreads even among people who know better because
| of competition. If you're not taking the risks other people
| are, then how do you do business?
|
| A fairly well known quote from a bank CEO is "As long as
| the music is playing, you've got to get up and dance".
|
| The corollary, from that perspective, seems to be that
| government regulation is required to save industry because
| individuals can't prevent a crisis.
| FormerBandmate wrote:
| Tiger Global thrashed every other VC because they did no
| due diligence, so everyone else stopped doing it.
| Competition frequently leads to market failures
| cloutchaser wrote:
| You are partially right, of course the individuals bear
| responsibility. But you also have to acknowledge that at a
| macro level every economic crises since 1999 has been caused
| by central banks blowing bubbles. Including the recent VC
| bubble.
| woodruffw wrote:
| In general, I'm skeptical of any sort of "look what you
| made me do" reasoning. Central banks can incentivize more
| or less risky market behavior, but they don't strip
| investors' autonomy. It takes a conscious effort to dump
| your money into patently fraudulent ventures.
| vba616 wrote:
| >In general, I'm skeptical of any sort of "look what you
| made me do" reasoning
|
| Sure, I would be too. But you're not conversing with the
| people who did it, are you?
| woodruffw wrote:
| Not sure what you mean; the GP's comment is an example of
| this reasoning format.
| xwolfi wrote:
| VC firms are not really capable of anything purposeful:
| they're here to find a discount, which helps the company
| return a premium: they're a symbiotic parasite and whatever
| the culture they foster, when discount is hard to find or
| when premium look gigantic, well they jump on anything
| forgetting that finding a discount in a difficult period or a
| gigantic premium is a red flag.
|
| But do you expect parasites to start thinking ? They cant.
|
| Sequoia put in their own website that the FTX CEO was playing
| a video game while pitching hundreds of millions of
| investment. The same firm would kick me out of the door if I
| went without a tie to interview for a secretary job.
|
| Difference is that I dont promise a huge premium at a huge
| discount. And it's a red flag for any sentient when someone
| is distracted in a high stake conversation, but not to the
| Sequoia parasite only eating premiums.
| nprateem wrote:
| A VC firm charging 20% carry has a massive incentive _not_ to
| put their civic interests before profit.
|
| Plus, if they don't chase returns, their competitors will,
| then they'll struggle to raise subsequent funds.
|
| Market forces + low interest rates are a recipe for
| recklessness.
| vba616 wrote:
| > Imo, most people crying out for lower interest rates are
| likely swimming naked and just want the tide to come back in.
|
| Is it possible that zero interest rates are bad _and_
| excessively high rates are bad at the same time?
|
| The long term inflation goal in the US, I believe, is 2%. And
| long term interest rates here that are determined by the market
| are higher, but not as high as policymakers have set short term
| rates to.
|
| Would it not make sense to set rates somewhere in that window
| (roughly 2-4%) and stop messing with them? For other countries,
| scale rates accordingly.
|
| Metaphorically, I feel like the US federal reserve was driving
| a car with the gas pedal to the floor and it didn't respond for
| a while, so they kept going until they suddenly found
| themselves going 100 mph, and now they are determined to keep
| on the brakes as hard as they can until they are 100%
| motionless. This is not a good way to drive in traffic, even if
| you do survive it.
|
| There is an alleged tendency of almost everybody to justify
| their job by looking busy even if what they are doing is worse
| than doing nothing. And that's what I think of when I think of
| central banks in my adult lifetime. Along with being a
| passenger in a car where the driver is on and off the gas and
| brakes constantly to the point of nausea.
|
| Inverted yield curves worry people even if they can't agree on
| how linked they are to recessions. So...why not just _not_
| invert them? I believe that markets have to be regulated, but
| they also should be listened to.
| __derek__ wrote:
| > Would it not make sense to set rates somewhere in that
| window (roughly 2-4%) and stop messing with them? For other
| countries, scale rates accordingly.
|
| That alone wouldn't work because inflation is affected by
| factors beyond interest rates, but this is basically a part
| of Modern Monetary Theory: set short-term interest rates at a
| fixed price, then use other levers to push inflation back to
| target.
|
| IMO, a more compelling alternative to the current system is
| Nominal GDP Targeting.[1][2]
|
| [1]: https://www.mercatus.org/research/research-papers/case-
| nomin...
|
| [2]: https://www.mercatus.org/research/working-
| papers/nominal-gdp...
| raincom wrote:
| High interest rates are product of high inflation. That's why
| 2% inflation target means 2 percent interest rate target.
| Nominal interest rate = inflation rate + real interest rate.
| vba616 wrote:
| Are you agreeing with something I wrote, or disagreeing, or
| what?
|
| I wonder if HN has banned using ChatGPT to comment or is
| considering it.
| Animats wrote:
| This action will have a useful side effect. The CFTC has been
| seen by the crypto community as a toothless tiger. Legislation
| was proposed (by FTX!) to get the SEC out of crypto enforcement
| and turn it over to the CFTC. With the CFTC looking at funding
| sources of scams, that now looks far less attractive.
| gitfan86 wrote:
| I love how SBF is continuing the grift. He is on Twitter posting
| spreadsheets claiming that FTX is still solvent even today.
| TacticalCoder wrote:
| FTX's current CEO, in charge of the bankruptcy, explained why
| SBF was, once more, full of it. The accounting by which FTX.us
| would be solvent relies on the $250m that LedgerX owns (FTX.us
| bought LedgerX). The problem is that... These $250m came from
| Alameda and is money stolen from customers and investors as
| part of the multiple frauds SBF committed.
| dtjb wrote:
| *FTX US
| nickpinkston wrote:
| If the CFTC does this, I hope they limit it to investments /
| valuations of $1B or more, as seed-stage companies shouldn't have
| to pay for an audit, etc.
|
| This is what happened with Sarbanes Oxley where they
| overregulated the IPO process and caused the companies to stay
| private (and uninspected) for longer as well as removing the
| post-IPO growth upside from retail investors [1].
|
| This is not to mention the recent SPAC craze being a way to get
| around this as well, which ended up with the median SPAC losing
| 70% of its value, while the S&P lost roughly 1/4 of that over the
| same period. [2]
|
| There's a sweet spot for this kind of regulation, and overly "get
| tough" never works more than sensible restrictions where the risk
| is highest.
|
| [1]
| https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sarbanes%E2%80%93Oxley_Act#Cri...
|
| [2] https://www.fa-mag.com/news/spac-euphoria-turns-into-
| painful...
| georgeecollins wrote:
| I don't think they have a case if they are arguing they didn't
| audit. VCs don't audit all the time. You will note they said
| "conflict of interest."
|
| A conflict of interest would be if they invested $x and then
| got early access to y tokens. The announcement of their
| investment suddenly makes y tokens more valuable. You could
| even imagine the tokens could be sold for more than the
| investment. In that case, what incentive does the VC have to
| audit? Also, that should be illegal if it isn't.
|
| Don't worry about the cost of audits. I do think if you took
| tokens from a VC investment and sold them you may have done
| something illegal.
| threeseed wrote:
| > as seed-stage companies shouldn't have to pay for an audit
|
| According to the new CEO, FTX had no board and lacked basic due
| diligence.
|
| That doesn't seem too onerous for seed-stage companies once
| they have taken external funding to have in place.
| beambot wrote:
| Most seed funds (sub-$2M checks) have to make a large number
| of investments (like 15 per partner every 2-3 years) to make
| the fund economics work. Sitting on as many boards would be
| impossible / ineffective.
|
| The situation is different when you hit SeriesA, where
| partners generally do up to 3x investments per year. This
| results in a more manageable board load.
| hef19898 wrote:
| SOX is, IMHO, one of the most reasonable regulations people
| came up with in the last decades. There seems to be quite some
| push back against some of the SOX rules, especially when it
| comes to internal controls, and especially coming from the
| start-up community.
| georgeecollins wrote:
| It's really weird the way people argue how disastrous
| regulations are when their are clear examples of them being
| fine.
|
| - California bans non-competes and it is essentially the
| fastest growing economy in the western world. But if you read
| WSJ banning non-competes is a disaster.
|
| - SOX is supposedly a disaster, but when SPACSs bypass that
| process they are almost universally terrible. Also, the stock
| market and the VC business have both done great under SOX.
|
| I think we don't realize how good the existing US regulatory
| framework is. If we try to improve it we should have a strong
| status quo bias.
| arbuge wrote:
| > - California bans non-competes and it is essentially the
| fastest growing economy in the western world.
|
| Source? From cursory Googling, it doesn't even seem to
| crack the top 10 US states, let alone Western world
| economies...
|
| https://www.usnews.com/news/best-
| states/rankings/economy/gro...
| georgeecollins wrote:
| You make a really good point, I should have cited a
| source. Let's compare California with the top state on
| that list.
|
| https://www.statista.com/statistics/187834/gdp-of-the-us-
| fed...
|
| https://www.statista.com/statistics/187861/gdp-of-the-us-
| fed...
|
| What's kind of a joke about that is that between
| 2020-2021 California added an Idaho.
|
| Also, to undermine my point, Texas seems to have grown at
| almost exactly the same rate (80% increase in 20 years):
| https://www.statista.com/statistics/188132/gdp-of-the-us-
| fed...
|
| Compare this to an excellent first world economy,
| Germany. I think all Europe and Japan is worse. South
| Korea is probably much better.
|
| https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?end=2
| 021...
|
| So I think you could say California only grew at the pace
| of the fastest states in the US in the last twenty years
| (all with non-competes, which was my point) but the
| overall amount of growth was by far the most. The point
| is having no non-competes didn't seem to destroy it.
|
| And here's the propaganda version -- I think being
| skeptical of this stuff is a good idea.
| https://www.gov.ca.gov/2022/10/24/icymi-california-
| poised-to...
|
| I was being too flip and you were right to point this
| out.
| Scoundreller wrote:
| Maybe not in percent but in added billions $ of gdp or
| gdp per capita. A large shell getting larger instead of a
| tiny one doubling.
|
| Just a shot in the dark though.
| teh64 wrote:
| On your own link it's 6th in terms of GDP growth. The
| other 2 are growth of young population and net migration
| where California is much more behind.
| thesteamboat wrote:
| Your link doesn't exactly mean what you think --- they're
| giving a combination of economic growth and population
| growth. When looking at just the GDP growth, your link
| suggests that they are the 6th fastest growing US state
| economy. As a sibling commentator noted, this is growth
| is on top already being the largest state economy. (Texas
| had the 2nd largest GDP percentage increase from 2020 to
| 2021. Texas grew 2% faster than California, for an
| economy only 2/3 the size. Raw data [which the usnews
| article cited] here https://www.bea.gov/itable/regional-
| gdp-and-personal-income )
|
| Not too long ago there was news that CA is about to pass
| Germany to become the 4th largest economy in the world.
| (CA press release here:
| https://www.gov.ca.gov/2022/10/24/icymi-california-
| poised-to... original article by Bloomberg)
| lumost wrote:
| Anecdotally, companies in bad shape use SOX as an excuse for
| a lot of their bad behavior.
|
| I worked at an ad tech which decided engineers should not
| have access to revenue data. Nor should they have access to
| click data or other relevant data on how customers were
| doing.
|
| Needless to say, if you are a transactional business who
| makes money when people perform an action - this is critical
| information to know. The company eventually lost focused and
| failed to IPO.
|
| While all of this was done in the name of SOX. I don't
| believe SOX required any of it.
| nickpinkston wrote:
| I think that it's mostly reasonable too, but there's a
| balance in regulation pushing the bad behavior to less
| regulated places and stifling what you're trying to
| encourage.
|
| One example of this in the Bay Area was the Ghost Ship Fire
| [1] where they were forced to live off the grid because of
| over regulation, and then dying in a fire that some of that
| regulation was trying to prevent.
|
| It's a classic problem. Laws have enforcement costs and
| knock-on effects.
|
| https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ghost_Ship_warehouse_fire
| stanleydrew wrote:
| I agree we need to think hard about tradeoffs of regulation
| and adjust when the pendulum swings too far in one
| direction. But I think you can come up with a better
| example of downsides of overregulation than the Ghost Ship
| Fire.
|
| To say that people were "forced" to live there due to
| overregulation is quite a stretch I think. I've known a few
| creative people in the bay area who lived in similar
| situations and they all were making an active choice to
| live in communal housing illegally converted from
| industrial use. They found it creatively energizing.
| nickpinkston wrote:
| Yea, a lot of my friends live in the same housing and for
| the same reasons, but I find many of them move out once
| they make enough money for typical housing.
|
| A better Bay Area example if housing regulations stopping
| all growth and leading to all sorts of problems, but
| that's well covered.
| [deleted]
| xiphias2 wrote:
| Regulators (specifically Gary Gansler at SEC) job is to protect
| consumers generally, pointing at VCs just shows that they are not
| doing their job.
|
| FTX is an offshore company, but Genesis, Blockfi, FTX US, Gemini,
| Coinbase are not, and regulators let them offer unregistered
| securities for a long time.
| bdcravens wrote:
| FTX stole investors' funds. That's a far greater concern than
| unregistered securities.
| namdnay wrote:
| The former usually follows the latter
| throwawaycities wrote:
| Lucky for those investors the FTC's investigation shows the
| funds/VCs handling their investments were negligent and
| breached their fiduciary duty by not conducting any due
| diligence. Time for those investors to sue the VCs/funds.
| cactusplant7374 wrote:
| Looking forward to the depositions.
| [deleted]
| nickpinkston wrote:
| Yea, this is more of a story of SBF and other crypto elites
| making a lot of donations to wealthy politicians, media
| companies, etc. who were hesitant to investigate them.
|
| Bloomberg apparently was presented evidence of the FTX fraud
| many months before its downfall which it didn't cover because
| it was bad for business. [1]
|
| This was also what happened in the Madoff case where outside
| investigators discovered the fraud and sent their pile of
| evidence to the Feds, who sat on it for years as the fraud
| expanded. [2]
|
| I bet we'll eventually see messages from SBF & Co. talking
| about Madoff specifically as a model for the scheme.
|
| [1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qXzvVRw_Qgw
|
| [2]
| https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harry_Markopolos#Madoff_invest...
| ejstronge wrote:
| It is hard to believe the claim in the video that '5 crypto
| ladies' at Bloomberg passed on this enormous story absent
| evidence from the speaker.
|
| Regarding Madoff, there were indeed investigations after some
| of the complaints. Notably, these situations differ in that
| Madoff was a respected figure within the regulatory apparatus
| (but it's hard to imagine that SBF holds sway over the
| editorial process at Bloomberg). It is true that the
| investigations into Madoff were ineffectual, at least
| according to reports I have seen
| nickpinkston wrote:
| Yea, that's why I linked to the video (re: source is a
| single witness), but also SBF was definitely a powerful guy
| almost to the degree Madoff was, and we already see
| publications like the NY Times covering for SBF [1], so I
| don't see that as a big jump.
|
| I have a personal journalist friend whose editors didn't
| let them cover Theranos before the WSJ broke the news for
| similar reasons, so it's not out of the question.
|
| Not to mention the regulatory apparatus and Congressional
| inaction. [2]
|
| [1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UqDJ6Ph8r9o
|
| [2] https://fortune.com/2022/11/10/ftx-crypto-collapse-
| binance-c...
| LatteLazy wrote:
| I agree Gansler are not doing their job. In this case, I think
| the CFTC (who seem to do more and make fewer speeches than
| Gansler) are doing good work though: Investors helped SBF
| commit his fraud, they funded it, they advertised it and they
| endorsed it. They SHOULD face some repercussions. The level of
| negligence they showed is frankly breath-taking.
| dragonwriter wrote:
| > FTX is an offshore company,
|
| FTX.US is not
| throw03172019 wrote:
| OP listed FTX US in the category of "in the US".
| ekpyrotic wrote:
| Non-paywall link: https://archive.ph/7yuc1
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